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Full text of "Pearl Harbor attack : hearings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a concurrent resolution authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto .."

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PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


HEARINGS 

BEFORE  TEB 

JOINT  COMMITTEE  ON  THE  INVESTIGATION 
OF  THE  PEABL  HAEBOE  ATTACK 

CONGKESS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 
SEVENTY-NINTH  CONGRESS 

FIRST  SESSION 
PURSUANT  TO 

S.  Con.  Res.  27 

(79th  Congress) 

A  CONCURRENT  RESOLUTION  AUTHORIZING  AN 

INVESTIGATION  OF  THE  ATTACK  ON  PEARL 

HARBOR   ON   DECEMBER   7,    1941,   AND 

EVENTS  AND  CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING  THERETO 


PART  14 
JOINT  COMMITTEE  EXHIBITS  NOS.  9  THROUGH  43 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the 
Joint  Committee  on  the  Investigation  of  the  Pearl  Harbor  Attack 


V 


PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


HEARINGS 

BEFORE  THE 

-s^-aOINT  COMMITTEE  OJ^  THE  INVESTIGATION 
OF  THE  PEAKL  HARBOR  ATTACK 
CONGRESS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

SEVENTY-NINTH  CONGRESS 

FIRST  SESSION 
PURSUANT  TO 

S.  Con.  Res.  27 

(79th  Congress) 

A    CONCURRENT    RESOLUTION    AUTHORIZING    AN 

INVESTIGATION  OF  THE  ATTACK  ON  PEARL 

HARBOR     ON     DECEMBER     7,     1941,    AND 

EVENTS  AND  CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING  THERETO 


PART  14 
JOINT  COMMITTEE  EXHIBITS  NOS.  9  THROUGH  43 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the 
Joint  Committee  on  the  Investigation  of  the  Pearl  Harbor  Attack 


UNITED  STATES 
GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
79716  WASHINGTON  :  1948 


C^v) 


JOINT  COMMITTEE  ON  THE  INVESTIGATION  OF  THE  PEABL 
HARBOR  ATTACK 

ALBEN  W.  BARELEY,  Senator  from  Kentucky,  Chairman 
JERE  COOPER,  Representative  from  Tennessee,  Vice  Chairman 
WALTER  F.  GEORGE,  Senator  from  Georgia    JOHN   W.    MURPHY,    Representative   from 
SCOTT  W.  LUCAS.  Senator  from  Illinois  Pennsylvania 

OWEN  BREWSTER,  Senator  from  Maine  BERTRAND   W.    GEARHART,    Representa- 

HOMER  FERGUSON,   Senator  from  Mlchl-         tive  from  California 

gan  FRANK    B.    KEEFE,    Representative    from 

J.    BAYARD   CLARK,    Representative  from         Wisconsin 
North  Carolina 


COUNSEL 


(Through  January  14,  1046) 

William  D.  Mitchell,  General  Counsel  /  y  ^ie 

Gebhasd  a.  Gesell,  ChieJ  Assistant  Counsel 

JDLE  M.  Hannafoed,  Assistant  Counsel  x^Jb      /^ 

John  E.  Ma'sten,  Assistant  Counsel  ^"'^  "       ^ 

(After  January  14,  1946)  C-OiJty^    t^L^ 

Seth  W.  Richardson,  General  Counsel  ^     ' 

Samuel  H.  Kaufman,  Associate  General  Counsel 
John  E.  Masten,  Assistant  Counsel 
Edward  P.  Morgan,  Assistant  Counsel 
Logan  J.  Lane,  Assistant  Counsel 


HEARINGS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE 


Part 

Pages 

Transcript 

Xo. 

pages 

1 

1-  399 

1-  1058 

2 

401-  982 

1059-  2586 

3 

983-1583 

2587-  4194 

4 

1585-2063 

4195-  5460 

5 

2065-2492 

5461-  6646 

6 

2493-2920 

6647-  7888 

7 

2921-3378 

7889-  9107 

8 

3379-3927 

9108-10517 

9 

3929-4599 

10518-12277 

10 

4601-5151 

12278-13708 

11 

5153-5560 

13709-14765 

Hearings 


Nov.  15,  16,  17,  19 
:N'ov.  23,  24,  26  to 
Dec.  5,  6,  7,  8,  10, 
Dec.  14,  15,  17,  18 
Dec.  31,  1945,  and 
Jan.  15,  16,  17,  18, 
Jan.  22,  23,  24,  25, 
Jan.  30,  31,  Feb.  1 
Feb.  7,  8,  9,  11,  12 
Feb.  15,  16,  18,  19, 
Apr.  9  and  11,  and 


,  20,  and  21,  1945. 

30,  Dec.  3  and  4,  1945. 
11,  12,  and  13,  1945. 

19,  20,  and  21,  1945. 
Jan.  2,  3,  4,  and  5,  1946. 

19,  and  21,  1946. 

26,  28,  and  29,  1946. 

2,  4,  5,  and  6,  1946. 

13,  and  14,  1946. 

and  20,  1946. 

Mav  23  and  31,  1946. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE 

Part 

No.  Exhibits  Nos. 

12  1  through  6. 

13  7  and  8. 

14  9  through  43. 

15  44  through  87. 

16  88  through  1 10. 

17  111  through  128. 

18  '  129  through  156. 
19.  157  through  172. 

20  173  through  179. 

21  180  through  183,  and  Exhibits-Illustrations. 

22  through  25  Roberts  Commission  Proceedings. 

26  Hart  Inquiry  Proceedings. 

27  through  31  Army  Pearl  Harbor  Board  Proceedings. 
32  through  33  Navy  Court  of  Inquiry  Proceedings. 

34  Clarke  Investigation  Proceedings. 

35  Clausen  Investigation  Proceedings. 

36  through  38  Hewitt  Inquiry  Proceedings. 

39  Reports  of  Roberts  Commission,  Army  Pearl  Harbor  Board, 
Navy  Court  of  Inquiry  and  Hewitt  Inquiry,  with  endorse- 
ments. 


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_bC,—        o 

to  "S        t- 

o    "^  > 

03  g. 5'^ 

K*  a_g 

«  b  .  o 

4*  S;  a: 

H-(  ^    3    I, 

4^  2^-2  2 
"  a;  «  0^ 

G  ^  ^ii 

■>  obI^ 
*^  3  o3  «: 

o 

Oi.S  3   « 
+i    O    w  ^ 

§-°| 


3   C^ 

i  o  « 


^2     c  5 


aa 


S  •*2  03^ 
3  03-3  O 

s  o.a^ 


Ci.flJ-5^ 
^<% 


a> 

t^ 

TP 

>« 

<S> 

CC 

l^ 

00 

M 

0 

"* 

00 

QO 

0 

(N 

0 

^H 

(N 

■* 

Tf 

o> 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

t-H 

^-l 

1-H 

^H 

M 

M 

M 

cq 

(N 

M 

(N 

(N 

IN 

(N 

(N 

M 

»c 

10 

iC 

»o 

10 

10 

iC 

iC 

IC 

•C 

iC 

Tt 

Tf 

■* 

■^ 

■* 

■* 

•* 

■* 

■«»< 

^ 

•* 

«C 

1-1    1 

^  1 

CC    1 

"*   i 

lO    1 

10     1 

IC    1 

»o   1 

"3    1 

«5    1 

0     1 

o>  ■* 

Os^-i 

Oj  '-< 

OSr-l 

OSrH 

05  r-l 

05.-I 

05^ 

05  —1 

05^ 

05^ 

0>-H 

■*  1 

o« 

oco 

OCC 

000 

OM 

OCO 

OM 

ow 

OCO 

S'? 

S*? 

?ST 

e^  1 

(N    1 

0  1 

(N    1 

M  1 

M  1 

M    1 

(N    1 

IM     1 

M     1 

CM  1 

CM 

(N 

M 

M 

M 

(N 

(N 

M 

1—1 

(N 

IN 

s 


B 


XVI 


INDEX  OF   EXHIBITS 


o  o 

"2  c 

r"     =« 
r-     O 

C     . 
c;  ~  — 

~  =«  C 
3  ««     . 

s  >;^ 

1- =  ^ 

^■^  is 

>-'    t.    03 

~    S    « 

■^  02i 

"*"  O  . 

>-,  ?'*" 
(-1  '^  -^ 

S  aj  rt 

«  ot: 
^t  5 

—  ^%J    w 

O  o 
•  -  O  C 
«^  o 

^  -*-  03 
~  —  <_ 
o;   03    o 


X  o  £ 


xi  "-^  "o  "= 
a;  c  o  o 

C  ^  c  a; 
oj     •  tr5  ^- 

o  o:r:  5 


C  t.  CI. 
O  03  ai 
r,  *^ r> 

=  a;  03 

^  >^ 

fc  -^  — 

O    03    1-^ 


2    0)   - 


15"^ 


a  2 


.>  =  "3 

2  o  es  — 
s;  c  S  01 

JK  c  > 

-^    ,  ^  tf 

03  t-  _  x: 

^S  c  g 
S^,  <^'^  ^ 


Tf<  ^  t;  c 

<■  ^   03    - 


^  03 
03^,»3    o 

£-oi 

■M  ^  £  * 

is£.£ 

a)  —  :   x: 


IS 


CC  -5 

o  — 


/^ 


a;       '^  *^ 


_J    <t 


-y:      - 


_x  o      a;' 


rr.  J^        O 


D-tP 


■3  E 
'^'  2 

2  ^ 


a;'? 


^^ 


*3  a. 

aj  'u 
>  -k- 

^03 

o  a. 


•-•7    i- 


y  .St; 

03  "^    <^ 


3 


2  => 


P  «3 


53  r 


-  u 

5 


■7^  o 


03 


w  a^ 


i" 

i= 

-ij 

0 

«T3 

0- 

oc 

x: 

aj 

OJ 

r1 

•0 

*J 

03 

03 

s 

TJ 

s 

S 

0 

u 

(N 

Tt< 

05 

b 

'■^ 

0 

te 

04 

^   s 


■3  8 

«a2 


^  aj  ~ 
<  03"^ 

£     g 

oco  »- 

2:  CO  (» 
o>  aj  es 

2'SS 


XJ  So 

S  Sx; 

f-<  (-^  c 

«  s  s 


is: 


2^ 


r-T  2 

2^ 

i= 

-  o 

.13 
X!  C 
«  o3 

^  P 

•0.2 
a)  +5 

o3   N 


>S 


_       t; 


i-       ■— ' 


— •  u 

_03    C 
•^  «*- 

a;  a) 


o  « 

1^ 


•a  « 

II 

aj  J= 


o  5 

aj  ^ 


i         ^  2'i"'* 


*o.2 
aj  02 
Eg 

PL, 


2  -*^  fl 
S  a;  C 

S  o  S^ 
>.^  « 
o    -Q 

TIM'S 

to 

">  So 
e 


to 

CO 

C^ 

^ 

■<*< 

t^ 

X 

(N 

es 

■tl 

00 

o> 

fCI 

■* 

■<t 

iC 

ir^ 

0 

ec 

CO 

CO 

CO 

Tf 

■^ 

Tf 

Tt" 

Tf 

iC 

L'; 

10 

iO 

kO-'^ 

(N 

(N 

C^ 

<N 

(N 

(N 

C^ 

w 

M 

(N 

w 

1= 

CO 

5C 

cc 

3*^  r-l 

CO 

CO 

CO 

^*    1 

CD 

C  «  3 

l>  1 

<©    ! 

t^  1 

t*     1 

^i 

S2 

S2 

§2 

■*,ii 

rriO 

cot 

TflC 

Tf  10 

^  eo 

■ceo 

«N    1 

<N    1 

<N     i 

(M    1 

^      1 

(n7 

(n7 

M    1 

N  1 

eo7 

g-o 

"■^ 

~^ 

"-' 

'"' 

^H 

wg 

' 

d 

1 

' 

1 

1 

1 

; 

2 

' 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

s 

< 

« 

! 

< 

«' 

d 

1 

« 

05 

0 

^ 

(N 

ec 

1 
CO 

1 

P5 

i 

0 

0 

0 

^ 

INDEX  OF  EXHIBITS 


XVII 


.2fe 


ss 


CO    •  5-" 


.3  o 


-fi  '-'      ^ 


fc 


^  o 


«° 


_  o 


-^        We. 

I        i-i  c 


«  o 

c  « 

O  Oi 
£«     . 

O     «     W 


02  O 


05.HS 


T3fe 


3^ 


83 

<*~  S3 


o 


iC 


c  ? 

03  t. 

>  OJ 

^  c 

-.03 

03  « 

^-  5 


o 

c 

O 
Pi 


o 
X 

« 

bC 

o 
hJ 

c 

Pi 


^   CO    M) 

>  to  *  ■*^ 


bC  ^    is 


^   C    ^  S 


«  .5 


o<  ■  *» 
Sole 

SO 

C 


W  c  .£  .2 


"o  - "«  S 


0) 


>l  03    , 

^       ^03 

a 

OS  -f^         t 
-I   03-0   CI. 


05       S 
^   O 


.P^'3 


« . 


o3  O 


•Pi 


t-l? 


_. .  _.  o 


03  T3 

■^  OJ 

.£  -S 

£  2, 


s 

T3   0) 

*>  if 


.Qx3 
3  a; 

^'■§ 

« -= 

c  ^ 

§  * 

si 

o  Cu 


P3 

d 

■^  a; 
■  C 

■S   A 

.  <a 


T3  « 
o  2 


CO  o      ^  ' 


o  > 

I" 

Is/I    C 

..-£ 


c 

O   o3 

c 


M  •  — 

-S.ti  ^" 
o3  !C  O 
T3   0.0 

fl    02    * 

"O     ^  ■* 

eij  i:  o3^  2 
2  S  1^  '^ 
O  *Ph^-K 

1  =  1^-  § 


g.2 


03    £ 


£g 


OQ 


3  S 


3   C 

^'£ 


W  ?^    T  " 


-t  -^     « 


c  « 

S   o 

ox 

03 

^^ 

03    -• 
03    C        «    03 


,20 


00 

^ 

CM 

t^ 

O 

r- 

00 

■* 

«2 

^ 

r^ 

lO 

o 

o 

t^ 

t>. 

o 

o 

CM 

CM 

CO 

»o 

« 

« 

« 

t^ 

t>. 

t^ 

t^ 

t^ 

I> 

t^ 

t^ 

CM 

CM 

CM 

CM 

CM 

CM 

c^ 

CM 

CM 

CM 

CM 

CM 

©7 


eg' 


CM 


05T     o>T     ojT 
MSab     "250     '2co 

CM    I        CM    I       CM    I 


si  si 


CM 


< 


P3 
I 

lO  CO 


I 


79716  O— 46— pt.  14 2 


XVIII 


INDEX  OF  EXHIBITS 


u  o3 


^    83 


a  s 


D. 


=    --       cc  a; 


c;  ^      «^  > 


'^'^ 


83    g; 


-  c     . 
.2  bC^t 


5-c 


PI 

'T  +J  05 

>    >■,  « 

fe    >    3 

M  «-  J 
O         03 

2v._ 


•*---»      *:  -2 


C 


*  o  flJ 

G.*-    83 

o  c 


>  s  s 

e3  o  O 

^-fi'    83 


Q  = 


'  --  a;  N 


oi?  ■" 


83  g 

83    g 
C  T3 

c 

83       . 
S(N 


4J      ~ 
^2  (N 


03  — 


c;  83 


O 


t-  <—     »►- 


3>-H 


O    >- 

r-c    -1-3 

5;! 


3  ., 


-o  * 

CO 

O   C 

a— 
2  >^ 

-^  ■/: 


o3  C 

■5^      -s 


.—  o 


«     •  -tJ  -y, 

d  o  5 1^ 
5^  S  S 

bC-C   °   °> 

5-^a^^ 

=  c  e  83 

~  3  b.  II 
-^  ^-^  «^ri  ^ 

to         05 

o3  C   4i  '- 

o;    -so 

83     -"C  5^ 

^  CO        83  _ 

S      'oil 

c  c  o  S  ^ 

^  cc 
0)  C 


C      1^ 


"502       c^ 


c 

o  _• 
^  5 


T3 
c;       . 

5       03  a; 
^,  —  CC  83 

^  §   OOQ 

W  s  *-  — 

_  C    »-  u-      • 

"C  o  o  o  fe 


«-  bC 


«  c 

la 

>>S3 
>  -^ 


.5  ^  ils-~ 


K.bcO 


^H    ?= 


-5^  o 
o  -ii^  -e  § 

S   83         S   x 

Pill 

■     >-  C 
c 


^   u 


> 


_  =  Tf  -^  2 
•2  -.^  >> 
«  cos  C  5* 

^  o3(N  D,  tX 
02 


K    . 

— 13 
03  fc' 
J;  83 

3  o 
l» 

^  c 

>>* 

cffi 
o^ 
s  »- 

■^^'^ 


to 

iso 

«o 

CO 

a 

^4 

(N 

r^ 

o 

iO 

,—1 

CO 

CO 

■* 

■* 

o 

CO 

tc 

1^ 

I> 

■* 

■<t 

-az 

r^ 

N. 

J>. 

« 

oc 

oc 

00 

« 

OS 

OS 

c^ 

N 

(N 

c^ 

IN 

<N 

M 

c^ 

M 

« 

w 

So 

^^ 

CO 

IC 

«c 

CC 

^ 

o 

«> 

CD 

CO 

CO 

as  8 

Si 

2l 
S7 

(n7 

ii 

(n7 

<n7 

oo7 

<n7 

Si 

00  ri 

(n7 

is 

%n 

(N 

■— ! 

I— 1 

.>4 

w§ 

d 

z 

S- 

] 

1 

ec 

ec 

>* 

IC 

«o 

i> 

00 

Oi 

d 

I-l 

<N 

C<l 

w 

1— c 

w 

CO 

CO 

INDEX  OF  EXHIBITS 


XIX 


83       ,2 


O       ^ 
>>       « 

c 

S        O 

5     H 
§     .2 


o 

O 

H 


^  i 


o  i. 
o-r 


-    QJ 
ll 


S3 


ca 


S     -2* 


c 

o 
1^ 


O 


lU 


«  — < 

C      , 


^1 

°-3 

OS  S3 


n-^M 


2  5 


C  00 

o    . 


T.   «   C    «   OJ   »         93 


S3 

Oh§S 
"c  5"*   *-' 

eS  -»^T3  to 
-3  c  c  * 

o  o  2  — 
«^  2  a 


IS 


O  93  g^U 

*f  o  S  J-  >. 

*-    ^    C!  ^    ^ 

88  5  ee  ^  '-S 

2S2a." 


=-'-rbt^  S3  o 

S-55  50^  «3  5_- 


Si  ^ 


5<   '=0 
33 

O  o  c 

>  o 

„  c  ^  _ 

S  c^-i  ^  c  i 

j:  o  S  ^  o  ~ 

fc-  aj  ^  ^  •::  «  „■ 


~  ^  o 
►2^ 


i:  ? 


<  2 


03  c 


S   bC 


I  '^  x:  +j  o 


11 

o 


11^  %o 

c.S'SP'2  c   -5 

--^X!   O   83  2  - 


©  «    t-  -^X  83   ® 


.CD   S 


*3  5j  qj  __  EC  ^ 
"'ts  J- 


03    C    " 


fc<  •-    B,  -»    e    03    w    i 

■^  ^  S^oo  H  c  c 
.s"^  o    .      S  5  c 


i:    —    03   S*  83 

—  §^Z    03^, '^•J- 
®«*7&  =03 

.-  ^  -C  .t  —    S    03    ^ 


'^-  ^  ^  ^  ^  •=  ^  o 
;§H  do  — >  aci, 


ec 

CO 

CC 

■* 

^^ 

l^ 

t* 

lO 

■* 

Tf 

lO 

(N 

t^ 

(X) 

00 

OJ 

C5 

35 

o 

i>-H 

r^ 

^-1 

^H 

^^ 

C<1 

(N 

<M 

M 

CO 

CO 

n 

eo 

CO 


si 


CO  J, 


I 


<NCS      MW 


< 

eo 


JS 


eo 


XX 


INDEX  OF   EXHIBITS 


a 

4 


99 

c 

c    . 

»— I  4J 
■*-    § 

CO  D 


S3  bC 
o!  O 


o 

'■3 

I 


O 

a 


3= 

a; 

u 

c 

gt^ 

01 

_2 
3 

a 

in 

5 

0) 

03  03 

o 

'- 

02  qT 

u 

;> 

^ 

a; 

■3  a 

CO 

5 

o 

^ 

r 

c     . 


a        ^ 


4):;^ 


rT"?^     5^ 


2      5  45 


<N<; 

o  .,A— ; 

"O 

•C  03  03 

SIj 

i:^ 

03  .S  t 

4JS 

'^^-^ 

o,  • 

«   03  i^ 

T.t^ 

t    M    03 

01     . 

f  mem 
charg 
and  re 

1^ 

co'c 

i;u 

OT3     - 

o     . 

election 
propose 
Genera 

H 

w 

^  > 

Si 


O  o3 


c         g.Z 
^       .2c 

CO  -*^    Ol 

4^  CO     U 

S       n  S 

=    C.5 

S.2 

1^ 

EL,     . 

-"I 

.2g 

^a 

aj  o 
SO 

-ti  00 

c  c 
o 


c    ii 


>  -fj 
CQ  bC 

.  c 

03 

u 


'     ^         OS 
•  a 


2 

'C 

a; 

e3 


o" 

o 

p 


oi  a)  c 
•S  ^-^ 

s  oT'C 

CO  S  CQ 

ago 
s  M  a 

03  o 

"SCO) 

c      c 


2  > 


-t-3 

u  c3 


si:- 

*^  o® 

""So 

a;       Q 


«    CO    o 

"0   03° 


O 

2^ 
IB 

2  *^ 


bC  0) 
C    to 


05  h^ 


-a 

03 


6  X 


S5-S=^- 


0> 


«4-§      -^ 


"a;  S  od 


a; 


O 


aj '"'  ;s  ^ 

C  CO  c 


'-'        05 


05  a; 

I  s  ?^  ^ 

-  5  bC  "^ 


-^'z  ^ 


O  iC 


M    03    C 

o  mo 
■»5  a;  ,_-U 


X! 


S 
a 

ajo 
^  bC 

i| 


N 


o 

as 
d  . 

03    ^ 

03  > 


(1    OQ 

o3  O 


02 


s*   ~-: 


S  a; 
^- 


5  aj 
!=  2 

§•« 

2  = 
§0 

1-00 


0 

>>2 

S 

J2 

3e<i 

cr-- 

im 

0 

c    . 

fc-  c3 

03 

p; 

HHJ2 

<J 

0^ 

a;  u 
53 

^ 

. — ^ 

<4-i    05 

u-   3 

b 

0 

iC 

"  rt 

OCL, 

2 

03 

N 

Sj-^ 

03  <«. 

w, 

Si 

SCO 

r. 

c  +^ 

.s  ^ 

53   . 

X} 

■3 

"O   03 

•a  s 

"^-^ 

a; 

? 

n^-l=i 

SX! 


2  I 
oeo 

1 


-*S         wop 


(N    I 

cods 


«c        to 

l>  I  5  I 

CD  ■*  t^  ift 

CO     i  CO    I 


O  •*       05  Tf 
CO    I        CO     I 


CO    1 


5 


« 


INDEX  OF  EXHIBITS 


XXI 


5  S 

^;6  1 

CO  cS 

DCS  '"' 

aw 


>>  00 

>  O 


g 
S     02 


>.a 


CO-* 


0) 


o  o 


C.2 


O  (A 

.Ph 

^8 

^  I— I 

O     - 

::< 

a;  o 
gee 

■H  o 

*  J:; 

»    03 
«    3 

>   C 

-^ 

o8 


la 
IS 

ll 


^° 

>>C 
-^^ 

«  o 

lO  o 
■^-^ 

^  c 

US 
cc  a 

,-<    w 

>^ 

O  >*i 

2  * 
III 

3  c5^ 


CD  'O 

DDa 
.S  1^ 

So 
o  »-i 


C   01   ^ 
O      .   m 


o  +s 


bC 


*^  o 

c  .. 

r/i    *-• 


3W 

O.  oj 

z2 


02 


!^s 


a; 
a  oQ 


w 


«  a 
o. 

3 
>-  .M 

'^  5^ 

-2  >>W 
»  >  rt 

2aj2 
>,^^ 

O)   fc.   S 
3   (D*^ 

lit 
p.  '-'^^^ 

43  ^  .S 

■fi       _  5 

^So 

<p  0)  S 

«  03  O 
gTSO 

Ph 


r-;  bc 


2^ 


05"< 


-^  e 

so 

'^  o 

£  as 

d  o 

u  «= 

3j  CD 

-u  — 


W    S 


"*  5 
>.^ 

3T3 

S  « 
►  aj 


.5  " 

3  -t^ 

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>i  aj 


tT.!:  *^ 
u  a  s 

««  "O  *" 


•  T3x: 
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^  «  c 

T3-^g 

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s  +i  a; 

S  >  4^ 
g  >a2 

9  ="^ 

M.S     CO 

aj  -jj  aj 

3  u  bG 

'^  2  « 

X  ■■  "" 


2-^ 

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O  <M 

«   O 

"«  S" 

O  93 

>>s 

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a>  c 
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Gi:- 
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^  3 
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bc  i3  o 
c8  g  a) 

SwQ 

«  o-g 
2  c  01 

•2k2 


*<: 

as- 

h  c 

^  3 
GOD 
o3 

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>  ^ 


3      ■*^ 


03  a^  '^ 


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S3-2_2 
a>  G.3 

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s-s 


3   »       01.3  «;• 


s-r. 


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G  -G 
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05  73 


Q  g 

1i 


GM 
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bc 

3 


03 

J 

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W.2 

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aj  a; 

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aj^ 
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c 


G       gT3  »^ 

n      S?  a;         "«--H 


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CA 


GO 


o  ^ 
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&0 


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to 

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XXII 


INDEX   OF  EXHIBITS 


INDEX  OF   EXHIBITS 


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XXIV 


INDEX  OF  EXHIBITS 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  923 

EXHIBIT  NO.  9 

TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 
Selected  Letters  between  Admiral  H.  R.  Stark  and  Admiral  J.  O.  Richardson 

1.  18  January  1S40  from  Admiral  Stark  to  Admiral  Richardson 

2.  26  January  1940  from  Admiral  Richardson  to  Admiral  Stark 

3.  16  February  1&40  from  Admiral  Richardson  to  Admiral  Stark 

4.  8  March  1940  from  Admiral  Richardson  to  Admiral  Stark 

5.  11  March  1940  to  Admiral  Richardson  to  Admiral  Stark 

H.  Ifi  March  1940  from  Admiral  Stark  to  Admiral  Richardson 

7.  S  April  1940  from  Admiral  Stark  to  Admiral  Richardson 

8.  7  May  1940  from  Admiral  Stark  to  Admiral  Richardson 

9.  13  May  1940  from  Admiral  Richardson  to  Admiral  Stark 

10.  22  May  1940  from  Admiral  Stark  to  Admiral  Richardson 

11.  22  May  1940  fr«m  Admiral  Richardson  to  Admiral  Stark 

12.  27  May  1940  from  Admiral  Stark  to  Admiral  Richardson 

13.  22  June  19-'0  from  Admiral  Stark  to  Admiral  Richardson 

14.  22  June  1940  from  Admiral  Richardson  to  Admiral  Stark  (with  enclosures) 

15.  18  September  1940  from  Admiral  Richardson  to  Admiral  Stark  (with  enclo- 

sures ) 

16.  24  September  1940  from  Admiral  Stark  to  Admiral  Richardson 

17.  1  October  1940  from  Admiral  Stark  to  Admiral  Richardson 

18.  9  October  1940  memo  from  Admiral  Richardson  for  Admiral  Stark 

19.  22  October  1940  from  Admiral  Richardson  to  Admiral  Stark 

20.  12  November  1940  from  Admiral  Stark  to  Admiral  Richardson  (with  enclo- 

sures ) 

21.  22  November  1940  from  Admiral  Stark  to  Admiral  Richardson 

22.  28  November  1940  from  Admiral  Richardson  to  Admiral  Stark 

23.  17  December  1940  from  Admiral  Stark  to  Admiral  Richardson 

24.  23  December  1940  from  Admiral  Stark  to  Admiral  Richardson  (with  enclo- 

sures ) 

25.  80  December  1940  from  Admiral  Bloch  via  Admiral  Richardson  to  Admiral 

Stark 

26.  7  January  1941  from  Admiral  Richardson  to  Admiral  Stark 

27.  25  January  1941  from  Admiral  Richardson  to  Admiral  Stark 

28.  10  Februarv  1941  from  Admiral  Stark  to  Admiral  Richardson 


18  Janttaby  1940. 

Dear  Joe:  As  of  possible  interest  to  you  I  am  enclosing  the  General  Board's 
report  on  organization  of  the  Navy  Department.  Will  be  glad  to  get  your  com- 
ments if  and  when  you  get  time. 

I  will  drop  entirely  the  question  of  Captain  Smith  coming  to  the  PENNSYL- 
VANIA for  the  purpose  of  acquiring  CincC  background  on  war  plans. 

Before  he  starts  East  I  will  ask  him  to  ask  you  for  an  appointment  so  that 
you  may  send  back  any  general  thoughts  you  may  wish  to  of  a  confidential 
nature  which  would  be  u.seful  to  all  of  us.  In  this  connection  I  have  a  letter 
from  Tommy  Hart,  just  received,  in  which  he  thinks  the  situation  in  the  Far 
East  is  very  serious  and  that  this  year  may  prove  to  be  a  crucial  and  critical 
one.  As  I  have  written  Bloch,  and  as  you  undoubtedly  know,  I  have  continually 
asked  him  to  bear  in  mind  what  is  going  on  to  the  Westward  which  in  this  par- 
ticular period  in  this  old  world's  history  may  be  far  more  important  to  us  than 
the  troubles  in  Europe,  especially  if  something  should  break  and  break  quickly 
and  without  warning.  It  is  something,  in  my  humble  opinion,  for  which  you 
should  be  mentally  prepared.  Anything  in  this  wide  world  I  can  do  to  help,  of 
course  I  will ;  that  is  my  only  reason  for  existing  here.  Incidentally  by  officer 
messenger  or  otherwise,  I  would  be  glad  to  know  what  your  thoughts  are  in  that 
connection  so  that  I  may  be  in  harmony  and  may  be  able  to  transmit  them  to 
higher  authority  if  they  should  be  asked. 

HoTpe  the  Army  Maneuvers  have  been  greatly  beneficial.  The  President  is 
Intensely  interested  in  our  working  closely  with  them  in  all  ways,  and  the  pull- 
together  here  in  the  Department  is  very  close. 

Best  wishes  to  you  all  as  ever 
Sincerely, 

/S/    Beitt. 

Admiral  J.  O.  Rtchardson.  U.  S.  Nary, 
Commander  in  Chief,  V.  S.  Fleet, 


924       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


COMMA  NOER-IN-CHIEF 

UNITIO    ST*T(S    rillT 

J     •    •     riNH*TlV*NI> 


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•^  ^»^~u  '*^^*^  ^^^^y^  ^^^'x^  ^^'^^'^  f^  w^ 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  925 


-•-*~^^      '«^^    '-'v-^-Ly      <^^4i^    ^v-...--<.       ^.K.*,.,*-/.     i-.v-»..»^        >'^  a^u^^t/* 


926       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 

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U.  S    ■.  r(HN*TlVANI* 


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"A»-»     A»-»"«»^ 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  927 


COMMANOER'INCHIEF 

UNITtD    »T*TC»    rtCCT 

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928       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


OFFICE  OF  CHIEF  OF  NAVAL  OPERATIONS 

^   .t^2X    /^i--^  75l— ^ 


Ji>J^    ^^    '^^^^ 


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EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  929 


CinC  File  No.  UNITED  8TATB8  FLEET  J, 

U.  &  S.  PENNSYLVANIA.  FlaoUp  f\Qr 


AgMAIL 

PERSONAL  San  Pedro,  California 

CONTIDgNTIAL  16  rebmary  1940 


Y 


Admiral  H.  R.  Stark,  U.S. Nary 
CMef  of  Naved  Operations 
Navy  Department 
Washington,  D.  C. 

Dear  Betty: 

Today  I  received  a  despatch  from  Andrews,  a  copy 
of  which  is  enclosed,  urging  that  the  information  in  regeurd 
to  the  chemge  of  home  ports  of  vessels  of  the  Hawaiian  De- 
tachment be  released  for  publication.  This  is  requested  in 
order  that  the  maximum  number  of  unoccupied  houses  and  apart- 
ments at  Honolulu  may  be  overhauled  and  made  available  for 
oooapemoy.  I  felt  constrained  to  reply  negative. 

The  delicacy  with  which  you  must  handle  thia  mat- 
ter is  fully  appreciated;  «md  the  reasons  for  yovir  negative 
reply  to  my  previous  despatch  requesting  that  the  security 
classification  of  the  despatch  changing  the  home  ports  of 
these  ships  (Opnav  031811  of  February  1940)  be  lowered  are 
fully  understood. 

It  seems  to  me,  however,  that  the  provision  of 
acceptable  living  accommodations  will  be  highly  conducive  to 
contentment  and  morale.  Therefore,  I  request  that  the  re- 
striction on  publicity  be  eliminated  as  early  as  you  deem  it 
advisable,  and  that  Andrews  and  I  be  informed  by  despatch. 

It  may  be  of  Interest  to  you  to  know  that  the  fact 
that  the  home  ports  of  these  vessels  have  been  changed  .appeared 
in  the  Los  Angeles  Times  of  .4  Februeo-y  under  a  Honolulu  date 
line,  and  was  subsequently  copied  in  Long  Beach  and  San  Diego 
papers  as  shown  by  the  enclosure. 

It  appears  that  this  matter  is  widely  known  now 
but  in  view  of  the  restrictions  on  publicity  Andrews  probably 
feels  that  he  can  not  officially  urge  private  interests  in 
Honolulu  to  prepare  houses  for  the  occupancy  of  Naval  personnel. 

V/ith  kindest  regards  and  best  wishes. 

Sincerely, 


sincerely. 


J.  0.  RICHARDSON 


930       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

[i]  United  States  Fleet 

U.  S.  S.  Pennsylvania,  Flagship 

San  Pedro,  California,  8  March  1940. 
Personal 
Confidential 

Admiral  H.  R.  Stark,  U.  S.  Navy, 
Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 

Navy  Department,  Washington,  D.  C. 
Dhiar  Betty:  I  am  forwarding  today,  by  air  mail,  my  recommendation  regard- 
ing a  relief  for  the  U.  S.  S.  AUGUSTA.     I  find,  in  making  this  recommendation, 
that  I  am  in  a  position  in  which  I  frequently  find  myself,  in  that  I  do  not  know 
all  the  points  that  should  be  considered  in  reacliing  a  decision.     For  example : 

(a)  I  do  not  know  what  considerations  led  to  the  assignment  of  Commander 
Scouting  Force  to  command  the  Hawaiian  Detachment,  but  if  there  were  reasons 
controlling  at  that  time  there  probably  has  been  no  change. 

(b)  I  do  not  know  why  we  have  a  Hawaiian  Detachment,  but  if  it  has  any 
relation  to  existing  plans  as  stated  in  my  oflScial  letter  I  think  it  should  be  com- 
manded by  Commander  Cruisers. 

(c)  I  do  not  know  how  much  weight  is  attached  to  the  necessity  of  having 
a  cruiser  available  for  the  President,  and  I  do  not  know  whether  he  insists  on 
having  the  HOUSTON  so  available,  or  whether  another  ship  would  be  equally 
acceptable. 

Andrews  recommended  that  Commander  Cruisers,  Scouting  Force,  shift  to  the 
HOUSTON  and  remain  in  command  of  Cruiser  Division  FOUR  with  the  Hawaiian 
Detachment,  and  that  the  present  Commander  Cruiser  Division  FOUR  shift  to 
the  LOUISVILLE  or  CHESTER  in  command  of  Cruiser  Division  FIVE,  and  re- 
turn to  the  West  Coast  with  that  division,  and  that  the  AUGUSTA  be  assigned 
to  Crudiv  FIVE. 

It  does  not  seem  logical  to  me  to  have  both  Commander  Cruisers,  Scouting 
Force,  and  Commander  S.-outing  Force,  in  the  Hawaiian  Detachment.  As  things 
now  exist.  Commander  Aircraft.  Scouting  Force,  frequently  sends  recommenda- 
tions to  me  in  order  [2]  to  save  time,  with  copies  to  Commander  Scout- 
ing Force,  and  Commander  Scouting  Force  frequently  makes  recommendations 
affecting  the  cruisers  without  having  the  recommendations  of  Commander 
Cruisers,  Scouting  Force. 

Any  number  of  solutions  could  be  suggested  and  any  one  that  you  select  wiU 
be  acceptable  to  me  because  I  have  made  what  appeared  to  me  to  be  a  logical 
recommendation,  but  I  have  no  personal  pride  in  it,  and  any  solution  will  work. 
However,  the  easiest  one  that  would  not  disturb  existing  conditions  would  be  to 
send  the  HOUSTON  out  as  temporary  relief  of  the  AUGUSTA,  and  have  the 
AUGUSTA  return  to  China  after  her  overhaul. 

In  any  event,  there  will  be  no  heavy  cruiser  with  the  Fleet  for  several  months 
this  summer  while  Cruiser  Division  FIVE  is  undergoing  overhaul,  and  I  know 
that  both  Bloch  and  I  feel  that  there  should  be  two  divisions  of  heavy  cruisers 
with  the  Fleet. 

I  do  not  know  why  Cruiser  Division  SEVEN  is  retained  with  the  Atlantic 
Squadron.  Consequently,  I  have  made  no  recommendations  or  requests  that 
that  division  rejoin  the  Fleet.  Neither  have  I  recommended  that  one  of  the 
divisions  now  in  the  Hawaiian  Detachment  return  with  the  Fleet. 

With  kindest  regards  and  best  wishes. 
Very  sincerly  yours, 

/S/    J.  O.  Richardson. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  931 


CfalC  nh  Na.  UNITBD  STATn  riMMft  t 

U.  S.  &  PBNMSTLVANIA.  IkgaUr 

PEK30!7;j.  San  Pedro,   Cedifornia 

COITnp-i^TIia.  11  March  1940 


Dear  Betty: 

In  «;oln6  over  the  meiaorandum  you  enclosed  with  your 
letter  of  12  February  (Subject:  Defense  of  the  Fleet  against 
attack  by  aircraft) ,  my  first  reaction  was  somewhat  similar 
to  Admiral  Bloch's,  that  is,  no  harji  can  come  from  letting  the 
Oeneral  Board  consider  the  comprehensive  agenda  contemplated  - 
although  at  the  same  time  there  arose  in  my  mind  a  question 
as  to  how  much  cood  mifiht  result  from  such  an  undertaking.  In 
Justice  to  the  serious  thoutjht  that  has  Pone  into  the  prepara- 
tion of  the  meraorandura  and  its  enclosure,  I  have  given  the  mat- 
ter detsiled  study  and  my  general  conclusions  are  as  follows: 

(a)  The  Oeneral  Board  is  v/ell  within  its  intended  scope 
in  studyiHci;  all  matters  relatinfr  to  iaprove.iients  in  arm- 
a-U'-nt.   I  believe  that  it  has  senerally  been  understood 
that  the  Oeneral  Board  would  deal  principally  with  major 
characteristics,  although  it  is  understandable  that  full 
treatment  of  aajor  characteristics  ;,iay  re'^uire  varying 
der.rees  of  consideration  of  details  of  ))atteries  and  fire 
control  eiuipment. 

(b)  In  my  opinion  the  General  Board  \.ould  be  stepping  out- 
side its  Intended  scope  if  it  were  to  consider  matters 
i-inediately  connected  with  details  of  traininf?  and  operation 
of  cxistinc  personnel,  ships,  and  eiuipaent.   I  say  this 
with  the  realization  that  article  402  of  the  Navy  P.egula- 
tions  uses  the  very  words  "or{',anization,  maintenance,  train- 
in.-,  and  operation",  v/hich  ^rht  be  invoked  to  refute  my 
opinion.  Fov/ever,  I  choose  to  believe  that  the  terms  "system 
of  principles"  and  "general  terms"  used  in  the  same  article 
do  not  cchte-ivolate  treatn^nt  of  all  of  the  phases  and  de- 
tails ificluded  in  the  pro->osed  ar«nda. 

Applyinr;  these  f',eneral  conclusions  to  the  several  sub- 
heads of  the  proposed  a.-;enda,  I  consider  items  to  be  matters 
"ippropriate  or  otherwise  for  the  Oeneral  Board's  specific  con- 
sideration and  reco.taendation,  as  follows: 

The  Fleet » 

Treatr.ient  of  none  of  these  items  by  the  General  Board 
is  either  necessary  or  desirable.  All  are  actively  under 
con-sideration  within  the  Fleet.   As  you  will  know,  the  re-v 


-1- 

1  Subsequent  pages  of  this  letter,  upon  investigation,  appear  not  to  be  in  existence. 


79716  O— 46 — pt.  14- 


932        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Confidential 

15  Mabch  1940. 

Dear  J.  O.  :  I  am  somewhat  at  a  loss  as  to  just  how  to  answer  your  questions 
(a),  (b)  and  (c)  in  your  letter  of  8  March. 

I  do  not  know  whether  Bloch  left  his  personal  file  of  correspondence  between 
him  and  me,  for  you  to  read  over  or  whether  he  talked  it  over  with  you.  The 
background  for  sending  the  Hawaiian  Detachment  was  for  the  most  part  con- 
tained in  this  pei'sonal  correspondence. 

One  of  the  first  questions  which  was  brought  to  me  after  I  took  over  this  job 
was  the  possible  reinforcement  of  the  Asiatic  Fleet  which  had  been  requested 
by  Admiral  Hart.  This  reinforcement  was  to  be  preferably,  according  to  Hart's 
request,  a  division  of  heavy  cruisers.  His  second  ciioice  was  a  division  of  light 
cruisers.  The  situation  in  the  Shanghai  Settlement  in  regard  to  control  of  that 
area  was  tense.  The  situation  in  Tientsin,  especially  in  regard  to  British  Japa- 
nese relations,  was  critical.  The  war  in  Europe  was  breakinji.  We  wanted  to 
do  what  we  could  for  Hart,  strengthen  the  State  Department's  hands,  and  at  the 
same  time  not  weaken  our  own  position. 

I  looked  into  the  question  of  our  War  Plans,  especially  as  to  the  Commander-in- 
Chief's  Operating  Plan  for  an  Orange  campaign.  This  seemed  to  meet  a  strategic 
situation  in  the  Pacific  in  a  manner  by  which  Hart  would  be  supported  by  naval 
deployment,  and  the  Commander-in-Chief  would  still  have  close  control  over 
all  units  of  the  Fleet. 

The  result  was  that  on  8  September  I  wrote  to  Bloch  and  made  the  suggestion 
of  sending  a  detachment  to  Hawaii,  but  only  after  I  had  talked  it  over  with  the 
President  and  the  okayed  it  one  hundred  percent ;  as  did  the  S^nte  Department. 

There  were  several  despatches  back  and  forth  (Opnav  0022-1815,  0024-1225, 
CinCUS  0023-1255,  all  of  September),  and  also  one  or  two  telephone  calls.  Bloch 
recommended  that  Andrews  be  in  command ;  he  also  recommended  that  my  first 
suggestion  of  moving  the  submarines  to  Hawaii  be  held  up;  I  concurred  in  both 
recommendations.  Admiral  Bloch  was  opposed  to  sending  any  more  cruisers 
to  the  Asiatic.     They  were  not  sent. 

We  did  reinfoi'ce  the  Asiatic  by  one  tender,  one  squadron  of  patrol  planes  and 
six  new  submarines.  The  Hawaiian  Detachment  fits  in  with  the  Commander-in- 
Chief's  Operating  Plan  Orange. 

When  the  time  came  for  the  Hawaiian  Detachment  to  go,  a  proposed  press  release 
as  drawn  up  showing  the  reason  to  be  "For  the  purpose  of  facilitating  training 
operations."      The  President  finally  said  :  '"Do  not  release  it  to  the  press." 

Hardly  had  the  Detachment  arrived  in  Hawaii  when  the  question  of  rotation 
came  up.  After  a  good  deal  of  correspondence  back  and  forth  we  took  the  bull 
by  the  horns  and  sent  out  our  directive  in  regard  to  this  question  (CNO  Serial 
938  or  4  January  1940).  Of  course  the  question  of  home  ports  and  transportation 
of  dependents  was  a  big  item  in  arriving  at  the  final  decision. 

My  original  ideas  in  regard  to  the  Hawaiian  Detachment  wei'e  that  possibly, 
in  fact  probably,  the  Commander  of  this  Detachment  would  be  able  to  carry  out 
the  regular  schedule  of  gunnery  firings  and  for  training  would  be  able  to  visit 
the  various  island  possessions  in  the  Mid-Pacific  area  to  familiarize  himself  with 
these  possessions  and  their  potential  uses  in  time  of  war. 

I  still  think  that  the  decision  to  send  the  Detachment  to  Hawaii  under  present 
world  conditions  is  sound.  No  one  can  measure  how  much  effect  its  presence  there 
may  have  on  the  Orange  foreign  policy.  The  State  Department  is  strong  for  the 
present  setup  and  considers  it  beneficial ;  they  were  in  on  all  discussions,  press 
releases,  etc. 

I  find  that  in  the  above  I  have  more  or  less  covered  your  paragraphs  (a)  and 
(b).  I  cannot  he^p  but  f^el  that  a  Vice  A('miral  should  be  in  command  of  the 
Hawaiian  Detachment.  He  would  probably  command  the  above  force  prescribed 
in  War  Plans.  Administration  may  be  difl5cult  but  it  will  be  more  diflacult  in  war 
and  means  should  be  developed  to  rflfset  this  difficulty. 

In  regard  to  your  question  (c),  of  course  I  don't  know  whether  the  President 
will  go  to  the  Coast  before  his  term  of  oflSce  expires  or  not,  but  I  think  the  chances 
are  that  he  very  probably  will ;  in  fact  he  intended  to  go  last  October  and  couldn't. 
At  that  time  he  told  the  people  in  San  Francisco  that  he  would  try  and  come  at 
a  later  date.  My  guess  is  that  if  world  conditions  will  permit  his  leaving  Wash- 
ington you  will  see  him  sometime  before  Winter  on  the  West  Coast  with  the  desire 
for  a  fishing  trip,  or  more  possibly  a  desire  to  go  to  Alaska  which  he  has  so  often 
expressed.  A  cruiser  force  flagship  or  its  equal  will  be  required,  because  the 
President  will  doubtless  want  to  take  someone  with  him.    When  he  went  to  the 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  933 

Canal  Zone  in  the  TUSCALOOSA  he  was  comfortable  but  he  had  cut  down  his 
entourage  to  the  minimum. 

In  regard  to  the  relief  of  the  AUGUSTA,  I  have  received  your  oflScial  letter  and 
we  are  now  making  a  careful  study  of  it  from  all  angles  and  hope  to  find  a  solution 
which  will  be  satisfactory  in  the  main  to  both  ends. 

The  decision  to  retain  one  division  of  CAs  in  the  Atlantic  was  made  after  con- 
siderable discussion  with  the  President.  Some  would  have  two  divisions.  I  held 
one  division  is  enough,  supplemented  as  it  is  by  a  couple  of  CLs.  With  the  general 
requirement  of  two  cruisers  in  the  Caribbean  and  two  on  the  North  Atlantic  Coast, 
we  cannot  well  do  with  less.  For  the  time  being  at  least  we  will  have  to  retain 
one  division  of  CAs  on  this  side. 

I  will  be  glad  to  get  your  reply  to  my  letter  on  the  CL  Force  Flagship.    Person- 
ally I  do  not  see  it — but  I  am  prepared  to  do  what  you  want. 
Every  good  wish  as  always  and  best  of  luck. 
Sincerely, 

/s/    BErrrr. 
Admiral  J.  O.  Richardson,  USN, 

Commander  in  Chief,  U.  8.  Fleet, 
US8  "Pennsylvania," 

San  Pedro,  California. 

P.  S. — Mr.  Edison  expects  to  leave  Washington  on  26  March  and  join  the  Fleet 
1  April ;  leave  Hawaii  in  NASHVILLE  15  April,  arrive  San  Francisco  20  April ; 
inspect  San  Diego  about  24  April  and  return  to  Washington  about  28  April.  I  do 
hope  you  can  acquaint  him  with  the  Navy  on  this  trip.  Deyo  will  take  up  the 
details  on  his  arrival  in  the  West,  etc.  and  you  will  be  acquainted  with  them  later. 


8  Apeil  1940. 
De'K  JO:  I  have  jiist  been  glancing  over  your  letter  of  S  February  to  Admiral 
Nimitz  to  check  my  memory  on  one  of  your  questions  as  follows :  I  did  it  because 
of  some  information  which  came  in  this  morning. 

(a)  Is  "CinCus  facing  trouble  in  the  Western  Pacific"  so  surely  as  to  war- 
rant giving  that  consideration  greater  weight  in  the  preparation  of  the  flag 
slate  than  the  usual  peacetime  considerations  of  training  flag  oflBcers  for 
higher  command :  If  so,  the  best  should  be  kept  at,  or  ordered  to  sea. 

I  believe  Nimitz  answered  your  letter  but  was  not  able  to  answer  the  above 
question.  I  want  now  to  answer  that  question  with  an  emphatic  aflarmative. 
I  believe  the  situation  in  the  Far  East  is  continually  deteriorating  so  far  as  our 
relations  with  Japan  are  concerned.  I  may  be  unduly  pessimistic  but  I  do  want 
to  communicate  my  thoughts  for  what  they  are  worth  and  I  might  add  they  are 
backed  by  some  pretty  concrete  evidence.  I  think  you  should  continually  keep 
uppermost  in  your  mind  the  possibility  of  trouble  in  the  Orient,  and  the  means 
to  meet  it. 

The  President  has  been  troubled  with  a  bad  cold  and  we  are  about  two  weeks 
overdue  in  an  appointment  with  him ;  however,  we  are  hoping  we  will  have  it 
within  the  next  few  days  and  after  he  has  agreed  to  the  topside  slate  we  will  send 
you  his  desires  for  your  further  recommendations  lower  down. 

I  am  also  in  hearty  accord  with  the  last  paragraph  of  your  letter  and  to  save 
you  the  trouble  of  checking  I  am  quoting  it : 

"If  the  eminence  of  trouble  does  not  outweigh  other  considerations,  I  think  that 
the  most  promising  material  for  high  command  should  be  given  adequate  sea 
experience  at  the  expense  of  the  less  promising,  and  that  a  long  range  plan  should 
be  prepared  with  a  view  to  having  the  best  possible  available  with  recent  Fleet 
experience  and  with  adequate  time  to  serve  when  those  now  in  high  position  in  the 
Fleet  step  out  of  the  picture." 

Here's  hoping  the  Maneuvers  are  highly  beneficial  from  every  standpoint. 

Every  good  wish  as  always, 

/s/    Bettt. 

[Copy  of  Mr.  Edison's  letter  of  5/7  enclosed] 

Confidential  Mailed  5/8/40  to  catch  clipper  of  5/14 

7  Mat  1940. 
Dear  J.  O. :  Just  hung  up  the  telephone  after  talking  with  the  President  and  by 
the  time  this  reaches  you  you  will  have  received  word  to  remain  in  Hawaiian 
Waters  for  a  couple  of  weeks. 


934       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

When  the  Fleet  returns  to  the  Coast  (and  I  trust  the  delay  will  not  be  over  two 
weeks,  but  I  cannot  tell)  the  President  has  asked  that  the  Fleet  schedule  be  so 
arranged  that  on  extremely  short  notice  the  Fleet  be  able  to  return  concentrated 
to  Hawaiin  Waters.  This  will  present  somewhat  of  a  problem  in  lugging  around 
more  oil  with  you  perhaps  than  usual  and  keeping  more  provisions  on  board 
because  if  action  is  wanted  it  will  be  wanted  quickly.  As  far  as  I  can  see,  your 
proposed  schedule  meets  this  requirement  and  unless  you  hear  to  the  contrary 
you  may  assume  it  okay. 

I  am  glad  you  want  to  run  East  to  have  a  talk  in  the  Department.  Had  you  not 
suggested  it,  I  would  have  myself.  We  have  been  making  some  close  examina- 
tions into  the  War  Plans  recently  and  I  remarked  at  the  time  I  wished  you  could 
have  been  present.  I  trust  your  arrival  here  will  not  be  delayed  over  about  two 
weeks,  beyone  what  it  normally  would  have  been. 

Of  course  you  know  the  thought  behind  the  above  and  that  is  that  the  Italian 
situation  is  extremely  delicate,  the  two  weeks  ahead  regarded  a^  critical;  then 
-     -     -     ?????  nobody  can  answer  the  riddle  just  now. 

I  am  still  hopeful  that  our  Expansion  Bill  will  go  through.  The  Appropriation 
Bill  has  also  to  be  acted  on.  Other  than  these  two  items  nothing  of  particular 
interest  that  I  can  think  of  for  the  moment  from  the  Fleet  standpoint. 

I  hope  to  get  money  for  elevation  of  the  NEW  YORK,  TEIXAS  and  ARKANSAS 
guns.  My  feeling  is  that  these  ships  are  of  little  use  as  is,  and  that  even  if  they 
have  to  be  out  of  the  Fieet  under  overhaul  at  a  critical  time,  we  should  go  ahead 
with  them.    Do  you  concur? 

Am  also  looking  into  the  question  of  one  or  two  more  flag  oflScers  in  Atron 
which  I  believe  you  desire. 

Am  delighted  you  are  able  to  give  War  Plans  your  personal  attention.  Per- 
sonally I  think  it  is  one  of  our  most  important  jobs. 

I  don't  know  how  you  teel  about  it,  but  1  have  always  felt  that  CincUS  was 
loaded  up  with  too  much  in  the  way  of  material  matters  and  administration ; 
and  that  in  general  material  matters  should  not  go  beyond  type  commanders,  at 
least  as  far  as  routine  items  are  concerned.  For  example  if  Combatfor  wants  to 
find  out  something  about  his  destroyers,  he  can  .send  for  Conidesbatfor  tell  him, 
or  better  still,  let  Comdesbatfor  write  him  or  see  him  frequently  enough  to  keep 
him  in  general  touch.  It  seems  to  me  force  commanders  should  not  have  to  sign 
or  even  think  about  the  thousand  and  one  material  details  which  must  detract 
from  their  more  important  duties  ;  let  the  type  commanders  do  this.* 

I  know  you  have  a  tough  job  in  submitting  the  names  of  six  rear  admirals  from 
among  whom  three  may  be  ear  marked  for  furlough.  I  have  got  to  do  the  same 
myself.  If  you  and  Peck  agree  it  will  automatically  make  it  easier.  I  just  men- 
tioned to  the  President  the  advisability  of  appointing  the  three  of  us  to  constitute 
a  board  to  actually  meet  and  make  this  recommendation.  This  would  take  away 
any  political  repercussions  so  far  as  the  President  is  concerned.  However,  he 
didn't  take  to  this  idea  and  said  all  he  wanted  was  to  be  told  verbally  the  names. 

With  best  wishes  as  always 
Sincerely, 

/s/     Betty. 

Admiral  J.  O.  Richardson,  USN, 

Vomniander  in  Chief,  U.  S.  Fleet, 

USS  "Pennsylvania,"  Pearl  Harbor,  T.  H. 


•This  is  just  thinking  out  loud — but  I  would  like  to  talk  this  over  with  you  when  you 
are  here. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


935 


daCFOiNa 


UNITBD  STATES  FLEET 
U.  8.  8.  PENNSYLVANIA.  FUgihlp 


f 


Pearl  Harbor,  T. 
Kay  13,   1940 


H. 


■Dear  Betty: 

".(■hen  Hill  was  detached  last  January  he  took 
v/ith  him  to  V/ashlngton  some  Ideas,   largely  Blooh's, 
as  to  what  mi^t  be  acceptable  to  the  C ommaader- In- 
Chief ,  (under  the  assumptions  then  made),   to  serve  as 
a  start  from  which  Op-12  vrould  develop  basio  assunip- 
tlons  to  be  officially  transmitted,  \/ithin  a  few 
weeks,  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  for  use  in  making 
plans. 

During  a  recent  conference  in  the  Twelfth  Naved 
District  it  was  broxight  out  that  we  were  woefully 
short  of  5"-38  caliber  ananunit ion  at  liare  Island. 

I  am  unable  to  grasp  the  meaning  of  Opnav  dis- 
patch 112130  sent  at   1630  last  Saturday,  but   we  are 
guessing  that   the  Department  has  tentatively  ap- 
proved, with  minor  exceptions,   the  contents  of  the 
mamorand\im  prepared  for  me  by  Hill,  and  that  the 
Department  will  correct  the  ammunition  situation  at 
!C»re  Island. 

The   assximptions  luider  \diioh  the  Hill  memorandum 
was  drawn  up  and  under  which  all  other  operations  In 
the  V/estem  Pacific  have  previously  been  considered, 
are  today  all  different.     Previous  assusiptions  and 
estimates  of  the   situation  no  longer  hold . 

I  It  seems  that,  \inder  present  world  conditions, 

the  paramotint  thing  for  us  is  the   security  of  the 
'.Vestern  Hemisphere.     This,   in  my  opinion,  transcends 
everything  —  anything  certainly  in  the  Far  Bast, 
our  own  or  other  interests. 

I  South  America  is  the  greatest  prize  yet  remain- 

ing to  be  grabbed.     Until  the  outcome  in  Surope  can 

'    be  more  clearly  seen,   security  in  the  'iVestem  Hemis- 
phere seems  to  be  the  most  important  consideration 
for  us. 


936       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


CM  rot  na.  imrrBD  states  flbet 

U.  8.  8.  PBNNSYLVANIA.  FlMaUy 


I  feel  that  any  move  west  neans  hostilities. 
I  feel  that  at  this  tine  'it  \/ould  be  a  grave  nis- 
talce  to  becoBe   involved  in  the  './est  \/here  our  in- 
terests,  although  inportant ,    are  not  vital,   and 
thereby  reduce  our  ability  to  nalntain  the  security 
of  the   iestern  Hemisphere  v/hlch  is  vital. 

If  the  Fleet  is  to  go  vrest  it  can  only  start, 
properly  prepared,  fron  the  '.lest  Coast  v/here   it  can 
be  docked,  manned,   stocked  and  stripped,   and  a 
suitable  train  assembled. 

Rest  assured  that  although  I  am  entirely  v;ith- 
out  information  I  realize  your  position,   and  I  v/ant 
you  to   know  that   if  the  situation  becomes   such  that 
higher   authority  decides  '.;e  should  go   .-'est,   all  of 
us  are  ready  to   give  all  we  have . 

These   are   some  of  the  things  I  wanted  to  talk 
to  you  about,    and  since  I  can  not   see  you,   I  feel 
that  I  am  duty  bound  to  write  you. 

V/ith  kindest  regards  and  best  wishes, 

Very  sincerely  yours, 

'    ■ / — to — A*-<,/*.*  1^ 

Please   acknowledge  receipt  by  despatch. 


Admiral  H.   R.   Stark,   U,   3.   Navy 
The  Chief  of  Naval  Operations 
Navy  Department 
V/ashington,   D.   C. 


J 


/9C 


' 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  937 


CtaC  File  No.  UNITED  STATES  FLEET 

U.  8.  8.  PENNSYLVANIA,  FU(sUp 


P. 3.    On  9  April  I  sent  Andrews  with  a  detachment  In  to 
simulate  a  raiding  force  against  Pearl  Harbor,  to  serve  as 
an» object  for  attack  by  our  patrol  planes  and  Army  bombers. 
Andrews  reported  sighting  llavy  patrol  planes,  but  he  did  not 
see  any  Army  bombers. 

Today  we  were  picked  up  by  our  patrol  planes  about 
0630,  but  we  did  not  see  any  Army  bombers.   However,  our 
submarines  made  several  successful  attacks  from  fairly  short 
ranges.  We  had  a  heavy  swell  with  white  caps  so  that  it  was 
difficult  to  see  the  submarines. 

'.Vhile  the  Secretary  was  on  board,  one  of  the  SARA- 
TOGA'S fighting  planes  had  a  forced  landing  close  aboard. 
The  plane  sank,  but  the  Reserve  Ensign  was  recovered  with- 
out his  even  getting  his  feet  wet. 

Today  one  of  the  LEXIN:>T0N  bombing  planes  (SBU)  had 
a  forced  landing.  The  plane  sank,  but  the  pilot  and  passenger 
were  recovered  with  slight  injuries. 

The  PENNSYLVANIA  should  anchor  in  Lahaina  about  1700. 


^. J  >— <vr 


tt 


938       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

H.  R.  S. 

Serial  013212  22  Mat  1940. 

Secret 

Dear  Joe  :  When  we  sent  our  dispatch  it  looked  as  if  Italy  were  coming  in 
almost  immediately  and  that  a  serious  situation  might  develop  in  the  East  Indies, 
and  that  there  was  a  possibility  of  our  being  involved.  However,  the  recent 
"blitzkrieg"  events  in  Europe  have  certainly  altered  the  picture  for  the  time 
being.  Personally  I  think  it  has  made  more  remote  (for  the  moment  at  least) 
the  question  of  a  westward  movement  of  the  fleet.  I  agree  with  the  tenor  of 
your  letter  and  you  will  be  glad  to  know  I  had  already  so  expressed  myself.  I 
also  realize  events  may  change  this  picture  and  possib'y  over  night. 

With  regard  to  the  specific  questions  raised  in  your  letter  of  13  May,  the  Joint 
Plan  for  Rainbow  Two  is  about  complete,  and  a  copy  of  it,  including  the  studies 
upon  which  it  is  based,  will  go  to  you  shortly  by  oflScer  messenger.  This  Joint 
Plan  embraces  in  general  all  the  basic  assumptions  listed  in  the  memorandum 
Hill  brought  East.  The  joint  tasks  of  this  plan  will  require  the  operation  of  the 
Fleet  in  general  with  the  fleet  tasks  set  up  in  Hill's  memorandum. 

I  think  these  assumptions  are  about  the  best  upon  which  a  basic  plan  of  this 
nature  can  be  promised,  although  in  any  preliminary  operating  plan  which  you 
may  prepare  at  present,  I  think  you  should  assume  the  present  strength  and  dis- 
position of  the  Fleet,  in  order  to  develop  the  problem  from  a  practical  basis. 

As  you  get  time  in  these  strenuous  days,  I  believe  it  would  be  advisable  for  you 
to  go  ahead  with  the  preparation  of  a  tentative  Fleet  Operating  Plan  for  Rainbow 
Two,  as  we  are  most  anxious  to  have  the  benefit  of  your  detailed  study  of  the 
difficulties  involved,  and  the  logistic  and  other  I'equirements. 

I  wish  you  would  keep  constantly  in  mind  the  possibility  of  a  complete  collapse 
of  the  Allies,  including  the  loss  of  their  fleets.  A  very  probab'e  development  of 
such  a  catastrophe  is  visualized  in  the  Rainbow  One  Plan.  Should  the  Allied 
fleets  pass  into  the  hands  of  the  Germans,  however,  an  entirely  different,  and  far 
more  serious  situation  wcmld  exist.  I  would  appreciate  your  views  regarding  the 
best  disposition  of  fleet  forces  in  such  an  event. 

Regarding  the  5  inch  38  caliber  ammunition  we  have  realized  the  deficiency, 
and,  as  you  probably  know,  Ordnance  has  now  arranged  for  shipment  of  20,000 
rounds  on  the  PYRO.  We  understand  that  this  will  complete  the  first  increment 
of  the  mobilization  supply  on  board  and  will  give  some  room  for  target  practice 
ammunition.  It  is  my  understanding  that  there  will  still  be  enough  on  shore  on 
the  West  Coast  and  in  Hawaii  to  meet  mobilization  requirements.  I  would  be 
glad  if  you  would  confirm  this. 

I  find  that  the  6  inch  47  caliber  reserve  supply  on  the  W^est  Coast  is  not  what  it 
should  be.  There  are  6,000  shells  out  there  and  I  have  requested  the  Bureau  of 
Ordnance  to  send  a  like  quantity  of  powder  by  rail. 

W  are  taking  up  the  question  of  another  Flag  Officer  in  ATRON  which  you 
suggested.  We  hope  to  put  this  in  elTect  in  the  near  future ;  the  idea  being  to 
assign  this  officer  as  Commander  Destroyers  Atlantic  Squadron.  Present  plan 
is  to  rig  up  something  on  the  DENEBOLA  for  him  to  use  as  an  Administrative 
Flag  Ship  and  then  assign  ad  interim  one  of  the  new  1500  ton  destroyers  as  a 
Tactical  Flag  Ship  with  the  idea  of  recalling  from  the  Fleet  the  SAMPSON 
(which  seems  most  logical  choice)  or  another  1850  destroyer  to  take  the  place 
of  this  new  1500  tonner  tentatively  assigned.  On  account  of  the  antiaircraft 
armament  on  the  1500  tonners  I  feel  that  the  1500  tonner  wou'd  be  more  valuable 
to  you  than  the  SAMPSON,  and  at  the  same  time  the  SAMPSON  would  give  a 
little  more  room  for  Flag  Quarters  and  Operating  Staff  accommodations.  I  do 
not  want  to  tie  up  anotiier  cruiser  as  a  separate  Flag  Ship.  I  sometimes  feel 
there  has  been  too  much  of  this  already.  This  seems  to  be  the  best  solution  for 
the  problem,  unless  you  can  suggest  a  better  one. 

In  regard  to  the  disposition  of  cruisers  I  feel  that  the  ST.  LOUIS  and  HELENA 
should  joint  the  Fleet  as  soon  as  they  are  out  of  the  Yard.  They  should  get  Fleet 
Training.  They  are  valuab'e  units  to  you.  If  we  take  them  out  of  the  Atlantic 
and  send  them  to  the  Pacific  I  must  replace  them.  Under  the  present  situation 
the  reduction  in  cruiser  strength  as  it  is,  should,  if  anything,  be  augmented. 
There  are  two  possible  solutions:  one,  to  assign  Rowcllff  and  Cruiser  Division 
FIVE  to  the  Atlantic.  This  would  give  two  heavy  cruiser  Divisions  in  the 
Hawaiian  Detachment  and  two  in  the  Atlantic.  The  other  is  to  send  Fletcher's 
Division,  Cruiser  Division  THREE,  to  the  Atlantic  which  would  give  one  heavy 
Cruiser  Division  and  one  light  Cruiser  Division  in  the  Atlantic,  but  would  reduce 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  939 

your  Light  Cruiser  strength  by  one  Division  and  would  give  you  a  total  of  three 
heavy  cruiser  divisions  in  tlie  Pacific.  Of  course  as  soon  as  the  TRENTON  comes 
home  from  Europe  we  will  have  her  overhauled  and  she  will  be  available  for 
duty  where  most  needed  in  the  Atlantic  or  Pacific  in  case  either  Cruiser  Division 
THREE  or  FIVE  is  sent  to  the  Atlantic.  Please  let  me  have  your  perfectly  frank 
reaction  to  the  above  by  dispatch  (supplemented  by  air  mail  if  you  so  desire). 

You  may  draw  back  at  the  thought  of  reducing  your  cruiser  strength  at  this 
time  in  the  Pacific.  This  I  can  believe  might  well  be  your  inclination, — as  it 
would  be  mine.  But,  as  I  indicated  above,  the  changing  situation  may  push  the 
decision  one  way  or  the  other.  In  fact  the  picture  may  change  by  the  time  you 
get  this  letter  to  the  extent  that  it  may  be  necessary  to  send  a  real  component 
of  the  Fleet  to  the  Atlantic  much  as  we  would  hate  to  do  so  and  thus  divide  our 
forces. 

The  ST.  LOUIS  is  due  to  be  completed  in  Norfolk  15  July.  The  HELENA  in 
New  York,  9  July. 

Th  situation  in  some  of  the  Southe  American  countries  gives  real  cause  for 
concern — and  I  say  this  advisedly.    If  Germany  should  win — then  whatlll'i 

Wish  I  could  see  you — and  if  the  pressure  here — day  and  night  ever  lets  up — 
I  hope  to  fly  out. 

Keep  cheerful. 
Sincerely, 

/s/    Betty. 

Admiral  J.  O.  Richardson,  VSN, 

Commander  in  Chief,  U.  S.  Fleet, 

U8S  '"Pennsylvania,"  Pearl  Harbor,  T.  H. 

P.  S.  Please  acknowledge  by  dispatch. 

Have  literally  lived  on  the  Hill — State  Dept. —  &  White  House  for  last  several 
days.  Thank  God  yesterday  I  finally  swung  support  for  170,000  men  and  34,000 
marines.    Lots  still  in  the  mill — but  I  hope  coming. 

I  hope  to  commission  the  remaining  35  DDs,  3  AOs  &  36  SS — another  per- 
sonnel nightmare  for  the  fleet — but  I  simply  couldn't  do  it  before. 

Here's  hopin. 

Betty. 


^^ 


940       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

I.,       /   /     (^-^      ■■•*■-■  ■    1"^ 


CinC  File  No.  UNfRD  STATES  FLMT 

U.  S.  S.  PENNSYLVANIA,  FUoklp 

CONFIPaCTIAL  Lahalna  Roads,  T.  H. 

22  May  1940 

Dear  Betty: 

As  you  no  doubt  well  appreciate,  I  now  nust  plan  the 
Fleet  schedule  and  ejiploynient  for  the  next  few  months.  To  do 
this  intellicently,  however,  it  is  necessary  to  knov/  more  than 
I  know  not  about  why  we  are  here  and  hov/  long  we  will  probably 
stay.  I  realize  that  the  ansv/er  to  the  second  question  is 
lar^iely  dependent 'upon  the  first,  and  probably  also  upon  further 
developments,  but  nonetheless  I  should  have  something  to  go  on. 
?or  instance,  carryinc  out  even  a  curtailed  gunnery  schedule 
will  require  wholeasle  movements  of  targets,  tugs,  utility  planes, 
etc.,  from  the  Coast,  The  following  are  pertinent  questions: 

(a)  Are  we  here  primarily  to  influence  the  actions  of  other 
nations  by  our  presence,  and  if  so,  what  effect  would    ^ 
the  carryin;;  out  of  nor  Tin  1  training  (insofar  as  we  \y^^ 
can  under  the  lialtatlons  on  anchorages,  air  fields,  '' 
facilities  and  services)  have  on  this  purpose?  The 
effect  of  the  emergency  dool:ing  program  and  the  conse- 
quent absence  of  task  forces  during  the  training  period 
laust  also  be  considered, 

(b)  Are  we  here  as  a  stepping  off  place  for  belligerent     ,  -'• 
activity?  If  so,  we  should  devote  all  of  our  time  and   *•   , 
energies  to  preparing  for  war.  Tliis  could  more  effective- v'"' 
ly  and  expeditiously  be  accomplished  by  an  iunediate  re-   ,. 
turn  to  the  './est  Coast,  with  "freezing"  of  personnel, 
filling  up  couplenents,  dookin,-^  and  all  the  rest  of  it. 

■./e  could  return  here  upon  completion. 

As  it  is  now,  to  try  and  do  both  (a)  and  (b)  from  here 
and  at  the  sa:ne  ti.ie  is  a  diversification  of  effort  and  purpose 
that  can  only  result  in  the  accompli aliment  of  neither. 

If  we  are  here  to  develop  this  area  as  a  peacetime 
operatin;;;  base,  consideration  should  be  given  to  the  certain  de- 
crease in  the  efficiency  of  the  Fleet  and  the  lowering  of  morale 
that  ;aay  ensue,  due  to  inadequate  anchorages,  air  fields,  facili- 
ties, services,  recreation  conditions,  for  so  large  a  Fleet.  If 
only  peaceti:Tie  training  is  involved  should  the  Bureau  of  Naviga- 
tion and  I  not  be  advised  so  we  may  remove  restrictions  on  officer 
details? 


-1- 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  941 


CioC  File  No.  (JNITBD  STATtS  FLBBT 

U.  B.  S.  PENNSYLVANIA.  FUf^P 

COITFIDENTIAI. 


y 


The  answer  to  your  rroposal  to  retnin  the  ZITfTPT.ISS 
at  San  Dleco  Is  drjpendent  upon  the  answer  to  the  above  rue;tions, 

I  aji  returnlny  to.  Pearl  Harbor  with  the  Fleet  on  24 
ilay  to  renain  until  10  June  for  upiceep.   Durinc  the  first  week 
of  this  period,  on  the  assumption  that  v/e  are  here  for  norraal 
peacetLne  trainins,  I  will  coiplete  a  survey  of  what  is  available 
and  what  are  the  ainimu-n  additional  requireaents  in  the  v/ay  of: 

Auxiliary  air  fields  Aiiplane  services 

Targets  Athletic  fields  and  facilities 

Tugs  Provisions 

Utility  pianos  ?uel 

Upon  oo.apletion  of  this  survey  I  may  recom..iend  a  re- 
duction in  the  number  of  carriers  to  be  .laintained  in  tliis  area 
and  I  will  probably  request  the  allocation  of  funds  for  immediate 
work  on  auxiliary  air  fields  and  athletic  fields  and  facilities.  . 

Based  on  this  survey  and  additional  infomation  fro.a  you, 
I  may  modify  ny  orders  regardin.-;  the  shifting  of  tugs,  tenders, 
targets,  and  utility  planes  fron  San  Die^o  to  Pearl  Harbor. 

At  present  the  followins  are  under  orders  to  proceed  to 
Pearl  Harbor  leavlnj;  the  V/est  Coast  in  June  (except  UT/JI,  BOGGS, 
and  LAMBEKTON,  which  are  to  coae  upon  completion  of  overhaul  in 
July  or  August) : 

(a)  Bntlro  utility  wing,  including  drone  squadron,  less  Atron 
units  and  less  .iiinimuiii  base  units  for  continued  overhaul, 
and  for  aooeptanoe  of  new  units  (chiefly  new  drones). 
This  amounts  to  approximately  40  planes  and  300  personnel. 
The  sufficiency  of  present  facilities  for  repair  and  opera- 
tion of  these  is  questionable.  However,  without  practic- 
ally all  the  utility  wing  present  in  this  area  it  is  cer- 
tain that  the  gunnery  schedule  of  the  Fleet  will  be 
seriously  curtailed. 

(b)  Three  battle  towing  targets  and  four  series  60  high 
speed  sleds,  and  a  number  of  seiM.es  40  high  speed  sleds, 
are  to  toe  towed  or  carried  to  the  Hawaiian  area  by  Base 
Force  tu^s  and  other  tes«  Force  ressels  noted  in  (o)  and 
(4). 

(o)  MXDDSA,  lISLVIlUtj  wlHTKIY,  DWaBY,  ELLIOT,  and  UTAH, 
B006S,  aoA  liUBXRTOM,  oa  aoaplatlon  of  overhaul. 


lU, 


942       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


i 


CinC  File  No.  UNITED  STATES  FLEET 

U.  S.  S.  PENNSYLVANIA.  FlacaUp 

co:tI3:^ti/j. 

(d)  One  oil  bar^e  and  one  garbage  lir^ter,  and  five  tugs. 

If  the  Fleet  is  to  reraain  here  and  carry  out  normal 
peacetime  training  it  will  be  conducive  to  efficiency  of  adminis- 
tration, to  the  carrying  out  of  eji-loyaent  schedules  and  to  the 
most  effective  use  of  services  and  operating  areas  if  the  ships 
and  services  of  the  Hawaiian  Detaclx-aent  are  incorporated  under 
their  norjial  type  connanders.  Unless  advised  to  the  contrary  by 
you  before  30  May,  this  will  be  done. 


In  any  event  and  \.hatever  the  future  holds,  we  serious- 
ly need  additional  enlisted  personnel.  V/e  should  no  longer  be 
content  to  operate  v;ith  any  vacancies  in  peacetime  allowance 
materially  below  our  needs  and  our  complement.   With  so  aany 
•  ships  building  and  other  ships  to  be  recoramissioned,  we  must  have 
.  '  many  additional  trained  men.   It  will  take  a  long  time  to  train 
."  them.   I  urge  that  all  training  stations  be  operated  to  full 
<'\  - .  capacity.  Trained  men  are  fully  as  important  as  additional  mater- 
'*  •  ^\>'  ial  and  equipment. 

■»  >  If  we  are  in  the  preliminary  stage  of  preparation  for 

f  )'  belligerent  action  our  ships  should  be  fully  iianned  by  the  most 

competent  available  officer  personnel.  Peacetime  shifting  of 
officer  personnel  should  ce<ise.  With  my  laclc  of  knowledge  of  the 
Department's  purposes  and  intentions,  I  feel  that  we  may  work  at 
cross  purposes,-  and  the  whole  matter  of   officer  personnel  changes  ,s*" 
may  become  most  confused.  y'   ^ 

.'.  '  iv^'"-^ 
With  kindest  regards. 


Sincerely  yours,  jJ^' 


Admiral  H.  R.  Stark,  U.  3.  Navy 
Chief  of  Naval  Operations 
Navy  Department 
'■Yashington,  D.  C. 


UK. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  943 

/Secret  '       27  May  1940. 

Deab  jo  :  Yours  of  the  22nd  just  received.  I  shall  endeavor  to  answer  It  para- 
grapii  Dy  paragrapa.  Fuse,  nowever,  1  would  liJce  to  say  tliat  I  know  exactly 
wiiat  you  are  up  against,  ana  to  tell  you,  that  here  in  the  Departmeut  we  are  up 
agaiusc  tiie  same  imug. 

Wuy  are  you  iu  tne  Hawaiian  Area? 

Answer :  You  are  tiiere  because  of  the  deterrent  effect  which  it  is  thought  your 
presence  may  have  on  tne  Japs  going  into  the  East  indies.  In  pievious  leiiers  I 
have  hooked  this  up  witii  tiie  Iiaiians  going  into  tne  war.  The  conuection  is  that 
With  Italy  in,  it  is  thought  the  Japs  might  teei  just  that  much  freer  to  take  inde- 
penueut  action.  Vv'e  believe  botii  ine  ijeimaus  and  the  Iialians  have  told  tne  Japs 
tuat  so  far  as  they  are  concerned  she,  Japan,  has  a  free  hand  m  the  Duicu  Jiiast 
Indies. 

Your  natural  question  may  follow — well,  how  about  Italy  and  the  war?  1  cau 
state  tliat  we  have  had  Italy  going  into  the  war  on  24  hours  notice  on  several 
diuerent  occasions  auring  the  last  two  weeks  from  sources  of  information  which 
looked  authentic.  Others  have  stated  that  it  would  occur  within  the  next  ten 
days.  I  have  stated  personally  that  cold  logiC  would  dictate  Ler  not  going  in  for 
some  time.  It  is  anybody's  guess.  It  may  be  decided  by  the  time  this  reacnes  you. 
Events  are  moving  fast  in  Northern  France. 

The  above  in  itself  shows  you  how  indefinite  the  situation  is. 

Along  the  same  line  as  the  first  quesiion  presented  you  would  naturally  ask — 
suppose  the  Japs  do  go  into  the  East  Indies?  What  are  we  go>ng  to  do  about  it? 
My  answer  is  that  is,  I  don't  know  and  I  think  there  is  nobody  on  God's  green 
earth  who  can  tell  you.  I  do  know  my  own  arguments  with  regard  to  this,  both 
in  the  White  House  and  in  the  State  Department,  are  in  line  with  the  thougnts 
contained  in  your  recent  letter. 

I  would  point  out  one  thing  and  that  is  that  even  if  the  decision  here  were  for 
the  U.  S.  to  take  no  decisive  action  if  the  Japs  should  decide  to  go  into  the  Datch 
East  Indies,  we  must  not  breathe  it  to  a  soul,  as  by  so  doing  we  would  completely 
nullify  the  reason  for  your  presence  in  the  Hawaiian  area.  Just  remember  that 
the  Japs  don't  know  what  we  aie  going  to  do  and  so  loing  as  they  don't  know  they 
may  hesitate,  or  be  deterred.    These  thoughts  I  have  kept  very  secret  here. 

[2]  The  above  I  think  will  answer  the  question  "why  you  are  there".  It 
does  not  answer  the  question  as  to  how  long  you  will  probably  stay.  Rest  assured 
that  the  minute  I  get  this  information  I  will  commun.cate  it  to  you.  Nobody  can 
answer  it  just  now.  Like  you,  I  have  asked  the  question,  and  also — like  you — I 
have  been  unable  to  get  the  answer. 

I  realize  what  you  are  up  against  in  even  a  curtailed  gunnery  schedule.  I  may 
say  that  so  far  as  the  Department  is  concerned  you  are  at  liberty  to  play  with 
the  gunnery  schedule  in  any  way  you  see  fit,  eliminating  some  practices  for  the 
time  being  and  substituting  others  which  you  may  consider  important  and  which 
you  have  the  means  at  hand  to  accomplish.  Specifically  if  you  want  to  cut  short 
range  battle  practice  and  proceed  with  long  range  practices  or  division  practices 
or  experimental  or  anything  else,  including  anti-air,  etc.,  etc.,  which  you  think 
will  be  to  the  advantage  of  the  Fleet  in  its  present  uncertain  status — go  ahead. 
Just  keep  us  informed. 

We  have  told  you  what  we  are  doing  about  ammunition ;  we  will  attempt  to 
meet  any  changes  you  may  desire. 

We  have  given  you  a  free  hand  in  recommending  ships  to  come  back  to  the 
Coast  for  docking,  etc. 

You  ask  whether  you  are  there  as  a  stepping  off  place  for  belligerent  activity? 
Answer :  obviously  it  might  become  so  under  certain  conditions  but  a  definite 
answer  cannot  be  given  as  you  have  already  gathered  from  the  foregoing. 

I  realize  what  you  say  about  the  advantages  of  returning  to  the  West  Coast 
for  the  pui*pose  of  preparation  at  this  time  is  out  of  the  question.  If  you  did 
return  it  might  nullify  the  principle  reasons  for  your  being  in  Hawaii.  This  very 
question  has  been  brought  up  here.  As  a  compromise,  however,  you  have  authority 
for  returning  ships  to  the  Coast  for  docking,  taking  ammunition,  stores,  etc.,  and 
this  should  help  in  any  case. 

As  to  the  fret  zing  of  personnel : — Nimitz  has  put  the  personnel  problem  before 
you.  I  will  touch  on  it  only  to  the  extent  that  I  have  been  moving  Heaven  and 
Earth  to  get  our  figure  boosted  to  170.000  enl'sted  men  (or  even  possibly  172,300) 
and  34,Oro  marines.  If  we  get  these  authorzed  I  believe  you  will  be  comfortable 
as  regards  numbers  of  men  for  this  coming  year.  I  know  the  convulsion  the  Fleet 
had  to  go  through  to  commission  the  64  destroyers  and  some  other  ships  recently. 


944       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

I  am  thankful  that  convulsion  is  over.  I  hope  the  succeeding  one  may  be  as  light 
as  possible  and  you  may  rest  assured  that  Navigation  will  do  everything  it  can 
to  lessen  this  unavoidable  burden  on  the  Forces  Afloat. 

I  had  hoped  your  time  in  the  Hawaiian  area  would  have  some  indirect  or  inci- 
dental results  regardless  of  anything  else,  such  as — 

(a)  Solving  the  logistic  problems  involved,  including  not  only  supplies 
from  the  U.  S.  but  their  handling  and  storage  at  Pearl  Harbor. 

(b)  Training,  such  as  you  might  do  under  war  conditions. 

[3]         (c)   Familiarity  of  Task  Forces  with  the  Midway,  Aleutian,  Palmyra, 
Johnston,  Samoa  general  area,  in  so  far  as  may  be  practicable. 

(d)  Closer  liaison  with  the  Army  and  the  common  defense  of  the  Hawaiian 
area  than  has  ever  previously  existed  between  Army  and  Navy. 

(e)  Solving  of  communication  problems  involved  by  joint  action  between 
Army  and  Navy  and  particularly  stressing  the  air  communications. 

(f )  Security  of  the  Fleet  at  anchor. 

(g)  Accentuating  the  realization   that  the  Hawaiian   group  consists  of 
considerably  more  than  just  Oahu. 

You  were  not  detained  in  Hawaii  to  develop  the  area  as  a  peacetime  operating 
base  but  this  will  naturally  flow  to  a  considerable  extent  from  what  you  are  up 
against. 

As  to  the  decrease  in  the  eflSciency  of  the  Fleet  and  the  lowering  of  morale 
due  to  inadequate  anchorages,  air  fields,  facilities,  service,  recreation  conditions, 
for  so  large  a  Fleet  ;♦ 

I  wish  I  could  help  you.  I  spent  some  of  my  first  years  out  of  the  Naval  Academy 
in  the  West  Indies, — I  remember  the  last  port  I  was  in  after  a  22  month  stay 
and  where  we  didn't  move  for  6  months ;  and  there  was  not  even  one  white  person 
in  the  place.  The  great  antidote  I  know  is  WORK  and  homemade  recreation  such 
as  sailing,  fishing,  athletics,  smokers,  etc.  You  can  also  move  Task  Forces  around 
a  good  deal  for  seagoing  and  diversion ;  just  so  you  be  ready  for  concentrations 
should  such  become  necessary.  We  will  solve  the  oil  situation  for  you  for  all  the 
cruising  you  feel  necessary. 

In  my  letter  of  May  22nd  I  mentioned  the  possibility  of  moving  some  units  of 
the  Fleet  to  the  Atlantic.  This  might  be  a  small  movement,  or  it  might  grow  to 
a  modified  Rainbow  No.  1, — modified  as  to  assumptions  and  as  to  the  distribution 
of  the  forces.  In  other  words,  a  situation  that  we  might  be  confronted  with 
would  be  one  in  which  the  Italian  and  German  Fleets  would  not  be  free  to  act, 
but  might  be  free  to  send  a  cruiser  or  so  to  the  South  Atlantic.  In  such  a  case 
there  would  be  no  need  to  send  very  extensive  forces  to  the  Atlantic,  and  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  Fleet  in  the  Pacific  would  maintain  its  stabilizing  influence. 

Units  that  might  be  called  to  the  Atlantic,  under  such  a  modified  Rainbow 
situation,  to  provide  for  conditions  that  now  appear  possible,  would  be  a  division 
of  cruisers,  a  carrier,  a  squadron  of  destroyers,  possibly  a  light  mine  layer  division 
possibly  Patrol  Wing  One,  and  possibly,  but  more  unlikely,  a  division  of  submarines 
with  a  tender. 

If  you  desire  to  have  task  groups  visit  the  Aleutians,  and  the  islands  in  the 
mid-Pacific  and  south  Pacific  somewhat  distant  [^]  from  Hawaii,  the 
possibility  of  such  a  call  being  made, — for  the  detachment  of  such  a  force  to  the 
Atlantic — should  be  borne  in  mind. 

Also,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind,  in  connection  with  any  movements  of  Navy 
units  to  the  southward  that  a  situation  might  arise  which  would  call  for  visits  to 
French  or  British  possessions  in  these  areas.  We  will  strive  to  keep  you  informed 
on  these  points  as  the  situation  changes  or  develops. 

I  believe  we  have  taken  care  of  your  auxiliary  air  fields  by  granting  authority 
for  leases  and  I  may  add  that  we  are  asking  for  authority  to  do  something  perma- 
nent in  this  connection  in  bills  which  we  now  have  pending  before  the  Congress 
and  which  should  be  acted  upon  within  the  next  two  weeks. 

Fleet  Training  has  recently  sent  you  a  letter  with  regard  to  targets  and  target 
practice  facilities  in  general.  We  will  do  everything  we  can  to  assist  you  in 
this  situation  and  I  trust  that  something  permanent  will  come  out  of  it  so  that  in 
future  situations  of  this  kind  the  14th  District  will  be  much  better  off. 

Regarding  the  carrier  situation,  we  are  prepared  to  go  along  with  you  on 
whatever  you  decide  is  best  after  you  complete  your  survey. 

Regarding  splitting  the  Hawaiian  Detachment  back  into  its  normal  type  com- 
mands:— We  will  naturally  leave  this  matter  entirely  in  your  hands.  If  a  part 
of  the  Fleet  is  brought  to  the  Atlantic  Coast,  or  if  the  main  part  of  the  Fleet  is 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  945 

recalled  to  the  West  Coast,  It  may  well,  In  any  case,  be  necessary  to  formulate  a 
task  force  for  retention  in  Hawaii  different  from  the  composition  of  the  present 
Hawaiian  Detachment. 

This  letter  is  rather  rambling  and  practically  thinking  out  loud  as  I  have  read 
yours.  Incidentally  it  should  be  read  in  connection  with  my  letter  to  you  of 
22  May  wherein  was  outlined  the  possibilities  of  having  to  send  some  ships  to  the 
Atlantic ;  and  which  you  had  not  received  when  you  wrote. 

I  would  be  glad  if  you  would  show  Admiral  Bloch  this  and  also  my  last  letter — 
as  I  want  to  keep  him  informed. 

Rest  assured  that  just  as  soon  as  I  can  give  you  anything  more  specific  I  will. 
Meanwhile  keep  cheerful  and  with  every  good  wish  as  ever 
Sincerely, 

/s/    Betty. 
Admiral  J.  O.  Richardson,  TJ8N, 

Commander  in  Chief,  U.  S.  Fleet, 

U8S  "PENNSYLVANIA,"  Pearl  Harbor,  Haumii. 
P.  S.    The  European  situation  is  extremely  critical.    Italy  may  act  by  5  June 
which  seems  to  be  another  deadline  drawn  on  information  which  once  again  looks 
authentic.    However,  it  still  is  a  guess. 


946       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Secret  June  22,  1940. 

Dear  JO :  Ynur  trip  to  Washington  was  held  in  abeyance  because  of  uncer- 
tainty as  to  tiie  movements  of  the  fleet  in  the  immediate  future.  Tentatively 
decision  has  been  made  for  the  fleet  to  remain  for  the  present  where  it  is.  This 
decision  may  be  changed  at  any  tinie.  It  rests  partly  upon  the  question  as  to 
what  happens  to  the  French  fleet.  On  this  last  there  is  no  definite  and  final 
information  as  yet. 

So  all  1  can  say  is  that  the  fleet  must  stay  in  a  condition  of  complete  readiness. 
By  now  you  will  have  received  my  last  letter,  in  which  in  reply  to  your  question 
I  stated  I  thought  it  would  be  best  for  you  to  concentrate  your  planning  energies 
on  a  distribution  of  task  forces  to  provide  for  the  problems  of  Rainbow  1  modified 
by  those  set  up  in  Rainbow  4.     This  picture  is  as  yet  unchanged. 

The  floating  dry  dock  from  New  Orleans  has  recently  completed  the  transit  of 
the  Panama  Canal,  and  is  being  reassembled  for  towing  on  to  Pearl  Harbor  as 
originally  planned.  A  few  days  ago  the  question  was  brought  up  as  to  whether 
or  not  this  plan  would  be  carried  out.  After  giving  it  some  reconsideration,  we 
decided  to  go  ahead  and  take  the  dock  on  to  Honolulu  as  it  would  be  needed 
there  to  care  for  the  forces  that  nnist  be  maintained  in  the  Honolulu  area  in  any 
case. 

Guaritanamo  is  receiving  considerable  development.  In  addition  to  air 
fields  on  both  sides  of  the  Bay.  we  are  increiising  the  gun  defenses  by  four  6" 
guns  and  four  3"  antiairciaft  guns.  In  the  near  future  we  will  send  about  105 
additional  Marines,  and  somewhat  later,  when  its  training  has  been  completed, 
we  will  send  down  a  Marine  Defense  Battalion  of  about  750  men. 

I  am  also  endeavoring  to  get  two  transports  ready  for  the  use  of  the  Marines 
in  the  immediate  future,  one  for  the  Atlantic  (probably  Caribbean)  and  one  for 
the  Pacific.  We  plan  to  load  these  transports  with  combat  units  of  the  Fleet 
Marine  Force  .so  that  they  will  be  strategically  ready  for  innnediate  use,^ — such 
a  tran.sport  full  of  Marines  and  equipment  can  be  dispatched  to  a  needed  task 
in  the  same  manner  as  we  now  dispatch  a  cruiser. 

We  recently,  as  you  read  in  the  papers,  introduced  a  bill  expanding  the  Navy 
suffciently  to  provide  for  major  tasks  simultaneously  in  both  oceans,  and  of  a 
strength  that  will  peiinit  us  at  all  times  to  have  strong  forces  in  each  ocean. 
It  is  not  our  intention  to  have  a  permanent  Atlantic  fleet  somewhat  disassociated 
fi'om  the  permanent  Pacific  fleet.  However,  there  will  necessarily  be  some  de- 
centralization in  fleet  command.     We  can  talk  this  over  when  you  come  East. 

AiK)ther  subject  to  take  up  with  you  is  the  question  of  basing  the  fleet  units 
that  might  be  brought  to  the  Atlantic — using  Caribbean  bases,  primarily — Cris- 
tobal, Guantanamo  and  othei'S. 

This  is  the  first  of  an  attempt  to  write  you  a  weekly  letter.  Hope  they  may 
l)rove  to  be  of  some  use  to  you. 

All  good  wishes. 
Sincerely, 

/S/    BETTT. 

Admiral  J.  O.  Richardson.    U.  S.  N. 
Commander  in  Chief,  U.  S.  Fleet, 

U.8.8.  "Pennsylranin."  e/o  Postmaster, 

San  Francisco,  California. 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE 


947 


Lahaina  Roads,  T.H. 
82  June  1940 


Dear  Betty: 

The  enclosures  are  self-explanatory,  and  caused 
me  to  send  confidential  despatch  220603, 

To  clarify  the  situation,  I  flew  to  Pearl  yes- 
terday and  held  a  conference  with  Andrews,  Bloch,  and 
General  Herron,  conLuandinc  the  Hawaiian  Department. 
Briefly,  on  17  June,  due  to  the  "Alert"  froin  the  './or 
Depart  lent,  the  Army  issued  live  aMiinition  to  all 
posts  iricludinG  A. A.  batteries,  etc.,  and  established 
a  patrol  and  -uard  over  all  critical  areas,  which  are 
considered  by  then  to  be,  all  landing  beaches,  land 
areas  (bridees,  roads,  etc.)  and  Fearl  Harbor  (Marines) 
Their  directive  included  a  proviso  that  all  despatches 
were  to  be  sent  in  cole  via  cable  to  the  Chief  of 
Staff  and  that  the  public  in  Honolulu  were  not  to  be 
excited,  hence  no  Army  was  stationed  at  waterv/orks, 
electric  light  plant,  gas  or  telephone  companies,  but 
extra  precautions  were  taken  by  these  latter. 

I     The  navy  increased  their  distant  Dl>»ne  patrol 
fro.a  130  miles  to  300  miles  and  enlarged  the  sector 
being  covered  to  include  from  180°  to  360°,  as  well 
as  establishing  a  30  mile  inner  patrol. 

Two  days  later,  the  Army  received  word  to  "ease 
up  on  the  Alert",  but  to  maintain  guard  on  all  criti- 
cal areas  on  a  seni -permanent  basis.   V/e  did  not 
know  aliout  this,  until  General  Herron  mentioned  it 
at  the  conference  in  reply  to  my  query  as  to  how  long 
the  Alert  would  continue.  General  Herron  stated  that 
he  niicht,  on  the  24th,  further  modify  his  present 
interpretation  of  the  "nodified  alert". 

As  a  matter  of  interest,  Herron  said  he  had 
been  asked  if  he  could  store  crude  rubber  and  tin 
to  the  extent  of  600,000  cubic  feet  (his  ficures) 
and  furtlier  that  no  such  storage  space  was  available. 


//«- 


79716  O— 46— pt.  14- 


948       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


/ 


COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 


Adi.iiral  Stark  -  2 


The  Array  "Alert"  and  action  taken  caused  me 
some  concern  though  I  felt  positive  that  any  Array 
intellisence  bearing  on  the  above  would  be  avail- 
able to  and  evaluated  by  the  l!avy,  with  information 
to  lie.   Of  course,  anythinc  of  this  character  tends 
to  a^-ravate  the  tenseness  of  the  situation  and  to 
Interrupt  training,  as  the  Fleet  Is  operating  from 
Lahalna  and  Pearl  by  single  ships  and  groups  and 
without  the  full  screening  and  scouting  which  a 
more  serious  situation  would  necessitate. 

As  a  similar  situation  may  again  arise,  I 
believe  a  remedy  would  be  to  insure  that  where 
possible,  when  Joint  action  is  involved,  even  in 
drills,  that  the  Comianders  of  the  Army  and  Navy 
be  jointly  informed,  with  definite  infora  tlon  to 
rae  as  to  whether  the  alarm  is  real  or  simulated  for 
purposes  of  training. 


With  best  regards, 


J.  0.  RICIiARDSOU 


Admiral  H.  R,  Stark,  U.S.N. 
Navy  Department 
V/ashington,  D.  C. 


tct 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  949 

"copy 

S2CRET 

U.  S.  S.  IIIDIAI'IAPOLIS,  M 

^"^    .  Pearl  Harbor,  T.  H.  W^ 

y   •,,,-—  .   Tuesday,  18  June  1940.  '^ i/ 

Memo,  for  Co."unander-in-Chief ,  U,  S.  Fleet, 

Rear  Admiral  Bloch  visited  me  yesterday  stating  that  he 
had  just  been  informed  by  General  Herron,  in  secret,  that  he 
(Herron)  had  just  received  orders  from  the  /Var  Department  plac- 
ing Army  in  this  area  on  the  "Alert".   This  nws  done  with  special j 
e.-phasis  on  possible  carrier  and  plane  attacks.  He  asked  Bloch  J 
for  a  distant  air  patrol  and  inner  air  patrol. 

I  explained  to  Bloch  your  present  patrol  plan  and  informed 
him  that  I  would  establish  im,Tiediately  an  inner  patrol  which  I 
did  at  1300  yesterday  and  aa  continuing  same.  General  Herron 
desires  that  a  VP  patrol  be  established  covering  western  semi- 
circle with  Oahu  as  center  instead  of  present  VP  patrol  from 
Lahaina  which  as  you  know  covers  from  220  to  335  distance  180 
miles. 

I  agree  with  Herron  and  I  have  VP  to  establish  such  a 
patrol  which  must  begin  at  dav/n  each  day. 

I  have  discussed  this  matter  with  Fitch  who  is  ready  to 
start  when  you  give  the  order. 

I  have  also  informed  Rear  Admiral  Calhoun  In  secret. 

If  you  desire  this  patrol  established  in  lieu  of  present 
patrol  I  suggest  that  you  send  Combasefor  a  message  "Affirm 
patrol"  and  this  new  patrol  will  be  started  tomorrow.  Such  a 
patrol  is  pictured  as  below: 
o 


lt^-^jP.,,,JL 


'no 

Sector  to  be  searched  daily  -  V/estern  semi-circle.  The  Army  will 
cover  night  patrol,  leaving  us  day  patrol  only. 

Calhoun  and  I  are  awaiting  instructions. 

Respectfully, 

I   .       jr        V     # »/     /■/  Adolphus  Andrews   ^j^^. 

I  J^jL*^    /^^fC^^  ;A«u3W  ^  A.,.U%€^    *-^  >*-^  0fn4j,^p 


950       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

AJ~^Z2p0    (LOCAL  TIME)  ON  18  JUNE,  |940,  SENT  THE  FOLLOWING 
TO  COMMANDANT,  ^T*TtiJlAVAL  DISTRICT: 
SEC£ET^~-~~^ 
"■.VOULD  LIKE  TO  KNO.V  .VHETHER  REQUEST  OF  COMMANDING  GENERAL 
HAWAIIAN  DEPARTMENT  FOR  ADDITIONAL  AIR  PATROL  IS" A  PART  OF 
ARMY  EXERCISE  OR  IS  IT  BASED  UPON  INFORMATION  FROM  THE  WAR 
DEPARTMENT" 

AT  09»5  (LOCAL  TIME)  ON  19  JUNE,  1940,  THE  FOLLO.VING 
REPLY  WAS  RECEIVED: 

CONFIDENTIAL 

"REQUEST  OF  COMMANDING  GENERAL  .VAS  BASED  UPON  A  DIRECTIVE 
FROM  THE  WAR  DEPARTMENT  X  HE  HAS  NO  INFORMATION  AS  TO 
WHETHER  OR. NOT  IT  IS  AN  EXERCISE" 


IW/ 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  951 


SECRET  and  CCMMANDAOT  .(i>V^ 

PERSONAL  FOURTEENTH  NAVAL  DISTRICT  V^ ,-, 

PEARL  HARBOR,   T.H.  fV' 

20  June  1940 


Dear  Rlohardson: 

This  will  aoknowledee  receipt  of  your  letter  dated 
£0  June,  reoelved  by  pleine  this  morning;  I  note  the  contents 
thereof  and  will  oarrj   out  your  wishes  expressed  therein. 

General  Herron  received  a  dispatch  from  the  Weur  De- 
partment the  other  day  which  stated  in  substance:   "Alert  your 
forces  against  hostile  oversea  raid.  This  must  be  done  in  such 
a  way  as  to  prevent  newspaper  publicity  or  notice  of  foreign 
intelligence  tcents.  Department  suggests  that  you  do  this  on 
a  maneuver  basis  in  order  to  accomplish  the  above."  General 
Herron  brought  this  dispatch  down  to  me  and  told  me  he  was  tak- 
ing the  necessary  action  and  hoped  that  the  Navy  could  see  its 
way  clear  to  have  an  off-ohore  patrol  each  day  and  do  anything 
else  in  its  power.  I  consulted  Andrews  and  an  off-shore  and  in- 
shore patrol  around  Pearl  Harbor  has  been  arranged  concerning 
which  you  have  been  advised  by  Calhoun.  I  have  no  idea  of  how 
Ion;  this  situation  will  exist,  nor  as  to  the  gravity  thereof; 
for  two  days  I  had  out  the  Fleet  Marine  Foxoe  and  their  anti- 
aircraft guns  with  eunmunition.   I  called  them  in.  yesterday  inas- 
much as  it  was  necessary  to  keep  their  aramunltlon  under  tarpaulins 
in  the  vicinity  of  the  guns  and  this  did  not  look  like  a  very 
safe  practice  inasmuch  as  they  were  deployed  in  the  heart  of  the 
navy  yard.  My  idea  is,  if  something  more  definite  is  not  heeu'd 
by  Monday,  I  will  probably  put  them  out  again  on  Monday  and  on  a 
distant  station  somewhere  near  the  Army  guns. 

I  have  many  things  of  relative  importance  and  unimportance 
to  discuss  with  you.  Everything  goes  along  smoothly  and  busily, 
I  took  the  liberty  of  telling  Eddy  that  I  thought  he  should  go 
back  with  Rucker  in  the  plane  today  without  giving  him  any  reasons. 

With  my  warmest  regards. 

Sincerely, 

/s/  C.  C.  BLOCH. 

Admiral  J.  0.  Richardson,  U.S.N. , 
Commander-in-Chief,  United  States  Fleet, 
U.S.S.  PENNSYLVANIA,  Flagship. 


CCB;lrt 


/f^ 


952       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


CinC  Pile  No.  UNITED  STATES  FLEET 

U.  S.  S.  ENTERPRISE.  PlacOip 

AIR  :. AIL 

P^jQWAL  :ionolulu,   T.   i;. 

C0::7IJ'r::TIAL  18  Septenber  1940. 


D«ar  3etty: 

While  the  Secretary  v;as  on  board  the  2I«TEaruISS  he 
said  to  ne,  "Adiiral,  v;ill  you  co.ie  to  ./a::'.ilnjton  in  early 
October  while  you  are  on  the  Pacific  Coast?".   I  replied,  "I 
can  not  cone  to  Jashlnjton  except  under  orders,  but  if  Stark 
wants  to  see  r\e  I   suppose  I  ■.»ill  be  ordered." 

Just  before  leavinc  Fearl  Harbor  the  Secretary  said, 
"Ad.ilral,  I  will  tail:  to  Stark  and  it  is  ;>os3i"-^le  that  we  riay 
•..ant  you  to  coae  to  ./ashinctoa  for  a  conference."  I  replied, 
"I  v;ill  be  jlad  to  coie  any  tixe  I  a-:  wanted." 

I  do  not  know  of  any  benefit  to  the  IJavy  that  would 
accrue  froa  ay  coMn-  to  .»ashincton  as  I  fully  and  fran'cly  ex- 
pressed nj'  views  to  the  Secretary  on  all  points  where  I  felt 
that  such  expression  .li.'rlit  help  the  !Iavy  or  the  Uation.   I  also 
cave  hin  a  aenorandai  v/hich  covered  the  .r.ore  important  points 
discussed  -./ith  hi:n.  Nevertheless,  if  you  or  the  Secretary  want 
.-ne  to  CQsie  I  v^ill  be  pleased  to  do  so. 

During  the  past  six  aonths  the  Tleet  has  been  visited 
by  two  Secretaries.  Durine  the  last  visit  the  Secretary  made  a 
aost  favopaMe  Lipression  upon  the  officers  and  aen  of  the  Fleet 
and  I  hav«  frequently  heard  officers  say,  "I  hope  that  Colonel 
kQOX  renains  as  Secretary  regardless  of  the  outcojie  of  the  elec- 
tion." 

In  the  Fleet  we  did  all  we  could  to  show  both  Secre- 
taries what  wc  are,  what  we  are  doing,  and  ..hat  we  are  thinking. 
Recardleaa  of  whether  we  aade  a  ^^ood  impression  on  the  Secretary 
I  believe  that  it  v;ould  have  boosted  our  spirits  a  "it  if,  upon 
his  departure,  he  had  sent  a  dispatch  to  the  Fleet  in  these 
vmters  or  to  Cincus  enpressinc  sane  appreciation  of  our  efforts 
to  sha*  our  wares  or  approbation  of  our  endeavors  to  maintain  an 
efficient  Jleet.  Personally  I  feel  that  the  Fleet  aade  a  ,-ood 
inpreasion,  and  that  a  dispatch  would  have  been  sent  had  the 
Secretary  been  aoooapanied  by  a  conpetent  aide. 

Flcase  tall  lliaitz  that  hio  letter  of  30  August  re- 
Cardine  six-year  enllstaents  was  delivered  to  at  by  the  Secreteury's 
Aide  on  llonday  afteraoon  a  fev/  ainutes  before  the  Secretary  left 


-1- 


EXHIBITS    OF    JOINT    COMMITTEE 


953 


CinC  FiJe  No. 


v;o:.'.-:3-;tiai 


UNITED  STATES  FLEET 
U.  S.  8.  ENTERPRISE.  rUgaklp 


fhe   iiSt^r;!  ""   "''''   '  "^'   ^-^Tletei  r.y  serious   talks  with 
■.lit;,   iiiadest  rc-.-sir-'s    ar.;"   ^ect  v.iEh -s. 


Gincercly, 


/J    ,.    ...   / 


J.  c.  ■.ic;;a:. 


c.'.ier  of  i:aval   Operations, 


l."avy  Depart. ;tnt, 
.•asLlnjtor.,   D.   C. 


xlC 


954       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


^  ■■■■.; 

CinC  File  No.  UNITED  STATES  FLEET  \         '/ 

V.  S.  S.  ENTERPRISE,  Flagship 

At   S««,  .-• 

18  3«pt«Bb«r,   1940.  *'\.^^. 


4 


0-^ 


/ 


MBIORANDDU  TOR  THE  SBCRgTARTl 

1.  lb*  following  not«s  wr*  aubalttod  os  tb«  points  «tiloh 
we  dlaouated  In  my  effort  to  meet  your  wlahes  to  know  offloera, 
learn  about  ablpa  and  find  out  how  you  oould  aaalat  tbe  Fleet 'a 
preparation  for  war, 

s.  psr3onki;l 

(A)  Offloera. 

(a)  Promotion  by  Mleotlon  best  method  yet  derlaed*     ''^ 

(b)  Uembera  ahould  be  allowed  to  serve  on  two  suoeesslTe  / 
boards  if  oirouastanoes  render  it  adTlsable  (requires 
ehange  by  Oongress). 

(o)  Sea  duty  assignments  should  be  based  on  ability;  t&e  /t„^'T' 
most  proaising  officers  should  be  giren  preferenoe.  - 
This  would  tend  to  oreate  a  dlTision  of  offioers  into  J'{ 
two  olasses,  the  most  proaising  and  the  least  promis- 
ing, or  an  A  and  B  liat. 

(d)  Tbe  abuses  of  retirement  for  physioal  disability  and   ^ 
the  retention  on  active  duty  and  delayed  retirement  of 
the  physically  unfit  ahould  be  corrected. 

(B)  toll sted  Personnel « 

(a)  While  the  enlisted  strength  increased  ll,3i9  between 

25  May  and  15  August,  the  Fleet  in  the  Pacific  made  /V<-^' 
a  net  gain  of  only  about  600.  Our  enormous  expendi^  \$  ■■ 
turea  for  material  may  prove  futile  unleas  there  is  •]  ,  a' 
prompt  and  commensurete  personnel  expansion. 

(b)  The  bottleneck  of  the  training  stations,  limiting  the 
rate  of  acceptance  of  new  men,  ahould  be  eliminated 

at  once  and  emergency  expansion  should  begin  now  with-  ^ 
out  awaiting  deficiency  appropriations.  We  have  not    ' 
waited  for  specific  appropriatlona  in  providing  material 
ezpanalon,  and  it  is  difficult  to  underatand  or  explain 
to  the  Fleet  why  we  are  unable  or  unwilling  to  meet 
even  more  vital  problems  of  personnel  (involving  the 
imperative  necessity  of  raaklng  ready  what  we  already 
have  as  well  as  training  .-aen  for  new  construction) 
wTEE  equally  direct  and  effective  action.  I  estimate 


-1- 


:,l^ 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  955 


CinC  File  No.  UNITED  STATES  FLEET 

U.  S.  S.  ENTERPRISE,  Flagship 

th«  time  nooessary  to  oak*  •  modern  maa-of •war*  ■'•oaa  i 
•t  4  years.  Tou  oan  ese  the  neoeeslty  of  getting  ( 
itarted  on  thla  training  right  away. 

(C)  Separata  Air  Corpe. 

(a)  UnquestlonaDly  a  higher  degree  of  cooperation  will 
exist  between  our  Naval  air  ana  and  other  Ilaral  arms 
if  all  of  them  continue  to  be  intimately  bound  to- 
gether in  one  Navy. 

(b)  .ifltb  a  separate  air  corps  there  is  bound  to  develop    / 
a  loyalty  to  the  Corps  rather  than  to  the  Navy,  a 
Jealousy  between  the  Corps  and  the  rest  of  the  Navy, 
many  perplexing  problems  of  supply,  personnel,  ad* 
ministration,  and  above  all  a  serious  loss  in  effeet- 
iveneas. 

(o)  I  kxiow  of  no  advantage  to  the  Navy  or  the  Nation  that 
would  accrue  from  the  creation  of  a  Navtil  Air  Corps. 

3.   UitERia. 

(A)  Surfaoe^l^e. 

(a)  I  believe  new  construction  la  bein^j  expedited  as  much  'i-'--"1 
aa  Doaaibla.   ^Inalavars  are  naadad  for  /Ltlantlo  aoaat:.  i.^r'' 


as  possible,  minelayers  are  needed  for  Atlantic  Coast. 


/" 


(a)  Aircraft. 

(a)  A  tremendous  expansion  in  this  field  conplioated  by    n  /  O 
foreign  orders  as  well  as  by  our  deaands.  Airplanes,   ' /c^-^ 
either  for  sale  or  for  training,  should  not  be  obtained  k/^ 
at  the  expense  of  the  active  Fleet,  fleet  planes  mnst 
be  replaced  as  rapidly  as  possible,  with  new  planes, 
but  old  planes  cannot  be  taken  off  until  new  ones  are 
on  hand. 

(C)  Aiynunition. 

/    (a)  Build  up  the  maximum  reserve  possible  of  anti-aircraft  i^ 
aoLnunltion. 

4.   0PgR/Vri0N3 

(A)  Retention  of  the  fleet  in  the  Hawaiian  Area. 

(a)  From  a  purely  Kaval  point  of  view  there  are  many  die*  y "■- 

advantages  attached  to  basing  the  fleet  in  this  area,   '*-'-"' 
some  of  which  arei  A^:- 


956       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


line  File  No.  UNITED  STATES  FLEET 

I'.  S.  S.  ENTERPRISE.  FlaRship 

(1)  Difficulty •  delay  and  ooat  of  transpor^xim  m«a, 
munitions,  and  suppllaa. 

(2)  Inadequaoy  of  Labalna  aa  operating  anohora^e  dua  / 
to  laok  of  security. 

(S)  Inadequaoy  of  Pearl  Harbor  as  operating  anchor-    < 
age  due  to  difficulties  of  entry,  berthing  and 
departure  of  large  ships. 

(4)  Congested  and  restricted  operating  areas,  la  the  ^^ 

air  and  on  the  surface.  '"•^ 

(B)  Inadequate  facilities  for  fleet  serrloas,  train-  V^ -^ 
^  -  -  Ing,  recreation  and  housing.  o->.~^>^~''  -^,-/'"Z      '^" 

''        (6)  Prolonged  absences  from  mainland  of  officers  *nd^J^>rs 


/.../. 


V 


man  In  time  of  peace  adrersely  affects  morale.  *C^' 

In  case  of  war,  necessary  for  fleet  to  return  to 
fflOblllBatlon  ports  on  v/ast  Coast  or  accept  partial 
and  unorganized  mobilisation  measures  resulting 
in  confusion  and  a  net  loss  of  time. 

hi <>   (b)  If  the  disposition  of  the  Tleet  were  determined  solely 
by  Naral  considerations  the  major  portion  of  the  Fleet 
ahoiU.d  return  to  its  normal  Pacific  Coast  bases  becausa 
such  basing  would  facilitate  its  training  and  its  pra» 
paration  for  war. 


.1.  .. 


(e)  If  factors  other  than  purely  Haral  ones  are  to  influa&at 
the  decision  as  to  where  the  fleet  should  be  based  at 
I   this  time,  the  Baral  factors  should  be  fully  presented 
/  and  carefully  considered,  as  well  as  the  probable  af- 
fect of  the  deciaion  on  the  readiness  of  the  fleet.  la 
other  words,  is  it  more  important  to  lend  strength  to 
diplonatic  representations  in  the  Pacific  by  basing 
the  neet  in  the  Hawaiian  Area,  than  to  facilitate  its 
preparation  for  actire  service  in  any  area  by  basing 
the  major  part  of  it  on  normal  Pacific  Coast  basest 

(d)  In  case  our  relations  with  another  Pacific  Ration  de- 
teriorate, what  is  the  State  Department's  conception 
of  our  naoct  moreT  Does  it  belicTe  that  the  rieet  is 
now  mobilised  and  that  it  could  embark  on  a  campaign 
directly  froa  Hawaii  or  safely, conduct  neeesaary  traia- 


ZfC 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  957 


CinC  File  No.  I'MTKO  STATES  FLEET 

I     S.  S.  ENTERPRISE,  FlaRship 

Ing  froQ  the  Inaeoure  anohorai3e  at  Lahalna  which  li 

2000  miles  nearer  ena^y  eubaiarlne  bases  than  our       ,' 

^_  normal  Paolflo  Coast  bases?  J 

5.   SHORE  ESTAJLISHtraiT 

(•)  I  hope  you  will  be  constantly  on  guard  not  to  have  the 
position  and  purpose  of  the  Shore  Establishment  orer- 
•mphaslzed.  It  has  only  one  purpose  -  the  support, 
malntonanoe  and  auguientation  of  the  fighting  71eet.   ^ 
It  oannot,  of  Itself,  damage  an  enamy.   It  is  onlf 
human  that  some  of  those  in  Washington  and  long  re- 
fflored  from  the  active  Fleet,  (predominantly  staff  corps) 
frequently  fail  to  Tieuallze  the  correct  priority  of 
obJectlTes. 


6,   MATY  PUBLICITY 


k^.-^ 


Practically  all  Nary  Publicity,  hearings  before  com-  -rf-*^^ 


mittees,  speeches  in  Confess  and  handouts  from  the  Nary  Depart- j**^^ 


ment  hare  stressed  one  or  more  of  the  follov^ing  ideas i        c*-*j'^ 

(a)  The  Navy  is  built  for  defense.  ,^^1^^ r^ 

(b)  A  so-called  adequate  Nary  will  keep  us  out  of  war.    ♦— -^l 

(o)  With  an  adequate  Navy  we  can  impose  our  will  upon  the  Jh''~'~- 
Nations  of  the  earth  with  little  danger  of  becaaia^    / 
inTolTed  in  war. 

(d)  In  the  unhappy  erent  of  war  the  71e«t  is  a  kind  of 

mobile  Uaglnot  Line  behind  which  the  people  »an  reside 
in  peace  with  no  obligation  to  their  Oountry  ezeept 
to  promise  that  their  descendants  will  some  day  pay 
for  the  NaTy. 

(•)  The  Tleet  is  fully  oaimed,  fully  trained  and  raady  to 
fight  at  the  drop  of  a  bat. 

(f)  Tbe  ecraparatlTe  sttangth  of  navies  is  aaasured  solaly 
by  oaterial  thing*. 

(g)  Aviation  is  a  cheap  aeans  of  defense  and  that  largo 
nuabers  of  planes  and  pilots  will  render  the  nation 
seeure. 

(h)  Outlying  Haval  bas*s  and  air  fields,  In  theaselves  ar« 
weapons  of  defense* 


Z/t 


958       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


.CinC  RIe  No.  UNITED  STATES  FLEET 

V.  S.  S.  ENTERPRISE.  Flagahip 

"Ri*  tfp*  Of  publlolty  a*ntlo&«4  •bora  is  wroac  iB 
that  It  tKOda  to  lull  the  publia  Into  a  false  Mna«  of  ••eurltr* 
Zt  turda  to  «aakan  thalr  aoral  fibra  and  to  oraato  an  uahaalthy 
national  aorala  in  a  ooimtry  ubioh  amj  ba  drawn  Into  war  on  yrj   / 
short  notice,  for  a  people,  who  may  aotually  ba  InrelTaA  in    Y 
war  in  a  oooparatlTely  short  tiae,  to  ba  told  that  tliay  ean  riak 
war  without  danger  or  wage  war  without  riak,  aay  be  fatally 
datrlnaatal  to  the  determined  proseoution  of  the  rery  war  to* 
wards  whioh  sueh  oonoeptlona  ineritably  lead.  At  the  baeinning 
of  the  present  war,  the  JPreneh  and  British  had  just  these  ideas, 
with  the  present  result. 

7.    cggi^giojr^DgT.yeKW  exkcot^ve.  3T/.ct.  war  m^  navt 

(a)  Whether  Justified  or  not,  I  ean  not  escape  the  feeling  '^^ 
that  the  coordination  and  mutual  understanding  Isetween  the  above  i^ 
dapartnenta  of  the  Rorernaent  is  not  as  close  as  la^eoessary  for 

affeotire  action.  2^-3^;  ^.'^^ '; -^.'^'7-'^^^:  ^  ,i^'J:.?ik^-i  ri^^J^^.- 

(b)  Before  reaching  a  declalon  aa  to  the  disposition  and  moTe«  '^'- 
nents  of  the  ?laat,  or  units  thereof,  is  the  Navy  Department  oon«  y^. 
•ulted,  are  ita  tIcws  frankly  and  forcibly  prasentetl,  and  are  its  ^^ 
representotions^horoushly  understood  and  considered? 

(c)  Present  policy  arpears  to  be  headed  towarde  forcing  our  ,^:-— . 
will  upon  another  laoiflo  ration  by  diplocaatic  representations   >'  ''■ 

^  '  y   aupported  by-«oonr>uio  maasut'es,  a  large  loaterial  iiaTj'  in  process/ <-'-'.' 
'' ,  >   of  construction,  and  the  disposition  of  an  inade<iuataly  manned  '/"''  '' 


■/-' 


Fleet  in  beinr..  Can  this  be  done  and  are  we  prepared  to  face    LI— 
war  or  the  inevitable  lose  or  preatice  if  it  cannot?  HaTe  the 
objectiveb  of  buo^  a  war  boe:i  foraulated,  and  its  costs  con- 
sidered and  caapared  with  the  rulue  of  victory?  Oaa  auoh  a  war 
be  won  by  defensive  measures  or  by  a  people  trained  to  believe 
that  the  ITavy  is  for  flefenslve  puri'Oaeo  only,  and  that  their 
whole  oblicatioit  to  t'.eir  country  can  be  met  by  the  payment  of 
taxes? 

(d)  the  Couoander-in-Chief  haa  no  responsibility  for  the 
form«U.ation  of  national  policy,  but  he  has  a  definite  responai- 
bility  for  the  efflolenoy  of  one  axra  upon  whioh  thr  novernmant 
relies  to  enforce  llatlonal  policy,  whon  Its  alms  can  not  bo  se-  ^ 
cured  by  diplomatic  moans.  !:e  aust  be  conoarned  over  the  question 
as  to  whether  the  strength  and  efflolenoy  of  the  I'leet  are  coq- 
mensurate  with  the  a/^sreBolve  policy  of  the  adninletration  in 
the  Pacific.  Especially  so  if  thero  Is  a  possibility  that  this 


•8- 


;t& 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  959 


CinC  Fil«  No.  UNITED  STATES  FLEET 

U.  S.  S.  ENTERPRISE.  FUfiklp 


polioj  will  r«auir«  lapl«iMnt«tiOB« 


(•)  if  ebJ«otiT«a  b«liie  fomulatfld  aad  pitas- auBt  for  eov 
•otlT*  partlolMtion  In  tb«  Iurop««n  w%x1   -ff*  eumot  lon«  r«aaiB 
h«lf  in  and  half  out  of  luob  •  «wr.  Wo  ohould  dooldo  now  on  4»* 
flnlt*  objeotlTOS  and  piano  and  ahoold  not  aaauaa  that  «•  will   ^ 
fight  tfaia  on*  Ilka  wa  did  tha  laat,  i.o.,  by  aandine  arlatiOB  ly^    i 
and  light  foroaa  for  aotlra  partleipation  and  utilliing  our   ^^v-^^v 
baary  ahlps,  In  seoura  hoaa  baaaa,  largaly  aa  training  ahlpa*    "^^^^ 
Suoh  a  oouraa  would  ioaobiliie  our  baary  ahipa,  whlob  ara  mo»%    /^C^^-*^ 
aortalnly  going  to  ba  naedad  althar  in  tha  Atlantlo  or  tha  ?»• 
olfle,  dapending  on  tha  prograaa  of  tha  war. 


^^.,,—JU--/jL<J^.<LA~sU-^ 


•ft- 

Z7( 


960  .     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


v..  t 


DSPiRTr.an'  of  thk  navt 

OKFICS  OF  THE  SBCRBTART 
WA3HIKCT0N 

I 
{.aeORANIXK.  FOR  THK  SKCRXTUnr 

Important  itams  to  b«  discussed   in  the  Dvparteent. 


Uedlterran«an  Study.    -^  ' 

Joint  Board,    (idnlral  Start)  "       -  ^     '  ■■* 

Dafaiisaa  and  dsTelopmants  for  new  bases.       Atlantic.     '^^ '    -•/' "-f  ' 
UUlarground  storage,  auxiliary  landing  fields,  eto. 
Will  defense  be  entire  responsibility  of  Navy  or 
will  irmy  be  inTolTsd?  —  -^  >-  >•■/  *->-—      '■^■•-  tL. 
(Idmirel  Stark. )  77-    ---/">'  ■ -^ 

Personnel  inorease.   >" >■  <*■  ■■  -    ."t  r<^'-'-  J- > *»'"■♦'••' *" 

(President,  after  dlsoussion  with  idmlral  Staik, 
idmirel  Nialts.) 


.1.:. 


<:«. 


4»     Fleet  n«lnlng.     Present  training  too  elMnentsry  sad 
oautlous.       What  steps  to  make  more  adTaneed? 
(idmlral  Stazk) 

S.     Oreater  target  practice,  SBBunltion  allowance  'y<(.j-   ^  .;tl\  i' 

and  more  drone  praetioe.       Ships  with  war  aoinunitlon 
allowance  cannot  carry  sufficient  target  practice 
annunition.       idditionsl  ajmunition  ships  urgently 
and  constantly  needed.  —  3-  '"»-^-  /  ♦^^  :    -  -*•-•" 
(idmlral    Stark) /t^  v.     >.vv  i /•-■  -^ 

6.  Great  weakness  in  fast  auxiliaries.  What  steps  for  -<J,>-'^ ''"r"'^^ 
early  procurement  of  fast  and  adequate  numbers  of  (\t-i  ''■'-/  ^'  ' 
suxliiaries  to  cover  all  probable  Fleet  anployment? 

(idmlral  Stark  -  idmlral  Bobinson)  * 

-   7.       Mine  laying  by  airplanes.     What  Is  oontaaiplated?    -/■> 'v.;  •>-.-/ '-'-^^» 
(iteiral  Towers  -  Admiral  Staiic)  ^r^t^-x-'-tA^'^""'  -^ 


x^c. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  961 

24  September  1940. 
Deab  jo  :  I  am  working  on  a  letter  for  you  but  will  send  you  a  copy  of  luy 

letter  to  Pei-k  ;  it  is  self-explanatory. 

I  meant  simply  to  mention  Faulkner  but  got  into  something  a  little  more 
serious. 

Frankly,  I  do  not  like  the  look  of  things  any  too  well.  Spent  over  three  hours 
in  the  State  Department  yesterday — something  over  two  in  the  morning  with 
Mr.  Hull,  Welles  and  Hornbeck,  and  then  again  in  the  afternoon  over  an  hour 
with  Mr.  Welles.  I  believe  had  you  been  present  you  would  have  been  in  agree- 
ment with  what  I  did  and  I  pushed  my  thoughts  home  just  as  hard  as  I  could. 
I  may  say  that  the  same  general  picture  so  far  as  our  attitude  is  concerned  still 
holds,  although  I  would  not  be  surprised,  confidentially  between  you  and  me, 
to  see  an  embargo  on  scrap  but  this  too  would  be  along  the  lines  State  has  been 
working  on. 

I  strongly  opposed,  and  I  believe  carried  my  point,  an  embargo  on  fuel  oil  for 
reasons  which  are  obvious  to  you  and  with  which  I  may  say  I  think  the  State 
Department  is  in  concun-ence.  I  believe  Mr.  Hull  brought  it  up  to  get  a  thorough 
discusson  of  the  subject  and  Mr.  Welles  said  he  was  in  complete  agreement 
with  me. 

Hope  to  get  a  letter  off  in  the  next  day  or  two  with  a  coverage  of  some  of  the 
thoughts  that  I  have  been  playing  with  and,  as  you  know,  my  mind  is  com- 
pletely open  to  you.  almost  to  simply  thinking  out  loud. 

With  every  good  wish  as  always 
Sincerely, 

/s/  Bettt. 

Admiral  J.  O.  Richabdson.  USN, 

Commander  in  Chief,  U.  8.  Fleet, 

US8  "New  Mexico,"  Long  Beach,  Califimia. 

P.  S.  Just  received  yours  with  regard  to  your  coming  East  and  will  take  it  up 
with  rhe  Secretary.  Unless  there  is  something  you  feel  you  want  to  talk  about 
or  that  crops  up  after  your  arrival  on  the  Coast,  I  will  tell  the  Secretary  I  see 
no  need  of  your  coming  East,  at  least  for  the  moment. 

I  am  sorry  the  message  was  not  sent  to  the  Fleet.  I  have  felt  that  was  an 
Aide's  job.  When  with  the  Secretary  I  always  sent  them ;  in  the  last  case  when 
I  visited  Hawaii  T  sent  them  for  the  Secretary  not  only  to  the  Navy  and  to  the 
Army  but  to  the  Governor  as  well.  I  will  tell  Mort  Deyo  to  be  on  guard  against 
these  slips  hereafter. 

Perhaps  a  letter  from  the  Secretary  now  would  be  helpful.  I  will  talk  to  him 
about  it. 

25  SBaT"EMBEB  1940. 
P.  S.  to  my  letter  of  yesterday. 

After  my  note  to  you  of  yesterday  I  spoke  to  Mort  Deyo  about  telegrams  back 
to  the  Fleet  or  other  activities  after  the  Secretary's  visits. 

Mort  told  me  that  the  Secretary  was  preparing  letters  himself  as  a  result  of 
his  visit  out  there  so  you  may  expect  to  hear  from  him. 

My  feeling  is  that  a  letter  sometime  after  a  visit  can  never  take  the  place  of 
an  appreciative  despatch  and  I  have  so  told  Mort.  Of  cour.se  in  the  last  analysis 
the  Secretary  is  the  Boss  but  I  have  given  Mort  the  thought — here's  hopin'. 

Until  you  wrote  I  had  not  seen  the  sheet  which  placed  officer  and  enliste'd  per- 
sonnel under  the  Assistant  Secretary  or  at  least  that  particular  item  escaped 
my  attention.  It  was  not  in  the  original  suggestions  I  made  to  the  Secretary. 
I  immediately  took  it  up  with  the  Secretary  and  it  has  been  changed ;  personnel 
now  coming  directly  under  the  Secretary  which  is  the  same  as  it  has  been.  Of 
course  you  know  that  BuNav  and  OpNav  usually  settle  these  things  pretty  much 
themselves. 

/s/  Bettt. 

Admiral  J.  C.  Richabdson,  VSN. 

1  October  1940. 

De.^b  J.  O.  :  I  hated  to  send  you  the  despatch  last  night  that  the  house  would 
be  full  when  you  got  here.  Kit  had  not  intended  to  return  until  two  weeks  from 
next  Sunday  when  Harold  Gillespie  from  Honolulu  expected  to  be  with  us.  How- 
ever he  has  been  again  delayed ;  will  not  he  here  when  planned,  and  as  the  only 
reason  for  Kit  remaining  at  the  Lake  was  for  his  coming,  and  his  coming  now 
being  indefinite,  they  decided  to  come  down  this  week.  By  they  I  mean  Kit 
and  Kewpie  (our  daughter)  and  her  two  children  and  nurse  girl  which  will  fill 
the  house  to  about  100  percent  complement 


962       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

The  Secretary  wants  very  much  to  see  you.  I  told  him  of  your  letter.  How- 
ever, one  of  the  things  he  wanted  to  talk  to  you  about  is  the  possibility  of  sending 
a  detachment  to  the  Far  East;  it  is  being  urg^d  here  by  some.  I  have  opposed 
it  and  so  has  Ingersoll.     Your  thoughts  are  likely  to  be  determinative. 

The  question  of  where  to  hold  the  Fleet  Problem  will  also  be  on  the  agenda. 

In  addition  the  Secretary  says  he  would  just  like  to  talk  to  you  anyway ;  so 
there  you  are. 

I  more  or  less  took  the  bull  by  the  horns  with  regard  to  getting  more  men 
aboard  ship  quickly  and  while  we  had  written  you  about  it  the  Secretary  took 
it  up  with  the  President  before  we  had  time  to  get  your  reply,  that  is,  with 
regard  to  cutting  the  training  period  to  three  weeks.  I  felt  I  was  on  fairly 
sound  ground  in  bringing  this  up  as  my  feeling  is  that  it  is  in  accord  with  your 
wishes.  I  would  prefer  to  get  twice  the  number  of  men  In  a  given  period  and 
get  them  quickly  rather  than  have  them  spend  an  additional  five  weeks  or  so 
at  the  Training  Station. 

Frankly  I  do  not  like  the  trend  of  things  and  I  would  not  be  surprised  at  any- 
thing happening  any  day.  Your  statement  that  we  can  not  stay  half  in  this  war 
and  half  out  sizes  up  the  thing  pretty  well  and  I  have  long  felt  that  it  is  only  a 
matter  of  time  until  we  get  in. 

I  am  writing  the  District  Commanders  a  letter  pointing  out  the  gravity  of  the 
situation  as  I  see  it  and  will  send  you  a  copy.  In  this  letter  I  made  no  attempt 
to  go  into  much  detail — my  objective  being  that  they  get  the  spirit  of  the  sit- 
uation as  I  see  it  which  would  leave  no  stone  unturned  towards  our  immediate 
readiness.  God  knows  I  hoi)e  I  am  wrong  because  I  realize  what  a  little  addi- 
tional time  would  mean  to  Us  but  sometimes  things  get  out  of  hand  either  from 
the  other  fellow's  action  or  our  own. 

Personally,  I  am  looking  forward  as  always  to  seeing  you.  I  will  keep  the 
decks  clear  and  will  arrange  our  evenings  according  to  your  desires.  The  fem- 
inine part  of  my  family  are  good  soldiers  on  retiring  upstairs  and  turning  over 
the  downstairs  to  stag  get-togethers  which  I  And  are  so  beneflcial  these  days. 

For  next  Tuesday,  8  October,  I  am  tentatively  slating  the  following  for  dinner : 
The  Secretary,  Comdr.  Murphy,  Admirals  Sexton,  Robinson,  Nimitz,  Ingersoll, 
Towers,  Furlong,  Moreell  and  General  Holcomb. 

I  am  sorry  that  you  will  not  be  putting  up  with  us  as  our  quiet,  late  evening 
talks  helped  me  so  nnich  when  you  were  last  here. 

With  every  good  wish  as  always. 
Sincerely, 

/s/    Betty. 

Admiral  J.  O.  Richardson,  USN, 

Commander  in  Chief,  V.  S.  Fleet, 

US8  "New  Mexico,"  San  Pedro,  California. 

P.  S.  I  see  no  reason  in  the  world  for  any  secrecy  with  regard  to  your  coming 
to  Washington. 

JOB/clp 

Confidential  9  October  1940. 

MEMORANDUM  FOR  THE  CHIEF  OF  NAVAL  OPERATIONS 

Points  covered  in  talk  with  the  President 

1.  Go  ahead  with  assembly  of  Train. 

2.  Have  we  fuel  oil  in  Samoa  adequate  to  fill  four  (4)  old  light  cruisers? 

3.  Give  me  a  chart  showing  British  and  French  Bases  or  possible  bases  for 
surface  ships,  submarines  or  airplanes  in  Islands  in  the  Paciflc,  east  of  the  Inter- 
national Date  Line. 

4.  The  British  Ambassador  stated  that  Ghormley  was  busy  transmitting  to 
the  Department  information  regarding  technical  materials,  and  the  British 
Admiralty  felt  that  they  should  have  officers  prepared  for  staff  conferences. 

5.  The  British  believe  the  Germans  will  attempt  to  occupy  Dakar  from  Spain 
over  land  through  Africa. 

6.  I  (F.  D.  R.)  can  be  convinced  of  the  desirability  of  retaining  the  battleships 
on  the  West  Coast  if  I  can  be  given  a  good  statement  which  will  convince  the 
American  people,  and  the  Japanese  Government,  that  in  bringing  the  battleships 
to  the  West  Coast  we  are  not  stepping  backward. 

7.  The  President  indicated  that  he  might  approve  sending  a  Division  of  old 
Light  Cruisers  to  visit  Mindinao  as  a  gesture.  He  did  not  appear  favorably 
disposed  toward  sending  a  stronger  force. 

/s/    J.  O.  Richardson. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  963 


ciac  rs*  Ht.  umiiv  ctatm  vur 

O:  I.  S.  MBW  MBZKIX  ~ 
A1«/01TM 

0.  3.  Hbtt  Tt»«,  BraMrtoa,    VMh. 

OotObBT  M,   1»40  ..^'''^ 

fMBi                  The  riwniMItT  In  "MTf    U.  3.  FlMt.                              « 
Tot  ItM  Chl«f  of  ««»«1  CpwatlOM.  

stftjMt:  War  Flaaa  -  Status  nl  rMftiaasa  of  la  vlaw  oe 

of  tha  «arr«Bt  tot«»atlooal  oltuatloa.  

^1.  SlBoa  tha  ratvn  ot  tha  CoMaaaar-ia-Chlaf ,  |     li^ 

O.  8.  naat.  «»o«  hla  raaaet  aeaf«r«Ma  In  w*«blii«ton,  and  In  \-^^-— 
Tlav  of  tha  ooBvaraatloaa  that  took  yUoa  thara.  adaitlooal 
thootfit  Mtf  atvdr  hcra  baan  civ«B  to  tha  atetua  aod  raadlnaaa  , 

of  tha  U.  8.  naat  for  «w  oparatlooa.     Aa  a  raarat  of  thla      | 

atody,  tha  rn—nflar  In  f*Mrf ,  V.  3.  Float,  faala  It  to  ba  j| 

hla  aolaaa  Auty  to  praaaet,  for  tha  oonaldaration  of  tha  I 

Ohlaf  of  Haval  Oparatloaa,  aartala  fMta  and  ooneloaloas  In      I -, 

ordar  that  thara  aay  ba  no  de*t  In  tha  alnda  of  bl/^ar  :     i^*^ 

authority  aa  to  hla  ooarrlatlOBa  In  ragrd  to  tha  praaont  \y^ 

altuatlea,  aapaelally  In  tha  Paalflo. 

1S>A 
8.               In  ordar  to  brine  oat  aora  elaarly  all  tha 
aapaeta  of  thla  altoatloa.  It  la  naaaasary  to  fotIow  oortaln    >      ' 
faatera  affaotlne  It  and  to  dlaeuaa  thaa  In  tho  llcbt  of           ' 
praaaot  avanta*  I 

8.  On  tha  oooaaloD  of  hla  flrat  Tlalt  to  Waablngtoij,    ao 

In  7«ily,  and  In  paraonal  lattars  to  tha  Chlaf  of  Raral  Opara- 
tloaa,  tha  OoMMkada^ln-Chlaf  atraaaod  hla  firm  oosYlotlon        • 
that  aalthar  tha  HcTy  ner  tha  oountry  «aa  praparad  for  war  «ll|h   "^^ 
Xopan.     Ba  polatad  oat  that  aash  an  arantuallty  ocmld  only 
raault  In  a  lone  draam  out,  ooatly  war,  with  doubtful  pro8< 
paata  of  ultlaata  auaaaaa.    Ba  laft  Waahlneton  with  thraa  dla-j 
tlnat  lavraaaiona : 

flrat.     That  tha  float  waa  ratalnad  In  tha 
Bamailan  araa  aolaly  to  aupport  dlploB»tla 
rapraaaatatlona  and  aa  a  datarrant  to 
'apanaaa  aser«**ivo  aatlon; 

That  thara  waa  no  Intantlon  of 
on  aatual  hoatllltlaa  ar.nlnat 
JTapan; 


</. 


-6c  ^"f  X^^. 


79716  O— 46— pt.  14- 


964        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  Al'lAUK 


ctoc  rito  Ntt.  oi«rr«D  btatb  flbr 

V.  &  &  mw  UKBoa,  ~    ' 
AX6/ea708  ^    8.  ■«»y  TM*.  Br«Mrtca.  ««.&. 

Oatc»«r  *8,  1940 

3ubj««ti  War  Plan*  -  Statoa  aad  rtAlamtm  of  In  ▼!•« 

of  «h«  «niT«Bt  iBtanatioaal  •itoatloa. 


^ 


njjljl.     That  tha  iMMAlata  Hlaalon  of  tha 
riaat  waa  aaaalaratad  iralAlnc  and  abaorp- 
tlon  of  turn  paraonaal  aad  tha  attalsaaat 

of  a  T*— ■-  aeadltloB  of  ■atarlal  aad  

paraooaal  raadlaaaa  aoaaiataiit  with  Ita 

rataotloa  la  tha  BanallaB  area.  " 


4.       Ob  tha  oaoaalea  of  hia  aaooad  vlalt  to  Vaahlagtok 
MO,  aa  aatlraly  aiffaraot  U^raaslon  waa  ob- 


i 


la  Ootobar,  1940 

talaad.  It  la  tma  that  tha  Irtaraatloaal  alt«iatlon,  hatwaaa 
tha  t«o  Tlalta,  had  aatarlally  ohaacad,  prlaolpallr  la  that 
tha  daacir  of  laYaaloa  of  tha  Brltlah  Xalaa  ««a  ocaaldarably 

laaa  liadaaat,  with  eeaaaquant  radooad  ahaaoaa  of  tha  loaa  or.  .. 

eoatroaiaa  of  tha  Brltlah  71aat;  la  that  tha  Unltad  Stataa  had 

■ora  eloaaly  Idantlflad  Itaalf  with  teaat  Brltala;  in  that 

/apaaaaa  agsrsaaloa  had  progroasad  to  tha  dcniaatloa  of  Indo-I 
Chlaa  aad  sava  alffu  of  furthar  prograaa  toward  tha  Dutch  Saai 
ladlaa;  and,  la  tha  opaa  alllaaoa  batwaao  Oamaay,  Italy  aad  i 
7apaa,  raportadly  alaad  at  tha  Oaltad  stataa.  |  ^ 

B.       Aa  a  raault  of  thaaa  ehangaa.  It  now  appaara  tha 
Bora  aotlva,  opaa  atapa  alaad  at  7apaa  aT9   In  aarlous  oontaB' 
platlon  aad  that  thaaa  atapa,  If  takan  now,  nay  laad  to 
aotlTa  hoatllltlaa.  It  la  la  oonaaotlon  with  this  oTantualltt 
that  tha  Coanaadar-la-Chlaf  la  oonatralaad  to  prasant  hla    ; 
praaant  vlawa. 

e.  .    Iha  praaaat  0-1  Flan  (oraMCS),  :nv3r   44  and 
^"Usr  49,  In  tha  light  of  tha  praaaat  latamatlonal  sltuatlouk    — 
la  ballavad  bayoad  tha  praaaat  atrangth  of  tha  V.   3.  Float  an|  a 
bayond  tha  praaaat  raaouroaa  of  tha  U.  3.  Nary.  This  la  ba- 
llarad  trua  for  tha  followlag  raaaoaa:  I  ~  ~^ 

I       76 

(a)     Tha  praaaat  atraofth  of  tha  u.   j.   Float  la  | 

not  aufflol«it  "tc  astabllah,   at  tha  ' 

aarllaat  praotloabla  data,   tha  Unltad  ^ 

3tataa  Joist  Aalatlo  Poroe  In  tha  Uarohall-  — 

Carollaa  Islanda  trat  la  atran^th  auparlor  ^ 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE 


965 


AXt/OlTOt 


V.  &  ■•  mW  MIIIWK 


o««ok«  aa,  IMO 


War  TXmB  -  Statu  mM  r— !!«•■■  of  la  vlwr 
of  tbo  MR«Bt  laUnaAlooAl  sitwtioa. 


Ji't'lC 


^ 


to  %ha%  of  cauma  taA  r^aly  fotr  farthar 
•lv«M«  to  th«  WMt«rm  PMlfU  Sb  ooadl- 
IB  tbat 


V/ 


(b) 


(o) 


tioa  to  oywato  offanalToly 

Vhtlo  TCOOcOalBC  tiM  q:nAlif7liic 
phr*M  *at  tho  oarlioct  prMtlaablo  dato," 
it  la  flMly  tallavad  that  «•  oaanot,  at 
tbia  tlaa.  mnta  with  <kr«at  Britain  aa- 
aodas  raspoaaiblllty  for  oar  Atlantis 
intaroata,  Aaoula  that  ooaan  of  auffioiaat 
foroaa  to  protaot  oar  ooaatal  traAa  and  to 
aafaffoarA  oar  BBro  vital  lataraata  la 
Sooth  Aaarioa.  >or  aan  wa  aaglaot  tha 
protaatioa  of  oar  oaa  and  tha  Intardiotioa 
of  Joaaaao  trada  la  tha  Sonthaaatora 
Paaina.  with  thaaa  enilf  wta  adaquataly 
aarad  for,  oar  r—lnlng  fooraa  la  baraly 
aoparior  to  ORMRS  ft  tha  btSLflftiAS  of  oar 
— at— rd  aaapalA.  xt  will  uadoubtadly  ba 
aabjaet  to  attritian  loasaa  aa  rotita. 

Tha  trmr  la  aot  aow  proparad  aad  will  aot , 
la  tha  uaaadiata  fotora,  ba  proparad  to 
aupport  oar  waataara  advaaaa.  Aia  FXaat 
¥0iaa  Toraa  la  aot  aaffioiaat  to  aupport 
tha  aaoaasary  oparatioaa  aloaa.  1^ 

Xha  oaptora  of  BASS  OKI  la  a  aajor  military 
oparatloa  raqiolrlnc  datallad  kaowladga  of 
tha  araa,  datallad  planning  baaad  on  auoh 
kaowladga,  aid  tha  taklag  orar,  ooaTaraioa, 
■aaaiag,  tralalag  aad  orgaaizatlon  of  a 
larga  aui<>ar  of  aarohaat  ahlpa.  nia  aatab- 
liahaaat  of  tha  BASI,  aft ar  its  oooopatlon, 
ra^^iiraa:   (a),  tha  traasport  of  larga 
ouaatitiaa  of  natarial;  (b),  ths  organiza- 
tion ,  traaaport  and  Balntananoa  of  oonstruo- 
tion  onits  oapabla  of  aoooiqtllshlng  tha 


Z' 


i:^' 


It-A 
19 

20 

20-A 

21 

22 

29 

75 

96 


•^ 


^7 


3/C  ^ 


7^ 


966       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

AXt/oifoe 


CtaC  ra*  H%k  UHITBD  ITATIB  FLBCT 

u.  a.  a.  NEW  MszKa  ~ 


0.  S.  Ii«*y  Ti»*,  Br— rtca,  ■••h. 
Ott*«r  BS,  IMO 

8Aj««t:  Var  Flaas  -  statu*  and  raaAlnass  of  In  t1«v 

of  tho  o«r«it  latmuttloiul  Bltoatton. 

BMosMrr  d«T«lo$a«Bt;  and  (o),  tho 
A«f«Ba*  and  aupply  of  tba  baaa  during 
tha  oenatruotion  period.     Tha  Plan 
r««alraa  tha  ee^latlon  of  thla  BASS 
forty-flTa  daya  aftir  tha  arrlral  of 
tha  flrat  aatarlaJL  at  the  alta. 

Va  do  not,  at  praaant,  hare  tha 
datallad  knowladca  of  tha  araa  roqul- 
alta  for  propar  planning  of  tbaaa 
walfold  MtlTltiaa.     It  la  trua  that 
•oaa  knowladga,  poaalbly  aufflolaot 
for  inltiatloB  of  oparmtlona  and 
ttntral  rTt'"'<''i  for  tha  attaok,  wmj 
ba  obtalnad  bjr  raaoanalaaanoa  aftar 
hoatUltlaa  hara  er— in^ad,   and  tha 
Plan  proTldaa  for  aooh  oparatlona. 
Eovarar,  It  la  not  now  knovn,  nor  oan 
It  ba  dataomlnad,  until  if^ir  aotual 
oaaivatlon,  «hathor  or  not  tha  hydro- 
graphy of  tha  araa  parolta  the  estah- 
llahaant  of  a  float  anohoraga,  idiat 
oonatruotlon  la  poaalhla  on  the  land 
araaa  undar  oonaldaratlon  and  whether 
or  not  adaquata  dafanalTa  Inetslla- 
tlona,  particularly  air  flalda  for 
laad-baaad  aircraft,  oan  be  aatabllshed. 
(Irantlng  that  tha  base  aalzed  offers 
possltillltlea  for  the  oatahllshrMnt  of 
these  faollltlas,   It  appears  certain 
that   the  aaseoibly  of  naterlal  and  tha 
organization  for  oonstruotion  nuat 
await  the  actual  occupation.     7o  the 
knowladee  of  the  Concandar-ln-CMef , 
no  material  has  as  yet  been  assectolad 
for  this  purpose,   nor  have  any  but  tha 
ragueat  Ideas  for  the  <iltliiate  aoeoc- 
pllahnant  of  this  objective  bean 
advanoad. 

-4- 


^ 


^ 


X 


21^, 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


967 


OiCnbNK 

AIC/OITOS 


UMIUU  (TAT 
V.M.M.  raw  lODDOa 


V.  8.  Mtcn  Tart,  Mimwfc 
0««ato«r  M.  IMO 


Walk. 


SObjMti 


War  Plaaa  •  Siatva  aad  raadlaaaa  of  la  ▼!« 
of  tha  eomBt  latanatloBal  aitvatioa. 


Ptiatt  nmt  vlaaa.  Aoa  ahlatly 
to  laak  «f  a«trial«t  laovlaaca  aa  a 
baaia,  aad  partly  to  tba  praeaatvatiaa 
of  ataffa  of  faraaa  afloat  «ith 
reotia*  aattara  of  aiBlalatratioa  aad 
tralalac,  hava  baaa  aoat  caawal  la 
aatara  aad  haiva  accaadad  ahlafly  to 
tba  aaalgnaaal  of  taaka  aad  foroaa. 
Only  taatatlva  idaaa.(baaad  laraoly  oa 
vaaovpartad  aaawtloaa)  for  tba  aataal 
■■■nmlliliaaijl  of  tba  obJaotlToa, taanra 


(d) 


Tba  tlaa  olMHat,  la  tba  praaaat  Flaa, 
la  ballarad  9«atly  oat  of  proportloa 
to  tba  taaka  to  ba  ■umi^llibad.    WbUa 
a  daflalta  tlaa  llalt  deaa  aot  aotoally 
opaar  (axaapt  for  tba  fortT-flra  day 
llalt  aaBtloaad  abova).  It  la  atroB«ly 
iMllad  la  tba  tablaa  la  Appaadlz  ZX  of 
MPL  14  aad  tbroo^oot  tba  0-1  ?laa  lt> 
aalf ,  tbat  tba  oparatloaa  nauallaad  ts 
to  tba  aatabUrtiaaui  of  Basi  orx  ou  ba 
aoooapllabad  la  a  parlod  of  aoaa  aUty 
to  nlaaty  daya  aftar  Boblllaatloa. 

It  la  tba  flra  baUof  of  tba 
CoBBaador-la-^blaf ,  U.  3.  riaot,  tbat 
OTon  If  aaareatlo,  alado-purpoaa  atapa 
toMTd  tho  flrat  obJootlTa  (BA3Z  OBK) 
of  tho  Plan  vara  Inltlatad  pronptly.  a 
parlod  of  aooa  alz  aoatba  to  oaa  yaar 
would  ba  roq:alrad  for  Ita  aooocvllab- 
aaat.     './1th  tba  kaovladea  now  avallabla. 
tha  tlaa  raqulrad  for  aubaaq:aaat  opara- 
tloaa oaa  aot  avaa  ba  guaaaad  at.    It  la 
baltarad  to  ba  of  tba  ordar  of  yoara 
ratbar  tbaa  aoatba. 


1^ 


^ 


^7 


s?3C, 


968       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


CioC  nk  Na 
Aie/01708 


SubjMt! 


UNITBO  STATCB  rUtlT 
U.  8.  a  NBW  MKZlOa  rta^U0 


V.  a. 


Mutt  Tard,  BroMrtfla,  Waoh 
Ootebar  U.  1940 


\^ 


Wat  Plans  -  Statu*  and  raadlaaaa  of  ia  ▼!•» 
of  tba  onrrant  latanatioaal  altoatloa. 


-'  (a)  Z  kBow  of  no  fXac  offloar  «ho  «aeia- 
haariadly  anAeraaa  tha  praaant  OUHOB 
Plan.  It  la  tha  cwaral  aoaoaption 
that  tha  Flan  had  Ita  laaaptlen  pri- 
■arlly  In  tha  daainbllltr  of  hariac 
a  jBUtna  dlraatlra  for  tha  Aaralop- 
MBt  of  tha  aaral  l«t«hUataHBt  to 
■aat  any  intasvatiaaal  attuatlon  that 
Bl«ht  ha  throat  iq,aB  It.  It  la  ^r 
baUaf  that  tba  l^praotloabUltlaa  of 
tha  CS.MI(B  Plan,  la  tha  abaanoa  of  a 
battar  ona,  hava  baan  parlodleallx 
OTwlaokad  In  ordar  that  tha  Dapart- 
■Mit  might  hava  for  budgat  pvrpoaaa 
and  praaantatloa  to  Concraaa  tha 
■artwa  Jaatlfloatloa  for  tha  naaaa- 
aarr  anlarsoMBt  of  tha  Rary.  In  wff 
opinion,  tha  daralopaiant  of  tha  Karal 
Katiibllahaaat  haa  not  yat  proaaadad 
to  tha  point  aaaantlal  to  tha  sua- 
<i«8afal  proaaoutlon  of  tha  Plan,  y^t^ 

7.       In  addition  to  tha  CRMOS  Plan,  tha  CooMndar- 
In-Cblaf  haa  arallabla  to  hla  an  approvad  Hairy  Baale  Var 
Plan,  Rainbow  Bo.  Z,  and  a  tantatlra  draft,  not  aa  r«t  ap- 
prorad,  of  a  7olnt  Artof  and  Rary  Bealo  War  Plan,  Ralnbov 
Ho.  II.  Tha  aaataytlona  of  naltbor  of  thaaa  Plana  ara  ap- 
plloabla  to  tha  praaant  altuatlon,  nor,  to  tha  knowladga  of 
tha  CoBaaadar-ln-Cblaf,  la  tha  aaalatanae  fros  alllaa  tIau- 
allsad  In  tha  tantatlra  draft  of  Rainbow  No.  II  a  llkalT 
poaalblllty. 

0.       Tha  foragolng  oonaldaratlona  ara  aat  forth  In 
aooa  lan^th  In  ordar  to  fooua  attantlon  upon  tha  faet  that 
tha  Comaandar-ln-Chlaf  flnda  hlaaalf ,  In  what  ha  la  lad  to 
ballara  aay  auddanly  baaooa  a  aritloal  altuatlon,  without  an 
appUaabla  dlraetlma.  Ra  oanikot,  In  tha  abranaa  of  a  alaar 

-6- 


i^ 


IS-A 

It 

ao 
aa-A 

21 
22 


M 
N 


\a^ 


-'7 


Jt<f 


EXHIBITS   or  JOINT   COMMITTEE  969 


cue  nt  Maw  v»an»  9t Aim  riMMt 

ViU^u,  mwimioQb 

V.  8.  l«Ty  TtfA,  Br— Miwi,  Wuk.  ^^ 

Q9to»«  as.  IMO  ,!k^ 
\^^~ — 

8abjM%i           Wi»  Plaa*  -  statu*  nA  r— aiaMt  of  la  ▼!•*  Of 

of  tiM  oorroot  latonatloaal  altaatioa.  


•oy-  ■ — 


plctoro  of  aatloanl  foXioy,  aatloaal  onitf  tto  ana  ootioaal - 

obJootlvM,  fevBolsto  his  9m  plau  othor  than  for  ^vloua  X^'^ 

— — IM  of  ■■■uilty  aoA  «•(•■••  nA  for  oooolwotoA  pr«par«-lx^^ 

tia«  fov  f«rtk«  •wkwAitio*.    ■•  la  of  tbo  flm  boUaf  

tkat  aMoosafal  opavatioas  la  wKt  omi  raat  oalj  on  aeoad  u 

plaasi  a«ar«fta  ■paaifla  yrofovatloa  «d  vlfloroaa  vvosaavtloa  I 

feaaat  «p«a  aeafiiflMa  la  tta  antoaao  of  tho  aooraa  baiac 

i 

•.  Thar*  la  aa  iataatioa  or  Aaalra  oa  tho  part  of 

tha  Cii— MHi   In  ffhiaf  to  avatfl  hla  laeitlmta  raapoaai- 
blUtiaa  war  is  it  Aaairad  that  anythlac  la  thia  lottor  bo 
aoaatmad.    Xt  la  f>d.ly  raaliiad  that  ao  plaa  oaa  foroaoo  or  i 
provlto  for  avaary  peaaibla  aitoatloa,  aad  that  aAJastaaata 
aa4  ra-aatiaatas  aast  ba  aaia  to  fit  tha  aotaal  sitvatlon 
praaaatai.    At  tho  ava  tiaa,  it  la  aeat  atroasly  baUovaa 
that  tha  nij^iiiai   In  mil  if  aaat  ba  bottar  laforaad  thaa  ha     ' 
is  BO«  aa  to  tho  Dapartaaat's  plaaa  aad  iatoatioaa  if  ha  la 
to  paifora  hia  Pall  Coty. 

10.  Iho  foro«ola«  la  briofly  amaiarizoa  aa  follona:; 

(a)  VasuitabUity  of  caotOt  Plaa  In  proaoat 
aitaatioa  aad  proaoat  dorolopoMit  of 
■oTal  Istabliafcaaat;  I 

(b)  XaapplioabUity  of  othor  Flans  arallablo 
to  tho  OoKaador-ln-Oblof ,  T7.   o.  Flaat 
(Rainbow  Hoa.  Z  and  ZDi 

(o)     Tltal  Boooaaity  for  (1)  now  dlrootivo 
(poaalbly  Raiabow  Ho.  Ill)  baaad  on 
proaoat  roalltioa,  national  objootires 
aad  oonnltaanta  aa  far  aa  thoao  era 
kaowB  or  oaa  bo  prodlotod  at  tbo  proaont 
tiaai    (8)  ooordlaatlon  of  plans  daralopod 
with  national  Folloy  mi.  atopa  to  bo 
takaa  to  laplanont  that  polioy4 


(y. 


^7 


y3S<^: 


970       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


CiaC  nh  Ktb, 

A16/01T0S 


MbjMti 


UNITBD  BTATtB  VVm 
O.  8. 1.  NSW  MBHOA 


U.  3.  Mterj  TarA,  BrcnrtoB,  WMb.  ^^ 
Oototvr  U,  1940  J> 


War  Plana  -  Statsa  aoi  raadlnaan  of  in  t1«w 
of  tba  oumraat  iataniBtlanal  altuation. 


J^ 


U)     Za  tha  li^t  of  lafonMtlea  bow  arallabla 
to  blB,  tba  0aMMB4ar-lB-Otaiof  la  of  tba 
•onrletlOB  tbat  tba  al«MBta  of  a  raaliatlo 
plan  abo«ld  aiAoAji 

(1)     BaaurltT  taA  Aafaaaa  aaaavrao  of 
tba  Waatan  BaBla^bara; 

(S)     Loac-raBoa  latardlotion  of  aneiqr 
oooMxaa; 

(8)     ttaraata  aaA  ralda  a«alaat  tba 
•amri 

(4)  txtaoalon  of  oparatlona  aa  tba 
calativa  atraacth  of  tba  Naval 
latabliabBaat  (nay  be  Influaaoad 
by  alliad  atranetb  aoA  fraedon 
of  aetion)  la  built  up  to  sup- 
port tban.   /"L- 

11.  Plaaaa  aaknowladga  raoaipt  of  this  lattar  by 

daapatab. 

IX.  It  ia  baraby  oartif ia:   that  the  orlrinAtor  oon- 

aidara  it  to  ba  ij^raotioabla  to  pLrase  t]ii6  docucant  ic 
aoab  a  Baanar  aa  will  parsdt  a  olaaairtoatiob  othor  tban 
aaarat. 

IS.  Tba  axlsaney  of  delivery  cf  ttls  locuaent  is 

auab  that  it  «rlll  not  reach  the  addreeaae   ii.  tiso  by  tbe 
next  arailable  otfloer  oouriv.     tlie  orl^inAtor,  therefore, 
autboriaaa  tbe  traaaaiealon  of  thia  doounaat  by  reciatarad 
^1  witbln  tbe  oontlneatnl  liadta  of  tb*  United  Jtataa. 


IB-A 

1*      • 

20 

20-A 

21 

22 

23 

75 


J.    C.    aiCKUiDSCK 


J6C^o,. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  971 

[1]        Secret  12  November  1940. 

Dear  J.  O. :  You  may  think  I  have  been  unusually  silent  for  the  last  couple 
of  weeks, — and  so  I  have.  Truth  of  the  matter  is  that  a  great  part  of  this  time 
was  spent  in  making  up  an  estimate  of  the  international  situation,  together  with 
a  number  of  officers  in  Naval  Operations  and  two  from  the  General  Board.  As 
a  start  on  this  I  sat  down  one  early  morning  and  drew  up  a  twelve  page  rough 
estimate,  working  on  up  till  two  o'clock  the  next  morning,  this  in  the  effort 
to  clear  my  own  mind,  as  I  sometimes  do  by  drawing  up  a  paper.  After  I  finished 
the  rough  notes,  I  then  got  together  IngersoU,  Turner,  Savvy,  Charlie  Wellborn, 
Forrest  Sherman,  Hill,  Sexton,  Moore  and  Oscar  Badger  and  we  went  to  it, 
day  and  night,  Saturdays  and  Sundays,  for  about  ten  consecutive  days.  The 
product  which  no  one  claims  is  perfect  is  now  in  the  hands  of  the  President.  I 
am  hoping  he  will  give  some  definite  pronouncement  on  it  in  order  that  I  may 
send  you  something  more  authoritative  than  I  otherwise  could  do. 

You  know  that  we  have  no  definite  commitments.  Perhaps  none  can  be  made. 
The  direction  which  things  finally  take  may  be  forced  upon  us. 

For  example,  as  you  stated  in  a  recent  letter : — Upon  your  first  visit  here  you 
found  us  of  the  opinion  that  in  the  event  of  war,  we  should  not  become  involved 
in  the  Pacific  and  that  any  major  effort,  we  might  make  would  be  in  what  we 
considered  the  most  vital  theater,  namely,  in  the  Atlantic.  I  have  never  changed 
my  viewpoint  on  that  and  I  may  say  that  so  far  as  I  know,  neither  has  the  State 
Department.  I  believe  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  also  holds  this  view.  But  no 
appeasement. 

Nevertheless,  we  can  not  afford  to  neglect  the  possibility  of  hostilities  in  the 
Pacific  and  that  is  why  in  so  many  of  my  letters  I  always  mention  keeping  a 
weather  eye  to  the  Westward. 

I  think  the  study  which  was  made  when  you  were  here,  has  been  highly  bene- 
ficial; studies  of  this  sort  always  ai-e,  whether  or  not  they  are  implemented. 

I  had  hoped  before  this  to  get  to  you  the  Navy  end  of  RAINBOW  III  as  a  more 
thoroughly  considered  directive  to  meet  the  possibilities  of  the  present  situation 
In  the  Pacific.  This  RAINBOW  III  plan  is  nearing  completion  now  and  I  expect 
to  send  it  to  you  in  a  few  days.  I  trust  that  you  will  find  the  tasks  assigned  to 
you  are         [2]        within  your  power.     We  will  await  your  comment. 

We  are  pushing  District  preparation  and  degaussing  work  with  all  the  speed 
we  can  command  and  if  by  any  chance  I  could  have  until  1  April  on  this  I  would 
give  a  good  deal.  One  January  should  see  degaussing  well  along;  one  April 
much  essential  work  accomplished  in  the  Districts.  Please  do  not  construe  that 
statement  to  mean  that  we  might  get  into  the  war  tomorrow,  as  I  have  nothing 
but  my  own  thoughts  on  this.  Nevertheless,  you  know  I  have  felt  right  along 
that  it  is  only  a  matter  of  time  before  we  do  get  in  (though  I  can  not  say  this 
out  loud).  The  chief  question  that  concerns  us  is  where  we  get  in,  and  whom 
we  will  fight — and  "tomorrow"  or  perhaps  "today"  is  what  1  am  working  towards. 

You  have  received  the  despatch  directing  the  sending  of  submarines  to  Manila. 
There  are  no  plans  at  present  to  send  anything  more  in  that  direction.  But 
present  conditions  are  far  from  static,  the  Japanese  appear  to  be  making  prepa- 
ration for  a  definite  move  of  some  kind,  and  the  answer  we  will  give,  if  any,  to 
the  steps  they  may  take  in  the  future  can  not  be  predicted  at  this  time. 

Your  letter  regarding  the  retention  of  a  part  of  the  Fleet  on  the  Coast  beyond 
the  date  of  its  intended  departure,  and  also  holding  another  part  in  Hawaii,  ar- 
rived at  a  time  when  the  election  prevented  my  presenting  this  question  promptly 
to  the  President.  Since  the  scheduled  departure  of  the  units  from  Hawaii  was 
the  day  following  my  receipt  of  your  letter,  there  was  nothing  for  me  to  do  other 
than  to  radio  you  to  carry  out  the  approved  schedule.  As  you  know,  the  matter 
of  withdrawing  the  Fleet  from  Hawaii  is  delicate,  and  could  hardly  be  accom- 
plished without  a  certain  amount  of  preparation  in  Washington.  It  does  not  now 
appear  that  we  can  withdraw  it  without  some  good  pretext. 

Regarding  this  Winter's  exercises  there  is  no  question  as  to  the  desirability 
of  training  both  the  Fleet  and  the  troops  in  expeditionary  operations  which  will 
simulate  war  as  closely  as  possible.  Therefore,  I  believe  we  should  go  ahead 
with  the  essential  features  of  such  a  plan.  As  I  understand  the  plan,  you  pro- 
pose to  assemble  in  Pearl  Harbor  an  Expeditionary  Force  comprising  most  of 
the  Fleet,  plus  transports  in  which  are  combat-loaded  the  west  contingent  of  the 
Fleet  Marine  Force,  plus  tankers  and  supply  ships.  This  expeditionary  Force 
will  then  set  out  from  Hawaii  and  will  simulate  the  actual  capture  of  an  island, 
using  Christmas  Island  or  some  other,  perhaps  San  Clements  for  example — I 
have  not  received  a  copy  of  exactly  what  you  plan  to  do  and  therefore  this  con- 
ception may  be  at  fault. 


972       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

We  have  all  been  greatly  pleased  over  Churchills  statement  of  recent  British 
action  against  the  Italian  Fleet.  Also  we  are  more  than  pleased  over  the  suc- 
cess of  the  Greeks, — even  though  it  may  prove  in  the  end  to  be  temporary.  We 
have  nothing  more  official  to  date  on  this  than  newspaper  reports. 

[5]  Regarding  the  German  claim  that  they  had  sunk  every  ship  in  the  39- 
ship  convoy  in  approximately  longitude  32,  latitude  58:-  all  but  6  of  these  ships 
have  safely  reached  port. 

Am  expecting  King  to  relieve  Ellis  shortly  after  the  middle  of  December. 
Hope  the  enclosed  to  Tommy  Hart  and  Ghormley  will  be  of  some  interest  to 
you. 

Best  wishes  as  always. 
Sincerely, 

/S/     Betty. 
Admiral  J.  O.  Richardson,  USN, 

Commander  in  Chief,  U.  8.  Fleet, 

USS  "New  Mexico,"  c/o  Postmaster, 
Long  Beach,  California. 


[U        Secret  12  November  1&40. 

Dear  Tommy  :  We  are  pushing  ahead  as  rapidly  as  possible  on  the  prepara- 
tion of  material  and  personnel  for  any  eventualities.  While  there  is  much  still 
to  be  done  (a  condition  that  will  continue  to  exist  for  years)  I  can  not  say  that 
matters  are  unsatisfactory,  so  far  as  concerns  things  under  my  control.  But  we 
do  not  yet  know  the  direction  which  attairs  may  take. 

For  the  past  three  weeks  I  have  been  spending  many  hours,  together  with  a 
group  of  officers  particularly  concerned,  in  developing  a  broad  estimate  of  the 
material  situation  as  it  affects  possible  naval  war  operations.  This  estimate,  or 
study,  is  now  in  the  hands  of  the  President.  I  do  not  expect  any  immediate  de- 
cision, but  do  hope  that  it  will  serve  to  clarify  matters  so  that,  at  least,  those  in 
authority  will  be  fully  aware  of  the  implications  of  any  particular  policy  that  may 
be  adopted  with  respeet  to  the  war. 

Ghormley  tells  me  the  British  expected  us  to  be  in  the  war  within  a  few  days 
after  the  reelection  of  the  President — which  is  merely  another  evidence  of  their 
slack  ways  of  thought,  and  of  their  non-realistic  views  of  international  political 
conditions,  and  of  our  own  political  system.  They  have  been  talking,  in  a  large 
way,  about  the  defense  of  the  Malay  Barrier,  with  an  alliance  between  themselves, 
us,  and  the  Dutch,  without  much  thought  as  to  what  the  effect  would  be  in  Europe. 
But  we  have  no  idea  as  to  whether  they  would  at  once  begin  to  fight  were  the 
Dutch  alone,  or  were  we  alone,  to  be  attacked  by  the  Japanese.  Then  again, 
the  copy  of  the  British  Far  Eastern  War  Plan  which  Thomas  obtained  at  Singa- 
pore, shows  much  evidence  of  their  usual  wishful  thinking.  Furthermore,  though 
I  believe  the  Dutch  colonial  authorities  will  resist  an  attempt  to  capture  their 
islands,  I  question  whether  they  would  fight  if  only  the  Philippines,  or  only  Sing- 
apore, were  attacked. 

The  Navy  can,  of  course,  make  no  political  commitments.  Therefore,  we  can 
make  no  specific  military  plans  for  an  allied  war.  However,  as  I  told  you  in  my 
despatch,  you  can  perform  a  useful  service  by  laying,  with  the  British  and  pos- 
sibly the  Dutch,  a  framework  for  a  future  plan  of  cooperation,  should  we  be  forced 
into  the  war.  I  rather  doubt,  however,  that  the  Dutch  will  talk  freely  with  you. 
If  they  do  my  idea  would  be  that  you  would  explore  [2]  the  fields  of: 
Command  arrangements, 
General  objectives, 

General  plan  of  cooperative  action,  including  the  approximate  naval  and 
military  deployment. 

You  are,  of  course,  committed  to  assist  the  Army  in  the  defense  of  Luzon.  But 
with  allied  bases  to  fall  back  on,  your  direct  support  of  the  Army  might  well  fall 
short,  in  degree,  of  the  support  you  would  afford  were  we  alone  to  fight  Japan. 

I  do  not  believe  Japan  will  attack  us  if  she  can  avoid  doing  so.  In  fact,  I  be- 
lieve she  will  go  far  to  avoid  hostilities  with  the  United  States.  It  is  even  doubt- 
ful if  she  wishes,  at  this  time  to  fight  the  British  or  the  Dutch.  It  seems  more 
likely  that  she  would  prefer,  while  maintaining  a  position  in  readiness,  to  con- 
solidate Indo-China  with  her  positions  further  north,  and  to  begin  a  more  or  less 
gradual  economic  penetration  of  the  Netherlands  East  Indies  and  Siam.  Should 
we  refrain  from  imposing  additional  economic  sanctions,  present  conditions,  in- 
cluding the  recent  1,800,000  ton  oil  contract,  might  be  stabilized  over  a  consider- 
able period  of  the  future.  Our  State  Department,  as  you  may  know,  had  a  hand 
in  the  execution  of  that  contract. 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  973 

But  we  never  can  tell.  Should  a  war  develop  between  Japan  and  an  alliance 
of  British,  Dutch  and  Americans,  I  believe  that  Japan  will  plan  to : 

(a)  Occupy  Guam,  and  reenforce  the  Mandates  with  troops,  submarines, 
and  some  air ; 

(b)  Establish  naval  control  of  Philippine  waters  by  destroying  our  naval 
and  air  forces,  basing  her  main  fleet  in  the  Pescadores  and  a  strong,  fast  de- 
detachment  in  Halmahera ; 

(c)  Capture  Luzon  with  troops  now  based  in  Formosa  and  Hainan; 

(d)  Capture  Borneo,  to  be  followed  by  a  campaign  against  the  Dutch  di- 
rected from  East  to  West. 

I  believe  that  the  allied  objective  should  be  to  reduce  Japan's  ofifen.sive  power 
through  economic  starvation  ;  the  success  of  the  blockade  would  surely  depend 
upon  allied  ability  to  hold  the  ma.ior  iwrtion  of  the  Malay  Barrier.  Your  own 
action  would,  of  course,  be  based  upon  your  view  as  to  the  most  effective  method  of 
contributing  to  the  attainment  of  the  ultimate  objective. 

One  thing  (and  this  is  for  your  ears  alone)  you  can  depend  upon  is  that  we  would 
support  you,  probably  by  sending  a  naval  reenforcenient  to  you  at  Soerabaja  or 
Singapore,  and  by  other  means.  I  would  be  glad  to  get  your  views  as  to  the  size 
and  composition  of  such  a  reenforcement ;  but  in  making  your  recommendation 
I  trust  you  will  keep  in  mind  that  our  Navy  must  hold  in  the  Mid-Pacific,  that 
we  may  also  be  in  the  war  against  the  other  two  Axis  Powers,  and  that  the  col- 
lapse of  Britain  would  force  us  to  a  major  re-orientation  toward  the  Atlantic. 

You  may  will  appreciate  that  I  do  not  welcome  such  a  war  (British  Collapse). 

The  naval  part  of  the  War  Plan,  Rainbow  III,  for  this  possible  war  is  about 
completed,  and  will  be  on  its  way  to  you  within  a  short  time.  We  are  hoping 
to  send  naval  attache's  to  Singapore,  Batavia,  Soerabaja,  Balikpapan,  and  Cey- 
lon ;  possibly  one  of  these  officers  may  bring  this  plan  to  you  via  air  transportation. 

We  are  all  delighted  to  be  able  to  put  over  the  dependent  thing  for  you.  The 
State  Department  strongly  supported  us.  I  can  appreciate  the  coals  that  must 
have  been  heaped  upon  you  when  it  was  learned  that,  while  we  were  forcing 
our  dependents  home,  the  Army  was  sending  dependents  out. 

You  know  how  glad  I  always  am  for  any  opportunity  to  assist  any  or  all  of 
the  Little  Harts,  as  well  as  the  Big  Hart,  in  any  way  in  which  I  can. 

Keep  cheerful. 
Sincerely, 

/S/    Bettt. 

Admiral  T.  C.  H.\rt,  TJ.  S.  Navy, 

Commander  in  Chief,  U.  S.  Asiatic  Fleet. 

P.  S.  Am  sixty  today.    Here's  hoping !    The  first  three  score  are  the  hardest ! 


18  NOVEMBEB  1940. 

Admiral,  Hart  : 

P.  S.  Admiral  Brownson's  name  is  being  submitted  to  the  President  on  the  list 
going  over  to  him  for  consideration  in  connection  with  the  new  destroyer.  Here's 
hoping. 


[1]        Confidential  November  22,  1940. 

Dear  Jo :  While  you  were  here  in  early  October  we  sent  a  despatch  to  Com- 
fourteen  to  a.scertain  from  Admiral  Bloch  whether  or  not  the  protection  being 
afforded  to  the  vital  elements  of  the  Naval  Establishment  in  Hawaii  was  satis- 
factory, this  in  order  that,  if  required,  we  could  make  representations  to  the 
War  Department  to  direct  more  thorough  protection  on  tb.e  part  of  its  Hawaiian 
Department. 

Admiral  Bloch's  answers  to  this  despatch  and  to  a  second  despatch  on  the 
same  subject  were  not  very  definite,  and  did  not  provide  basis  for  further  action 
by  the  Department. 

Since  the  Taranto  incident  my  concern  for  the  safety  of  the  Fleet  in  Pearl 
Harbor,  already  great,  has  become  even  greater.  This  concern  has  lo  do  both 
with  possible  activities  on  the  part  of  Japanese  residents  of  Hawaii  iind  with  the 
possibilities  of  attack  coming  from  overseas.  By  far  tlie  most  profitable  object 
of  sudden  attack  in  Hawaiian  waters  would  be  the  Fleet  units  based  in  tliat 
area.  Without  question  the  safety  of  these  units  is  paramount  and  imposes  on 
the  Commander-in-Chief  and  the  forces  afloat  a  re.sponsibility  in  which  he  must 
receive  the  complete  support  of  Commandant  Fourteen,  and  of  the  Army.  I 
realize  most  fully  tliat  you  are  giving  this  problem  comprehensive  thought.    My 


974       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

object  in  writing  you  is  to  find  out  what  steps  the  Navy  Department  and  the  War 
Department  should  be  taking  to  provide  additional  equipment  and  additional 
protective  measures. 

For  instance,  it  is  desirable  to  place  torpedo  nets  within  the  harbor  itself?  I 
will  appreciate  your  comments  and  those  of  Comfourteen  on  this  question. 

Antiaircraft  protection  can  be  provided  first  by  units  of  the  Fleet  actually 
in  Pearl  Harbor  with  tjuns  ready  at  all  times ;  by  stationing  about  the  Navy  Yard 
of  Army  A.  A.  defense  measures  including  mobile  batteries ;  and  possibly  by  utiliza- 
tion of  Marine  Defense  Battalion  Antiaircraft  Units  now  available  in  the  Pear' 
Harbor  areas,  or  that  could  be  made  available.  Also  by  keeping  carrier  fighters 
squadrons  alerted  and  ready  to  go. 

[2]  Another  aspect  of  local  security  which  prompted  the  Department's 
original  despatch  was  the  security  of  the  oil  tanks  against  attack  from  the  road 
passing  near  by. 

I  would  like  to  have  you  take  up  the  whole  question  upon  your  return  to  Hawaii 
with  Comfourteen  and  with  the  Army,  and  let  me  know  of  any  deficiencies  which 
will  require  remedial  action  here  in  Washington. 

Much  is  being  done  by  the  Army,  and  by  the  Navy  in  support  of  the  Army,  to 
maintain  security  of  the  Panama  Canal.  Of  at  least  equal  importance  Is  the 
security  of  our  Fleet  against  sudden  destructive  attack.  And  the  Fleet  is,  as 
usually  must  be  the  case,  in  a  more  exposed  situation. 

I  have  been  in  somewhat  of  a  quandry  whether  to  write  this  letter  to  you  or  to 
write  one  on  similar  lines  to  Admiral  Bloch  to  take  up  with  you  and  Army.  It 
really  is  immaterial  so  long  as  we  get  the  answer — but  after  all  the  Fleet — your 
command — is  the  subject.    I  am  sending  Admiral  Bloch  a  copy. 

My  best  to  you  both  and  to  "all  your  works" — 
Sincerely, 

H.  R.  S. 
Op-12-VED 
Serial  050312  ( SC )  A16/FF1 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  975 


CinC  FUt  No.  UNITED  STATES  FLEET  v 

U.  S.  S.  NEW  MEXICO,  Flagriilp  (V^  ^ 

Lon'7  Beach,   California 
/  Kovember  28,    1940 


Dear  Betty: 

Your  last  tv/o  letters,  touching  on  the  security  of  the 
?leet  v/hile  operating   In  the  Hawaiian  area  and  the  prospec- 
tive  operations   of  the  Second  Brigade  of  the  Fleet  llarlne 
Force  v/ith  the  Fleet  during  the  third   quarter  have  been 
received . 

,  -/ith  regard  to  the  first  of  these  Ciatters,   I  v/ill  take 

I  this  up  v/ith  Bloch  on  ny  arrival  back   in  Kav/aii.     This 

\  feature  of  the  problem  does  not    give  nie  a  great  deal  of 

\  concern  and,    I  think,   can  be  easily  provided  for.      I  think 

I  torpedo  nets  -./ithin  the  harbor  are  neither  necessary  nor 

^  practicable.      The   area   is  too  restricted  and  ships,    at 

I  present,  are  not  noored  vrf.thln  torpedo  range  of  the 
entranc  e . 

The  security  of  the  units  v/hile  carrying  out  routine 
operations  gives  me  greater  concern,  because  to  provide  a 
reasonable  degree  of  security  calls  for  en^loycient  of  a 
great  nuLiber  of  Fleet  units  for  security   alone,  v/hlch  v/ill 
consume  both  time  and   effort  that  could,    otherwise,  be  v/ell 
directed   toward  training  and   Indoctrination.     I  feel  that  the 
Fleet  must  operate   on  either  of  tv/o  assumptions,    i.e.,    (a) 
that  v/e  are  at  peace  and   no  security  neasures   are  required; 
or   (b)  that  v/ar  time  measures  of  security  must  be  carried 
out.     Heretofore,  we  have  carried   out  limited  security 
z^easures  largely  as  a  basis  for  training  and  on  the  assump- 
tion that  no  foreign  pov/er  would  choose  to  bring  on  a  war  by 
an  attack  on  the  Fleet,  but   that  some  misdirected  or   fanati- 
cal nationals  ml^ht  undertake    individual  and  Irresponsible 
I  attack  on  Fleet  units.     How,   hov/ever,    in  the  lieht   of  your 
concern  over  these  matters  and  in  vlev/  of  your  better  In- 
formation and  position  to  evaluate  the  possibilities,   I  have 
come  to  the  conclusion  that  I  must  operate  on  the  basis  of 
'  (b)   above.     I  enclose   a  tentative  draft   of  a  directive  v/hlch 
il  plan  to  issue   upon  arrival  at  Pearl  Harbor.      It   is  bound 
/{to  result  in  the  curtailment  of  badly  needed  basic   training 
'I of  nev/  personnel,  particularly  in  destroyers  and  planes,   and 
I  some  degree  of  extra  discomfort,  but  under  the  assumption, 
Itbis  v/ill  have  to  be  accepted. 


A 


/7t 


976       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACH: 

CIbC  File  No.  UNITED  STATES  FLEET 

U.  S.  &  NEW  MEXICO,  Flairiay 


In  regard  to  the  operations  with  the  Seoond  Brigade, 
Fleet  Karlne  Force,  we  had  originally  planned  on  a  tentative 
date,  cf  January   20.     This  was  based   on  the  readiness  of  the 
transports  by  January  1  and  the  Department's  desire,   as  I 
understood   It    (See  Cooke's  mamoranduia- to  you  of  October  10) 
to  fit  these  exercises   Into  the   international  and  diplomatic 
picture.     I  do  not,   of  course,   know  to  what  extent  the  pic- 
ture has  been  altered   or  how  these  exercises  now  fit  in.     As 
you  will  see  later,  this  makes  a  great  difference  in  their 
conception. 

According  to  our   Information,  the  last   of  the  "dTT" 
transports  will  not  be  completed,    at  the  yard,  until  January 
23,   with  a  fitting-out  period   of  seven  days  at  a  navy  yard 
on  top  of  that.     This,   with  the  other  fovir   "CTTY"  class  and 
the  EXOCHCRDA,   will  give  us   six  transports  by  February  1,    If 
tbe  dates  now  set  are  met.     Allowing  for  an  Indoctrination 
y6nd  8hakedo\«i  period,    it  does  not  appear  possible  to  embark 
the  l^arines  prior  to  abcnit  March  1,   with  the  exercise  actu- 
ally starting  in  the  Hawaiian,  area  around  liarch  10.     By  that 
tine,  the  Uarines   inform  ma,  they  will  have  about   12,000  man, 
which  would,    if  we  took  the  whole   Force,  require  at  least   six 
more  transports.     This  brings  up  the  question  of  the   objec- 
tives of  the   exercise.     As  I  originally  understood  them,   they 
v/ere  to  be  a  full  dress  rehearsal  of  an  Island   attack,   with 
the  possibility  that  they  night  turn  into  the  "real  thing." 
Under  this  conception,   we  would,   of  course,  want  to  carry  the 
entire  Force  and  all  their  equipment.    Including  organic  trans- 
portation and   ground  unit   support   for  their  aircraft. 


1/ 


If,    however,  they  are    to  be   larcely  training  exercises, 
with  definitely  limited   objectives,   we  can  accomplish  much 
needed  training  for  marines,  transports  and   supporting  forces 
by  limiting  the  numbers   of  men  and  the  quantity  of  equipment 
to  the  facilities  provided  by  the  six  transports,   organizing 
the  units   into  more   or  less  complete  combat  teams  —  one  on 
each  transport,     '/e  could,   under  this  assumption,    start  the 
exercises  much  earlier    (that    is,  earlier   than  waiting  for  six 
more  transports)    and  perhe^is   follow  the  first  ones  with  a 
second   series  applyine  the  lessons  learned  the   first  time  but 
utilizing  the  remaining  troops. 

Until   a  decision  is  reached   on   the  foregoing,    I  can  do 
little  except   study  the   problooi  and  general  planning. 


:t^ 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  977 


CinC  Pita  No.  UNITED  STATES  FLEET 

U.  S.  8.  NEW  MEXICO,  FkgaUp 


Preliminary  discussion  along  this  Una  brings  out  the 
follo\vlng: 


/ 


L 


(a)  Thd  Uarlnos  vflll  have  only  two  squadrons  of 
planes.     These  oan  be  embarked  on  carriers,  "*   ^°  ~    .'^^ 
but,   depending  on  the  scope  of  the  operations, 
a  separate  ship  or  ships    (probably  a  cargo 
▼essel)  nay  be  needed  to  acccmnodate  the  ground 
troops  and  equipment. 

(b)  If  the  scope   of  the  exercises   Includes  readiness 
for  further  eventualities,  at  least  one  and 
probably  two,   extra  cargo  ships  will  be  required 
to  carry  organic  transportation,   90  days' 
ammunition,   and  supplies. 

(o)     In  any  concept,    something  will  have  to  be  done 

about  landing  boats.      I  assume  that   all  trans-         "y.^ 
ports  v/ill  carry  the  boats  listed   in  your  con- 
version letter.     These  will  provide,    roughly, 
abcxit   500  boat   spaces  per  ship,   whereas  1100  are 
reouired   per  combat  team.     The  remainlne  600 
boat  spaces  per  transport  must   either  be  pro- 
vided  fron  the  supporting  ships    (manifestly 
undesirable)    or  be  carried   into  the  transport 
area  by  special  cargo  vessels  or  boat  carriers. 
I  believe  we   should  convert   q  special  boat 
carrier  for  this   purpose,   similar  to  ones  used 
at  Shanghai  by  the  Japanese. 

(d)  Transport  crews  should  be  ample  to  provide  boat 
crews  for  boats  carried,  boat  officers,  and  or- 
ganized beach  parties.  A  boat  carrier,  if  pro- 
vided, should  carry  the  necesseiry  boat  crews  as 
part  of  its  complement, 

(e)  Transport  equipment   should   include   either 
special  tanks   for  fresh  v/ater  capable  of  being        / 
carried   ashore  in  boats  or  sufficient  drums  to 
carry  water   for  troops  transported. 

{t\  If  further  eventualities   are  to  be  provided   for, 

/  I  would  v/ant   the  A'liinCAi:  SZJCJd:   (liritime 

J  Comr.ission  traininc   shipl  especially  eo.uipped   as 

I  distilling   ship)   taken  over  and  made  available. 


3fC 


uill 


978       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

CinC  File  No.  UNITED  STATES  FLEET 

'    U.  S.  S.  NEW  MEXICO.  FUgdUp 


(g)     The  Marines'    aannunltlon  situation  Is  critical. 

I  feel  sure  this   Is  known  at  Jlarlne  Corps  head-       i.^— V  'v, 
quarters,   but   it  cannot  be  over-emphasized.  '    •  [ 

\/^       They  also  need  pack  hov/itzers,    to  replace  their 
present  heavy  and  unwieldy  guns. 

(h)     An  able,   energetic  Transport  Group  Commander 
must  be  assigned   as  soon  as  possible.     This  is 
a  man-sized  Job,   requiring  ability  to  work  with       /  _,  -  i  « 
/    the  Marines.     There  are  many  details  which  can        '  ^~*     ^-^ 
^y      be  worked  out  only  by  close  cooperation.     It  is 
my  present   intention  to  operate  the  transports, 
as  soon  as  each  is  ready,    in  the  San  Diego  area, 
training  in  loading,    eiii>arkii]g,   debarking  and 
landing  exercises. 

(i)     To  be  ready  for  real   service  we  will  have  to  have 
bombardment  amnunition,   preferably  at  Oahu,   v;here 

/it  can  be   intsrchanged  with  service  ammunition  if    .^ 
found  necessary.     The  only   such  ammunition  now  on  //,<^s^ 
the  ./est  Coast,  to  my  knowledge,    is  14''/50,   eVSS 
and  5"/51,   which  would  limit  the  gunfire  siq>port 
to  BB's  and  CL's    (7500),   whereas  CA's,   CL's 
(10,000)  and  OO's  are  indicated  for  this  typa 
work. 


I  have  told  the  Marines ,    as  a  basis  for  their  present 
planning,   that   we  will  take  only   so  much  of  the  Brigade  as 
can  be  conbat  loaded   on  the  six  transports,  and  that  these    ^^ 
should  go  prepared  with  what  can  be  carried,  ready  for  any 
operations  that  might  be  possible   Sast  of  the  160^  East 
Longitude. 

VI         V/e  have  no  reply,   as  yet,  to  our  letter  of  October   31, 
relative  to  diplomatic  arrangements  for  reconnaissance  of 
CHRISTMAS  and  MAEIIN  Islands.     Of  oourse,  deoision  as  to  the 
suitability  of  CHRISTMAS  must   await  reconnaissance,   ecd 
special  diplomatic  arrangements  will  have  to  be  made   if  the 
landing  is  to  be  held  there.     General  Upshiu:  rather  favors 
an  exercise   on  Oahu  or  similar  large  island,  where  oppor- 
tunity will  be  afforded  for  maneuvers  after  landing.     This 
question,   however,  cannot  be  settled  now. 


yot 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  979 


CinC  File  No.  UNITED  STATES  FLEET 

U.  S.  S.  NEW  MEXICO.  Flacriiip 


As  I   see  it,  the  possibilities  as  to  locale  include: 


Christmas  Island  —  if  found  suitable 

Palmyra  Island       —  probably  will  limit  force 
that  can  be   employed  to 
less  than  that  available 
in  six  transports. 

One  of  Hawaiian 

Islands 


^ 


Please  let  me  know  as  soon  as  possible  your  decision 
as  to  the  concept  and  scope  of  the  exercises.      I  would  also 
appreciate  being  infoimsd  as  to  the  progress  made  in  the  con- 
version of  the  transports,  the  provision  of  landing  boats, 
boat  carriers,  etc. 

•Vlth  best  regards,  j  /r-       d         t         ' 


Sincerely, 


Admiral  H.  R»  Stark,  XJ.   S.  Navy 
The  Chief  of  Naval  Operations 
Navy  Department 
Washington,  0.  C. 


y 


79716  O — 46 — pt.  14- 


980       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

.  Navy  Department, 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Navai.  Operations, 

Washington,  Dec.  11, 1940. 
Secret 

From :  The  Chief  of  Naval  Operations. 
To :  The  Commander  in  Chief,  U.  S.  Fleet. 
Subject :  War  Plans — Status  and  Readiness  of  in  View  of  Current  International 

Situation. 
Reference:   (a)  Cinc's  Secret  Letter  A16/01705  of  October  22,  1940. 

1.  In  reply  to  your  recommendation  in  the  above  letter  that  a  new  war  plan  be 
issued,  you  are  informed  that  Navy  Basic  War  Plan — Rainbow  No.  3  (W.  P.  L. 
44)  has  recently  been  completed.  Four  advance  copies  have  been  forwarded  to 
you  by  oflScer  messenger.  The  finished  copies  of  this  plan,  plus  such  revisions 
of  WPL-42,  Navy  Basic  War  Plan — Rainbow  No.  1,  as  have  been  found  desirable 
for  making  parts  of  that  plan  usable  with  Rainbow  No.  3,  will  be  distributed  as 
soon  as  practicable  through  the  Registered  Publication  Section. 

2.  War  Plan  Rainbow  No.  3  is  designed  to  provide  against  the  most  imminent 
and  difficult  war  situation  which  may  confront  the  United  States  in  the  near 
future.  It  is,  therefore  requested  that  the  Commander  in  Chief  prepare  as 
soon  as  practicable  the  operating  plans  for  a  war  envisaged  by  Rainbow  No.  3. 

3.  The  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  has,  in  the  past,  kept  the  Commander  in 
Chief  advised  as  to  all  matters  within  his  own  knowledge  which  related  to 
current  national  policy  and  pending  national  decisions.  This  past  practice  will 
be  continued  in  the  future.  However,  the  Commander  in  Chief  is  doubtless 
aware  that  the  changing  world  military  situation  will  continue  to  affect  policy, 
and  thus  will  influence  plans  for^the  war  operation  of  the  naval  forces.  It  is, 
of  course,  impracticable  to  draw  up  and  to  issue  new  Navy  Basic  War  Plans 
when  merely  miner  changes  in  policy  occur.  The  Chief  of  Naval  Operations 
considers  that  Rainbow  No.  3  is,  in  its  major  aspects,  suitable  for  all  probable 
situations  which  may  arise  in  the  near  future  where  the  principal  portion  of 
the  national  effort  is  directed  westward.  Under  study  now  by  the  naval  and 
army  oflScials  are  plans  based  on  assumptions  requiring  the  exertion  of  the 
principal  portion  of  the  national  effort  to  the  eastward  (Rainbow  No.  5),  and 
also  a  plan,  somewhat  similar  to  Rainbow  No.  1,  involving  the  defense  of  the 
entire  Western  Hemisphere  against  attack  from  both  the  east  and  the  west 
(Rainbow  No.  4).  So  far  as  now  can  be  foreseen,  these  three  basic  plans  should 
be  adequate  to  guide  mobilization,  initial  deployment,  and  initial  operations 
under  all  contingencies  which  are  foreseeable  at  present. 

4.  In  view  of  the  above,  it  is  believed  unnecessary  to  comment  on  the  present 
applicability  of  the  Orange  War  Plan,  as  that  Plan  was  drawn  up  to  guide  the 
prosecution  of  a  war  under  circumstances  which  do  not  now  exist. 

5.  The  urgency  of  this  document  is  such  that  it  will  not  reach  the  addressees 
in  time  by  tlie  next  available  oflScer  courier.  The  orginator  therefore  authorizes 
the  transmission  of  this  document  by  registered  mail  within  the  continental 
limits  of  the  United  States. 

/s/  H.  R.  Stark. 
[1]         Oi>-12A-fhg 
Secret  23  December  1940. 

Dear  JO :  Your  personal  letter  of  November  28th,  headed  Long  Beach,  Cali- 
fornia, arrived  here  on  the  l^th  of  December.  While  Murphy  was  here  he  spoke 
of  this  letter  as  liaving  been  prepared  before  his  visit  to  Washington,  but  we 
were  unable  to  locate  it.  Apparently  it  was  not  actually  mailed  until  after  the 
arrival  of  the  NEW  MEXICO  in  Honolulu. 

In  the  meantime  undoubtedly  Murphy  has  given  you  oral  answers  to  some  of 
the  questions  brought  up.  However,  I  have  had  prepared  a  memo  covering  some 
of  the  points  set  forth  in  your  letter,  from  which  I  will  quote  later  on. 

First,  in  regard  to  security,  I  endeavored  to  outline  to  Murphy  my  idea  as 
to  the  extent  security  measures  should  be  prosecuted,  namely,  that  while  the 
extent  of  security  measures  required  is  increasing,  it  has  not  yet  reached  the 
demands  of  full  war  time  security.  As  I  discussed  with  Murphy,  there  will 
be  an  advantage  in  making  occasional  sweeps  by  aircraft  and  surface  craft 
but  it  is  not  yet  necessary  to  make  these  continuous.  I  agree  with  you  that 
the  wear  and  tear  on  equipment  ,and  the  detrimental  effects  on  training,  of 
full  security  measures  should  be  given  due  weight. 

In  regard  to  the  objective  of  the  training  exercises,  the  picture,  of  course,  may 
change  at  any  time.  At  present  the  main  objective  is  the  purely  training  aspect. 
I  feel  that  it  is  desirable  to  conduct  the  exercises  in  an  area  sufficiently  distant 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


981 


from  bases,  such  that  the  difficulties  of  the  problem  are  concretely  and  un- 
avoidably present.  It  is  also  desirable  that  the  exercises  be  conducted  on 
beaches  where  our  probable  problems  are  most  closely  paralleled.  In  addition, 
the  islands  utilized  should  provide  suflScient  area  for  the  maneuvering  of  the  land 
forces  involved. 

We  desire,  of  course,  to  avoid  conducting  maneuvers  which  would  appear 
unduly  provocative  to  our  friends  across  the  way.  On  the  other  hand  we  also 
wish  to  avoid  any  change  in  our  dispositions  which  would  indicate  a  walking 
back  of  our  position  in  the  Pacific.  Taking  these  various  factors  in  mind,  I 
think  the  use  of  San  Clemente  for  the  final  full  scale  exercises  would  not  be 
so  desirable.  One  solution  that  suggests  itself  is  conducting  some  of  the  exer- 
cises on  the  island  of  Lanai,  and  other  part  on  Christmas  or  Palmyra,  depend- 
ing upon  the  results  of  your  reconnaissance  of  Christmas. 

Due  to  the  delays  in  the  transport  program  it  appears  necessary  to  carry  out 
these  exercises  during  the  fourth  quarter.  We  have  encountered  much  difficulty 
in  getting  transports.  The  only  ships  that  we  have  been  able  to  acquire  ate 
very  old  ships — ships  with  machinery  not  in  the  best  [2]  conditon,  and 
in  which  conversions  bring  to  light  structural  corrosion  and  defects  which 
necessitate  additional  work  in  effecting  satisfactory  conversion.  Consequently, 
completions  in  all  cases  have  been  delayed  except  in  the  case  of  the  EXOCHORDA, 
the  present  HARRY  LEE,  which  was  the  only  fairly  new  ship.  The  following 
table  shows  the  estimated  readiness-for-sea  dates  of  the  transports  now  under 
conversion.  (This  includes  a  two-week  period  for  fitting  out  after  the  com- 
pletion of  overhaul)  : 


Name 


Readiness  for  sea 


at  Navy  Yard 


GEORGE  F.  ELLIOT. _. 

HARRY  LEE 

HEYWOOD 

ANTHONY  P.  BIDDLE 

FULLER 

NEVILLE. 

HARRIS. 

ZEILIN 


24  January.. 

3  January.. 
15  February 
15  February 

1  March... 
28  February 

31  May 

31  May 


Norfolk. 
New  York. 
Puget  Sound. 
Mare  Island. 
Puget  Sound. 
Puget  Sound. 
Puget  Sound. 
Puget  Sound. 


Six  APD's  will  be  ready  for  sea  on  3  January.  The  MANLEY,  McKEE  and 
STRINGHAM  are  scheduled  to  depart  Norfolk,  on  January  6,  and  the  Canal  Zone 
on  January  15,  and  will  then  report  to  Commander-inChief,  U.  S.  Fleet,  for  duty 
in  the  Base  Force. 

It  appears  that  the  HARRIS  and  ZEILIN  will  not  be  ready,  even  for  exercises 
in  the  fourth  quarter. 

Referring  to  the  various  points  in  your  letter  designated  by  letters,  the  situa- 
tion is  about  as  follows :  ( I  quote  from  memorandum  giving  me  data  in  some 
instances) : 

(a)  Problems  involved  in  having  the  Second  Marine  Aircraft  Group  participate 
have  undergone  some  change  in  view  of  the  pending  transfer  of  the  group  from 
San  Diego  to  Pearl  Harbor.  By  the  end  of  the  third  quarter  all  three  combatant 
squadrons  of  Group  2  should  be  available  at  Pearl  Harbor  with  effective  tJT)es  of 
aircraft.  It  seems  practicable  to  distribute  their  combatant  aircraft  among  the 
carriers  that  will  be  available.    VMJ-2  will  also  be  in  Hawaii. 

The  memorandum  submitted  on  this  question  states  "It  is  estimated  that  if 
planes  are  carried  on  CV's  there  will  be  61  officers  and  180  enlisted  men  on  board 
the  latter,  and  that  there  will  be  9  commissioned,  6  warrant  officers  and  456 
enlisted  men  to  be  transported  by  other  means.  The  material  required,  exclusive 
of  aviation  gasoline  and  oil,  will  be  460  tons  (22,925  cubic  feet)  of  general  cargo, 
and  268  tons  (7,320  cubic  feet)  of  high  explosives." 

[S]  In  regard  to  additional  ships  to  carry  ground  crews  and  equipment,  and 
to  meet  the  requirements  set  forth  in  your  paragraph  (b),  we  may  have  a  few 
cargo  ships  available  for  employment  during  the  latter  part  of  March,  which  may 
fit  in  for  use  in  these  exercises.  It  seems,  at  present,  that  the  ammunition  ship 
recently  taken  over  will  not  be  available  before  June,  because  it  will  be  hauling 
ammunition  from  the  East  Coast  to  the  West  Coast. 

(c)  Availability  of  boats. — It  now  appears  probable  that  all  transports  will  be 
equipped  with  landing  boats  at  the  time  the  ships  are  ready  for  sea,  although  it 
may  be  necessary  initially  to  substitute  30'  boats  for  36'  boats.  In  any  event,  it 
is  anticipated  that  the  boats  will  be  delivered  by  1  March.  Tank  lighters,  how- 
ever, will  probably  not  be  delivered  before  the  middle  of  March.  It  is  expected, 
however,  that  Artillery  lighters  (non-self-propelled)  will  be  completed  at  Puget 


982       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Sound  Navy  Yard  in  January,  and  that  these  can  be  substituted  for  tank  lighters 
until  the  latter  are  delivered. 

(d)  Ships  to  act  as  boat  carriers. — ^There  are  no  ships  at  present  available  to 
carry  excess  landing  boats. 

The  question  of  a  special  boat  carrier  was  discussed  with  Murphy  during  his 
last  visit.  Such  a  vessel,  or  such  vessels,  would  be  useful.  However,  we  continue 
to  encounter  the  usual  diflBculty  of  obtaining  funds  for  the  acquisition  of  auxil- 
iaries of  any  kind. 

(e)  Quoting  from  memorandum:  "Fresh  Water  Facilities  for  Marines.  The 
Second  Marine  Brigade  has  adequate  facilities  for  getting  water  from  ship  to 
shore  storing  and  distributing  to  troops. 

This  includes : 

For  movement  ship  to  short :  Tank  and  artillery  lighters,  double  bottoms 

5  gal.  water  cans. 
For  storage  ashore :  14  canvas  tanks — 3000  gal.  capacity. 
For  distribution  to  troops :  10  water  carts,  5  gal.  water  cans. 
The  Brigade  also  has  the  necessary  pumps,  hose  tittings,  etc.,  for  handling  this 
water. 

Also — they  have  one  water  purification  unit  for  purifying  water  found  ashore, 
if  any. 

[4]        In  addition,  the  Marine  CJorps  has  on  order,  four  evaporating  sets  for 
experimental  use — with  the  capacities  as  follows : 
1—5000  gal.  per  day. 
1—1000  gal.  per  day. 

2 — smaller,  exact  capacity  not  yet  determined. 
If  satisfactory  this  equipment  will  be  made  standard  and  provided  to  Marine 
Brigades." 

In  addition  to  the  above  there  are  being  procured  and  placed  in  storage,  with 
other  advanced  base  equipment,  well-digging  equipment  and  13  sets  of  evaporator 
and  water  purifying  apparatuses  distributed  as  follows : 
5  at  San  Francisco. 
4  at  Charleston. 
4  at  Panama. 
This  information  can  undoubtedly  be  obtained  in  the  detail  desired  from  the 
Fleet  Marine  Force  at  San  Diego,  California. 

(f)  Use  of  the  "American  Seaman"  as  a  distilling  ship. — The  ship  is  at  present 
at  St.  Petersburg,  Florida,  and  is  currently  engaged  in  training  personnel  for  the 
Maritime  Commission.  A  sister  ship,  the  AMERICAN  SAILOR,  will  be  completed 
about  the  middle  of  February  1941.  Although  these  ships  are  suitable  as  dis- 
tilling ships  it  is  not  desired  to  divert  them  from  their  present  use  in  training 
merchantseamen  unless  a  major  emergency  develops. 

(g)  Your  statements  about  the  Marine  ammunition  situation  are  well  founded^ 
We  have  been  making  strenuous  efforts  to  remedy  the  Small  Arms  Ammunition 
situation,  not  only  for  the  Marines  but  also  for  other  Naval  Small  Arms,  aircraft 
and  ship,  for  many  months.  The  situation  has  been  brought  to  the  attention  of 
the  Secretary  many  times.  No  satisfactory  remedial  action  in  the  near  future 
appears  possible,  but  we  will  pry  out  of  the  Army  all  we  can. 

It  is  estimated  that  there  are  now  between  5  and  10  units  of  fire  of  various 
calibers  available  on  the  West  Coast. 

The  organization  of  the  Second  Marine  Brigade  calls  for  12 — Pack  Howitzers  or 
(75  m/m  guns)  for  each  of  the  two  battalions.    They  have 
12 — Pack  Howitzers. 
12—3"  (75  m/m)  guns. 
There  is  some  shortage  of  fire  control  equipment,  but  the  units  can  operate 
without  it. 

[5]  (h)  Captain  Braisted  has  been  designated  by  the  Bureau  of  Navigation 
for  duty  in  command  of  the  Transports  in  the  Pacific.  He  is  due  to  report  about 
January  3. 

(i)  The  Bureau  of  Ordnance  has  been  requested  to  provide  in  OAHU  at  the 
earliest  date  practicable,  the  following  bombardment  ammunition : 
14' ' — 500  rounds,  loaded  and  fused. 
8" — All  available  rounds  of  the  1000  now  on  order. 
6" — 1000  rounds,  loaded  and  fused. 
5" — 5000  rounds,  loaded  and  fused. 
4" — 5000  rounds,  loaded,  fused,  and  assembled. 
The  14"  ammunition  is  now  on  order  and  it  is  expected  to  be  available  about 
May  or  June. 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  983 

The  8"  ammunition  is  also  on  order,  but  delivery  is  not  expected  before  the 
latter  part  of  calendar  year  1941. — In  connection  with  bombardment  however,  you 
have  available  quite  a  bit  of  8"  ammunition  still  fitted  with  instantaneous  fuses. 

The  situation  in  this  respect  is  as  follows : 

No.  of  8"  projectiles  fitted 
Ship  or  station :  with  instantaneous  fuses 

ASTORIA-l 110 

INDIANAPOLIS 66 

NEW  ORLEANS 110 

NORTH   HAMPTON 126 

PENSACOLA 105 

MARE    ISLAND    (Note:  Some    fuses    may    have    been 

changed) 324 

OAHU 999 

HINGHAM 1,  000 

Note. — These  projectiles  can  be  used  in  either  the  long  chamber  or  short 
chamber. 

The  6",  5",  and  4"  ammunition  will  be  shipped  to  OAHU  by  the  NITRO  or  the 
LASSEN  in  February  or  March. 

The  present  estimated  availability  of  bombardment  ammunition  is  as  follows: 

14"— 307  East  Coast ;  151  Mare  Island. 
8" — 1000  rounds  on  order — Delivery  from  6  to  10  mos. 
6"/53— 2657  East  Coast;  300  Mare  Island;  379  Puget  Sound;  1989  Cavite. 
5"/51— 36,000  East  Coast ;  2000  Mare  Island  ;  1300  Puget  Sound  ;  167  Pearl 
Harbor ;  777  Cavite. 

It  should  be  noted  that  the  5"/25  and  38  caliber  service  ammunition  is  con- 
sidered to  be  suitable  for  use  as  bombardment  ammunition. 

[6]  In  regard  to  CHRISTMAS  or  MAKIN  Islands— The  State  Department 
did  not  wish  to  ask  permission  to  visit  Christmas  Island  for  fear  of  jeopardizing 
our  claim  but  suggested  that  we  proceed  with  the  visit  without  permission  and 
they  would  bear  the  brunt  of  any  repercussions.  However,  we  decided  as  a  matter 
of  courtesy  to  inform  the  British  Naval  Attache.  The  British  Government 
replied  by  note  to  State  saying  the  visit  was  agreeable  but  that  it  would  in  no 
way  reflect  on  their  claim  which  was  unassailable.  You  therefore  have  permis- 
sion to  make  a  reconnaissance  of  Christmas  Island.  In  the  event  that  your 
reconnaissance  indicated  the  suitability  of  Christmas  Island  for  landing  exercises, 
decision  can  be  made  later  as  to  whether  it  is  advisable  to  use  Christmas  Island 
and  as  to  just  what  steps  should  be  taken  in  advising  with  the  British  authorities. 

Permission  was  obtained  for  reconnaissance  flight  over  Makin  on  about  No- 
vember 15.  However,  we  questioned  the  advisability  of  taking  such  an  open 
step — a  step  that  might  indicate  our  future  intentions.  Therefore  we  did  not 
communicate  this  permission  to  you.  We  postponed  answering  the  letter  because 
of  the  protracted  correspondence  regarding  Christmas.  There  is,  of  course,  a 
certain  amount  of  information  available  in  the  Naval  Air  Pilot,  H.  O.  No.  184, 
and  in  charts  2179  (consecutive  1632),  and  No.  121  (1(531)  which  have  been 
furnished  you. 

Murphy's  visit  was  extremely  profitable  to  all  hands.  I  trust  that  on  his  return 
he  was  able  to  give  answer  to  many  of  the  questions  that  have  arisen  in  your 
mind. 

If  there  is  anything  which  you  have  asked  for  and  which  is  not  included  in  this 
letter  or  supplied  by  Murphy — other  than  the  answer  to  the  Pye  memorandum 
concerning  which  you  will  receive  an  answer  in  the  near  future — please  let  me 
know,  and  I  will  supply  the  answer  if  I  can.  We  are  continuing  daily  bulletins 
to  you  and  have  received  the  first  semimonthly  summary. 

There  is  little  that  I  can  add  which  is  not  repetition,  but  I  shall  repeat  just 
the  same  that  every  24  hours  past  is  just  one  day  nearer  to  actual  hostilities  and 
that  your  flag  officers  and  captains  should  be  completely  in  the  frame  of  mind  that 
we  will  be  in  the  fighting  business  most  any  time,  and  purely  as  a  guess  on  my 
own  part,  I  would  say  at  any  time  after  the  next  90  days.  Our  heads  and  our 
hearts  and  every  ounce  of  energy  that  we  have  should  be  devoted  exclusively  to 
the  business  of  war  and  keeping  fit — and  I  don't  mean  maybe. 

It  may  come  anytime.     All  good  wishes. 

/s/    Betty. 

P.  S.  Referring  to  your  recent  dispatch  on  the  subject,  it  does  not  appear  on  its 
face  that  the  Captain  of  the  destroyer  concerned  followed  up  his  contact  to  the 
nth  degree  or  even  asked  for  additional  help  to  locate.  However,  we  will  reserve 
all  judgment  on  this  espisode  until  we  hear  further  from  you. 


984       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

[1]         Op-12A-(lrc 

Secret  23  December  1940. 

Admiral  Thomas  C.  Hart, 

Commander-in-Chief,  U.  8.  Asiatic  Fleet, 

U.  8.  8.  "Houston,"  Flagship,  Manila,  P.  I. 

Dear  Tommy:  Your  letter  of  December  4  containing  Purnell's  report  of  his 
conference  with  the  British  arrived  a  day  or  two  after  McCrea's  departure,  en 
route  for  Honolulu  and  Manila.  McCrea  will  be  able  to  give  you  the  answers  to 
some  of  the  questions  raised  in  your  letter.  However,  I  will  refer  to  them  herein 
even  though  I  may  be  duplicating. 

I  agree  with  the  two  big  points  in  the  situation  that  you  outline.  The  location 
of  the  "command  post"  wouid,  however,  depend,  in  my  opinion,  very  much  on 
the  conditions  obtaining. 

Purnell's  report  gives  me  an  interesting  and  valuable  atmospheric  background 
for  the  consideration  of  the  situation  in  that  area. 

To  follow  your  letter  on  down,  the  Department  realizes  very  acutely  the  limited 
capacity  of  the  obsolete  equipment  at  Cavite.  Measures  are  under  way  to  improve 
the  situation  by  giving  you  better  equipment,  and  i^erhaps  more  equipment. 

The  planners  in  the  War  Plans  Divisio..  and  in  the  Districts  Division  are  giving 
very  close  scrutiny  to  the  problem  of  laying  an  anti-motor  boat  boom  in  25 
fathoms  of  rough  water,  and  are  looking  int't  the  question  of  supplying  the  large 
amount  of  material  that  will  be  required  for  nets,  etc.  [2]  It  is  apparent 
that  not  only  will  it  be  a  job  to  get  the  material  to  you,  but  also  you  will  be 
confronted  with  a  job  of  getting  it  put  together  and  laid  down. 

The  mine  plan  from  Manila  Bay  has  been  recently  received  here  and  in  the 
War  Department,  and  is  under  study.  In  reaching  an  answer  the  planners  will 
undoubtedly  be  guided  by  your  requirements  for  ingress  and  egress  of  ships 
through  the  entrance. 

In  regai-d  to  your  next  paragraph,  I  am  completely  with  you  and  have  sought 
at  every  turn  to  improve  the  security  of  Manila  Bay  and  the  Philippines.  I  might 
say  in  this  connection  that  opinion  in  general,  in  regard  to  how  far  we  should 
go  in  maintaining  oiii  ijosition  in  the  Philippines  seems  to  be  changing  upward. 
While  such  a  charge  is  going  on,  it  is  not  always  practicable  to  be  definitely  final 
on  questions  that  arise.  In  the  mean  time  we  will  send  you  all  of  the  material 
you  ask  for  to  the  extent  it  can  be  made  available  and  can  be  shipped. — Inci- 
dentally, send  me  a  sample  of  your  "britches".  I'll  send  you  a  bale  of  cloth  for 
their  eidargement.     More  power  to  you  ! 

We  have  already  requested  your  advice  as  to  sending  out  division  of  birdboat 
mine  sweepers.  The  division  will  be  fitted  out  for  magnetic  mine  sweeping  in 
late  January  or  perhaps  in  February. 

In  regard  to  your  various  recommendations  on  air  matters,  I  will  say  that  I 
perhaps  in  at  least  some  of  the  instances  would  have  made  recommendations 
similar  to  yours  had  I  been  in  your  place,  with  the  knowledge  then  available  to 
you  and  your  staff.  However,  the  recommendations  from  the  ASIATIC  must 
be  considered  in  the  light  of  our  expanding  aviation  program  as  well  as  that  of 
foreign  countries,  and  in  the  light  of  our  plans  not  only  for  Manila  and  the 
Philippines,  but  also  for  the  rest  of  the  naval  establishment.  For  some  time  we 
had  had  it  in  our  minds  to  increase  the  submarine  force  in  the  ASIATIC  and  to 
make  this  force  more  effective  by  adding  to  the  patrol  plane  strength.  An  addi- 
tional requisite,  of  course,  has  been  an  increase  in  the  tighter  strength  of  the 
Army.  Only  recently  has  the  Army  gone  along  with  us  on  this  [3]  point. 
I  might  add,  parenthetically,  that  as  we  have  increased  the  patrol  plane  strength, 
we  have  decreased  the  amount  of  overhead  per  plane.  Altogether,  I  hope  that  we 
have  made  available  to  you  a  substantial  increase  in  your  power  to  carry  out 
ix»ssible  war  tasks. 

I  can  thoroughly  appreciate  your  difficulties  in  regard  to  the  movement  of 
dependents;  and  if  the  pressure  on  you  gets  too  heavy  just  pass  the  responsibility 
for  It  on  my  shoulders.  I  could  even  with  the  babes  yet  unborn  were  on  their 
way  home. 

I  presume  this  letter  will  reach  you  before  McCrea's  departure.  His  orders 
indicate  his  remaining  with  you  for  nine  days.  However,  you  and  he  may  find 
it  desirable  for  him  to  remain  S(mietimes  longer,  in  which  case  I  will  of  course 
be  glad  to  have  him  extend  his  visit. 

/s/    Bettt. 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  985 


0-AlA.m/A1_9/HnlA  OKHCK    OK    rilK    COMMANU.VNT 

^^jjjj/    «/««X*  FOURTI'.ENTH  NAVAI.  DISTRICT 

MAVT   YA«».  PKARI.   HARBOR.  lUWAlI.  USA  fv    r\C   (*     ^  ^ /^O 

CONFIDENTIAL  ^^"^^ 


I  OOHkateBt,  rwirt««nth  SmyX  Dlatriet. 

Si     I  Ttm  Oklaf  «f  a*wml  Op*x«tioa«. 

VU  I  Cfi«M1»i  Im-Chlmt,  Qnlt*d  3tatM  flMt. 

ftifejMti        •ItiMtioa  OoManlag  tb*  SMorlty  of  tlk«  n««t  ud  tli* 
f>«aaKt  Ability  of  tho  Loeal  Dtfoaoo  roroM  t«  Moot 
Ouiyriao  Atuoko. 

BofoxwMMi   (a)  OVMT  41ap«toli  09aU5  of  Oetobor  IMO. 
(b)  OpuT  diapatoh  letUa  of  Oetebar  1»40. 
(•)  Chiaf  of  Mbt&L  OpantiwM*  potmbaI  lottar  adOrMaod 
to  CIMCDS  AaUd  IS  lior«Bbor  1940  (oojy  out  to  Htm 

(A)  COB  14  diapotoh  IMOM  tf  Oetobar  1940. 
(o)  OOB  14  AiapaUb  S80t30  Of  Ootobar  1940. 

I.  la  n,tm  of  ttio  iB(iairiaa  ooateiaod  in  roforoaeea  (a), 

(b)  aaA  (o),  Z  eoaoiter  it  doainblo  to  writ*  thla  lottar  to  aot  lortk 
tko  praooat  abilitjr  of  tha  fOurtoaath  Naral  Diatriot  to  aaat  aurprlea 
bMtila  attaoka  of  aa  abaajr  aitb  tho  oq^uipaaat  aad  fenaa  at  band. 

\J  Alroxmft  att«okln<!  tba  basa  at  Paarl  ILirtor  wUI  undoubtea- 

1/  ba  brengtit  by  oairiara.     Tharafor*.   thara  ara  two  aaya  of  repoilio^i 
attaak.     Pirate  by  looatiog  and  daatroylne;  the  carrlar  prior  to  luuncb- 
ia«  plaaaa.     Sooood,   by  drlTln«  off  atUoklAi  bocbera  irltli  tintl-ulrcraf  t 
(uaa  aad  fi^Ura.     Ilia  mry  ooaponant  of  tha  looul  dafanaa  foixras  lata 
ao  planaa  for  diatant  raeoBnalaaanoa  with  which  to  iooate  acony  carriers 
and  tha  only  planaa  balonglats  to  tha  looal  dafanae  foroaa  to  utUiok 
9^rrt.»n  whan  looatad'  would  ba  tha  ajay  boobara.     rha  Angy  has  li    tha 
Hawaiian  araa  fifty-aina  I^IB  bonbara.     All  of  thaaa  ar«  oluaslfled  aa 
bainti  obaolata.     The  aodal  la  alz  yaan  old  and  tho  planea  thaaaelrea 
ana  flTa  yaara  old.     ItiarBfora,   It  la  ay  oplalot  that  noltior  nirubera 
Bor  typaa  ara  aatlafaotojy  for  tha  purpoaee   Inteadad.     t.'aw  bosbla 
planaa  ara  axpactad  aoaatlaa  In  tha  futuia.     Uoverer,  not  bafoia  July 
\     1941.    Tor  diatant  raoonnaiaaanoa ,   rat^ulatlon  would  have  to  be  made  on 
tha  foroaa  afloat  for  auoh  aa  eould  be  aparad  by  tha  Pleat. 

%  dnra  off  boablntk  planaa  after  they  have  bean  launchao 
■ill  raqulra  both  fl^ihtlnK  planaa  and  antl-alrcral't  runa.     Tho  ^isoi'  1'^:. 
in  tha  Hawaiian  araa  thlrty-alz  purault  planes,   oil  of  which  ara  cl„ci:il- 
fiad  aa   obaolata.     Sana  of   thoa  dira  alz  yauxs  old  and  aorae  of   tl.tui  <>ru 
four  ya«ra  old.     In  nuobara  and  oodala,    there  la  a  aerloua  daflul^i.cy 
•xiatiag.     Maw  fi^^Ura  axa  axpactad  whan  tha  l«-40  la  ia  productloi:  to 


986  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

.  .  OmCR  or  TH«  OOMMAHDANT 

0->A14-1/At*t/IOL4  FOURTEENTH  NAVAI.  DISTRICT 

COrTlr  I  DENT  I  All****"- '"^^  "*■*•■•  "*•*"•«"*•  „ro  ^o&Q 

■*jM«i      utaaUM  OMCMsiM  tiM  awwrttr  t  «W  n—t  Ud  tte 
rvwwt  AbilltT  af  U*  Uoa  MTWM  Momm  to  11m« 

««M  aei  «nMur  to  b*  iBoteblc  k«f  on  th*  «>d  «r  XM1|  this  awbor  «om 

CU  Mnr  la  •kMB«4  wlU  th«  yrotooU«a  mt  Mm  Tmrl  Rubor 
loM  kf  MU-oiMJOft  COM*     tteio  OM  U  HmmII  tw—ty  ■!»  fUod 
>>laBh  coo  uA  fortr-fottr  BObUo  S>tMh  chh.    ttorc  or*  |iojMt«« 
*nm.^-tmut  mm,  «o  bo  AoUtoioA  U  XMl.    IMvo  oro  bo  Sf-otiUlMtor 
•mA  •air  IM  .00  oallbor  o«%  of  «)m  pi«Joo«o«  UO  s^iaiUiMter  ood 
9M  alO  oollbor  ■Mhlao  cwm.    tho  Aiagr  yHoao  bo  floeo  tho  szoobor 
furt  «r  bko  ^laob  c«M  oiwaU  ffborX  Rubor  ob«  aOy  o  (oo  mu  othor 
■ftUbuT  «kJ«oUvM.    Za  mr  «»iaUa,  lb  olU  bo  aoowMty  bo  laorooao 
bko  aabon  of  iwa  arooad  Marl  Rubor  cioably  bo  havo  aar  aaablaaao 
or  artl-4lnaBfb  «af«oo.    IMrblwaoM,  Z  oavrcao  ar  daabb  aa  bo  tho 
•maaay  oT  a  S-Uok  gaa  albk  a  tl  aoe«aR  faoo  tat  drlTlM  eCT  kl«b 
alUbato  bwfcin.    n»  Aagr  baa  aUa  ao  flaaa  fHr  bto  aaM-alrtsaft 
diCaaaa  at  Laalaalol  or  Tiinbn  ftarbhaaaaro.  It  wUl  bo  aoooaaarr  to 
tevo  a  watHwblt  ooMoabiabloa  at  aaU-alruaf t  com  to  dofoad  tho 
ahl>gda«  bamtaala  aad  haibo*  af  Hoaalola  la  ardor  bhat  llaoo  at  eos- 
—ilMUua  aar  bo  kof t  ofM.    nth  a  Uiatod  kaaaladc*  if  bho  daaltgr 
at  aabl^-alnxafb  banaiaa  ahioad.  I  oa  oT  tho  oflalaa  that  at  loaat 
800  COM  at-  ada^aata  alaa  aad  loaca  wUl  bo  *o«arod  for  tho  offlolaat 
diToaao  of  bho  naaallai  arta*    VOa  waAar  lo  la  addltioa  to  Vf-iOlllaotor 
aad  .00  ooUbor  aaahlaa  gwa. 

Za  addltioa  to  bha  Aovo,  bho  abv  haa  plaaaad  aa  alravafb 

aaalas  oovrloo  abloh  alU  ooMlat  of  oUht  Radar  otatlaaa.    Ihroa  of 
thooo  otatlaaa  aro  flaod  aad  f Ito  art  aobllo*    Ihm  oaoslotod  at  aa 
tadtf lalta  blao  la  tho  fataro,  thla  aaaal^  aot  ahoald  bo  ado«aato. 

J   8.        mnma  i<uz»rr  oturtmr. 

tho  Uoal  drfoaai  aaatMt  ■abatrliiii  aoald  ba  ooadaatod  by 
yatral  Toioola  aad  alroaaf  t  aoaklw  la  ooajoaatloa.    &o  dlotrlot  haa 
•a  alronfb  for  thla  yarvooo.    RMoably,  thna  hava  arrlTod  hoio  throo 
rmntla  at  Saatrcvar  unaloa  nOBXT  i*loh  la  imI^I  bo  tho  IomI 
daftnaa  foiooa.    fboao  Ttaatla  havo  llataatM  •M'  dad,  ahaa  ropalrtd 
od  raa^  for  ooivloo,  alll  bo  a  valaablo  ooatrlbatloa  for  aaU- 
■lilBiilii  aad  Ml  art  aook.    A  lazia  na^or  of  yatral  voaaala  alU  ba 
i««al>id  far  aabtf-oabaarlaa  wvtt  U  tha  nolalty  af  Oaha  aad  tho  othor 


-  ■- 


nc 


Vi«v«- 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  987 

0»Al6-l/A7-2/ln)14  OKKICK   OK    TBK  tH»«>«  \N1>.^!^T 

(62J)  Foi'nTi;ENTn  navai.  district 

AHD 
i ^    I    ^    ,  •     I    13   '■_  t  "J       i     i'M'X  X^">-  rE*"-   UA'.ICOn.  HAWAII.  U.  ».  A. 

aibjaeti         Situation  Coaaamlnc  Xbm  Smourlty  of  tha  fl*«t  mad  tlu 
FTMMt  Abllltjr  of  th«  Lo«al  DafoBM  roroM  to  MMt 

iiarprtxo  Attaaka. 

island*.     At  proeMt,   th*  diatriet  has  bob*  aad  ivquoot  •mXd  baro  to  bo 
aada  oa  tb*  Fleat  for  auob  raaaala  and  planoa  aa  eould  ba  aparad  for 
Uila  Boat  ijaportaat  verk.     No  aati-aubaarlBa  aata  ar*  pLaaaad,  aer  ara 
any  ooDaidarsd  daaiiubla.     Antl-torpado  aata  ara  ptvjaotad  t9r  tba 
antronaas  of  Honolulu  aad  I%arl  liurbor.     Tb»j  will  probablj  b*  dollTaoroA 
about  1  ifereh  IMl.     Ilk*  aat  depot  aill  b«  ootplctod  ■!»— hat  lator.    ^   > 

vj       4.         parjiy.-  ..jAm^T  uuas. 

Th*  diatrlot  haa  raea&tljr  built  aad  aqulypad  oa*  pa*«y  bare* 
and  tbraa  tt«a  ar*  baiag  *iiulpp*d  for  tovlag  aad  «aa>glalBg  th*  aell. 
Ibia  barga  can  probably  look  out  for  Boaololn  aad  Marl  Harbor  oatU 
aueh  tijie  aa  It  is  sarloualy  iajur*d.     Iha  dlatriot  baa  ao  wm»m§iL» 
BTallabla  for  uaa  aa  awaopa  for  aa*h*r*d  alaa*.     A  mabar  of  aiaa 
aaoapors  ax*  baiag  built  or  farobaaad,  bat  tbair  dallTory  dataa  bora  ara 
uncertain.     A  large  nvabar  of  avoopsra  irill  b«  reiiulrad  ia  erdor  to  koof 
ttie  barbora  of  Paarl  harbor,  Honolulu  aad  Kanaob*  elaar  aad,  ia  addittaB* 
lUlo  on  ik^aali,  tt^hului  and  Uibaiaa  oa  Maui,  aad  I^rt  All**  aad  MavHiwUl 
en  Kauai;     Kith  the  delirety  of  avaapara  ae«  being  bollt  or  pnwhaaaA, 
tlM  genural  aituation  vill  b*  iaproved  iJHaaaurablj. 

5.         Dijiatdi.  ti:.aicT  flo>>a*raiicjn. 

Pu*  coaat  dafeaaaa  of  the  Aiajr  are  oonaidersd  ado^uat*  aaaapi 
tyait  .voneoho  raoalTea  raiy  littla  protaotioa  froa  tb*  battarlaa*  '^ 

rUere  are  t«o  taak  fasaa,    tb*  upper  aad  th*  laaor.     Tb*  loaor 
is  aatiTel>-  contained  In.  lita  tjOTamaent  reaarvatloa  and,  by  tbe  uaa  of 
roTlne  patrols,  is  eonaider*d  rwasoaably  aeoure.     Iha  ivpar  turn  la 
adjaoant  to  a  public  biabaar.     Tb»  faxa  ia  auzreuaded  by  aa  iiaal  laabla 
fense  and  aaeb  tank  with  an  earth  bssx.     Ita  ehlsf  *i(peaur*  la  alda*; 
th*  hi^baay.     To  eountax«ct  thla,  thr**  •l*Tat*d  aaatiy  atatloaa  bava 
been  ereoted,  eaah  equipped  with  aaarahllKhta .     Ihla  eaablea  aaatrlaa 
to  k**p  a  eoatinuoua  lookout  eror  th*  *atir*  f*ae*  11a*  day  aad  alckti 
th*  uppar  fara  ia  eonsidared  fairly  aeaure. 

7.        JATJ-.  Hi'j)  mcmc  jqrmr. 

Haeently,  a  guard  bouae  b«a  beaa  araotaA  aad  M4MI«lgaB*at 


988       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

3U0LC  IS40 


romriEBrni  natal  vamet 

CO  N  r" I  D  El  N  T  l«iin,>MR  »UBt  a«Haft,«unB.  V.  1.  A. 


*mm  aalak  «to  Mirtaw  •ItaMatiw  *ltk  «to  Aiagr«  fW 


A  ■—<■■»  c«ui  !•  kit*  «■  «to  •tMtala  iMWlr  Itaw  «kn(«li 
ihtek  «itel««  ya««r  to  >— i*^n*« 

kUM  la  U  •»••%,    aMS*  mm  vnr  8,000  MtU  aurto*  flir— 
late  tJM  yu*  Mak  ter<    >i  aMltlaB,  %kn«  an  abovt  9,000 
af  alTlllaa  aaataaatea*  aad  aaraiml  tkawaaad  wllata*  aaa* 
la  alKliii  te  tba  aWva,  Uaia  to  a  aaaataat  atn«  tt  tswka  ai« 
vaktolaa  af  all  aaaarlptlaaa  aanyiac  aaypUaa,  atoa<aa,  at  —tmwm,    X% 
to  lipiiilbU  te  aatotato  abaoluto  aaawtty  wltkaut  AlazivtlaB  of  tka 
va*  af  tha  yard.      Bovarar,  aoiyvtaa  aaazohaa  «■!  parladto  atepa,  aft 
aatoaa,  ara  to  affaat  to  avdar  %b*t  tka  alaxt  ■■/  b«  laikaalaaA*     tta 
■ato  gate  haa  baaa  atrw^thiad  te  ^araat  xuahlosi  ttera  kava  baan  taa 
OitUji  far  tka  fwrpaaa  af  sl^las  awrprlaa  txmtolag  te  tte  yaz<A  ganrtoaa 
to  tka  amt  af  a  aaxyrtoa  Hat  to  tka  yavt.     Xa  aMlUaa  te  tka  akawa, 
a  aoTfay  kaa  baas  aaAa  aat  oaly  aT  tte  raz«  bat  af  all  aC  tte  aatlylas 
atettoaa,  aid  araqry  affart  to  balac  aate  te  aloaa  holaa  aad  atop  gapa* 
■hUa  tte  Ci—iiifliiit  la  aat  aatlaflad,  ha  faato  ttet  tte  yraoautlana 
takaa  ara  raaaaaably  affaatlva  but  ttet  tk^r  axa  aoaaaptlbla  te  layMva* 
■aat,  wklak  will  te  aate  aa  aaoaaloa  aairaate. 

ff.  It  ahoold  te  bacaa  to  atod  ttet  until  ooapazatlvaly  raaantly 

aoaa  af  aa  to  tkla  oeaatiy  ted  vair  amah  oeaoaptloa  af  aliat  aaaauraa 
vara  aaaaaaary  aad  atet  prarlaloas  wmf  daalxabla  In  orimr  te  affaot  any 
aaaaura  of  prataetlon  acalnat  alxanift,  agalaat  aubaarlnaa,  against 
Blaaa  and  agatoat  aubvazalra  alia«nte.     Tba  offlaara  and  am  of  ttito 
aoaaaBd  hi^rm  baas  alart,  aaalooa  and  Tlgllaat  to  azaouttog  all  aaaaozaa 
uadar  ttelr  aontrel  to  ordar  te  proparly  prapaza  tte  dlatrlot  far  any 
axlgaaelaa. 

10*  It  should  ba  aaauaad  ttet  tte  ter  Oapartaant  la  folly  umra 

af  tte  situation  bars  and  ttet  tkqr  ara  proeaadlag  rlgorooaly  with  a 
Tloa  te  orarsealng  daflolanolaa.     It  aay  bs  ttet  iter  tera  fallad  te 
raaognlsa  tte  aaoaaalty  for  larsa  niHtera  of  antl-«lroraft  guns  and 
pursuit  plsnaa.     I  suggaat  ttet  tte  Chlaf  of  Itaral  Oparttloaa  aaka 
In^uliy  froa  tte  aar  Oaparteant  as  te  atet  ttelr  plans  ars  and  on  wtet 
dataa  ttey  pradlot  ttet  thay  all!  te  aeooapllshad  aad  than,  if  tka 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  989 


evnoB  or  tri  ooimamd/.kt 

ii..   «#»««>.  TOURTBBNTH  NAVAL  DISTRICT 

^AY-'2/IB14  AMD 

ty)  MAVY  YA«0,  PIAltL  UAQOOn.  HAWAII.  U.  S.  A. 

CONrlDLNTlAl  30D 


>»iMit  Abilltjr  et  tbm  Leoal  0«f«B*«  roroM  to  U»«t 
auyrla*  Atteoks. 


wabavi  »mA  imXmu  ar*  not  ••tl«f«otoz7,  tlMa«  fwituiwa  any  be  dlscucaed 

U*  It  la  o«aal4*r*d  highly  uad«ali«bl«  fren  mj  point  of  view 

t)>*t  tlM  >kr  DapartBant  ahouU  In  aajr  wty  oo(m  to  l>eIl«T«  thut  ti>«i« 
la  laak  of  agi^iiot  bataaaa  th«  kxmy  authorltla*  sad  tiary  authorities 
haxa,  or  that  Uia  offlolala  of  tbo  rouxtoanth  Maral  IHatnot  t>re  preas- 
lac  Um  Umrj  Dapartaaat  to  do  aeMathln«(  la  ratvird  to  Ainy  oattexs. 


C.  C.  aJOGA 


tf^  ■'-  "H^?. 


990       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


CNZTBD  STATS  FLXCX 
A16/  U.S.S.    NXS  USnCO,    Flagship 

Jerlal  022. 

raauary  t,  19 


/^S 


Pearl  Harbor,  X.H. , 


Co:^IDB>TIAL 

FIR;>T   EriiXK5iy.ENT  to 
Com  14  Cont.   Ltr. 
C-A16-1/A7-2/ND14 
(629)    of   30   Dec.    1940. 

From:  Commander-in-Chief,   United  States  Fleet. 

To     :  The  Chief  of  Naval  Operations. 

Subject:  Situation  Concerning  the  Security  of  the  Fleet 

and  the  Present  Ability  of  the  Local  Defense 
Forces  to  k'eet  Surprise  Attacks. 

1.  Forwarded.  '^The  Coicmander-in-Chief  has  conferred 

with  the  Comcandant  Fourteenth  N'aval  District  anV)   the 
Conmandlne  General   of   the  Hawaiian  Department.     As  a  result 
of  the   conlerence  v^ith  the   Commandine  General,   Hawaiian 
Lepartment,   and  un  inspection  in  company  with  him,   infonia- 
>  tion  was   furnished   the  Commandant  Fourteenth  Kaval  District 
who  prepared  the   basic  letter.     The  Commander-in-Chief 
concBlls  with  the   Commandant  Fourteenth  N'aval   District  in 
the  opinion   that  the   present  Army  Pursuit  Squadrons  and 
antiaircraft  batteries  are  inadequate  to  protect  the  Fleet 
and  Pearl  Harbor  against   air  attack.     Uihen  establiahed   the 
proposed  pursuit  strength  will  be  adequate-.     The  proposed 
total   of  68  mobile  three-inch  guns  for  this  area  is  not 
considered   adequate.      With  the  almost    continuous  high  ceil- 
ing prevailing  in  this  area  a  materially  greater  number  of 
larger   and  longer  range  antiaircraft  guns  are  necessary  to 
counter  high  altitude  bombing  attacks  on  Pearl  Harbor. 

2.  AS  neither  the  increased  antiaircraft  batteries 

nor  the   augmented  pursuit   squadrons  will  be  available   for 
an  extended  period  the   defense  of  Fleet  units  within  Pearl 
Harbor  will  have  to  be  augmented  by  that  portion  of  the        ^ 
Fleet  »4iich  may  be   in  Pearl  Harbor  in  event  of  attack  by     ^-^"^mo tcA^dta4j 
hostile  aircraft.     Plans   for   co-operation  with  the  local      "  yJ^^.  -' 
defense  forces  are  being  made.     At  present   the   continuous  a.L^^ -  "^  ' 

readiness  of  carrier  fighter   squadrons  or  antiaireraft  q^"^*^  ^^ 

batteries  is  not   contemplated.      The  improbability  of  such     C^'^^ ^yf^— A 
an  attack  under  present    conditions  does   not,    in  the  opinion 
of  the  Connander -in-Chief ,   warrant   interrupting  entirely 
the  training  required  by  Beet  Air  Units  which  wotild  have  to  be 
largely  curtailed  if   constant   readiness  of  a  fighter 
squadron  were  required.  /  -  ^        .  *9  ^v 

y  SecrM^::.!  Oi.«r  ^  '**         ' 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  991 

QBTS  STATIS  VUR 
Ale/  Q.8.8.  HnriOBEEOO,  ria«ihlp 

S«rUl  022. 

8abJ«et:     Situation  Conoernli^  th«  Stouritjr  of  th«  n««t 
and  th«  Present  Ability  of  the  Local  Defense 
roroes  to  Heet  Surprise  Attacks . 

8,     Tbere  does  not  appear  to  be  any  practicable  nay 
of  plaeins  torpedo  baffles  or  nets  within  the  harbor  to  protect 
th«  ships  aoored  therein  against  torpedo  plane  attack  without 
Crtatly  liaitinc  tha  aotlTities  within  the  harbor,  particularly 
t^a  aoTaaents  of  larse  ships  and  the  landing  and  take-off  of  patrol 
S^oadrons.  Inasaaob  as  Pearl  Harbor  is  the  only  operating  base 
•▼•liable  to  the  Fleet  in  this  area  any  paasiTs  defense  measure* 
tha\  will  further  restriot  the  use  of  the  base  as  such  should  be 
•voided.  Considering  this  and  the  improbability  of  such  an 
•ttaok  under  present  conditions  and  the  unlikelihood  of  an  eneny 
baing  able  to  advance  carriers  sufficiently  near  in  wartime  in 
the  faoa  of  active  Pleet  operations ,  it  is  not  considered  neces- 
sary to  lay  saoh  nets. 

4.  The  defense  against  subaarlnea  and  mines  are  con- 
sidered adequate  under  present  peace  time  conditions,  but  early 
Installation  of  underwater  sound -submarine  detection  system 
should  be  made.  Alao  the  delivery  of  the  required  ships  to  the 
fourteenth  Naval  Diatrict  Defense  forces  should  be  expedited, 
particularly  ships  for  sweeping  aagnetic  and  anchored  mines. 

5.  In  this  oonneotion,  it  is  urgently  recommended 
tlMt  Local  Defense  foroes,  adequate  for  the  protection  of  naval 
installations  at  Pearl  Harbor  and  the  Fleet  units  based  thereon, 
be  provided  the  Commandant  fourteenth  Naval  Diatrict.  In  order 
to  provide  freedom  of  action  for  the  United  States  Fleet,  and 
further,  to  avoid  the  necessity  for  detailing  important  Fleet 
units  (becauae  no  other  ships  are  available)  to  tasks  requiring 
only  port  of  their  full  capabilities,  it  is  considered  that  the 
foroes  provided  should  be  sufficient  for  full  protection  and  should 
be  independent  of  the  presence  or  absence  of  ships  of  the  U.S. 
risat.  It  is  further  considered  that  the  provision  of  adequate 


992       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

xanrxD  statb  nnr 
u.s.s.  nnr  laaaco.  riagship 

StrUl  oat. 

MDjcett  situation  Concerning  the  Security  of    the  Fleet 

and  the  Preeent  Ability  of  the  Local  Defense 
7oroe8  to  Meet  Surprise  Attacks. 


Looal  Defense  ?orce8  for   the  Fourteenth  Naval  District   should 
t9  glTCD  higher  priority  than  continental  Naval  Dlatricts,    where 
both  the  possibilities  of,  and  objectives  for,    attack  are  much 
l«aa.  fi/ 


J.    0.    RICIIAnDSON. 


Copy  to: 

Com  FOURTtSN 


^...jA^-rt.^-^^P"" 


!^  '-  ■  ++£? 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  993 


CinC  File  No.  UNITED  STATES  FLEET  3BCRBT 

U.  8.  8.  PENNSYLVANIA.  FUxship 


A16/0129 


PoaPl  Harbor,  T.  H. 
January  25,    1941 


From:  Conmander-lD-Chlaf ,  TT.   S.   Fleet. 

To:  The  Chief  of  Naval  Operations. 

Subject:  Chief  of  Naval  Operations'  Flan  DOG. 

References:  (a)   Opnav  secret  despatch  212155  of 

January,   1941. 
(b)   Opnav  meaorandum  for  Secnav  Op-ls-oTB 
of  November  12,   1940. 

1.  Keference    (aj  was  received  by  the  Commander- 

in-Chief,  U.    3.   Fleet,   one  day  prior  to  the  arrival  of 
Commander  UoCrea  at  i'earl  Harbor  en  route  to  Vne  Navy  Depart- 
ment .     It   is  considered  desirable  to  take  advantage  of  his 
retxirn  to  inform  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  of  the  vievra 
of  the  Commander- in-ohief  as  to  the  new  situation. 

S.  In  view  of  reference    (a)   and  some  degree  of 

urgency  implied  therein,   it  is  considered  that   study  of  the 
new  situation  and  the  preparation  of  plans  therefor  should 
take  priority  over  the  preparation  of  plans  for  Kainbow  No. 
S.     Unless  advice  to  the  contrary  is  received,  this  will  be 
done. 

V  3.  The  new  situation,   as  visualized  by  the 

Cosmander-in-Chlef ,   alters  the  assumptions  and  concepts  of 
Hainbow  No.   3,  principally  in  that  the  major  offensive  ef- 
fort of  the  United  States  is  to  be  exerted  in  the  Atlantic , 
rather  than  in  the  Pacific,   and  in  that  a  "waiting  attitude" 
will  be  taken  in  the  Facific,  pending  a  determination  of 
Japan's  intentions.     If  Japan  enters  the  war  or  commits  an 
overt  act  against  United  States'    Interests  or  territory,   our 
attitude  in  the  Pacific  will  be  primarily  defensive,  but  op- 
portunities will  be  seized  to  damage  Japan  as  situations 
present  themselves  or  can  be  created. 

4.  Under  the  foregoing  general  conception,   it  is 

deemed  desirable  to  outline  as  briefly  as  possible,  certain 
tentative  assumotions,  upon  which  the  actions  of  the  U.  S. 
Fleet  in  the  Pacific  will  be  predicated,     'i'hese  are: 

(a)     The  United  States  is  at  war  with  Ciermany 
and  Italy. 


(^  ""     "''^'"  ^•.•'^'':   ......         ^^'^-rr   -7^^ 


«. 


996       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

CinC  File  No.  UNITED  STATES  FLEET  SBCRgT 

U.  S.  S.  PENNSYLVANIA.  Flagship 


A15/0129 


Pearl  Harbor,   T.   H. 
January  25,    1941 


Subject:  Chief  of  Naval  Operations'  Plan  DOG. 


(4)  rrotect   United  States'    ahippinc.     This  will  require  the 
following: 

(a)  Provide  escort   for   important   ships. 

(b)  Houte  allied  and  United  States'    shipping  in 
the  Fleet  Control  Zone. 

(c)  Base  cruisers  on  Saxjoa  to  cover   shipping  in 
the  South  Seas. 

(d)  Despatch  the  Southeastern  Pacific   Force. 

(e)  Bstablish  escort  and  patrol  ^roup  between 
Kav/ail  and  the  '.('est  Coast. 

(f)  liaintain  striking  group  to  operate  against 
raiders    (search  for  raiders  might   afford 
opportunity  to  reconnoiter  the  I.^rshall 
Islands  without  provokin:::  Japan) . 

(5)  Protection  of  outlying   islands.     This  will  require  the 
following: 

(a)  establish  defense  battalions  at  ..idv/ay  and 
janoa  and  siaaller  units  at  Johnston,  './ake, 
Jalnyra  and  u ant on. 

(b)  Maintain  subiiarine  patrols  at   all  the  above- 
nentloned   islands,   except  Samoa. 

Ic)  ZJespatch  two  subiaarlnes,  plus  the  UUTOLAN, 
for  the  defense   of  Unalaska. 


(6)      .-Adjust  'J.    o.   Fleet  training  to  war   conditions. 


^^  St^iH< 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  997 

CinC  File  No.  UNITED  STATES  FLEET 

A16/0129  "•  ^-  S-  PENNSYLVANIA,  Fi^ship  ^sgRgr 

Pearl  Harbor,   T.   H. 
January  25,   1941 

Subject:  Chief  of  Haval  Operations'  Plan  UOG. 


Additional  t..ea3ure3  if  Japan  enters-  ..'ar 

(7)  llake   Initial   sweep  for  Japanese  merchantnen  and  raiders 
In  the  l^orthern  Faciflo.  h, 

(8)  Establish  submarine  patrols  in  the  I^shall  islands, 
withdrawing  them  from  own  outlying  Islands  as  necessary. 

(9)  Uake  early  reconnaissance  in  force  of  the  liar  shall 
Islands.     Thereafter  conduct  a  general  su'nreilleaice  of 
that   area  and  make  raids  on  forces,   material  installa- 
tions,  and  communications  therein. 

(10)  Uake  periodic   sweeps  toward  the  l^larianas  and  Bonins. 


y 


6.  it  will,   of  course,  be  realized  that  the  ef- 
fectiveness with  Trtiich  the  tasks  set  forth  above  can  be  prose- 
cuted is  dependent  upon  the  forces  available,   especially  after 
the  withdrawal  of  the  Atlantic  reenforcements.      If  a  carrier 
is  to  be  included  in  the  Atlantic  reenforcement ,    one  of  the 
LZ^UvGTON  class   should  be   selected  due  to  difficulties  of 
handling  in  Pearl  Harbor.     There  is,   however,  definite  need 
for  all  four  carriers  under  the  tasks  assigned  this  fleet. 

7.  in  connection  with  the -execution  of  the  forego- 
ing tasks,   and  with  partlcvilar  reference  to  the  early  initia- 
tion of  offensive  operations,    it  must  be  pointed  out   that  the 
existing  deficiencies  in  the  defenses  of  Cahu  and  in  the  Local 
Defense  ^forces  of  the  Jfourteenth  Naval  District   is^ose  a  heavy 
burden  on  the  fleet   for  purely  defensive  purposes.      Ideally,    a 
Fleet  Base  should  afford  refuge  and  rest  for  personnel  as  v/ell 
as  opportxinity  for  maintenance  and  upkeep  of  material   installa- 
tions.    V/hen  Jfleet  planes.  Fleet  guns  and  irleet  personnel  are 
required  to  be  constantly  ready  for  defense  of   its  own  Base, 
the  wear  and  tear  on  both  men  and  material  can  not  but  result 
in  impaired  readiness  for  active   operations   at    sea.     The  most 
outstanding  deficiencies  affecting  this  readiness  of  the  iileet 
are: 


^  /^ 


^»fc- 


998       CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


CinC  File  No.  UNITED  STATES  KI.EKT 

A16/0129  ^'  ^-  ^-  PENNSVLVANIA,  Flai^ship 


i  earl  i. arbor,    .'. 
J&nuery   2C,    1'j41 


Subject:  Chief  of  Laval  Operations'"   i-lan  JU' 


(a)  The  critical   inadequacy  of  A. A.    j\ans  avail- 
able  for  the  defence   of  learl  Harbor,   neces- 
sitatinr  constant  mannlne  of  ships'   A. A. 
Guns  while   in  porv. 

(b)  The  snail  nunber  and   obsolescent  condition 
of  land-based   aircraft,   nedessitatlnc  con- 
stant readiness  of  atrikins  groups  of  Meet 
planes  and  use  of  J^'leet  planes  for  local 
patrols. 

(o)      Lack  of  suitable  local  defense  vessels  for 
the  fourteenth  Naval  District,   necessitating 
detail  of  fleet  units  to  this  duty.     The 
detail  of  ifleet  units  to  this  duty  not  only 
results  in  loss,   to  the  J^leet,   of  the  avail- 
ability of  important  vessels,  but  also  re- 
sults in  the  forced  employment   of  ships 
whose  more  valuable  characteristics  v/ill  be 
largely  wasted  due  to  the  nature  of  their 
tasks.     This   is  particularly  true  where  de- 
stroyers nust  be  diverted  to  local  A/3 
patrol,  off-shore  patrol  and  local  escort. 
These  duties  could  better  be  performed  by 
submarine  chasers,   converted  gimboats  and 
converted  escort  vessels. 

(d)     Lack  of  aircraft  detection  devices  ashore. 


6.  It   is  considered   Imperative  that    immediate 

measures  be  imdertaken  to  correct  the  critical  deficiencies 
enumerated  above.      It   Is   further  believed  that  these 
measures  should  take  priority  over  the  needs  of  continental 
districts,   the  training  program,   and  material  aid  to  Great 


Britain. 


<\^ 


SSC 


1 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  999 


CinC  File  No.  UNITED  STATES  FLEET 

U.  8.  8.  PENNSYLVANIA.  FlanUp 


A16/0129 


Pearl  Harbor,  T.  H. 
January  25,   1941 


Subject:  Chief  of  NaTal  Operatloos*  Plan  COG. 


9.  It   la  reooimnended  that  the  Alaakan  and  Hawaiian 
reenforeemanta  referred  to  in  paragraph  S103(a)(5)   of  W.F.L. 
44   (adranoe  oopy)  be  despatohed  aa  aoon  aa  poaslbl^  In  order 
that  neeesaity  for  beary  eaoort  may  not   esbarrasa  the  XJ.  S. 
Paeifle  Fleet   in  Its  later  operations. 

10.  This  letter  has  been  prepared  in  oollab oration 
with  the  prospeetiye  Coisinandar-ln-Chlef ,  TT.  S.  Pacific  Fleet, 
Rear  Admiral  H.   S.   Kimmel,  U.  S.  N.     It  represents  his,  aa 
well  as  my  own,  rlews. 


J.    0.   RICHARDSON 

Copy  to; 

Rear  Admiral  E.Z.  Kijmel 


COPY 


S6C 


1000    OQNGRESSIONAt  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Op-12-CTB(SC)A16(H-S)   Serial  014412 

Navy  Department, 
Office  of  The  Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 

Washington,  10  February  WJfl. 
Secret 

From  ;  The  Chief  of  Naval  Operations. 
To :  The  Commander-in-Chief,  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet. 
Subject :  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  Plan  D. 

References:   (a)  Cine,  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet,  secret  Itr.  A16/0129  of  January  25, 
1941. 
(b)   SecNav   secret  Itr.   to   SecWar,   Serial  09112  of  Januarv  24, 
1941. 

1.  Receipt  is  acknowledged  of  reference  (a). 

2.  Since  the  plans  to  be  prepared  under  the  directives  of  WPL-44  will  be 
applicable  to  a  large  extent  to  the  situation  presented  by  Plan  D,  the  Chief  of 
Naval  Operations  desires  that  planning  under  WPL-44  continue  to  have  the 
highest  priority. 

3.  The  general  concept,  the  assumptions,  and  the  tasks  under  a  Plan  D  situa- 
tion, outlined  in  paragraphs  3,  4,  and  5  of  reference  (a),  are  in  accord  with 
the  views  of  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations. 

4.  In  connection  with  the  initial  sweep  for  Japanese  raiders  ih  the  Northern 
Pacific,  mentioned  in  paragraph  5  (7),  a  suggestion  may  l^ere  be  in  order.  The 
Chief  of  Naval  Operations  believes  it  possible  that  Japan  for  some  time  main- 
tained a  ve.ssel  about  500  miles  north  of  Oahu.  Indications  are  that  Bome 
similar  vessel  is  now  stationed  about  1,000  miles  southwest  of  Oahu.  In  con- 
nection with  reports  of  unidentified  submarines  near  Oahu,  Panama,  the  Mexi- 
can coast,  and  in  the  open  sea,  it  may  be  surmised  that  the  vessel  mentioned 
above  is  a  submarine  tender,  and  that  Japan  may  plan  during  war  to  ba.se 
submarines  on  tenders  in  the  open  sea.  It  is  conridered  inost  inadvisable  that 
we  indicate  too  much  curiosity  in  this  respect  for  the  tinje  being.  It  would  be 
well,  however,  to  keep  track  of  such  vessels,  and  to  talje  immediate  steps  to 
sink  them  on  the  outbreak  of  war. 

5.  With  reference  to  paragraph  7  of  reference  (a),  the  Chief  of  Naval  Oper- 
ations is  cognizant  of  the  condition  of  the  defenses  of  Oahu,  and,  in  view  of 
the  inadequacy  of  the  Army  defenses,  the  responsibility  which  must  rest  upon 
the  fleet  for  its  own  protection  while  in  Pearl  Harbor.  In  this  connection,  yo«r 
attention  is  invited  to  reference  (b),  a  copy  of  which  was  furnished  to  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet.  The  War  Department  is  taking  steps 
to  remedy  the  situation,  but  the  Commander-in-Chief  should  constantly  press 
the  Commanding  General  of  the  Hawaiian  Department  to  make  all  the  im- 
provements that  lie  within  his  own  power. 

6.  It  is  noted  that  no  provision  is  made  in  the  Naval  local  Defense  Force 
plans  of  the  Fourteenth  Naval  District  for  the  employment  of  Vessels  as  a  part 
of  an  aircraft  wai-ning  net  in  the  waters  to  the  northward  and  southward  of 
Oahu.  It  is  suggested  that  in  coordinating  the  plans  of  the  Commander-in- 
Chief,  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet,  and  the  Commandant,  Fourteenth  Naval  District, 
this  matter  be  given  consideration.  It  is  possible  the  large  sampans  equipped 
with  radio  might  prove  useful  for  this  purpose  duri»i:  war. 

7.  The  urgency  of  delivery  of  this  document  is  such  that  it  will  not  reach 
the  addressee  in  time  by  the  next  available  officer  courier.  The  originator 
therefore  authorizes  the  trahsmission  of  this  document  be  registered  mail. 

/s/     H.  R.  Stark. 
H.  R.  Stakk. 

EXHIBIT  NO.  10 

Op-12B-9-McC  (SC)A7-2(2)/FFl 

Serial  09112 

Secret  Jan.  24,  1941. 

My  Dear  Mr.  Secretary:  The  security  of  the  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet  while  in 
Pearl  Harbor,  and  of  the  Pearl  Harbor  Naval  Base  itself,  has  been  under  re- 
newed study  by  the  Navy  Department  and  forces  afloat  for  the  past  sevel*! 
weeks.  This  reexamination  has  been,  in  part,  prompted  by  the  increased  grav- 
ity of  the  situation  with  respect  to  Japan,  and  by  reports  from  abroad  of 
successful  bombing  and  torpedo  plane  attacks  on  ships  while  in  bases.  If  war 
eventuates  with  Japan,  it  is  believed  easily  possible  that  hostilities  would  be 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  1001 

Initiated  by  a  surprise  attack  upon  the  Fleet  or  the  Naval  Base  at  Pearl 
Harbor. 

In  my  opinion,  the  inherent  possibilities  of  a  major  disaster  to  the  fleet  or 
naval  base  warrant  taking  every  step,  as  rapidly  as  can  be  done,  that  will 
increase  the  joint  readiness  of  the  Army  and  Navy  to  withstand  a  raid  of  the 
character  mentioned  above. 

The  dangers  envisaged  in  their  order  of  importance  and  probability  are  con- 
sidered to  be : 

(1)  Air  bombing  attack. 

(2)  Air  tori)edo  plane  attack. 

(3)  Sabotage. 

(4)  Submarine  attack. 

(5)  Mining. 

(6)  Bombardment  by  gun  fire. 

Defense  against  all  but  the  first  two  of  these  dangers  appears  to  have  been 
provided  for  satisfactorily.  The  following  paragraphs  are  devolted  principally 
to  a  discussion  of  the  problems  encompassed  in  (1)  and  (2)  above,  the  solution 
of  which  I  consider  to  be  of  primary  importance. 

Both  types  of  air  attack  are  possible.  They  may  be  carried  out  successively, 
simultaneously,  or  in  combination  with  any  of  the  other  operations  enumerated. 
The  maximum  probable  enemy  effort  may  be  put  at  twelve  aircraft  squadrons, 
and  the  minimum  at  two.  Attacks  would  be  launched  from  a  striking  force  of 
carriers  and  their  supporting  vessels. 

[2]        The  counter  measures  to  be  considered  are : 

(a)  Location  and  engagement  of  enemy  carriers  and  supporting  vessels 
before  air  attack  can  be  launched  ; 

(b)  Location  and  engagement  of  enemy  aircraft  before  they  reach  their 
objectives ; 

(c)  Repulse  of  enemy  aircraft  by  anti-aircraft  fire ; 

(d)  Concealment  of  vital  installations  by  artificial  smoke ; 

(e)  Protection  of  vital  installations  by  balloon  barrages. 

The  operations  set  forth  in  (a)  are  largely  functions  of  the  Fleet  but,  quite 
possibly,  might  not  be  carried  out  in  case  of  an  air  attack  initiated  without 
warning  prior  to  a  declaration  of  war. 

Pursuit  aircraft  in  large  numbers  and  an  effective  warning  net  are  required 
for  the  operations  in  (b).  It  is  understood  that  only  thirty-six  Army  pursuit 
aircraft  are  at  present  in  Oahu.  and  that,  while  the  organization  and  equipping 
of  an  Anti-Air  Information  Service  supported  by  modem  fire  control  equipment 
is  in  progress,  the  present  system  relies  wholly  on  visual  observation  and  sound 
locators  which  are  only  effective  up  to  four  miles. 

Available  Army  anti-aircraft  batteries  appear  inadequate  if  judged  by  the 
standards  of  the  war  in  Europe.  There  are  now  in  Oahu  26 — S"  fixed  anti- 
aircraft guns  (of  which  something  over  half  are  grouped  about  Pearl  Harbor), 
56  mobile  3"  guns,  and  109  .50  caliber  machine  guns.  The  anti-aircraft  bat- 
teries are  manned  in  part  by  personnel  which  is  also  required  to  man  parts  of 
the  sea  coast  artillery.  Should  an  attack  on  Oahu  combine  air  attack  with  a 
gun  bombardment,  one  or  the  other  countering  fires  would  suffer  from  lack  of 
men.  If  the  prevailing  high  ceiling  is  taken  into  account  the  caliber  of  the 
anti-aircraft  guns  m'ght  be  inadequate  against  high  altitude  bombing  attack. 

By  late  summer  the  defenses  will  be  considerably  strengthened  by  additions 
in  guns,  planes,  and  radio  locators.  It  is  understood,  sixteen  additional  3" 
Mobile,  twenty-four  90  mm.,  and  one  hundred  twenty  37  mm.  guns  will  be  on 
hand;  the  pursuit  aircraft  strength  is  to  be  expanded  to  a  total  of  149;  the 
new  radio  locators  will  have  an  effective  range  -of  100  miles.  Although  the 
caliber  of  the  guns  will  still  be  small  for  effective  action  against  high  altitude 
bombers,  this  augmentation  will  markedly  improve  the  security  of  the  Fleet. 
It  does  not,  of  course,  affect  the  critical  period  immediately  before' us. 

[3]  The  supplementary  measures  noted  in  (d)  and  (e)  might  be  of  the 
greatest  value  in  the  defense  of  Pearl  Harbor.  Balloon  barrages  have  demon- 
strated some  usefulness  in  Europe.  Smoke  from  fixed  installations  on  the  ground 
might  prove  most  advantageous. 

To  meet  the  needs  of  the  situation,  I  offer  the  following  proposals : 

(1)  That  the  Army  assign  the  highest  priority  to  the  increase  of  pursuit  air- 
craft and  anti-aircraft  artillery,  and  the  establishment  of  an  air  warning  net  in 
Hawaii. 

(2)  That  the  Army  give  consideration  to  the  questions  of  balloon  barrages, 
the  employment  of  smoke,  and  other  special  devices  for  improving  the  defenses 
of  Pearl  Harbor. 


1002    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

(3)  That  local  Joint  plans  be  drawn  for  the  effective  coordination  of  naval  and 
military  aircraft  operations,  and  ship  and  shore  anti-aircraft  gun  fire,  against 
surprise  aircraft  raids. 

(4)  That  the  Army  and  Navy  forces  in  Oahu  agree  on  appropriate  degrees  of 
joint  readiness  for  immediate  action  in  defense  against  surprise  aircraft  raids 
against  Pearl  Harbor. 

(5)  That  joint  exercises,  designed  to  prepare  Army  and  Navy  forces  in  Oahu 
for  defense  against  surprise  aircraft  raids,  be  held  at  least  once  weekly  so  long 
as  the  present  uncertainty  continues  to  exist. 

Your  concurrence  in  these  proposals  and  the  rapid  implementing  of  the  meas- 
ures to  be  taken  by  the  Army,  which  are  of  the  highest  importance  to  the  security 
of  the  Fleet,  will  be  met  with  the  closest  cooperation  on  the  i)art  of  the  Navy 
Department. 

Sincerely  yours, 


Secretary  of  the  Navy. 
The  Honorable  The  SECRirrABy  of  Wak. 
Copies  to :  CINC,  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet. 

Com  14 

Op-22 

Op-30 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1003 

WAR  DEPARTMENT 

WASHINGTON  . 


Subject:       Air  IJefense  of  Pearl  Harbor,  Hawaii. 
Tot  The  Secretary  of  the  I.avy. 


1.  In  replying  to  your  letter  of  January  24,  rej^airlinR 
the  possibility  of  surprise  attacks  upon  the  Fleet  or  the  Naval  Baso 
at  Pearl  Harbor,  I  wish  to  express  complete  concunrence  as  to  the 
importance  of  this  matter  and  the  ui-gency  of  our  makinc  every  possible 
preparation  to  meet  such  a  hostile  effort.       The  Hawaiian  Department 
is  the  best  equipped  of  all  our  overseas  departments,  and  continues 

to  hold  a  high  priority  for  the  compl»»tion  of  its  projected  defenses 
because  of  the  importance  of  ci^inB  full  pi^tection  to  the  Fleet. 

2.  The  Hawaiian  Project  provides  for  one  hundred  and 
forty-ei£:ht  pursuit  planes.       There  ai^  now  in  Hawaii  thirty-six 
pursuit  planes;  nineteen  of  these  are  p-36's  and  seventeen  are  of 
somewhat  less  efficiency,       I  am  arran[dnc  to  have  thirty-one  F^36 
pursuit  planes  assembled  at  55an  Die^'O  for  shipment  to  Hawaii  within' 
the  next  ten  days,  as  a{-reed  to  with  the  Navy  Department.       This 
will  bring  the  Arry  pursuit  ci^^P  in  Hawaii  up  to  fifty  of  the  p-36 
type  and  seventeen  of  a  somewhat  less  effic5-ent  tjTie.       In  addition, 
fifty  of  the  new  P-40-3  pursuit  nlmes,  with  their  (funs,  leakproof 
tanks  arid  modem  armor  will  he  acsrimtled  at  5an  I'ieco  about  March 

15  for  shipment  by  carrier  to  Hawaii. 

3«       There  are  at  present  in  the  Kav.'siian  Islands  eighty-' 
two  3- inch  AA  guns,  twenty  37  mm  '^P.  junrt   (en  rt)Ute),  and  one  hundred 
and  nine  caliber   .50  fj.  machine  cuns.       *he  total  project  calls   for 
ninety-eight  3-inc>i  AA  ^uns,  one  hundred  and  twenty  37  mm  AA  guns, 
and  three  hundred  and  eight  caliber  .50  AA  machine  guns. 

A»       With  reference  to  the  Airornft  Warning  Service,  the 
equipment  therefor  has  been  ordered  and  vrill  be  delivered  in  Hav.^ii 
in  June,       All  arrangements  for  installation  will  hcve  been  made  by 
thft  tine  the  equipment  is  delivered.        Inqniri'  developr.  the  infor- 
mation that  delivery  of  the  necessary  equipment  cannot  be  ir.ade  at 
an  earlier  date. 


1004    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

SE  CRET 

5*   The  Commanding  General,  Hawaiian  Department,  is 
being  directed  to  give  iraiediate  consideration  to  the  question 
of  the  emplpyment  of  balloon  barrages  and  the  use  of  smoke  in 
protecting  the  Fleet  and  base  Tacilities.   Barrage  balloons 
are  not  available  at  the  present  time  for  installation  and  can- 
not be  made  available  prior  to  the  summer  of  1941.   At  present 
there  are  three  on  hand  and  eighty-four  being  manufactured  — 
forty  for  delivery  by  June  30,  1941,  and  the  remainder  by 
September.   The  Budget  now  has  under  consideration  funds  for 
two  thousand  nine  hundred  and  fifty  balloons.   The  vaj.ue  of 
smoke  for  screening  vital  areas  on  Oahu  is  a  controversial 
subject.   Qualified  opinion  is  that  atmospheric  and  geographic 
conditions  in  Oahu  render  the  employment  of  smoke  impracticable 
for  large  scale  screening  operations*   However,  the  Coninanding 
General  will  look  into  this  matter  again. 

6,   With  reference  to  your  other  proposals  for  Joint 
defense,  I  am  forwarding  a  copy  of  your  letter  and  this  reply 
to  the  Commanding  General,  Hawaiian  Depazi;ment,  and  am  directing 
him  to  cooperate  with  the  local  naval  authorities  in  making  those 
measures  effective* 


r^£i4A^   A^^^l^^c^ 


SSc 


cretaiy  of  War. 


-2- 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  1005 

(2-8-41) 

Op-12B-McC  (SO  A7-2  (2)/FFl 
Serial  015712 
D-27446 

Secret  Fm.  11,  1941. 

From  :  The  Chief  of  Naval  Operations. 
To :  The  Commander-in-Chief,  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet. 

The  Commandant,  FOURTEENTH  NAVAL  DISTRICT. 
Subject :  Air  Defense  of  Pearl  Harbor,  Hawaii. 
Reference:   (a)   SecNav  Secret  Let.  to  SecWar,  (SO  A7-2  (2)/FFl,  Serial  09112 

of  January  24,  1941. 
Enclosure:   (A)  Copy  of  SecWar  Secret  Let.  to  SecNavy  dated  February  7,  1941 
in  reply  to  reference  (a). 
1.  In  connection  with  reference  (a),  a  copy  of  which  was  forwarded  to  you, 
there  is  forwarded  herewith  as  Enclosure  (A),  a  copy  of  the  reply  of  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  to  reference  (a). 
Copy  to:  Op-22 
Op-30 


Via  Air  Mail  Febettart  7,  1941. 

Subject :  Air  Defense  of  Pearl  Harbor,  Hawaii. 
To :  Commanding  General,  Hawaiian  Department. 

1.  Attention  is  invited  to  the  inclosed  copy  of  letter  from  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  to  the  Secretary  of  War  of  January  24,  1941,  relative  to  the  above  mentioned 
subject,  together  with  copy  of  reply  thereto  from  the  Secretary  of  War,  February 
7,  1941. 

2.  It  is  desired  that  you  cooperate  with  the  local  naval  authorities  in  making 
effective  the  measures  for  joint  defense,  referred  to  in  paragraph  6  of  the  reply 
to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

By  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War : 

Wm.  W.  Dick, 
Adjutant  General, 
Reg.  No.  900270,  2-8-^1. 
2  Inclosures — 

Inc.  1 — Copy,  Itr.  from  Sec.  of  Navy  to  Sec.  of  War,  1-2-41. 
Incl.  2— Copy,  Itr.  from  Sec.  of  War  to  Sec.  of  Navy,  2-7-41. 


13  Feb.  1941. 
Subject :  A.  dse.  o.  ph.  hwi. 

Received  of  The  Adjutant  General,  letter,  February  7,  1941,  subjectras  indicated 
above,  together  with  two  (2)  inclosures  noted  therein. 

(Signed)     Carl  Grosse, 
Cakl  Gkosse, 
Major,  A.  G.  D.,  As.'iistant  Adjutant  General, 

Office:  Headquarters,  Hawaiian  Department. 
[Stamped  notation  :45  AGO  Feb  24  1941  Received! 
Note:  Please  accomplish  promptly  and  return  to  The  A.  G.  O. 


1006    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

EXHIBIT  NO.  11 


CinC  Flic  No. 

Aie/oifte? 


UNITED  STATES  FLEET 
U.  S.  H.  NEW  MEXICO.  Flilifcly 


Lon«  B«aeb,  California 
Oo lobar   16.    1940 


01 


Tot 
Subjaot: 

Baoloauraat 


CooMndar-ln-Cblaf , 
CoBoasdar-lA-Chlaf , 


3.    riaat. 

3.   AaUtio  Tlaat. 


Zatamational  aituation 
tha  Aaiatio   Flaat. 


Raanforoamant  of 


(A)  Copy  of  aaauB^tiona. 

(B)  Copy  of  tantatlra  oparationa. 


1.  Durioe  ^^*  raeant  Tlalt  of  the  aosaaandar-in- 

Chlaf,  n.   3.   Flaat,   to  .Vaahin^on  and  on     Cotobar  10,  tha 
3«oratary  told  tha  Coomandar-lii-Ohlaf  that  tha  Praaldant 
wna  oonaidarlne,   in  oonuaotion  with  poaalhla  retaliatory 
Baaaurea  taken  by  Japan  aeainat  Oreat  Britain  upon  open- 
ly of  the  Boraa  Road,  tna  frllowln^: 

(a)  Raanforoenent  of  the  Aaiatie   Fleet  aa  a 
peaea-tina  mora. 

(b)  Daolaring  a  oampleta  asfcarso  on  ahipnanta 
to  and  from  Japan. 

(e)   Atteoptia?  to  atop  a^l  trads  batwaan 

Japan  and  the  A&erioaa.     To  aooocnliah  thia 
latter  neaaura,   he    (tha  Ireaident)   propoaad 
aatabliahmant  of  patrol  linea  of  liciit 
foroea  free  Honolulu  westward  to  tha  Philip* 
pinaa  and  a  aecond  lino  rourhly  froc  Sanoa 
to  Singapore,    "in  aupport   of"   the   firat  line. 
The  impraotio ability  of  thia  and  other  s\x£- 
gaationa  waa  explained  to  the  3eoret(iry, 
and,   after  some  further  oonvorsationa  deal- 
ing v/ith  erentualitiea  and   at  the  direction 
of  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations,  the  Co?::- 
Band«r-in-Chiaf ,   and  his  War  Plant.  Offioar 
in  oonjunotion  with  the  War  Plana  DiTiaion 
of  the  Chief  of  HaTal  Operation's  office, 
aiibaitted  a  Damorandun  (Cnoloaura  A)   of 
aaaunptions  outlining  the  sitrmtion  prcscoted 
by  th-)  Jeoretary  and  a  brief  outline  sketch 
of  operationa    (Enclosure  B]   by  tha  U.    J. 
Fleet  to  neet  the   isaur-tlona   In  a  tiore  proc- 
tic-.ble  Conner.      Thia  wq3  aubmittcd  to  the 
Chief  of   iiavH   Opoyatlcr.c   o;.     ctober  11    for 


06 


06 


12 


16 


16 

18-A 

19 

20 

20-A 

21 

22 


23 

75 


96 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1007 


CinC  File  No.  UNITED  STATES  FLEET 


LoBC  B«aoh,   Calif ornic 
Ootobcr  16,   1940 


05 
06 


Subjaot:       Xntamational   altuatlon  -  Raanforoenent  of 
the  Aaiatlo  Flaat. 

■uboiaslon  to  the  Sooratary  and  the  Iroaldent 

•IS  to  what  the  Navy  proposed  to  do  If  dlreoted 

to  proceed   on  the  proposed  aaaumptiona  and  " 

tentatlTe  deolsions. 

£.  To  date,   the  Comnaader-lii-Chlef ,  U.    J.    Meet,  '^ 

has  had  no  further  word  in  regard  to  the  nanornndur.  re-  

farred  tc  aboTe.    but   reoeived  u  despatch  today  froi:.  the  ]5 

Chief  of  Naval  Cparations  dlroctint^^  that   a  copy  be   for- 

virarded   to  you  via  the  IKUalVJH.      It    is  believed   that  — 

further  atudy  in  the  Departzoant   and  in  the  Fleet  v/ill  le 

result   in  sooa  nodifioations  in  the  operations  proposed 

for  the  Fleet,  particularly  oa  ret^ards  Uistribiitlon   of 

patrol  planes  and  oruiaers.  18.A 

9.  The  further  operations   .ndicntod   In  paragraph 

9  of  Snolosure   (B)   are  owasures  for  the  reduction  and     o-  19 

oupation  of  the  Llea-ahall   Islands,   or  a  feint   in  the  L'id- 
Faoifio  «fhioh  will  be   inltintod  \ft.on  o  train   is  assembled 
and  transports  are  ready.     Due  to  the  situation  in  the  20 

Atlantis,   the  Oepartnent  did  not    fori   that   our  oain  Fleet 
should  get  too  for  in  the  lacific,   03  it  r<l  ht  be  neces- 
sary to  call   it  book  on  short  notice.      It  vma   felt,  20-A 
hov/ever,   th.qt  aotlvo  operationa  acalnet   0;jAi"«CE  possessions 
rJ.  ht  have  a  deterrin     effect  on  afVtfl6&  f^jll   scale  oporn- 
tions  in  the  South  China  Sea  and  putoh  £-iat   Indies. 


21 


2.3 


4.  It  v/ill  be  noted  that  the  nb:'ve  on«r."tl-ns 
'^orellel  very  cl08«ly  the  present  6lOVM€  Pknn ,  tlloiiflc'.  by 
tT'B    'eopatch   of  on   \dv  moe   "oroc   *a  tho  A'>ittic    ■si\ 
further  nodified  by  the  rostrlctl  Jii    1"  malt  Fl%at  r>"ora- 
tions  to  tho  r.i4-Pncl"'lc   ar.vi. 

5.  I  './as  rirt'.or  tcld,    Ir.  th->  Oepartmeirt     tK»t  ^c  7-, 
Ar;-v   f  .rsos  ^rouia  tc   av.llabls   onA   t):'i'.    '^.?  flri*.  Is-  had 

a-raed   to  t?io  '.'nit-'    States'    'xao   of  Sl:.(sp«re.  

95 

6.  Ir.  the   3vcnt    thit   thi   asouwptj    .  :    as«.  tutT 
r';2lizcd  fX\Ott'o  albooi"  Jin MT.ry   1,    19^1,  ■;'i.-l.      ij 

not   r^'M.-.'iZ    •-.:   :l-dr?t3h   tho  Advance  Oct'.;:  :..?.. t  ief«r«  •iAftt  96 


1008    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

ClnC  FUe  Na  UNITED  STATES  FLEET 

U.  &  &  NEW  MEXICa  rtrngakip 
416/01667 

Lone  Bcaeh,  Oallfomia 
Ootobar  16,    1040 

3ubJ«ct:        International   situation  -  Raenforoaaant   of 
tha  Aalatie  riaat . 


tijM.   tbara  was  diaeussian  of  aa8aat>linc  a  train  and  trana- 
porta  in  «a*t  Coaat  porta  and  holding  a  full  draaa  ra- 
haaraal  of  oparatioaa  asainat  an  atoll,   as  a  Flaet  azaroiaa, 
utilisia«  Chriataaa  laland  aa  a  alta.     Stapa  ara  bain« 
takaa  for  tha  aoquiaition  and  oonraraion  of  tha  naoaaaary 
traaaporta,   ate.,  to  be  ready  around  that  time.     If  tbia  ia 
dene,  tha  reenforeaaant  of  tbe  Aaiatlo   Fleet  Bay  take  plaee 
ooineidently  with  thla  axaa^oiae,  tha  idea  being  that  J^apan 
will  be  iapreaaad  by  this  aridenoe  of  United  Statea  de- 
teoTBinat ioo  to  proteot  ita  intereata.     I  presuaa  you  will 
be  further  inforaad  of  this  erentuality  aa  plana  are  sore 
fully  derelopad. 


h'r 


7.  My  aaoret  aerial  Al6/016e3  of  thia  date,   cover-         *^^ 

ia«  the  ooi^aition  and  preparation  of  the  tentatire  de-         — -     — 
tashaaat  elated   for  reenf ore eaant   of  the  Asiatio   Fleet ,    1  .. 

aaaa  suoh  a  aove  ia  ordered,   was  forwarded  to  you  by 

elippar  loekad  box,    a  oopy  being  sent   on  the  EOtTSTON  with  

this  letter.  20 

e.  It   ia  hereby  certified  that  the  originator 

eonaidara  it  to  be  iiQ>r  actio  able  to  phrase  this  docuioant   in        20-A 
•ueh  a  ■aai.er  aa  will  permit  a  olassifioation  other  than 
a«eret. 

21 

J.    0.    lilCKARDSOH  22 


Cotpif  To:     (.    a   /»>  "^W*!  \) 

\<il0O9  of  Oct   b 


23 
76 

96 


j:XHIBITS    OF    joint'  COMMITTEE  1009 

Oi>-l2B-2^MoC  19-11-40 

USaSUR&S  Kia  OPaMTiOtIS   TO   BB  VHDERTAKZti  BY  HIE  tf.S. FLEET 

1.  Mobili^o  U.S.ri««t,   In  aooord&aos  with  Oraiv^a  ?l«n. 

2.  Rd4iapos«  forcoa  .-lOw  in  tn*  Atlaatic  as   followat 

j^.Mova  2  iiactvy  oruiiiars  and   une  divlaion  of  4  ^^^  Daatroyora  to 
Soutbarr.  Brazil  -  Uruguay,    and  /Vr^antlne  porta,   baalns  looally 
or  oa  yalhlan<l  lolaslda   In  ordar  to  iotar<iiot  Oa/i.'CE  trado  and 
protaotlon  of  U.S.&hippiots. 
^.MoTa  2  heuT/  oruioara,  00a  aircraft  oarrlar,  and  U  dastroyera 
(froa  i-acifio)   to  oovar  waat  ooaat  porta  of  South  Aaerloa,  baaing 
looally  or  at  fonaoa* 
2»  0(oTa  18  Old  Daatroy«r5  to  paoifio  for  looal  dafanaa  and  protaotioo 
of  U.S.  Shipping  SB  folloicu:- 

9  to  Pucat  Sound  and  Alaai:a 
5*  to  San  /ranoiaoo 
4  to  Hawaii 
j^.Mova  ona  airoraft  oarrlari   one  iig^it  oraLaor,   two  tr;in;«port«, 
on*  daatroyar  tandar,  all  new  daatro/ura,  one  Jaatroyvr  tranaport, 
plus  lat  Marina  Brigada  (noW  at  Ouantanamo),   and   thrae  n«w 
auhoiarinaa,   an^  thraa  old  aubouirinaB  to  {i/eal   iJoaat. 
jB.Mova  Patli^ine  J*     (  plana*)   with   tand^ra  to  San  i>l«0o  Tor  looal 

oottital  defense    (relieve  Paivliiga  1  and  ^) . 


1010    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


IC^U-J^ 


),  T«f«  .'M«aur«t   for  dafrn**  of  Ala*K«  ••   toilem»: 

g,  pi«p«ten  too  su)*ikarina<  *ni   ■.Mil  taiiiar  to  ^icfi  Har^r. 

t{.  IU«nrt>rca  kkrln*  gsirlaon  at  Uuteh  Harbur  by  r«nki.i^cr  •(  ^cfana* 

battailJn,   houainc  thaa  In  vaaaala  c:i«rt«r«d   for  ike  purpose. 

2«  Oispatcn  one  at^uadron  (6  piaiiait^  af  P«ir#l  fl»na«,  ^Iw:.  taftdttrV 

to  Outeh  Harbor,  and  on*  aquadron  (4  pla.ea)  vt-i  ien4«r  f*  Ktditl^ 

d.  Prapara  a  dataewant  for  poaalbia  d^a^teh  to  Cast   lnd)a/«r««y 

canalatlnff  oi  «  CA,  1  CV,  V  DO,  4- AMD,  (Daadiv  91;,  1  AC,  i  ««.  \tM5  r^rce  ai^l 
raani'orea  U.S.  Aalatlo  flaat  unit*  ahloh  will  hava  ratlreu  ti  i.Ma  araa,  tn^  Bill 
oparata  in  eonjunetlon  vlth  ■rltlan  »ni  Outoh  Namil  rjrua*.     Upon  arrival  ^aiatlc 
•atara,  thla  forea  «111  rapert  to  tha  Co«b>>nd«r-l.-v-C:il'-r,  ASliZlC  FUtT.  ilknt:' 
It  dafMiaain*  and  ethar  ■eblllBation  aaaauraa  itava  not  baan  eo*plat«d  prior  i.o 
daparuurv,  thla  haaard  will  rMy*  to  ta  »eca(ft«u,  uni  «atarla;.a  rm^ir*^  w'^ii 
hava  to  ba  fomartfad  at  a  iatar  dato.     In  add^'.lor,,  ir  aant  pr;or  to  tr>e  cojt- 
platlen  uf  roadlnoaa  aoaauraa  fur  t.-.o  e^r«tl»n  of  thm  maik  h»dy  in  ilm  iMd^ 
Paelfic.  it  aiat  b«  r«aiitad  that  Mar  aajr  raault  with  tkt*  y*tu*l»i«  farco  c^- 
poaai  and  unauopartad.     Tha  aaaa  la  trua  of  tna  Adatle  fiaat. 

).  Plapateh  proaptljr  fro*  Haa*ll  »  d«tac>i««nt  e»n«i(ting  »4 

e«rrii^r,  erulaara,  ami  daatroyara  to  a«aap  North  /'acific  w^iTt  betwaai  Ha'^aK 
$(\ii  41uatlana  for  Japarwaa  eosaorea,  or  Japanaaa  raldara.     T*  b«  fittai  m  w%*i^ 
iBObillaation  radulrcmanis. 

^  Aaaaiabia  tranaporta  aiid  trai;)  anC  a«bark  2n<i  R«anf»rc«d 

librlno  Bri^a^a   inmr*t  Coaat  ports. 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1011 

Ti  Ttka  •••aurat  f^r  dtfam*  af  i'keiric   iMixnS*  as   foUova:    - 

^  lUanforc*  MlO«/*T  Mlth  raoalnaar  of  Nf«n««  fWttaXlon,  2  P»tr«na, 

^.  OparAt*  Z  tS  tor  d«r«ria«     of  WaKE. 

c.  JD«rat«  2  SS  and  1  PAlron  vilh  tcnOar  frun  JOHNSTON  JSUt/O, 

provide  aaali  Uarln*  ilatanlnf  poii. 
J.  Jpamt*  6  VP,  i  AVP,  and  2  i>S  for  Amtmnf  ot  CAVTON  I&L/WO. 

£.  Clapatch  2  OSa  for  dcfana*  of  SAMOA. 

r.  Oia/i«tch  Z  Patrana  «f  Patwlnf  OlC  to  HAK/aII   (24  Plane*)  uftar 

raU«f  ty  Pf.twla<  flVB. 
9.  Siapa'.en  raaalrvlar  of  Subrooa  FOUA  Mod  SIX  (Approxiaataly  2,^  SS) 

to  CA/lOUHES  arid  MAiiSHALLS  for  prailAlnary  raconnalaa^nca  op«ratio;ia. 
9«  Upon  eoauiotlon  of  aoblllaatloii  praparKtiona,  aaaauhXa  fleat 

In  Hawaii  praparad  to  Inltlata  furt.ivr  «a»suraa  as  tt*  9..*.uuLlo:.  ra^uLiaf. 
10.  ^»si»\.  In  dafanaa  of  U.S.   Ship^^-t    b/   iric  Jataii  of  wartain 

fia«t   Fercaa  to  Coaatai     Fr.intliir  forc«a.l<'fP  lh«   i'ujlf'.o   Ihla  nli...  b« 
cPiKprisa:  - 

J»  m  to  MAVAII 
9  OCL  to  PMlfie  CoMt«l  Proatlar. 


79716  O— 46 — pt.  14 8 


1012    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

SeCtLiT  Oot*ker  11,   l*j4tO 

II  «     *tfFT  DiBDoaltlona  and  OpwratloaB  to    aeoV   •poolBl 
"*ftM»tIon  In  ««.t«rn  Paolflo. 

A&SUM1>T10N&. 

1.  Th«  Gravity  of  tha   alta(it.iun   uistlns  today    Is   Intensified 
by  tb*  opsaiafT  of  ttim  Burma  Aoad  by  Oraat  ^xritala. 

2.  Tba  Japactee  anjiouaoa  or   iadiouta  that   the  o^eulna    uT   t^a 
BuriM  Ro«d  la  an  aet  unfriaadly  to  Japau. 

3.  Tti*  Japaneaa  und«rtaka  rataliator/  fflasiaarea  to  anforce  oo- 
oparatioa  wltb  Japan  b/  Oraat  Britain  in  tba  far  Xaat. 

4.  Japan  undartaKes  positivD  ag&rujsive  aotlcn  to   enforce  foil 
oooparatioa  by  the  Outoh  I^ot  ladiea. 

>.  Tb«  Unitad  Sttttas  pruol.ulma  oonplete   embargo  on  ifilpaeota 
from  tb«  Unitad  utatAS  or  United  States  pObseaaions  to  Ju^a:.  and  noQ» 
lataroourae  with  Japan. 

6*  Tb*  United  Statea  andartak«3   by,di;l&ji«tLc  a:id  naTnl  aotion 
to  pravant  Japaneaa  trade,   in  Japanese  uMps  and   ic  ahlpe  of  other 
oatioos,  «itb  tbe  Vaatarn  U«Alaphare. 

7.  Tha  Unltad  Statea  will  support   British  forces   xc  t.'-.e  lastem 
Paolflo,-  in  Australia  and  Singapore,-  and  Cutoh  Foroes   '^u  tt.e  Dutob 
£ast  Indies   in  stopping  Japaness  trade  south  ef  Chica  Sea  -  Celebes 
Sea  area. 

6.  Tha  Unitad  States   is  prepared  to  acsept  war  if  the  measures 
taken  oausa  Japan  to   declare  «ar. 

9,  Great  Dritaln  will  prevent   aay  odval  aefjeisloi)   i.e\  the 
Uastsm  Atlantic  aaalnst   the  Western  Haalaphere   by  the  4xis  Powers. 

l&.Tbe   sltu'ati:,i.a  and  deoisiocx    b/  the  Ucited  Statos  assaaed 
haraia  oay   arise  17  Ootober,   1940. 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE 

EXHIBIT  NO.  12 


1013 


U  Vmmimr  X%5 


.Son*  fr&ak  B.  K»«r«, 
Ifcihinttton,  D.  C. 
Tfy  dMr  Mr.  S««f«t 

pristiocs  for  tlM  jTMor*  1932  to  1941  SntHiuAm  to  bo  MiMrtltatod  f m* 
tlw  MM  moloMKi  with  tb*  8«er«t«i7  of  tbo  Navf  *•  lottor  iMtst  yew  oa 

1hi«  rovisod  •tatoaont  hm  proparod  aftor  ooll«bormti<m  botivowa 
Mli»  Mff loo  and  th«  Bctroau  oi  tbo  Budfoi  in  otuidrisg  tiM  roeords  of 
fiw  yooro  In  ci^«tloa»  and  the  flguroa  ai^joarlag  thoroon  will  agi«o 
idth  tJioflo  foztdahod  you  t^  tho  Soroait  of  tha  Bodgst.    Viilo  tho 
roeoirda  oooeoraiog  tho  rognilar  KavaX  IppropariAticn  BllU  f  cr  oaeh 
y»«r  nor*  cwa^loto,  inforaatlm  oooeoming  dafleianejr  and  PH^loaontal 
<»8tiBat«a  roqfiMiatod  by  t^  Marsr  DojMUiafKit  »aa  l&cking  4s  suu^jr  caaoa 
«Qd  roqairod  ioctondad  aaareh  tliKme:h  tha  filoa  for  the  jeara  in 
q!aaatl<m. 

Slnearoljr  youra. 


:>■{ 


Baarlidaiirai,  U.  S.  iiavy, 
Oiroetor  of  Budsat  axid  Saporta< 


1014    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 
Appropriations,  tfavy.  Department,  fiscal  years  19S2  to  19Jfl,  inclusive 


Fiscal  year 

Appropriations 
requested  by 

the  Navy 
Department 

Budget  esti- 
mate of 
appropriations 
submitted  to 
the  Congress 

Amounts  made  available  by 
the  Congress 

Appropriations 

Contract 
authority 

1932 
Annual  appropriation  act.       

$354,809,746 
0 

$347,  794,  248 
0 

$358, 262, 123 
0 

$7,  700, 000 

Supplemental   and   deficiency   appro- 
priation acts 

0 

Total-. --- 

354, 809,  746 

347,  794, 248 

358, 262, 123 

7,  700, 000 

1933 
Annual  appropriation  act.            -  .  .  _ 

399, 139, 886 
10,000,000 

341,677,450 
10, 000, 000 

317,583,591 
10,000,000 

5,715,000 

Supplemental   and   deficiency   appro- 
priation acts 

0 

Total 

409, 139, 886 

351,677,450 

327,  583, 591 

5,715,000 

1934 
Annual  appropriation  act        .. 

352,  717, 786 
0 

308,  669,  562 
0 

308, 669,  562 
0 

8,100,000 

Supplemental   and  deficiency   appro- 
priation acts.. 

0 

Total 

352,  717,  786 

308, 669,  562 

308, 669,  562 

8,100,000 

1935 

Annual  appropriation  act 

Supplemental   and   deficiency  appro- 
priation acts 

318,324,414 

17,086,504 

335,410,918 

286, 332, 392 
17,075,257 

284, 658,  799 
17, 075,  257 

2,800,000 
0 

Total 

303,  407,  649 

301,734,056 

2, 800. 000 

1936 
Annual  appropriation  act 

502,855,817 
23,931,725 

485,  443, 847 
23,931,725 

458, 684, 379 
23, 915, 851 

6, 590, 000 

Supplemental   and   deficiency   appro- 
priation acts        ......     ... 

0 

Total       .      .  . 

526,  787,  542 

509, 375,  572 

482, 600, 230 

6,  590, 000 

1937 
Annual  appropriation  act 

585, 010, 984 
1, 921,  300 

549,  591,  299 
1, 921, 300 

529,  546,  532 
1,921,300 

13, 000,  OUO 

Supplemental   and   deficiancy  appro- 
priation acts.. 

0 

Total 

586, 932, 284 

551,  512, 599 

528,  467, 832 

13, 000, 000 

1938 
Annual  appropriation  act 

594, 269,  223 
4,  766, 000 

562,  425,  709 
4,  766, 000 

516, 258, 808 
2. 881,  000 

15,000,000 

Supplemental   and   deficiency   appro- 
priation acts. .                     . 

0 

Total 

599, 035,  223 

567, 191,  709 

519,  139, 808 

15, 000, 000 

1939 
Annual  appropriation  act. 

629, 665, 104 
89,  714,  905 

564, 406, 461 
85,839,950 

546, 866,  494 
76, 659,  700 

15, 000, 000 

Supplemental  and  deficiency  appro- 
priation acts 

0 

Total 

719,  380, 009 

650,246,411 

623,  526. 194 

15, 000, 000 

1940 
Annual  appropriation  act. .     .         .  . 

788,  775,  549 
288,  602.  340 

790,  342, 453 
186, 088, 316 

773, 049, 151 
170, 326, 098 

20,000,000 

Supplemental   and   deficiency   appro- 
priation acts 

2, 450, 000 

Total 

1,077,377,889 

976,  430,  769 

943,  375,  249 

22, 450. 000 

EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1015 

Appropriations,  Navy  Department,  fiscal  years  1932  to  19^1,  inclusive — Continued 


Fiscal  Year 

Appropriations 
Requested  by 
the  Navy  De- 
partment 

Budget  Esti- 
mate of  Appro- 
priations sub- 
mitted to  the 
Congress 

Amounts  made  available  by  the 
Congress 

Appropriations 

Contract 
Authority 

1941 
Annual  appropriation  act 

1,  384.  442,  202 
3. 862, 187,  700 

1, 337, 311,  577 
2,  224, 094,  342 

1,274,171,138 
2,  275,  212, 207 

148,741,612 

Supplemental   and   deficiency   appro- 
priation acts.   

797,  356,  500 

Total. 

5,  236, 629, 902 

3,  561, 405,  919 

3,  549,  383, 345 

946,098, 112 

Total  asked.  .. 

9, 434,  271,  533 

2, 006, 031,  343 
857, 694, 198 

7,  428,  240, 190 

7,  256, 8%,  276         1,029,038  112 

1934-1941  inclusive: 
Budget  cut  requests.. 

Total 
8,  285, 934,  388 

Congress  executed  budget  by.. 

^ 


1016    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


\^/An  D  E. F^An  r  M  e:  N  T 


Honorable  Frank  B.    Keefe 

House   of  RftpresflntatlTea 
Washington,   DC. 

Dear  Mr.   Keefe: 

Attached  !■  a  •tatement  which  contains  fo**  the  War 
lepartnent  MHltar:^  Establishment,  data  on  amoiinta  req-iested 
of  the  Bijreau  of  the  Budget,  araounta  aporoved  by  the  Bureau 
of  the  Budget,  and  funds  and  contract  aithorliailona  made 
available  to  the  War  Department  for  the  fiscal  years  19.1? 
through  1941.   These  data  were  requested  by  you  on  October 
19th  for  use  as  a  member  of  the  Pearl  Harbor  investigating 
comalttee . 

Insofar  as  can  be  determined,  there  Is  no  copy  In  the 
files  of  the  War  Department,  of  a  speech  delivered  by  the 
President  of  the  Philippine  Islands,  Mr.  Quezon,  In  Manila 
some  time  In  November,  1941. 


Sincerely  yours. 


•-'V»^-— ^ 


ROBERT  P.  PATTERSON 
Secretary  of  War 


Incl. 
Stmt 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE 


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1018    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


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EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1019 

EXHIBIT  NO.  13 


HIADQUARTKRS  HAWAIIAN  AIR  FORCS 

Off )M  af  th«  Air  Fero*  C«inmaiitftr 
HICKAM  FIELD, T.H. 


(T-3) 

lar*pl7r«t«rto:  20  Aogost  19la 


SUBJ-'OT:  Study  of  the  Air  Sit\i«tion  In  ftawall, 

TO     «  CommancUjig  Ooneral,  Army  Air  Forces,  Washln^^ton,  D,  0. 

THHII   I  Coinmandiitg  Oeneral,  Havmllan  Dopartmant,  Port  Shafterf  T,  H. 


1.  In  ooD^llance  vdth  copy  of  oorreoted  ownorandon  for  the  Cooauidtn^ 
Oenaral,  Aivy  Air  Foroes.  CCS  1723U-25,  from  tha  Secretarjrt  General 

StaTf ,  dated  July  17 »  19lil,  "that  a  stucfy  be  made  of  the  air  sltoatlon  la 
Hawaii",  there  is  attached  for  consideration  of  the  Mr   Department  a  plan 
for  the  anployrwnt  of  long-range  bombardbnent  aviation  in  the  defense  of 
Oahu,  This  plan  olaarly  presents  the  air  defense  of  the  Havallan  Islands. 
Attention  Is  called  to  the  reoomnendations  therein. 

2.  No  Increase  in  personnel  of  the  permanent  air  garrison  of 
IhvMtii  Is  nece3nea*y  to  bring  the  actual  heavy  bombardhnent  strength  to  on* 
group.  Under  provisions  of  Table  of  Basic  Allonances  No*  1.  Mr  Depart- 
ment, dated  December  1,  19ljO,  foui-teen  additional  heavy  bombarthnant  aiiv 
planes,  wil  1  be  re'ulred  txj  provide  a  total  strength  of  one  group  of 
thirty-five  B-17D  type  airplanes.  This  force  is  so  small  for  the  mission 
to  be  performed  that  it  is  considered  entirely  Inadequate. 

3.  Then  the  RDF  installation  is  coii7>leted  and  the  15th  Pursuit 
Clrdup  has  its  full  complement  of  80  fighters  no  further  increase  for 
pursuit  aviation  is  considered  necessary.  Provision  should  be  made  to 
maintain  at  all  tines  the  Hith  Pursuit  ^Ving  at  full  combat  strength  of 
ftO  fighters  and  105  interceptors.  It  is  contenplated  that  pursuit  avia- 
tion >rlll  perform  its  normal  mission  in  the  defense  of  these  islands  by 
Intercepting  and  destroying  enen^  aircraft  in  the  vicinity  of  or  over  thft 
island  of  Oahu.  This  is  considered  an  adequate  force  to  perform  the 
pursuit  mission  in  the  defense  of  those  islands. 

Ii.  A  combination  medium  bombardment-torpedo  force  is  considered 
highly  desirable  in  order  that  attack  can  be  made  under  conditions  of 
low  vislbiJ  ity  when  horizontal  bombing  is  not  feasible  and  is  therefore 
recommended  as  a  component  part  of  the  Hawniian  Air  Force.  (See  Study 
No.  2  in  attache!  plan). 

5.  On  the  assumption  that  there  is  a  possibility  of  enengr  s  urf  ace 
craft  reaching  the  shore-  of  Oahu,  one  squadron  of  dive  bombers  is 


uV 


1020    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


Subject:  Study  of  the  Air  Situation  in  Hawaii,  cont  'dj 

conoidered  necessary  to  assist  the  ground  forces  in  withstanding  an 
invasion  effort  by  concentrating  on  denying  the  enemy  any  opportunity  to 
establish  beach  heads.  The  quick  and  accurate  striking  power  of  dive 
bombers  makes  them  particularly  effective  for  close-in  support  on  the 
gro»ind  forces  and  this  prenise  is  borne  out  by  information  contained  In 
Intelligence  reports  received  on  the  war  in  Europe.  Dive  bombers  would 
also  b*  employed  against  hostile  surface  craft  and  subraarines  which  had 
penetrated  close  to  the  shores  of  Oahu. 

6.  With  the  addition  of  the  force  of  medium  bombardment-torpedo 
airplanes  and  one  squadron  of  dive  bombers  no  further  increase  in  the 
number  of  light  bombardment  airplanes  is  required 

7.  One  additional  observation  squadron  should  be  assigned  the 
Hawaiian  Air  Force  to  supplement  the  new  ground  organization  of  the 
Hawaiian  Department  which  is  being  re-erganlted  into  two  triangular  divi- 
sions. The  ground  forces  of  the  Hawaiian  Department  should  be  provided 
with  three  observation  squadrons.  At  present  there  is  assigned  one 
observation  squadron  (C&D)  and  one  light  bombardment  squadron  which  could 
b«  diverted  to  observation  duty. 

8.  To  Increase  the  number  of  aircraft  In  the  Hawaiian  Air  Force  aa 
outlined  in  this  letter  and  in  the  attached  plan  it  is  estimated  that 
approximately  3,871  additional  men  should  be  assigned.  A  minimum  of  216 
combat  crews  and  180  maintenance  crews  are  necessary  to  pperate  180  B-17D 
type  airplanes.  Sufficient  personnel  are  now  present  in  the  Hawaiian  Air 
Force  to  man  70  combat  crews  and  70  maintenance  crews  for  heavy  bonbardofsnt 
aircraft.  Additional  personnel  equal  to  the  difference  above  should 

be  assigned  to  the  Hawaiian  Air  Force  to  meet  these  requirements.  Further 
personnel  increases  should  be  made  to  activate  two  medium  combination 
bombardment-torpedo  sqxiadrons,  one  dive  bomber  squadron,  one  additional 
observation  squadron  and  five  air  base  squadrons.  The  five  air  base 
squadrons  will  be  used  to  maintain  the  outlying  fields  tabulated  below 
which  win  house  heavy  bombardment  squadrons  as  indicated.  The  two  Air 
Base  Groups  (S)  are  to  be  used  to  maintain  Bellows  Field  and  the  site 
selected  for  the  station  of  the  15th  Pursuit  Crroup. 

Barking  Sands  2 

Uorse  Field  2 

Hllo 1 

Lanal 1 

Parker  Ranch  1 

9.  The  dive  bomber  squadron  and  three  observation  squadrons  with 
allied  services  will  become,  in  effect,  air  support  command  and  will  be 
stationed  at  Bellows  Field. 

-  2  - 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  1021 


Subjeott   Study  of  the  Air.  Situation  in  Hawaii,  Cont'dt 


10.  Tables  of  Org;a'i<  ration  prcsoribe  five  enlisted  men  for 
heavy  bombardment  comiat  crew.   For  continuous  dally  op«ratiaai  m.  wn. 
of  fourteen  men  will  he  necessary  for  eaoh  heavy  malnt«iume«  orerw.  Usln^ 
these  figures  as  a  basis,  personnel  requirements  have  been  oonputed  mM 
shoim  in  Inolosure  No.  2. 

11.  Thert)  Is  at  present  available,  under  ocnstruotion  and  evKlting 
approval  of  the  War  Department,  housing  for  12,286  enlisted  men.  This 
stuv.y  will  require  housing  for  a  total  of  12,813  men  to  provide  for  all 
Air  Corps  and  assooiated  personnel.   This  leaves  but  525  men  to  be  oared 
for  in  a  future  yroji'-t   which  will  be  submitted  when  this  study  has  been 
approved.   Kor  detailed  analysis  of  housing  see  Inolosure  No.  S. 

12.  It  Is  my  oonvlntion  that  by  inoreeslng  the  present  strength  of 
the  Hawaiian  Air  Force  by  one  observation  squadron,  a  mlnifflUB  of  one  dlT* 
bontber  squadron,  two  squadrons  of  combination  medium  bombardment-torpedo 

airplanes  and  by  increasing  the  strength  of  long-range  bonberdnent  to  • 
total  of  IbO  airplanes  a  posltire  defense  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands  oan  be 
assured  W.  thout  any  assistance  whatever  from  the  naval  foroua  glylng  the 
Navy  complete  freedtH  of  aotlon* 


P.  L.  MARTIN, 
Major  General,  U.  S.  Araiy, 

Inols-  Connandlng. 

Inol  #1  -  Plan  for  the  anploy- 
ment  of  Long-Kan^e 
Dombarditient  Aviation  < 
in  the  Defense  of  OaJiu. 
(In  triplicate), 

Inol  ifZ   -  Personnel  Requirement  Recapi- 
tulation.  (  In  trlplioate^. 

Inol  ifZ  -   Air  Force  Housing  Kacilitles, 
(In  triplicate). 


■^l\tx^Mui\Lj.^^l.  P 


<' 


1022    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

PLAM  FOR  THE  EUPLOYttBiT  OF  BCMBiiRIKfWT  hVIhTIOW  IN  THtT  DEFEWSE  OF  OAHU 

I.  GENJglAL; 

1.  The  key  to  this  plan  i3  found  in  the  provision  for  first,  a  coi»- 
plote  and  tiiorou^  search  of  the  Hawaiian  ar«a  daily  during  daylight; 
secondly,  an  attack  force  ;available  on  call  to  hit  a  known  objective  loca- 
ted as  a  result  of  the  search  and  thirdly,  if  the  objective  la  a  carrier, 
to  hit  it  the  .lay  beforo  it  could  steam  to  a  position  offshore  of  Oahu 
where  it  could  launch  its  planes  for  an  attack. 

2.  The  most  difficult  problem  presents  itself  when  it  is  necessary 
to  search  through  360°.     This  night  occur  daily  and  it  is  the  only  one 
considered  in  this  study.     It  is  possible,  of  course,  that  intelligence 
obtained  from  advanced  naval  buses  and  ships  at  sea  mi,':ht  iiiqf>lement  this 
plan  and  reduce  the  search  area  to  270°,  180°  or  even  90°.     In  this  case, 
the  striking  force  would  be  augmented  by  those  planes  not  required  for 
search. 

3.  All  computations  in  connection  with  air  operations  under  this 
plan* are  based  on  the  B-17D  airplane.     This  type  of  airplane  is  consider- 
ed available  for  either  a  search  mission  or  an  attack  mission  and  conae- 
quently  no  reference  is  made  to  reconnaissance  or  bombardment  aviation  aa 
such  but  to  the  search  or  the  attack  forces.     The  combat  crew  training 

of  both  will  be  identical  and  search  and  attack  misaiona  will  be  rotated 
for  the  pi^pose  of  resting  crows  and  ciaintaining  aircraft. 

II.  THE  PROBLaii 

1.     To  analyze  the  mission  of  heavy  bombardment  aviation  in  the 
defenae  of  Oahu  with  a  view  to  prooulgating  a  plan  in  accordance  there- 
with. 

III.  FACTS  BEARING  ON  TOE  CASE; 
1.     Facts; 

a.  The  Amy  mission  ia;     "To  defted  the  Naval  B*ae  of  Qkhu"* 

b.  The  bombardment  mission  iat 

(1)  When  Navy  roconnaiaaanca  is  aduquatet 

"To  attack  and  destroy  onany  surface  craft 
within  radius  of  action." 

(2)  Vftion  Navy  is  absent  or  not  present  *d.th 

equipment  in  Numbors  or  Quality; 

"To  soRTCh  for,  attack  and  destroy  jneagr 
surface  craft  within  radiua  of  action." 

c.  «Capftbilitio8  pf  B-17D  typo  airplanoa  arot 

Gal  Fuel    Ullea 

(1)     Search  at  i.5<  P°*y  at  3.000'  Altitude  yed        flown 
(No  bonDa-2500  gallona  fuel) 

One  hour  full  throttle  operationa  (»32          214 

Two  hour  fuel  ruaerve  272 

Climb  30            10 
Cruiso  at  143  knota  at  136  gal/hr 

Radiua  of  Action  in  nautical  milea 


-  1- 


n 


^^»l 


Gal  Fuel 

Uilos 

used 

flowi 

432 

2U 

272 

30 

10 

2100 

EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1023 

Plan  for  the  Ktaploynent  of  Boabardnent  Aviation  in  the  Defense  of  OahUfContM: 

(2)  Search  -  Attack  at  U5<  at  5.000 
[U  -  600)f  boabo  -  2100  gallons  fuel) 
One  hour  full  throttle  operation 
Two  hours  fuel  reserve 
Climb 
Cruise  at  1X^3  knots  at  136  gal/hr 

Radius  of  Action  in  nautical  miles 

(3)  Attack  at  65iC  Power  -  Return  at  U5% 

Power  at  15.000' 

U  -  bOCHf  bonbs  -  SIM  gallons  fuel) 

One  hour  full  throttle  operation 

Two  hours  fuel  reserve  at  U5%  power 

CliJii) 

65*  Power  -  193  knots  at  208  grd/hr 

U5%  Power  -  150  knots  at  136  gr.l/hr 

Radius  of  Action  in  nautical  ndles 

(4)  Attack  at  65i?  Power  -  Return  at  k5% 

Power  at  15.000' 

(8  -  60Cit»  bonis  -  IW  gallons  fuel) 

One  hour  full  throttle  operation  432              236 

Two  hours  lUol  rosorve  at  U5%  power  272 

Clijii)  90                27 

65*  Power  -  193  knots  at  .208  golAr  i»85              450 

U5%  Power  -  150  knots  at  136  gal/hr  408 


432 

236 

272 

90 

27 

687 

643 

612 

643 

15^ 

I^ 

Radius  of  Action  in  nautical  miles         170^^^^581 

*Mote—  The  above  capabilities  were  fJton  froo  curves 
in  the  B-17D  handbook  and  checked  by  actual 
flight  tests. 

d.  To  perform  its  missions,  the  Fleet  nust  have  freedom  of  action 
without  responsibility  for  the  defense  of  its  base. 

e.  If  the  solution  to  i  problem  is  dosignod  to  meet  the  most 
adverse  eonditions,  any  loss  idrorso  condition  will  facilitate  the  solution. 

f .  Army  Air  Force  units  at  present  are  not  charged  with  the 
reconnnissonee  mission  for  the  dufonsc  of  Oohu. 

£.     The  combatant  force  having  the  longer  range  weapon  has  a 
basic  advantage,  other  f  vctors  buing  equal. 

h.     Tho  bombardment  lirplane  is  i,t\t:  longest  range  weapon  which 
ths  Deportment  Coanander  his  at  his  disposal. 

2.     Assumptions t 

a.     Tho  following  arc  the  assumed  or  kno*n  maxinum  capabilities 
of  unoiny  equipment  t 

(1)  Sane  of  his  carriers  can  Btuam  at  30  knots  for 

at  least  24  hours.     (Best  r vnilablc  intelligence 
indicates  GRANGE  has  tJirue  carriars  with  this 
perforraoncc), 

(2)  His  carrier  bombing  pianos  havci  600  mutical  miles 

range  and  cniiso  at  180  knots  (basud  on  porfor- 

-  2  - 


1024    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Plan  for  the  Employmont  of  Bombardmunt  Avi>'>tion  In  tho  Dofonsc  of  Otvhu,   cont'd! 

nnncc;  data  of  the  U.  S.  Navy  carrier  planoa 
and  no  'vllowance  la  mftdo  for  tr.ko-off,   rally 
after  att'tck,   full  throttlo  oporation  nnd 
landing). 

b,     Tho  following  r.ro  tho  assumed  probablo  cap.-\billtios  of  enomy 
oqulpmunti 

(1)  His  carriers  stoara  at  27  knots  for  24  hours, 

(28  knots  is  tho  moun  top  spood  of  his 
carrlors;  1  knot  reduction  ia  rar.de  for  fou^ 
bottoms). 

(2)  His  carrier  bombing  pianos  havo  AOO  nnutical 

miles  rango  and  cruise  at  180  knots  (reduc- 
tion in  r-.ngo  from  600  to  400  nautical  mllos 
is  la-^.do  to  allow  for  tnkj-off,  rally  aftor 
attack,   full  throttlu  oper'>tion  and  landing). 

Note:     In  the  discussion  thrt  follows  it  is  assumed  that  hostile 
earriora  operating  under  conditions  a  and  b  above  once  committed  to  action 
will  steam  atraif;ht  in  to  thoir  launching  radius.     Any  maneuvering  by  tho 
enemy  whan  within  our  soirch  r.roa  will  aimplify  our  problem  for  it  will 
give  tho  search  force  mon^  tino  in  which  to  locate  the  .momy. 

c.  The  Hfiwaiian  Air  Force  is  primarily  concerned  with  tho 
dostructlcm  of  hostile  carriers  in  this  vicinity  before  they  approach  with- 
in range  of  Oahu  where  they  can  launch  thoir  bonbardmont  aircraft  for  a 
reld  or  an  attack  on  Oahu. 

d.  An  onomy  will  not  venture  an  att;.ck  against  the  Hawaiian 
Islands  until  control  of  ooa  lanes  of  conmuniCitipn  is  obtained.     Then  aa 
the  enony  fleet  approaches  those  islands,   raids  by  surface  vessels,   sub- 
nvarines  and  cr.rrier-baaod  aircraft,  may  be  nxpectod. 

c.     Our  most  likely  oncray,  ORANGE,  can  probr.bly  employ  a  maxl- 
nura  of  6  carriers  agjiinst  Oal-iu. 

f .     A  25-milu  visibility  is  assumed.     This  assumption  Is  based 
on  standard  U.  S.  Navy  search  end  p'ltrol  methods  employed  in  this  area, 

£.     For  tho  purpose  of  this  problem  the  Jay  is  divided  into  13 
hours  of  daylight  and  11  hours  of  df.rkncss.     Theso  assumptions  are  based  on 
the  follcwing  computations  t 

(1)  June  22,  20°  N.  Lat.,  Sunrise 

Sunset 
Hours  of  d-iylight 
Add:     Uorning  Twilight 
Evening  Twilight 
Total  houri-  of  daylight 

(2)  Doctinber  -''1,  20°  N.  Lnt.,  Sunrise     0630 

Suns3t  1750 

Hours  of  daylight  1120 

Add!     Morning  Twilight  24 

Evening  Twilight  2/^ 

Total  hours  dr.ylight  12:08 

Average  (1)  und  (2)  13:09 

-  3  - 
CONFIDENTIAL 


h 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  1025 

Finn  for  tho  Employment  of  Bombardmont  Aviation  In  the  Defonae  of  Oohu,  cont'di 

ly.^ISCUSSICMi 

Part  1:  Tho  Search; 

1,  Tho  only  manner  In  vrtdch  the  Hawiiian  area  can  be  thoroughly 
searched  for  enemy  surface  cruft,  particularly  aircraft  carriora,  in  tho 
event  of  a  situation  roquirinf;  such  action,  ia  to  provide  a  sufficient 
number  of  aircraft  to  conduct  u  daily  soarch  of  a  dosirud  aroa  during  day- 
light hours  with  lOOjt  covoragu  through  360°,  A  method  of  searching  5° 
sectors  through  360°  to  a  radius  of  833  reiutical  milos  from  Oahu  amployw 
Ing  72  B-17D  airplanes  is  indicated  in  Chart  No.  1.  It  ndll  be  noted  that 
the  outside  lines  of  visibility  for  the  diverging  tracks  cross  at  tho  600 
nautical  mile  circle,  the  overlap  aroa  inside  of  that  distance  becoming  a 
non-covorod  area  boyond  that  distance,  Tho  width  of  the  non-covorod  area 
increases  -is  tho  distance  increases  boyond  600  nautical  miles  with  the 
corollary  that  tho  probability  of  finding  tho  targot  decroasos  as  the 
soarch  continues  out,  Howuvor,  as  can  bo  soim  on  tho  chart,  each  search 
plane  on  the  search  bock  covurs  tho  crea  not  covorod  botwoon  any  two  planes 
on  the  search  out  and,  in  addition,  covers  the  area  previously  searched  by 
the  plane  on  its  loft  on  thu  search  out  but  uncovered  on  tho  search  brok, 
lOCSt  eovorogo  of  tho  area  is,  therefore,  obtained  on  tho  search  out  and 
back, 

2,  In  order  to  hr.vo  availfiblo  for  ready  roforonco  a  nuans  of  dotor- 
minlns  coverage  and  non-coverage  of  areas  on  the  soarch  out  using  3°,  U° 
and  5°  sectors,  there  is  attached  Chart  No,  2.  The  raothod  of  construct- 
ing tho  curves  th^roon  is  indicated  on  tho  chart.  It  will  bo  observed 
that,  with  the  assumed  visibility  of  25  miles,  lOOjJ  covorago  on  tho  search 
out  is  obtained  to  a  radius  of: 

a,  600  nautical  miles  with  r.irplones  in  5°  sectors. 

b,  750  nautical  miles  with  airplanes  in  U°   sectors, 

c,  1000  nautical  miles  with  r.irplanos  in  3°  sectors, 

3.  Under  any  givon  set  of  operating  date  for  the  search  pianos  and 
on«ny  carrier,  tho  radius  of  ;\ction  of  tho  search  force  is  determined  byt 

a.  Rate  of  closure  of  tho  carrier  .''.nd  so;irch  planes, 

b.  Miniimim  distance  tho  carrier  can  bo  offshore  and  allow  the 
search  force  to  moke  interception  and  relay  the  infom.tion  to  tho  attack 
force, 

c.  Uininum  time  required  for  the  attack  force  to  make  intercala- 
tion beyond  the  radius  of  action  of  tho  currier  planes, 

U,     In  developing  this  plan,  Jill  soarch  aircraft  take  off  at  day- 
ll^t.  They  might  t.•^ke  off  during  darkness  in  order  to  bo  at  a  certain 
location  at  dawn  if  definite  information  as  to  the  movomonts  of  enemy 
surface  vessels  is  reported  from  some  source  such  as  our  soarch  of  a 
previous  day,  friendly  surfac**  vessels  or  Navy  p^itrol. 

Part  2;  This  part  of  the  discussions  deals  with  tho  maximum  capa- 
bilitios  of  enemy  equipment  namoly,  his  carriers  steam  at  30  knots  and 
his  bombing  planes  have  600  nautical  miles  range  and  cruise  at  180  knots. 
See  Chart  No,  3. 

1,  Section  No,  It 


a.     An  onomy  should  be  prii.«irily  interested  in  obtaining  tho 
maidnun  cover  of  daritnoss  for  his  carrier  approach.     This  section  illus- 

-  U- 
£ONLI£ENTlAi 


1 


1026 


CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


PjAa  for  the  L-ployrr-.K-.r.t  of  Bcrtb' rdr.'-nt  rtVi--'tion  in  thv   D^f"nsc  of  Oihu, cont'd; 

tr'-t'-c  four  poc^ibl  usos  of  -r.rkricss  by  -n  ..nimy  to  cover  his  .ip-.'ro'.ch.^ 
In  .--.ch  c  J  i-r,  ■  ;  st'.ncc  out  '\.r  ',usk  -ind  d'.v/n  is  corsput'-J  fror.  t.h>.'  nost 
r.ist.-.nt  :.iicr-.ft  l-.ur.chinK  circle,  or  3S-0  rv  utic:  1  rdlcs.  Tiiis  figure  ic 
bas-d  on  the  f  .ct  t.h  t  -ifter  Ivanching,  the  c.rrie-r  pl.-.ncs  will  be  in  th>j 
-iir  3:-C  -nd  Jurinj^  th't  time  the  crrier  ctcv-ins  in  IX  nr^uticJ.  ndlcs  to 
r'.cov  -r   its   pl-.r.cs. 

b.  Lk  shov.s   \   r  rri   r  1  .  .-iC, .r:,^,   ^  Vi   '.ircr'-ft    .t   radriii'ht,   3tt' ck- 
in*',     nd   rTcovcnnr,   -,^ri;-'    1  .'■   sao',.;;   1  h',    1   uiicSir.^;     t      .:  k   vdth 
th-.;'   :tf'Xk   M.o    r.cov   ,  y      .n.,-  -;;    IC   :  .rjv/n   t,-..,-    l-unchLrir     t   nt-on 
Viith  the  :-.ti    ck   -r.J   "-.cov   ry  o'ur.ng    i-^ylip'-t;   -.nd  ID  snows  tt.     I-tincr.ing 

at  dfwn  •.'ith  the  •:ttick  'rd  r,cov-ry  during  aiyli,-ht. 

c.  It  vd.ll  be  noted  thit  o-ch  tirse  ^chouulo  haa  .-;  d-.yltght  period 
within  thT  r  dius  of  "ction  of  th-  t-.tf.ck  force  but  th".t  ID  peraits  the 
leist  tine  iiit';rv  J.   for  our  forces  to  op^  r  t^.    4:-.inst  ^n  oricray  -;nd  requires 
it  to  --.tt  ;ck   't   ih  .  lo-i.-^ePt  r-iir.o.     The  ■,   rly  r.ornifv.  '-ttck  is.   therefore, 
the  bjst  plr.n  cl'    xtion  cr-;n  to  th     ..ne-ny , 

d.  It  is   -h  ;  opinion  of   .-:...-    ii.  ix-.  iiinla   th.".t  -.  l-'.t'.   •  ft-;rnoon 
itt '.ck  is~hichly  prob-.blc   since  it  p-.n-ltc     n  e-nei.Tj'  c-.rrier  to  escape 
under  cover  of  d^rkne-ss.     This  pr-suppon.n  rh' t  c  ■-rch  oper-.tions   -^re  irv- 
pr'  ctiC'blc,     This  he-rqu- rtera  cnnot  oubsnribe  to  this   opinion  for  the 
follov/ing  re.-.sons: 

(1)  A  ninor  aurprise  r  id  such  '■.:,  a  slngl  .■  carrier 

ii;  not   ■■.  logicj.   Tttthod  of  -ttriCk  to  reduce 
the  d<  fens 0  3  of  Ohu, 

(2)  It  pemits  us  to  oper'ite  ■  c-lnst  him  for  ■■■-  long 

period  on  D  Day  .it  clos..  r'^.ngo. 

(3)  The  enery  vdll  be  nor"    coricern^jd  vdth  deliver- 

ing .:.  successful  r.ttr.ck  tlir.n  he  vdll  be  with 
osc-.ping  -.ftur  the  -.tt-'.ck,     H«'  will  h-:ive  c.-.re- 
fully  consider.']  the  coi't  of  'he   .nttrprise, 
will  prob.-.bly  iiako  n  dete-minod  -.tt.ck  with 
.■Tv.xir-Tun  force  '-nd  vdll  v.llliri<;ly  ''CCept  his 
losses  if  iii.s  :.tt-ck  i;  succoiirful. 

2.     Section  No.   '^: 

c.     This   rcction  illustr-too  m  I'^utin.    ci  ily  Se-.rch  by  the  rjc'.roh 
force  which  will  be  ru'de  in  ord..r  to  prevent  an    .'iieniy  fron  mking  -jt.  undetec- 
ted appTCach  on  0-'hu» 

b.  Specific'-lly,  v.-it:.  t.h.:   crri'T   ■  ppi'-'' thing    -.t  jO  <not3   -\nd  the 
sciirch  force  f'king  off   m   g-:v;-,,  ir.t-i-cepti'.n  nust   be  n-de  no  closer  to 
OThu  thin  i.35  r-.utic.il  nrdlos  ■  nd  ne    I- t' r   *.h-in  3:'j3  '-ft-r  d.\wn  on  D  Dny. 
Thl3  perraits  /,'  ainut   s  to  aoa'  .'    r  -Uo  .•.ier.i.-.f e   '.e  th  ;  hone  bise  and  got 
tho  r.tf'ck  f  '  Ir  "-n.l  ^::10  for  it  to  intercept   nnd  deliver  its 
attack  befor                    -.  -r  cr.n   Iranch  its  plr>nes.     The  atfick   force  will 
strike-  the   c  :.  ^-.    ■. ..   its  d^-.wn  plus   5!34  D  D.iy,    359  nnutic.-J.  nilos  out, 

c.  On  a  time  dliit-'nce  h-sin,   diwn  D  D'.y  for  i  cirrier  is   526 
nnutic'.l  mile'S   from  O'.hu;   dusk  D  'My-1  is   B5fc   nr.utic-il  niler.  out  '\nd  dawn 

'      D  D.-.y-l  is  12U6  n-'.utical  niles    from  'y^h--^.     Solvin,'   the   r-te  of  closure 
probleri  for  the  trio   forcec  l?i.6  nauticl  rdl^ia    ip-.rt,   it  is   found  th.'.t 
conU.ct  \fiil  be  nude  at  1030  iii.utic-.l  niles  fron  CfJwx  •->.t  c".rrier's  d".wn 
plus  7:12  on  D  Day-1, 

d.  It  niu^t  be  pointed  out  thnt  this   solution  is  tho  naxinun 
rrdius  of~action  for  the  se-.rch  force,   yet  not  necessarily  the  nost  diffi- 
cult nroblen  pn.-s.-r.tcd  to  our  att  ck   f'.rce,     Vftiil     -•.  crrier  arriving  at  ^ 

_  5  -  -  Q' 

ecu  FIDE  NTIrtL  '.' 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  1027' 

Pl.in  for  the  Eniploynant   of  B 'v  ibirdn-nt  avI- tlon  in  thu  Defense  of  0-\hu,   cont'dj 

the  1030  nauticr-i  ailo   cLitlo     t  'i.vtr.  pl-as  7:12  on  D  ?>■'.•/-!  c-.nnot  b.-; 
p.tt?ckod  t.l.-t  ii  y,   it  en  b..    -.tt-cki'i   '':w   following    i-y  's   .-hovai  in  b 
•ibovt  -.vtion  it  rust  come  within  cisy  r.-.nf','-   of  th     "*.t.  ck  force  if  it  Ts  to 
'.ttunpt  to  stcvon  to  ^.itliin  its  launching,  r'ldius, 

3.     Stction  Mo.  3? 

n.     This   Section  illustrates  the  nost,  difficult  probler.i  'vhich 
the    at-.ck  force  h\r,  to  jolve.     It  is   the   :■.-■-.    pr< 'oler:  th.'.t  is  illustra- 
ted in  Section  No.    ID.     TKo  criticr'l  point  lH;r.    i3   th-  c-.rri^r's  position 
•It  his   liunching  rdius    .t  d-'.wn.     Under  th'.;;.    circur,;-,tr>.nccs  ho  is    •■ble  to 
l.i.unch  his      ircr-  ft  before  we  intercept  hin  :.n;s  deliver  ^n  .'itt'.ck  at^iinst 
hiia  on  D  Diy»     Tlier^for«.'.   wo  nu.-t  lUt  hijti  D  D-iy-l,   or   the  d-iy  before.-  he 
nrrivcs  -.t  this  position. 

b.     Specifically,  if  his  d.^wn  position  D  Day  is   350  a-iuticil 
rules   frors  O^hu,  his    iusk  position  D  D^y-1  -lUst  be  680  n.'.utic-J.  inilos  out 
rj\(i  his  d-iwn  pc.sition  D  0  .y-1  nust  be  1070  ly-utic-.l  i.iiles  out.     If  ho 
nakcs   t;ood  this   bchcdulc,   inUrception  by  tr.'    so'-rch  force  v<ill  be  nr.do  at 
98/,  nautical  miles  out   -it  his   J-.v.ti  plui"  6:11  on  D  D-'.y-l.     Allowing  UO 
nunutes  to  tr^nsnit  a  !r,cs.v.?,(.    ind  to   ivt  v!^       tt'.ck   forc%.  in  the  air,   the 
att^-'.cking  force  v/ill  strike  thv  cr.rri   r     \   ':  ts    :  ;.vn  plus  10:/»3  D  Day-1  at 
a  di5:tancc  of  7/.ft"n;;utic-'l  r.ile-   from  O-Jiu  •  r.d   en  operate    -.j^-dnst   it  during 
the  roiTt'lning  2:16  befor  .  du^k.     Und-.r  ?t.'.  n.ost   I'lvor-blc  condition  for  the 
cncnyy.   th'.:  enuwy  crrier  c-n  '■>-   yublectod  to  attack  by  our  attacking  force 
during  ■•-  p^.riod  of  2;  16  on  D  Day-1. 

L,     Section  No.   4;     This   section  shov;s  th:    r  i  lus  of  -.ctian  of  tho 
B-17D  type  airplane  with  fuU  ioo.d  of  bonbs  and  1700  f.r.llons  of  fuel.' 

5.     Effect  of  Visibility  (Sec  Chart  Ho.   2); 

h.      To  cover   thij   r^rjulreJ   :;<-'.rch   :.:••  a  unH.   r   th     -:'ti'  v.    -v-nrtitions 
120  airpl.'^.nes,   ■„.- ch  cov.rin^;    .  3"  sector,   w^uld  t,    n^  jdc  :   »  j    jr,.:r   tc  to 
a  distance     Df  1030  rnutic:.l  r.ilvs.     This   n-or.bir  e:"  pl-n.s  %/oula  p..rait 
lOOSK  cover^ce  n;"  the  vnttre  36c"  r>n  the  m.arch   out. 

b.     enviously  any  dvcrv  -•.■;'    in  ■^ht    nui.A.    :■   -f  pi  .n<-0   e.\;ployed  v/ill 
incr-.a:>'.    the   '-..-ct.or   t'   t.    :,i.-.rched   ty       .r;.   ;i-:n^     -iid   Vr,\  r  .£'.,r'   reJuceS 
th''  prob' bllity  of  fir.dinc  th''   t-'ri^et.      A.'.y  imc;  v  T-'.-d   •  f.- '   '/.ould,   however, 
with  a   I'jsser  nuisber  of   s<..';rc.h  {Ixnes  b'.  c^  v  r^  1    >n  th'    i.e  irch  back,   .-'nd 
'dep.ndiri*^  upon  th'.    loc.ition  of  thi'    carrit.r  .aa!   i  r.  .   ho'jr  ^f  thi    day,   rdght 
pernit   ■J'l     tt  .ck  to  be  ma'ic  or,  D  Day-1  or  D  '■'•.y, 

~  P'.rt  3?     This  part  of  th..   'Ix.'.;e\is3.;.cn  ('  ..'.Is   -'Ith  the    i3:^um*-d  probable 
capabilities   of  t.'nemy  e':jui{i-.i>.nt   (s  .-e  Ch.irt  'U;,    i,) ,     It   ia  bvll_.v;d  that 
his  rr.axir.Tur:!  capabilities   .rill  t  .   r-.iucd   f  t- .'•    th-. ':..   '.5  3u/ii..,d   for  Sections 
1   tc   /.,    inclusive,    (Ch-irt  Ho.     ')   by    t;.      .'    11   v. :  :  ,■    !  ictorS! 

1.  His  ■'.vra^e  carrl'-r  i.;    ypi.  ^  i   ..ill  *      '■  7  knota.     This  st.at.A'.iimt 
is   tr'.'liCited  upon  the   fct  th.i*    th.       ."r  .r      *  '{.■    ipt.'..!  -if  OflnNGE  c.'.rricrs 
is  ?n  knots,    -  nd   th..    b' 1  i '  f  'r.''    on  hi.    r.ir.  .nr.  :'"   th..  P.-..cific,    foul 
bottoi.TS  will   prohlily  ru.-V',   r   :■  'luoi    hi.-;   :i  ■. 'l, 

2.  The  cruising  r  n/'  f  i.i';   carrier   -.Irci- I't  will   b'.-  iOO  n.autiosl 
lilies,     IJo  allowance  is  r.Vi'l..  In  [.:•'  va^us  ^nnput.at.i.;  ns   foi-   full   throttle 
op>;r'>tion,    for  fuel    r- .i- rv.',      r  f„r   tine  r.  quired   to   t".ke   off  fro;,i,   •  nd 
land      rio^rd,    ih  .   carrier. 

3.  H',.  will    not    h  V  .   unii.Mit.^d      ^  un-  r,   (  !'   approach  f'jr  his    -.ttack, 
n.      H      ^u.'.t     iV'ii;!   th':    :,hippinc.    !.  .n  .r.    to    av(yi^-e   d.  t'-ctlon, 

c  u  :;  F  I  D  i.  IJ  1  I  .»  1  / 


79716  O — 46 — pt.  14- 


1028    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Finn  for  th-  !->^ploynent  of   i'--t.  r-i- nt  ,,•      •  ■■      Ocfcnse  of  Oahu,  cont'd: 

..sst  of  ths  158th 
ik!  thw:  proh'billty 

■,n3  ttv.t  his  most 
nm  0°  count(  r-clockwisc  to 

1  .i.-.dr.-.nt  ISC'"   --  :-•    --clock- 


not  the  jfily  ijourcc 
'  .Hi/5>-nct;,  surDiCo 
.    -   iccpt  rinrt  proposed 

.   iu;::   gonoral  locstion  find 

•      .  '   f  rccs. 

_;.      ■'     "V.!    -  r,!    '.    •-  k.   th«;   shor^   :  ♦,    lir.t'.ncc  t...  his  objoctivo, 
•silth.^Uf^h  t;  ■.  nor  considt;r.itit.ii  if  hi;:    r:nf[c  is   sufficii^nt 

to   fk  rrlt   h  .  /rch, 

Z».      StiCtiog  No.    5i 

a.  "^   '  '      rs  ir'-.v.-n  to   r>Hc\i  c:n«  possibif  plan  of 
ntt-.ck  nf~t;.  'iir.od  protebie  c.-'.prbilitics.     H<;rc  cansid-.-r- 
p.tion  h."s  b                                           l   rs   i..n'a.'Kr  t>-d  in  r>  r  .graphs  1,   2  'tnd  3 
irnr.udintttly                                    result  t^  •  r-ct-  ristics 
h-ive  bctin  T'                               .  is  spi;<-d   f                                            '  1*00  n'ritic.-.l 
niles   r^.ngi;   l-  i-  ;i:.s  irpi    .icS,      Under   Lr;<_5v    ciiaitirnB    it   will   bu   nuci.'S- 
sary  for  thu  cr.rri'  r  tr^   -.ppro.ich  within  233  niuticnl  rdlGS  of  Oihu  before 

it  can  launch  its    iircr.ft;   rocovcry  would  be  rvide  it  167  nautical  riles. 
Accordingly,  the  r-.dius  of  Eo-.rch   co.n  bt;  r-  duced  to  833  avatical  railes 
and     still  pt,  rmit  the  scnrch  force  to  locritc  the  currier   md  tho  att-.ck 
force  rnfike  its  ntt'ick  befor*i  the  cirrior-based  ',ircr"ft  cxn  bu  If.unched, 
These  f.ssuncd  characteristics  can   r,,duci,'  thv  required  search  r-.dius  to  833 
ncutic'l  rdlfs  and  still  p. rrdt  the  c-.rri.-r  bein^  attackod  before  it 
reaches  the  position  fron  which  -drcr-irt  c-.n  h..   launch<'d. 

b.  If   on  D  Day-1   '  .r   force  is    .t  ■.   ■iistr'nce  of  991 
nauticf.1  niles  stivarrin^  in                      :3  and  the   search   force  t.'ikes  off  at 
dawn,   int'jrci,pti:n  will,  occ  ..  "-.rri-'r's  daivn  plus  5:^9,   833  nauti- 
cal miles  ■ 'A'                   .xir-.'jj.i  r  .aius  -jf  search  under  these  conditions. 
»llcvdng  U'                          :-r-i^r  th,  attack   force  out    >nd  3:1*2  for  the  flight, 
the   carrier     c  .n  do  attacked    it  its  davm  plus  10:11  D  Day-1,   715  nautical 
riles  out  and  can  optratc   "igainst  it  during  the  remaining  2:1*9  before  dusk. 

c.  Further,  should  the  carrier  be  missed  an  D  Day-1  there  still 
r  ;~.-.iny  an  v^pportunity  to  r;ttack  it  on  D  Day,     Interception  nust  be  riade 
by  the   search  f-  -  rer  than  carrier's  dawn  plus  2:02,  288  nautical 
railes  out  on  D  L"                     .    t.^  :ri.ake  -.n  att-ack  prior  to  launching.     This 
attack  would     ecu;  rlus   3:56,  ,?37  nautical  niles  out. 

5.  Section  No.  6;      Ti  nur^;  is  the   sar;;e  as  that  sh<wn  in 
paragraph   3,   Part   2  abov^^,    i.'.. ,    tr.  ;  rtest    fav;irable  plan  of    action  open  to 
an  ene.^y,     With  the  carrier  PvOking  good  its  tLrne  schedule  to  arriv,;  at  its 
airplane  launching  position  at  daylight,   interception  by  the  se-arch  force 
will  bo  rvade  at  dawn  plus   5:11   "'f  c-rriur's  B  Day-1,     Allowing  1*0  rdnutos 
to  transmit  the  mossnga  tc>  th-    h-ne  b."se   and  for  tht  attack   force  to  take- 
off,  the  attack  force  en  reach  the  carrier  at  -.'.awn  plus  9:08    if  carrier's 

D  Day-1  and  can  operato   •  f;  inst  the  carrier  during  the   reaaining  3:42  before 

dusk.     Under  the  nost  pr':bable  plan  of  action  of  an  oncry  carri'^r,    >  B-l'it! 

att.ackj.ng  force  en   operate  ■  ,ninst  the  carrier  f -r  3:^2  of  th..-  day  prior 
to  his  atf'Ck   :>n  Oahu. 

6.  Effect  of  Visibility: 

a.     In  Section  N-^,    5,   a   5*^  search  spread  should  give  adequate 
Cov.cr5ge.     The  scrrch   time  schedule   is   such  that  if  interception  is  not 
nadc  on  the  search  out  it  can  be  nade  on  the  search  bick  in  tine  to  trans- 
nit  the  infor.T.ticn  and  t     deltv'^r  -an  attack  by  the  striking  force  before 

-  7  - 
CONFID^NTIkL 


\o 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  1029 

im  for  tiM  lipaAfaMA  9t  no«fcir*wr<t  Aviation  in  Mi»  I>«foM«  «f  Okha,  eoniU) 

daak  «o  0  Dajr-l*    Th«r«  it  lit  oov«r&c«  at  800  iiMtioal  ailea  on  xi\*  awurfih 
out,  hit  on  the  aoarch  out  and  b»ck  thoro  i»  XOOJt  covoracc     72  airplanaa 
wouid  bo  UBOd  for  tho  aoaroh. 

b.    In  Soction  No,  6,  with  5°  ««croh  •oetora*  tho  probability  of 
findli«  tno  targot  at  740  nauticrj.  miloo  ia  85$  for  the  search  out  tmd  aa 
•tatod  in  ^  above,  IOCS  for  the  aoaroh  out  and  back.     72  airplanoa  would 
bo  Buffioiont  for  ooBf>loto  covorago  in  thia  coao,  for  if  interooption  ia 
not  aado  on  tho  «a/  out,  it  can  bo  node  on  tho  aoaroh  baok  in  tiao  to  tram- 
Bdt  inf  oRMtion  and  dolivor  an  attaok* 

1«    Aotion  bQT  unosqr  oarrier-<baaod  booblnc  plonoa  againat  Oahu  ahould 
1)0  fiipirod  on  tho  baaia  of  thoir  huving  400  nautical  niloa  range  and  a 
•pood  of  lao  knota. 

2.  «^.     H»  ooat  favorable  plan  of  actlcn  opon  to  tho  anonjr,  and  tho 
jlotioR  upon  which  wo  ahouXd  baae  our  plane  of  operation,  ia  tho  earljr 
aoming  atta^  in  which  tho  ononor  nuat  fflaieo  good  tho  following  tlaa 
•oheduloi 

(X)    Croaa  circle  860.  nautical  niloa  fron  Oohu  at 
dann  of  tho  iay  bofor«  tho  attack. 

(2)  Croaa  circle  530  nautical  ndloo  from  Oohu  at 

duak  of  the  aoy  before  tho  attack, 

(3)  lAunch  hla  planoa  233  nautical  niloa  froas  Oahu 

at  dawn  tho  day  of  tho  attack. 

(4)  Recover  his  planes  167  nautical  milea  from  Onivx 

2i30  aftor  dawn  the  day  of  tho  attack. 

^.     Any  variation  f  roa  tho  above  tine  achodulo  perrdta  our  attcusk 
force  to  strike  the  onenisr  during  daylight  of  th<J  day  before  hla  att&ek 
over  ti  groator  time  interval  nnd  at  a  ahortor  range;  or,  ponnita  our 
attack  force  to  strike  hia  during  delight  of  tho  day  ho  attacks  but 
boforo  ho  ia  within  his  radius  of  action  of  Onhu.    If  an  enoRQr  carrier 
•vceoodod  in  slippir^  in  undetected  k^r  our  search  force  rjyi  launehod  aa 
attack,  we  could  and  would,  of  courae,  attack  aa  soon  aa  pooalble  in  ordor 
to  doatroy  or  dioablo  tho  carrior  prior  to,  or  during,  tho  rocovory  of  tta 
|Vlanea« 

3.  The  croa  botw«an  tho  circles  with  radii  530  nautical  ailoa  and  933 
nautieiO.  iilos  from  Oahu  is  thu  oporrting  aroa  for  the  aolutiun  of  thio 
probloQ  under  its  most  advurso  condition. 

4.  a.    With  the  Aray  Air  Forco  rospcnslble  for  its  om  rocoanoiaaaace, 
72  B-17D  airplanes  will  be  roquirod  to  search  dftily  the  aroa  within  tho 
circle  of  833  nautical  niloa  rcuiiua  froa  Oahu,  e,-.ch  plane  covoring  a  5* 
•octor. 

b.     Based  upon  the  ".ssumption  of  visibility  uaod  in  thia  atudy, 
72  airplanes  afl^oyod  to  soarch  a  360°  sector  should  result  in  100)1  cjvon- 
ago  with  sonc  overlap  to  600  nautical  nilea,  85!S  coverage  at  700  nautictJ. 
mil  OS  and  75$  covurage^at  800  nautlctd  ndlos  in  the  search  out.    In  every 
case,  tho  search  out  and  in  would  poroit  100$  coverage  within  tho  tine 
interval  which  would  allow  the  launching  of  tho  boohing  attack  prior  to 
dusk  on  D  Day>l. 


5.     If  a  siidlar  search  could  be  conducted  from  Dutch  Rirbor,  Uidwoy, 
Johnston  or  Paljnyra  the  possibility  of  unony  surface  ships  approaching 
Hawaii  and  the  west  ooast  of  tho  United  SU.tos  undatoctod  would  be  prrcti- 
ealXy  non-exiatcnt. 

-  8  -. 


u 


CfiliF  iD  SNIi  Ai  ^^, 


1030    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Plan  for  the  BK^oyraent  of  Bombardment  Aviation  in  the  Defense  of  Oahu,   cont'd: 


6.  Search  must  be  conducted  during  daylight  hours  because  of  the 
extrene  difficulty  of  locating  i*at  will  be  an  unlighted  objective  proceed- 
ing under  cover  of  darkness.     The  B-17D  airplane  is  capable  of  searching 
for,  anl  attacking,  an  eneny  force  the  day  prior  to  its  arrival  vdthin 

its  striking  distance  of  Oahu. 

7.  With  this  plan  in  actual  operation  the  defenses  of  these  islands 
can  be  assured  without  assistance  from  the  Navy.     This  will  pernit  complete 
freedom  of  action  of  the  Pacific  Fleet. 

8,  The  B-17D  airplane  is  capable  of  operating  beyond  the  combat  range 
of  any  knonei  eneay  carrier-based  aviation. 

9,  Attack  tnust  be  conducted  during  daylight  hours  because  it  is 
considered  impracticable  to  locate  and  borafc  a  raaneuverlng  precision  taiN- 
get  during  darkness. 

10.  Based  on  the  worst  situation  that  could  arise,  i.e.,  the  eraploy- 
nent  of  6  enetay  carriers  against  Osihu  simultaneously  each  approaching  on 
a  different  course,  an  attack  force  of  36  B-17D's  would  be  rocjuired  to 
disable  or  destroy  the  carriers.     It  is  expected  that  6  &-17D'8  with  bomb 
loads  of  seven  600#  botnbs  v;ould  be  sufficient  to  accon^lish  the  desired 
result  (see  Study  No,  1).     It  is  contemplated  that  this  attack  force  will 
be  augnientcd  by  36  additional  B-lTD's  of  the  maintenance  and  reserve 
force  If  in  coranission, 

11.  This  attack  force  should  be  further  augmented  by  a  ndninuia  of  36 
long-range  planes  of  the  B-26  or  similar  type,   capable  of  carrying  tor- 
pedoes to  be  usedUas  the   striking  force  under  conditions  of  low  ceiling 
and  visibility  when  high  altitude  level  borablng  technique  Is  not  practi- 
cable.    (Sqb  Study  No.  2). 

12.  A  reserve  of  72  planes  »/ill  be  needed  to  provide  for  maintenance, 
replaceaent  and  rtscrve  for  both  the   senrch  and  attack  forces.     As  was 
stated  in  paragraph  10  above,  36  of  this  nunber  may  be  eraployed  as  part  of 
the  attack  force  if  in  conmission. 

13 «     In  order  to  operate  the  above  number  of  B-17D's,  a  minjjauo  of 
216  coaivat  crews  will  be  needed  as  indiccted  in  Chart  No.   5. 

vi^  RBcaasNDATiote! 

1.  It  is  recommended  that  the  v;ar  Department  give  Immediate  considera- 
tion to  the  allotment  of  180  B-17D  type  airplanes  or  other  four-engine 
bombers  with  equcd  or  better  p«rfonaance  and  operating  range  and  36  long- 
range  torpedo-carrying  aedlum  bombers  to  the  Hawaiirui  Air  Force  for  'the 
performance  of  search  and  attiick  missions  In  an  irea  bounded  by  a  circle 
whose  radius  is  833  nautical  miles  and  center  is  Oahu,  as  follows! 

72  for  daily  search  missions. 

36  for  -ittick  missions  (these  airpltnes  will  bo  in  readi- 
ness daily,   fully  armed  and  loaded  »dth  boniss,   for 
a  mission), 

72  for  malntenrjice  and  reserve  from  wtiich  36  may  be  used 
to  augment  the  attack  force. 
T^  total  B-17D's, 

36  torpedo-carrying  medium  bombers  of  the  B-26  or  other 
suitable   type, 

2,  While  this  number  of  bombardment  airplanes  could  not  be  accommo- 
dated at  Hickam  Field  and  there  are  no  other  suiuible  bases  avnllablo  on 
Oahu,   It  Should  bo  only  ?.  ra>3tter  of  time  until  projects  submitted  to  the 
War  Department  for  the  construction  of  airdromes  on  outlying  islands  of 

-  9  - 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1031 

CONFlD-iNTIAL 
Plan  Tor  th'..  Sraployr.-nt  rf  rciara-   nt  n'.oation  in  the  Defense  of  OcJiu,   cont'd: 

the  Hawrdim  group  are  completed  which,  with  Hickan  Field,  will  be  ado- 
qur-.te  for  optr'^tions  of  the  r.bovj  naibcr  of  piar.es.     Easting  plans  for 
the  dispersion  of  th-  13th  Bonsbaror-nt  Wing  (H)  provide-  for  units  of  one 
and  two  STuadrons  to  opor?tu  froia  disp.jrsod  ;iirdronies,     Uodificrtion  of 
the  plan  to  "pply  to  op^ritionr  thorefroB  "re  anticipated  and  will  be 
nade , 

3.     It  is  fufth  r  ri co.-iT. ;;n<1c  i  that  in  siking  future  allotnents  of 
officers  and  cnliit^d  ncn  to  thv  Hav/j-.iian  Air  ForCw  considcrution  be  given 
to  providing  a  lainiraua  of  216  B-17D  combat  crews  a;id  36  medium  bonbcr- 
torp5do  combat  cr--w3.     In  this  conn^action,  sjc  pa.riigraph  8,  basic  letter. 

U.     Our  l''-.ding  t-.cticians   -n.:  stratsgists  hsrt  concur  in  the  opinion 
that  this  plan  will  solve  the  dcfe-ase  cf  tho  Hav.tiiian  Islands   -uid  that  to 
their  knowledge  it  is  tt.:  best  and  only  njans  that  can  be  devised  to 
locate  cneay  carriers  and  r.akt    attacks  th,.rvor.  b'.forc  said  carriers  can  corae 
within  launching  di  static  c  cf  Cahu.     T'ne  s<^l3  par  rose  of  the  existence  of 
the  nilitarj'  ost  iblish.Mont  on  Oahu,  gj-cund    xid   air,  is  for  the  defense  of 
Oahu  as  an  outlying  navel  base.     Th'i   bost  defenso  is  an  aggressive  and 
well-organized  offense.     The  basis  of  thic  plan  is  offensive  action.     We 
have  hrd  clearly  denonf. rate-d  to  us  in  Europe-  t;;e  fallacy  of  depending  upon 
passive  mc  .sviros  of  d.-fense,     W:-  mat  not  base  our  plans  of  action  en  the 
"Def:.:nsc  of  Hawaii",  but  rather  upon  a  vagcrous   offensive,     h'e  nust  ferret 
out  the  cnjciy  and  destroy  hla  before-  he  c-ji  t^.ke    icticn  to  destroy  us. 

It  has  b«--en  said,   and  it  is  a  popular  belief,  that  Hawaii  is  the 
strongest  outlying  aaval  base  in  th-.    world  and  co-did,   therefore,  withstand 
indefinitely  att' cks  and  atfanpted  invasions.     Plans  br.sed  on  such  convic- 
tions arc   inherently  w^ak    ind  tend  to  cr.ate  a  false  sense  of  security  with 
the  consvquent  unprup«.ri:dness  for  offensive  rction. 

In  order  to  initiate  offensivu  action,  the  Hawaiian  Air  Force 
laust  h.ave  at  its  iraaediate  corjnr.nd  wall-organized,  equipped  and  trained 
conJbat  crews.     It  should  be  reaembered  that  while  reinforcements  fron  the 
Uainland  can  be-  nadc.   -vail-ble  on  -hcrt  notice  their  expeditious  presence 
here  will  not  solve  th.'  prohlea.     Upon  their  arrivl  they  aust  be  given 
an  o.-'portunity  to  undergo  a  ccrtrin  ano-ant  of  indispensj>ble  indoctrination 
and  training  in  tho  pl.an  of  action  cf  the  Hawaiian  Air  Force,     If  this 
plan  is  to  be  effective  the  force  recoaraended  above  niist  be  nade  a 
reality  v.nd  naintained  in  exist-^ncc  in  Hawaii  for  conbat  at  any  tine.     With 
the  United  States  living    Tid  working  under  a  condition  of  unliidted 
National  £rifcrg-:ncy,   Japan  raaking  its  southward  nxivonent  nnd  the  world  in 
general  in  a  coa.pl --le  state  of  turnoil  we  misX.  be  prepared  for  D  Day  at  any 
tine,     ReinforCQr.-.:nts,   then-fore,  nust  be  consiri- red  fron  the  standpoint 
of  rcplacer.onts  for  losses  only.     Any  delay  in  placing  this  plan  in  oper- 
ation, such  as  would  be  necessary  for  tho  above  reasons,  would  ruti^atc 
against  its  success. 

It  is  bellov-jd  that  "-  force  of  180  fcur-notored  aircraft  with 
36  long-range  torp'j-io  airplanes  is  a  srvall  force  when  co.'aprrod  with  the 
inport-ance  cf  this  outpost.     This   force  c^-Ji  be  provided  it  less  cost  to 
the  GovLTnnent  than  the  cost  of  one  .•aadcrn  battleship.     It  is  further 
b<:'lieved  that,  this   force  nhould  bo  r.ade  'vailable  -.s  soon  as  possible  oven 
at  the  expense  of  oth.r  units  on  tho  Eainland. 


-  10  - 


\t 


1032    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


CONFIDENTIAL 


STUDY  OF  TOE  BaSS  RKQUIREU  TO  DIS^BI£  aN  kIRCR.>FT  CARTER 


1.  It  is  ass'a;:icc'.  tlv't  two  ilirect  hits  by  500  lb,   or  600  lb,  demo- 
lition bonbs  will  be  sufficient  t;:    lisablo  an  f.ircrift  carrier, 

2.  Fr.n  th'.-  V.bloa   ::f  prt-b'.bility  cf  I'ircct  hits  by  bontiing, 
results     btrint'".  by  units     1"  the  H-^.w'Aii  ji  .dr  Force  in  bonbinc  sleds  Umed 
y,-,,  K' ^f.■    :i;rrf .    '-"   ft    Mil   from  prcvivjus  uxpcrioncos  by  borabarcliers  who 

i;  •,  is  nr>turc,   it  is  j'ctcrained  th'it  '.'out  90ji 

pi  -.  :ct  hits  rciy  bo  cxpcctc  i  from  6  D-17D's  -yr  similar^ 

typ-  .irpl--acs  -.t'.ackinj^  n  oincuvcring  c^rilor  from  15,000  feet,  each 
r-r-.ppin^;  seven  600  lb.  birabs  in  train.  Bo!-ib-\rdiors  c-.rt  ."^.ssmaed  to  bo 
c-xn.-\bl(j   -^'f   nt  I'jast   a  20  iiil  -^.cciir-icy. 

3.  In  -irrivdng     t  the  nunib  ;r     f  btjwbs  .'jni     irpl-.ncs  required, 
sovor.'l  moth  -'ri     f   ■  "t    ck    '.re   c  -nci^'.-rcd: 

K.     Att-;ck   by  in  'ivi  iual  lirplanos  frcia    liffcrcnt  -directions, 
-tt." ckini^  in  cl.-so  succ-.s.'-i   n. 

b.  ■■  n     '.'^- c\:s  by  thr,;e  pi'.ne  clei.ients  from  r'ifferent 
''.ir'.cti-ns                         -      :uccer,si  ^n. 

c.  Forri-.tion  •-\tt-ck  in  •■  6-pl-.nc  flight. 

In  •  11  CIS-:-  npe-:  in  tr-in  by  er.ch  r.ir- 

plT,>-   v.lth  The  number  .^f  bontos  (42) 

■\n-\  •  irpl.-.r.--   v-/   •■  •  ■■     -    ■  -  ^  y^    -  -ility   ;f  two  qffoctive 

hits  wvi  'ieternine''  t.  y  the  s-'.r.c  f^r  e-'.ch  type  .f  atVvck, 


.    1 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  1033 

CONFIDENTIAL 

-"    —    "    —    —    ■""■"""""""■"  \tr:'-        ■ 

n\-yn  VCR  TORPEDO  PUMES   IN  TH£  H^YJhIIAN   nIR  FORCE 


1.  ^.     Any  or  all  of  the  following  factors  ':ould  be  expected  to 
jjartially  or  wfiolly  prevent  the  auccesaful  accomplishment  of  the  bombard- 
ment mission; 

(1)  Inability  to  find  enemy  force  (navigation). 

(2)  Lock  of  bombing  accuracy. 

(3)  Enerny  fighter  action. 

(/*)     Hostile  anti-aircruTt  artillerj-  fire. 

(5)     Weather  obscuring  the  objective, 

b.     Consideration  of  these  factors: 

(I  and  2)       Navig>itional  and  bombing  accuracy 
are  primiirily  nvatters  of  training  and 
.  practice.     Efficient  standards  can  be 

and  .Hre  being  attained  by  the  training  of 
combat  crev/s  in  the  Hawaiian  Air  Force, 

(3)     The  critical  altitude,  high  speed  and  defen- 
sive armament  of  the  present  heavy  bombard- 
ment aircraft  is  such  as  to  provide  excel- 
lent defense  .-gainst  enemy  fighters.     It  is 
not  believed  that  carrier-based  fighters 
vdll  be  very  effective  against  the  B-lTD's 
at  high  altitudes, 

{U)     Reports  from  abroad  indicate  that  anti-air- 
craft fire  will  bo  only  partially  effective  and 
will  not  prevent  the  accomplishment  of  the 
mission, 

(5)     The  -..■^.-ather  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands  is  probilly  the 
best  in  the  world  from  a  standpoint  of  flying 
conditions    inrl  yet  i.  vcty  definite  percentage 
of  bombing  missions   fail  because  of  overcast 
conditions  which  obscure  the  objective.     Heavy 
bombardment  as  such  is  useless  against  surface 
cnifr    ■*-   -   1-v  ceilings  (200  -  1,000  feet) 
pr'  •  '.  is  doubtful  if  it  could  be 

use  !  ,    JO  feet  without  prohibitive 

losses  frc.T.  anti-aircraft  fire  before  reach- 
ing the  bomb  release  line.     Enemy  surface 
craft  may  be  expected  to  take   full  advantage 
cf  all  cloudiness  conditions  and  even  to  wait 
until  such  conditions  occur  before  launching 
an  attack.     At  present  tfie  Hawaiian  Air  Force 
has  no  weapon  to  effectively  combat  surface 
craft  under  such  conditions. 

2,  The   following  is  subnittcd  as  a   solution  to  this  problem: 

a.     The  most  efftctivi-  action  "igpinst  surface  craft  under  poor 
woather  conditions  is  believed  to  be  a  torpedo  attack  from  low  flying 
aircr-i't.     This  is   substantiated  by  results  from  abroad,   i.e.,   Bismarck 
sinking,  Taranto  attack,  etc..     A  torpodo  plane  flying  just  off  the 
water  can  op<>rate  under  a  very  lew  ceiling  and  with  guar.-intced  accuracy 

-  1  - 

£21iEISENTlAL 


\i 


k 


1034    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL 


N'.--'d  for  Torpedo  Planes  in  the  Hawiiian  Air  Force,   cont'd: 


against  all  surface  cr-ft.  The  torpedo  pli-ne  should  to  Icnd-basod,  of 
long  range,  fast  ;xnd  capublo  of  b.3ing  nccuratoly  n-.vigrit3d.  It  should 
operate  in  con.lunction  i:iti"i  h...r.vy  bonbcvrdriont. 

3.     a.     Tho  orJ.7  type  -airplane  thet  co  ill  be   ■ -i.-.pted  to  this  pur- 
pose 't  present  in  U-.e  Hj^ii-Piian  Depart.T.ont  is  the  A-^'CA.     It  is  b^li'jvd 
that  this  -icapftion  can  be  r.-.di.-  and  the  prcblon  is  under  considt  r.tion 
and  tost  -t  present, 

b.  It  is  believed  th  t  tha  r.cdiura  bcrib-^ri- ;nt  r.irplar.o  of  tho 
B-26  type  vd.Il  be  even  rTiOr..   Latisf-xtory  b  cause  of  its  longer  range, 

c.  It  is  reco-ai-i-ndod  that    .  iajf  tion  of   ie.-.e  .;uch  airplane  be 
mcde,  preferably  in  such   '   r.annr   '■'  net  t:    ir.t-rf  r.  vdth  the  norr.al 
bombardnent  adssion. 


C   C  »  F  1   D  :•.  ;:  T   I   A 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  1035 

(In  addition  to  the  foregoing  sections  of  the  Study  of  the  Air  Situa- 
tion in  Hawaii  dated  20  August  1941,  Exhibit  No.  13,  there  are  included 
in  the  Exhibit  the  following  charts  : 

Chart  1.  A  Method  of  Searching  5°  Sectors  Through  360° 
to  a  Radius  of  833  Miles  from  Oahu  Employing  72  B-17D 
Airplanes. 

Chart  2.  Relation  of  25  Miles  Visibility  to  Distance. 
Chart  3.  Radius  of  Action  of  B-17D  Airplane  Under  Various 
Load  Conditions  in  Relation  to  Possible  Plans  of  Action  of 
Carrier  Group  Attacking  Oahu,  Assuming  Carrier  Speed  of  30 
Knots  and  Carrier  Planes  Performance  600  Mile  Range. 

Chart  4.  Radius  of  Action  of  B-17D  Airplane  Under  Various 

Load  Conditions  in  Relation  to  Possible  Plans  of  Action  of 

Carrier  Group  Attacking  Oahu,  Assuming  Carrier  Speed  of 

27  Knots  and  Carrier  Planes  Performance  400  Mile  Range. 

Chart  5.  Schedule  for  B-17D  Combat  Crews. 

The  above  five  charts  are  reproduced  as  Items  Nos.  20,  21,  22,  23  and 

24  respectively  in  EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS  to  Proceedings 

of  Joint  Committee.) 


1036    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


(/.  Ir    Corps    Troopt.    CTily7 


Aul}i        Aclu 


Total    liq   Kav/'n   <■•  ir   •  orco 


50C  365 


130 


Zira    bomh   Sq   {';,) 


^  'P  (;;) 


4<irici  Bomb  i>q    (li) 

50th  Reooim  Sq   (ii) 

Hq  *  i'.Q  Sq    17th  AB   Op   (R) 

Idth  AB   Sq 


!=.pt 


■L) 


Total 


i738  4 ICC 


14  th   Pur  sii  i  t 


46th  Pur  Sq   (F) 
47th  Pur   Sq   (K) 


(F) 


ir>ti 

14: 

£04 

20; 

175 

17S 

175 

^J 


■^^ 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1037 


Auth       Actual        Over        Siiort 


.,    ..4   ..^    1    th   Vxxr    Jn  (Int.)  -04  1;.?  1? 

Gtii   '-'xxr    '-'4    \l-  t)  i:.7  ICl  <l 

r,/t!i   .^ur    oq    (Int)  li,7 '  irC  2 

•1.:  M.    .', .!•    ..I.    f  ;nt^  If;  ; 


'ase    ar    (;,) 


Total   14th   f'xir    ,;r,  a!:u   ,,heelar    .'ielJ 


i;.7         v/j        13 


14: 


'■I.:  '-  1 


1  "^ 


1038    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


;sr  lDb>i  «.^-- 


3T.<Ei;";rH  -o-;  ••^a^.WxS 


216   oombst   cr?iwr>    (Ions   70   row  pr»38nt)        146 


180 
14.f. 

mainti!inani;o   crews    (less   70   now 
present) 

oor.bat   cr-s  .a  «  5  men  each 

110 

730 

110 

maintonaiico   crowa  ;;   14  men  e«ioh 

1540 

z 

me  iij.n  ',-ombardrit:nt-t-or;'cdo 
r.q'i»^'!rons  f-M  217  ir'jn  eaoh 

434 

5 

air   !»u3f'    squadrons  C-  145  ::ie.i   ea 

ch 

725 

1 

•  IV           ,    or     ;  _ ,     .  •:  n 
) 

L*;-3    .-retien*--   ov   .--        ~:     t-,h 

Total 

155 
210 

^50 
470?, 

881 
3071 

o 


1 


,  V 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE 


1039 


so.inel 

7,];>2 
.■5,  "71 

'    - '  ■ 

0    250 

Total 

r?,5i'3 

Pcr:",tx.»^r  t 

■ob 

U1r.«tion 

T.-f-l 

?>,Z''  ^ 

i.'as 

•1 ,  ?.-'0 

l,;i37 

141 

1,978 

l,o08 

1 ,008 

■>    (Klpapft    j\\\ 

ch) 

1,294 

i,2y4 

Pi-id 
;Fi«l<3 

.Field 


I  -s    ;  ot:;er    i'risj.  is;    -lov;   •■ein', 
>ori:;trncto  j   ■  r   projecteH,  3,218 


3,218 


Grand  Total  \i ,Zm 
('jiffarenoo)  Mousiaf;  to  b*  ;;rovidod      525 


Inolosur*  #3 


IP 


-^:>J 


1040    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

EXHIBIT  NO.  14 


HEADQOARTERS    HAWAHAN    DE?AatMENT  ,: 
OPFJCE  OF  THE  OEPARTMEHT  COMMANOEB 

roRT  SMArTER.  T.  M;  -* 


Subj&ct:     Air  D»fiins«  of  Poari  Bs-riior- 

?oi  Th»  Adjutant  Seaeral ,  feehirigtoa,  0.  C 


1.  RaJoraKCs  ia  Wit«d.  to  ascrat  l«tt«r  froa  the  Mjufcsat  BmmmX 
to  •idadquartera  Hwfti.i«n  Departaect,  aboT©  subject,  dated  T  Fsbruary  1941  j 
fiJe  Mi  3R1  (l-24-4l)M.  There  ar»  inclosed  beyewitb  for  yotar  information 
«opi3s  of  th«  princijile  dirsctives,  orders,  and  ssrtlaatsa  which  hme  feaes 
iasusd,  in  coop«r*tioa  with  th«  local  natred  &ttthoriti88,  to  prorid*  for 
the  joint  d9f«HB«  of  the  Peart  Kao-bor  KaY«l  Basoi  aad  ship*  of  tba  Pacific 
n««t  in  I'jwaiisuts  mtsrs  agaiast  ourpris*  raids  or  aix  attaeks. 

Z,    fcclosurs  1,  JoiBt  l«rtt«r  iWO  -  14tii  KD,  dated  14  y#t»rBary  1941, 
LTitiatad  ths  study  by  joiwt  coiSBoitteae  of  Array  and  Hawy  offtc«r«  of  Ihs 
jftrtt  jjrobleffia  of  tba  <iefoB»«  whicto  were  (se'ntioned  i»  tlie  conreaporidaaca 
batTOSri  tVid  3««ret&rl«9  of  Wjir  and  Kayy,  incl«»«Ki  in  th«  lett«r  referred 
to  Ir.  p«ragr«pli  1  aboTs,  and  also  iecltMed  study  of  additional  problems 
ahich  sar«  raised  by  ildairal  KSsmml,  C<s!ffland»r  in  Chief  "of  the.  f&cifle 
neot.  ■    ■  ' 

3.     iBclosure  2,  Annex  Ho-  VII  to  the  Joiirt  Coastal  Frcaitier  B«f«ri8e 
Pltsn  (HCF-39}   is  a  new  joint  a|;reecant  «ith  the  local  navA  awthoritiea 
.ynich  pertaijis  to  joint  security  aeaanres.     Attention  is  .p«rtic«larly  is* 
vitad  to  Section  It  of  this  docua«nt  'shXeih  relates  to  joint  air  operatioisa. 
This  joint  agresjaaat  eovigrg  the  aajor  .poiats  •sljich nera  studied  fey  the 
ioint"c0i2aiitt«eB  organieed  ±a  inclo.aure  1.     Iiicloaurs  A  to  this  .A^wsx 
Ko.  VII  has  not  yet  oeeu  coc^leted,  however  teafe*  are  no*  being  conducted  , 
to  daterrnine  the  most  effective  aseans  of  joaitive  identification  of 
friesidly  aircraft  and  insure  ita  protection  from  aatiaircraft  artillery 


4.  Inclosure  3,  Joiat  Sgtisiats  KawaiiiiB  Air  Force  and'Pwtrol  Siag 
>0  (N'aTea  Base  Defense  Air  Force)  ia  self  e;g!laKatory  ajid  -sfill  serre  as 
»  basis  of  joint  air  ope"ratio»s  orders  to  be  issued  in  the  "wear  future. 


ia  the  coa- 


of  air  operations,  aircraft  of  one 
rol  of  tho"  other  sonrioe. 


EXHIBITS    OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE 


1041 


1042    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

EXHIBIT  NO.  15 


t^^ 


TELEGRAM  RECEIVED 


From 


ID 

This  .tEltgram  oust  be 
olOBcly  paraphrased  be- 
fore being  comaiunioated 
to  ,inyone,      (D) 


eccretnry  of  State, 
IBaehlngton, 


Tokyo 

Dated  January  27,  1941 

Beo'd,  6;38  a.m. 


.-4t tU 


125,  January  27,  R  p.m. 

Hy  Peruvian  Oolleogue    told  a  mrisber  of  my 
8t'->Jff  thn.t  he  hid  heard  from  meuiy  sources  in- 
cluding a  Japancne   eource   that   the    JaP'-^iicse 
military  forces  planned,    in  the   event  of  trouble 
with  the  Itoitcd  States,   to  attempt   a  surprise 
attack  on  Pcaxl  Harbor  using  '>J.l  of  their  rnilitary 
facilities.      He  added  that  although  the   project 
crcmrd  fantactic   the   fact   that  he   had  heard  it 
from  nany  sources  piomptcd  him  to  i>aee  on  the 
information. 

GREW. 


CO 


^1 


..sk'^'!:  »•'  itis- 


EXHIBITS    OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  1043 


^  ^,RA..i:  g  J.  OJl 


Althosg^  th«  folXo«laf  rv^ort  s««s»4  to  th«  ftMYl^n 

p*«t«4  It  to  •  »iwib«r  of  nj  tt^ff  b*o«s««  h*  h«a  h»ard 
It  tnm  so  aany  4iff«r»at  tourevs,    iReludULR^  »  J«pan«a« 
ItforMUlt.     Th.*  r*port  vaa  to  th«  efftot   thnt  ah^uld 
*tr««bl«*  bi>««lc  out  b«t«««n  J«p*n  and  th*  Col  tad  Stataa 
tha  «7ap«iiaaa  Intandad  to  aaJca  *  aurprlaa  cttaok  on  ?aarl 
K«rb«r.  aa  aaaaa.     Thay  would  aaploy  In  thia  attacks  thair 
•atiro  ailitarjr  acittlyaiaitt. 


l/^r 


79716  O — 46 — pt.  14 10 


1044    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

"ffice   of   the    "ihifef   of   }^r^vrl    Oofrr-tinns 

Seri  Tl   ■■o.    og'^ie 

T'eb,    1,    1941 
C"!"TT:'"^'""T  'T.  10465 


FroTi:  Chi-f    :^f    ■"  ,v  1.    ^'y.c- r: '.  iGt:s 

To:  C.:--:;'V  :--r- :--:;.  ^  ■_*■,      •- -i  f  ic  TL^at 

1.  'hrj   I'c  11  o'.'.  i  r --^    Ir    f  oi-.v-r^i/d    for   your   ir.fornntion. 

'•p.'i.r   Cit-.'    of   i:"   J-2"U''ry   tl:-i      r-.^ri^TP      nb-^ssniior   -a   Tokyo 
t.   '     -r    ■  ;--,i    'Aie   St-te    1  r  r-^rt-^:,.  nt    to    the    followintr   effect: 


"T:ie   ^ 

-.:-hor   of 

n-.y    St-: 

■ ;  r  •:; .  s  , 

ircluc. 

evtnt 

of   tro 

■  tvi    Status 

.^nd    .T"> 

surnrisc 

,  +  .  .   ,  > 

•if    i  : 

;;•    iT'.rl    hnrhcr   : 

,•  i  +.  1 

■'  1 1    of    th>, ir 

,-  ^.T-t  :',T^ 

;    M'pl -vinff    -11    0- 

f    "^  ''i 

;  r    L  c-iip";f:nt . 

7 hi;    ~':-: 

ru\-i  ■  ; 

'!l  ::i;- -'jp   cone;  "■ 

ru-'iCrF 

f  •':::*  ■''  L^ 

•■    V    r'h.vUss   h. 

-■■i    thon-  of 

suf  f ;  :■- 

■■-■',  ; 

r:  r.rt.-.r;^o    to    cci.' 

7  J  y     I 

', ;  s    information 

to    -     > 

,. 

"f    ~y    st-ff." 

~> 

iv-   Plvision 

- 

■  -r  1  li^-,!,-.^s   r)l3i 

cre'^eno'"'   ' 

•n    t.h-: 

'^•:,    Tur':Ors.    " 

•   ,    ■'  ■■,^'  '^     -ri    know: 

rep^;r ' ' 

rnv-a 

ImirAr.^-x.i..    . 

.-...-,    -  ■  .     A ..    -  ;.■     : 

.  .-'i  .-.  , 

■  ^  -      ^  y  I'  ^  :  -  ■  , 

Oi-lf^-F  .rules    J-n-T., 

py    fiireotiori 

Cp- 16 -]■'-::      ~:--^:-     i    .'[,.    .31,1941 

n  ■  ■   T  i  ■:; ut .    Cono  r  .    ;, .  H . "  'cCc  1  luni 
Tyned   Vv   ■'.  ..hT--- 

CC    -   Oc.Ti  14         10466 

(30)    .•,16-3/iT3'' 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE 


1045 


//i- 


,'i 


>.<.    ...^,,^''L.   /-     -l^i^^    ■  t.Vi 


TELEGRAM  RECEIVED 


BAS  

Thle   t'-l^gram  must  b"" 
clos'"ly  p^raphrasfid  b""- 
forc   b-lng  communicated 
to  anyonr,      (SC) 


-Tokyo 


Dated  Nov^ober   3,    1941 
FROM 

""Rec'd     6:06  a.m. 


Srcrrtsry   of  Staf,  ?    •    '    '      ' 

'A-aehington, 

/   , 
1736,    Nov-mbrr   3,    5  p.m.      (SECTION  %W.) 

STRICTLY  CONFID'%NTIAL  FOR  TH^    S^CR'^TARY  A«p 

UKD^R  S'^CP'^TARY  ONLY. 

One.      I   fl^-Kraphra   t^xtually   on  Nov^mbTr  1 
(pleas'-    SC"   "vijibaesy' s   1729^   Nov-ab^r  1,    4  p.m.) 
a  translation  of   th':   Iradlng  article    in  that  morning's 
NICKI   NICHI  which  under  th«-   banner  headline    "Empire 
approach"^ 8   Its  greatest  crlele"    pr'^ceded   a  New  York 
d'-spatch  summarizing  a   etafment   reportedly  given 
to  the  NTW  YORK  TIMES  by  the  Japanese  E'mbaBfly  at 
Washington  with  regard   to  the   need  for  putting  a 
stop  to  the   economic  ws*  between  the  Onlted  States 
and  Japan,     That  article  and  the  paper's  editorial 
rlao  telegraphed  textually  (Embassy' s  173,  NoTcmber 
1,  7  P.O.)   closely  reflect  the   ataosphTC  now  pre- 
vailing In  this  country  as  we    sens'-   It. 

Two,     There  Is  nothing  to  add  to  my  snalyeea 
as  pr^'sent'^d  in  the   telegraais  over  the  past  several     ^ 
•ontha  of  the  factors  which  affect  Japan'*  pollcyj 


C 


t 

s 


1046    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


-2-  #1736,  NovrmbTr  3,  3  p.m.  (SCCTION  ONE)  fro»  Tokyo, 

nor  db  I  ezK   nerd  for  dubetantlally  r*-vl8lng  thEm, 
I  b^'llrvc  that  Japan's  position  can  conclusively 
be  *:8tlni«t€:d  by  applying, 

GR«:W 
HSM 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE 


TELEGRAM  RECEIVED 


1047 


F€V  Tokyo 

This    telegram  must   be • 

clo3Ely  paraphrased  be-        FROfjIjtEd  NovE-iber  3,    1941 

fore   being   COTtrunlcat Ed 

to  anyone.      (3^)  Rcc'd  10:29   a.m. 

Secretary   of  Stote, 

Vfashlngton.  f 

1736,    November  3,    3   p.n.,    (SECTION  T*!C) 
to  the    situation  ^vhich  now   see*",    to  be   sh-^.plng  up 
cert-^, In   consider". t Ions    na    follows: 

(n)    Japan  cannot    dlssoclntc    either   herself    or 
the   China    conflict    from   the    Exxropean  vrir   ■■  nd    its 
fluctuations . 

(b)    Hnllke    public    opinion    In    the    denocr-  r,i  e  3 
where    there    Exist-'    ■     '\r^  .■  :zrizo\x;^   ■'^cdy    oV    principles 
directin;-;    or   inflxiE-.c  ■^  "j     ''-r'^:..        :     llclc3    ■  nd   "'riere 
dirfEren^r.;:     .  -    o- :  -     •        -■     ■      r^     Ukrly    * -^      v'^r-E 

ciplen    puMic    opi  nl--:    In    /■  p'  -    ••■.trt.    poll^lo'I 
^houf/ht    •'■.■r'  i3    :■  i^r—l'-v-    ^o    liber-lisr    ia 

.;    V    --'  /.■•-.■  ]^y     ^'       ■.•     --np     -'ven    tire    only 

^'  ^t    ::^;hfri    r '^    Uiou-ht    predonln    •(.'    '.hl'^h    is 
br'  -p  ■  '     "'     '  ■  ■:    '     y       p     the    inpi.ct    of    cor.c'.  ' 
•.■.■!    event,'    r-ntnide    the  oountr".      T*    '■';-::    the    i  -•- 

■  'er-i^in   vi^'or'   ,         •  •   .vn    f/'n'-cpe 

p  .' '  '         1  oh  brc ' :    '  *     '  '     "    ■      ■  •-•--■■■ 


1048    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


1756,    !TcvE-;^'i:r       . 

ele-Ents ;    *.}.f:    :     1  ;.. 

thereby   cre-itln^;    ioubl 
tc:ry    of    GEr-ony, 


RR 


GRET-v 


EXHIBITS    OF    JOINT    COMMITTEE  1049 

'I 

TELEGRAM  RECEIVED 


Tv'L 


Russia , 


Ax* 


f  crv;-:.r  :  . 


FROM 


China,  re?  ....  px^^cA.    I 

f.vrcr.   It       .ttE'npt  shr  .   .  "  .      if  Oer- 
"T  :  -  »  1  lock 

*.f  3LE  -.  fin--:  :         .  nt  of  .' 

"ht   Axis. 

T' .  '"r  c'H''  Ti'l   by  inanv  of  our 

leading  econor;!;:'  ion  -.nd  ever. r.u'xl 

Exhaustion  of  econo-  ;ncir:l  rcsour'- es 

would 


1050    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOJNT    COMMITTEE  1051 

TELEGRAM  RECEIVED 


1052    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


TELEGRAM  RECEIVED 


=1'   ""i-.'-'  ■■       From 

for-     t^-i 

to    ^'nvor;    .       ,  „ .  .  .-Ti 


< 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1053 


1054    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


.v^- 


t,    November  3,    3  p.m.    (S'^CTICN   SIX) 
uncertain  J^ypothcsiP  upon  which   to  brnc   the  con- 
sldtrcd  policy   «  nd  wt; -Jtrts   of   tt  e    United   Stftes, 
CKir  own  view    is    ttct  avch  r   course    If   tr  i<en  would 
not    (repe.'t  not)   cvrrt  wtr.J   Ncvcrthtle  -s   bcth 
Views   ore   no  I'orc  thtn  opinion,    nr.d    It  Is   thrrrforc 
our  bellrr    tix  t    it    wculd    br   corit»ry    to    •>uf   m  tU'.rl 
intcresta    tc   pcstulrtc    tic  correctncia   of    eifhrr 
otlnlon   rnd    to   rr'rct    thereon   r    dtfJnitlvr    pol'.t-y . 
To  clo    30  woiOii    be    to  pi-t-    the  cert   bcforr    tie   hfr.ir. 
The   r.rlr;t.ry  po\i.t   fur  dcf.ision  wor.ld    f  pi  r.- r'   tn    ii.- 
vclvr    the   I'u  rati  -n   r  .-.    to  wnet'irr   <  nr   n!  Uir,..  1    nei  'i, 
i-icllcJca   :  ncl    objective:;    jualily   «•  r   wltli   Jr,;<-!i    ii. 
tir    cvnt    tlj  t  d-.  pi-"-':  cy,    on    iirv.\.    ll'-.t    f.l    p.-  ti    i- 
1   nt:i'r.n-^t,,  3lc<  hi   ftil,    fir   >  nly    on    t.t.r    1      -it^    .t 


ch  (ircUilf  ^    ci  ■■ 

■  r-  ,^     i  1  vr;-l  f:i    .■; 


1^1 


dr^Inl  nt  f^ 


r     r-.i  )     v; 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  1055 


-«-   <^*1"37,    Novrr-brr    ?>,    3    p.-n.    Tn  n-    T^  kyo 

tc   be    irrcvccfblE,    )\t..i    -Irc'dy    brrn    '"    "  '        irb-  tr  i 
/:  nd    rdoj!trd,    for   the    n.-nnn    .' r  •     r\nui'.!        i      ■', 
FIVE.       llr.:  -u-    vf:  lizf    Ih;  t     i  :,     -  ...^.■;  :    ; 

tciffl.    v;;  t  h    t  :  n    ..fl'  '  .  ru  n  tT"    I'     -  '  ,<     t  •  .         :.I 
tionr.     tbri-f'-n   •  rri     tJ^rt    it    in    'cf    :  >■ 
tt^    lr,}ply     M  •  r 


1056    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

TELjEGRAM  RECEIVEP 


FU'OM 


el;--''.  .        '        ■  .  . 

>■)'■■■■ 


sulcl-al    c  wU.h    thr    Unlf^d    Stntr^:, 

8nr.l*:y    w  -ulu     ilctnt'-  v  n.t ,     I 

rsr    ?"nli,y    cannot    bi^'    "■.'"aeur'^d    by    cur   own 

logic.      Wc    n'^F'    not   br    ov^  r-c  )nc'^rntd    by    liF    pr^  pr  ^^t 

"bKllicQ^F.    tor.r    and    subst.- ncf    :if   th.r    JapRn^pt    jrrse 

which  has   nttackrd    th"::   Unltcti    St'tCF/.n   r'^curr^nt   wnvca 

of   Ir.'  urlng   the   past    ecvrr'^l   yf-ira,    but   it   would       I 

be    shortelghtec'.    to   undf r'^stlmp t*^    Japan's   obvioup   ■ 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1057 


-2-    *^1V/-  ,    .     ■.  '    -S     '    p.n:..    k-     •  3"VEN)    from   Tokyo 

■'rations    for   a   prorr^-      •  •  ■ -■ 

ait '!'r. '■>!,<.  vr    croP'r'fis  f '>"'  ,         *.   would   hr. 

siTdlarly    shortslr-  ' 

llrf    thfn    th'-sr    rT"-i  :*ratlor.t:  -  r^  ^y    1 - 

of    spb'^r   rpttline-  th^    rxcl'JFlvr    pur 
Qoral    support    to   Jrrpn's  "■'"psui-f"    iliplomacy, 

Japan's   resort    t'^    ."Fa=;-ur="s   w,  war  with    thr 

Unlt^"!;!   Statf^s   In'vltably  nay   ccr-'X    witn   dramatic   and 
dang'^rvOus    suddgrrnr  ^f, 

{~ND   OF   MaSSAC^)  ^ 


CSB 


1058    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


NOV  18  1941 


.¥>' 


9his  tdegrea  mmt  be 


„       _       _  Tokyo  ^fejWMfgJ^^  "P^ 

to  nayom.  isS;  ||„n  a,g,  p,^ 


Stortttay  ot  ftlM 
>fftahlngton. 


NOV  1  8  1941 


1941 


1814,  Horeabcr  17,  8  p.«i« 

OMDEP.  KCBETAKSr  OHM. 

RcfErcnor  ecibass7*ii  I'Sa,  NoTEaber  3,  3  p.m., 
Ir.Bt  eentcnoc. 

In  cmphaBiting  need  for  guarding  againgt 
sudden  nllltary  or  nnval  ftctlona  by  Ji^nn  in 
nrcr.s  not  nt  prcocnt  involved  in  the  China  oon- 
fllct,  I  «U3  taking  into  fioccunt  ns  r.  probability 
that  the  Japancac  would  esqploit  nil  nvnllnble 
tr.cticnl  advanttigtc,   including  these  of  initia- 
tive ".nd  Guxprl«c,     It  it  inportant,  hovevcr, 
that  our  Oovcmncnt  not  (repeat  not)  place  upon 
uo,    Including  the  nllitnry  and  naval  attaches, 
•2ftjir  rcspcnsibllity  for  giving  prior  warning. 
The  c-;ntrrl  in  Japan  ovtr  nilitary  Inf-rnntlon, 
b.-th  -irlnr.ry  and  eEcondary  is   extrenaely  efftrctlve, 
-n'   WE    ;-Lnvc   nc  expectation  that   any   advance   In- 
fcrr..ntlon  w:uld  be  obtained  cither  through  the 


EXHIBITS    OF    JOINT    COMMITTEE  1059 

-2-  #1814,   NovEmbEr  17,  8  p.m.,  from  Tokyo 

przsa'  tfT.trom  personal  contaotn  with  Japanese; 
the  few  AraErlcans  lEft  in  Japan    arE  mostly  con- 
cEntratEd  In  Tokyo,   Yokohama  and  KobE,   and  arE 
m  no  position  to   obsei^E  military  taovEmEntef 
and  thE  absEncE   of  AraErican  r.nd  other  forEign 
vEssEls  in  adJacEnt  waters  almost  assurEs  to  thE 
JnpnnEsE   the  ability  to  dEspntch  troop  trans- 
ports in  various  dirEctions  without   foreign 
obsErvntion,       RecEnt  rEports   from  our  consuls 
at  Taihoku  and  at   Harbin  DOint   to  Japnnese 
trcop   concEntrations   in  both  Taiwan  nnd  Man- 
churia,   and  rdl.  other  available    ir-   '         '  ons 
are  that   einc'    the   gEnernl  mobilization  of 
July  Irst,    troop  ^Itlons  have  brren  m.^de 

to   enable   new  opErr.ticni.    to  'oe    c.nrrled   out    on 
the   PhortEst  poGC-lble  notl-ce   In  either   Siberln. 
or  the    southwest   Prvclflc   cr  th, 

We   fully   reaJ-ize  thnt   pu^:,iol:/   our  ":ost 
icr-cvtnnt    duty   -t    this   time    lo    to  vntch   for 
rtr.-.onltory   inai cations  ■  'v' 

•      ^lons  which' ml  fijht  be   f  ..  I'Vjicr., . 


79716  O— 46 — pt.  14 11 


1060    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


~5—     #1814,    i'^ovE;;r.c cr  1'',    '1    ■-  ♦  n,  ,■   fror.  Tckvc 
field   of   -  •    Men   is 


:'orE,    c\d\'i2Z    th:^t    our    T/:y/zrn- 
from   ■'■  ""   cQUti  -s 


'."Die    to  glvt 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1061 

EXHIBIT  NO.  16 

Secret  War  and  Navy  Department, 

Serial  0130012  Washington,  November  5,  1941. 

Memorandum  for  the  President: 
Subject :  Estimate  Concerning  Far  Eastern  Situation. 

The  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  and  the  Chief  of  Staff  have  reexamined  the 
military  situation  in  the  Far  East,  particularly  in  the  light  of  messages  recently 
received  from  the  American  Ambassador  to  Chungking,  the  Magruder  Mission,  and 
the  United  States  Naval  Attache.  These  despatches  have  indicated  it  to  be  Chiang 
Kai-Shek's  belief  that  a  Japanese  attack  on  Kunming  is  imminent,  and  that 
military  support  from  outside  sources,  particularly  by  the  use  of  United  States 
and  British  air  units,  is  the  sole  hope  for  defeat  of  this  threat.  The  Secretary 
of  State  has  requested  advice  as  to  the  attitude  which  this  Government  should 
take  toward  a  Japanese  offensive  against  Kunming  and  the  Burma  Road. 

There  is  iittle  doubt  that  a  successful  Japanese  offensive  against  the  Burma 
Road  would  be  a  very  severe  blow  to  the  Chinese  Central  Government.  The 
result  might  even  be  the  collapse  of  further  effective  military  resistance  by  that 
Grovernment,  and  thus  the  liquidation  by  Japan  of  the  "China  incident".  If 
use  of  the  Burma  Road  is  lost,  United  States  and  British  Commonwealth  aid  to 
China  will  be  seriously  curtailed  for  some  months.  If  resistance  by  the  Chinese 
Central  Government  ceases,  the  need  for  Japanese  troops  in  China  will  be 
reduced.  These  troops  can  then  be  employed  elsewhere,  after  the  lapse  of  time 
suflScient  to  permit  their  withdrawal. 

Concentration  of  Japanese  troops  for  the  contemplated  oflCensive,  based  in 
northern  Indo-China,  cannot  be  completed  in  less  than  about  two  months,  although 
initial  offensive  operations  might  be  undertaken  before  that  time.  The  advance 
toward  Kunming  over  nearly  three  hundred  miles  of  rough  country,  with  poor 
communications,  will  be  extremely  diflBcult.  The  maintenance  of  supply  lines  will 
not  be-easy.  The  Chinese,  on  favorable  defense  terrain,  would  have  a  good  chance 
of  defeating  this  offensive  by  the  use  of  ground  troops  alone,  provide^  those  troops 
are  adequate  in  quality  and  numbers. 

The  question  that  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  and  the  Chief  of  Staff  have 
taken  under  consideration  is  whether  or  not  the  United  States  is  justified  in 
undertaking  offensive  military  operations  with  U.  S.  forces  against  Japan,  to  pre- 
vent her  from  severing  the  Burma  Road.  They  consider  that  such  operations, 
however  well-disguised,  would  lead  to  war. 

At  the  present  time  the  United  States  Fleet  in  the  Pacific  is  inferior  to  the 
Japanese  Fleet  and  cannot  undertake  an  unlimited  strategic  offensive  in  the 
Western  Pacific.  In  order  to  be  able  to  do  so,  it  would  have  to  be  strengthened  by 
withdrawing  all  ^  naval  vessels  from  the  Atlantic  except  those  assigned  to  local 
defense  forces.  An  unlimited  offensive  by  the  Pacific  Fleet  would  require  tre- 
mendous merchant  tonnage,  which  could  only  be  withdrawn  from  services  now 
considered  essential.  The  result  of  withdrawals  from  the  Atlantic  of  naval  and 
merchant  strength  might  well  cause  the  United  Kingdom  to" lose  the  Battle  of  the 
Atlantic  in  the  near  future. 

The  only  existing  ^  plans  for  war  against  Japan  in  the  Far  East  are  to  conduct 
defensive  war,  in  cooperation  with  the  British  and  Dutch,  for  the  defense  of  the 
Philippines  and  the  British  and  Dutch  East  Indies.  The  Philippines  are  now 
being  reinforced.  The  present  combined  naval,  air,  and  ground  forces  will  make 
attack  on  the  islands  a  hazardous  undertaking.  By  about  the  middle  of  December, 
1941,  United  States  air  and  submarine  sti'ength  in  the  Philippines  will  have  become 
a  positive  threat  to  any  Japanese  operations  south  of  Formosa.  The  U.  S.  Army 
air  forces  in  the  Philippines  will  have  reached  the  projected  strength  by  February 
or  March,  1942.  The  potency  of  this  threat  will  have  then  increased  to  a  point 
where  it  might  well  be  a  deciding  factor  in  deterring  Japan  in  operations  in  the 
areas  south  and  west  of  the  Philippines.  By  this  time,  additional  British  naval 
and  air  reinforcements  to  Singapore  will  have  arrived.  The  general  defensive 
strength  of  the  entire  southern  area  against  possible  Japanese  operations  will 
then  have  reached  impressive  proportions. 

Until  such  time  as  the  Burma  Road  is  closed,  aid  can  be  extended  to  Chiang- 
Kai-Shek  by  measures  which  probably  will  not  result  in  war  with  Japan.  These 
measures  ai'e :  continuation  of  economic  pressure  against  Japan,  supplying  increas- 


1  Preceded  by  handwritten  Insertion  "practically". 

*Two  preceding  words  struck  out,  and  handwritten  word  "current"  sabatituted. 


1062    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

ing  amounts  of  munitions  under  the  L^nd-Lease,  and  continuation  and  acceleration 
of  aid  to  the  American  Volunteer  Group. 

The  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  and  the  Chief  of  Staff  are  in  accord  in  the 
following  conclusions : 

(a)  The  basic  military  policies  and  strategy  agreed  to  in  the  United  States- 
British  Stalf  conversations  remain  sound.  The  primary  objective  of  the  two 
nations  is  the  defeat  of  Germany.  If  Japan  be  defeated  and  Germany  remain 
undefeated,  decision  will  still  have  not  been  reached.  In  any  case,  an  unlimited 
offensive  war  should  not  be  undertaken  against  Japan,  since  such  a  war  would 
greatly  weaken  the  combined  effort  in  the  Atlantic  against  Germany,  the  most 
dangerous  enemy. 

(b)  War  between  the  United  States  and  Japan  should  be  avoided  while  building 
up  defensive  forces  in  the  Far  East,  until  such  time  as  Japan  attacks  or  directly 
threatens  territories  whose  security  to  the  United  States  is  of  very  great  im- 
portance. Military  action  against  Japan  should  be  undertaken  only  in  one  or 
more  of  the  following  contingencies : 

(1)  A  direct  act  of  war  by  Japanese  armed  forces  against  the  territory  or 
mandated  territory  of  the  United  States,  the  British  Commonwealth,  or  the 
Netherlands  East  Indies ; 

(2)  The  movement  of  Japanese  forces  into  Thailand  to  the  west  of  100° 
East  or  South  of  10°  North ;  or  into  Portuguese  Timor,  New  Caledonia,  or  the 
Loyalty  Islands. 

(c)  If  war  with  Japan  can  not  be  avoided,  it  should  follow  the  strategic  lines 
of  existing  war  plans ;  i.  e.,  military  operations  should  be  primarily  defensive, 
with  the  object  of  liolding  territory,  and  weakening  Japan's  economic  position. 

(d)  Considering  world  strategy,  a  Japanese  advance  against  Kunming,  into 
Thailand  except  as  previously  indicated,  or  an  attack  on  Russia,  would  not 
justify  intervention  by  the  United  States  against  Japan. 

(e)  All  possible  aid  short  of  actual  war  against  Japan  should  be  extended  to 
the  Chinese  Central  Government. 

(f )  In  case  it  is  decided  to  undertake  war  against  Japan,  complete  coordinated 
action  in  the  diplomatic,  economic,  and  military  fields,  should  be  undertaken  in 
common  by  the  United  States,  the  British  Commonwealth,  and  tlie  Netherlands 
East  Indies. 

The  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  and  the  Chief  of  Staff  recommend  that  the 
United  States  policy  in  the  Far  East  be  based  on  the  above  conclusions. 

Specifically,  they  recommend : 

That  the  dispatch  of  United  States  armed  forces  for  intervention  against 
Japan  in  China  be  disapproved. 

That  material  aid  to  China  be  accelerated  consonant  with  the  needs  of  Russia, 
Great  Britain,  and  our  own  forces. 

That  aid  to  the  American  Volunteer  Group  be  continued  and  accelerated  to 
the  maximum  practicable  extent. 

That  no  ultimatum  be  delivered  to  Japan. 


Chief  of  Staff.  Chief  of  Naval  Operations. 

The  Joint  Boaed 
washington 

Secret 

Minutes  of  Meeting,  Novembeb  3,  1941 

At  the  call  of  the  Senior  Member,  the  weekly  naeeting  scheduled  for  November 
5,  1941,  was  held  today  in  Room  2003,  Munitions  Building.  The  meeting  was 
called  to  order  at  3 :  40  p.  m. 

Present:  Admiral  H.  R.  Stark,  U.  S.  N.,  Chief  of  Naval  Operations,  Presiding; 
General  G.  C.  Marshall,  U.  S.  A.,  Chief  of  Staff ;  Rear  Admiral  R.  E.  Ingersoll, 
U.  S.  N.,  Assistant  Chief  of  Naval  Operations ;  Major  General  William  Bryden, 
U.  S.  A.,  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff;  Major  General  H.  H.  Arnold,  U.  S.  A.,  Deputy 
Ch'ef  of  Staff  for  Air;  Rear  Admiral  J.  H.  Towers,  U.  S.  N.,  Chief  of  the  Bureau 
of  Aeronautics ;  Brigadier  General  L.  T.  Gerow,  U.  S.  A.,  Acting  Assistant  Chief 
of  Staff,  War  Plans  Division ;  Captain  O.  M.  Read,  U.  S.  N.,  War  Plans  Division, 
Office  of  Naval  Ojierations,  in  absence  of  Rear  Admiral  R.  K.  Turner  ;  and  Colonel 
W.  P.  Scobey,  U.  S.  A.,  Secretary. 


EXHIBITS  OP  JOINT   COMMITTEE  1063 

Additional  Officers  Present:  Major  General  R.  C.  Moore,  U.  S.  A.,  Deputy  Chief 
of  StafiE;  Colonel  C.  W.  Bundy,  U.  S.  A.,  War  Plans  Division,  War  Department 
General  Staff;  Captain  R.  E.  gjhuirmann,  U.  S.  N.,  Office  of  Naval  Operations; 
Commander  F.  P.  Sherman,  U.  S.  N.,  Office  of  Naval  Operations ;  and  Lieutenant 
Commander  A.  H.  McCoUum,  U.  S.  N.,  Office  of  Naval  Intelligence. 

The  Presiding  Officer  directed  the  minutes  of  the  meeting  of  October  22,  would 
stand  approved  unless  there  were  objections.     The  minutes  were  approved. 

The  Secretary  then  announced  the  agenda  for  the  meeting  as  follows : 

Serial  693 — Delivery  of  Aircraft  to  Great  Britain. 

Serial  732 — Revision  of  Paragraph  109,  "Joint  Action  of  the  Army  and  the 
Navy."     Communications  between  Ship  and  Shore. 

Serial  665-11 — Allocation  of  Mechanical  Time  Fuze  M43A2  to  the  Army  and 
the  Navy. 

Serial  725 — Coordination  of  Local  Defense  Measures  in  Bermuda  and  the 
West  Indian  Islands  where  United  Sates  Ba.ses  are  being  Established. — Re- 
vision requested  by  the  British. 

Discussion — Action  of  the  United  States  in  the  Far  East  in  support  of  China. 

Discussion — Alternate  Route  via  Canton  Island  for  movement  of  airplanes  to 
the  Far  East. 

Action  taken  on  the  several  subjects  was  as  follows : 

Serial  693— Delivery  of  Aircraft  to  Great  Britain.  Following  a  discussion  of 
this  subject,  during  which  General  Arnold  stated  that  the  development  of  air- 
plane ferrying  facilities  to  the  British  Isles  was  provided  for  in  Serials  683-1  and 
723.  the  Board  approved  the  Joint  Planning  Committee  report  of  October  23, 
1941,  and  directed  that  the  subject  be  stricken  from  the  calendar. 

Serial  732 — Revision  of  Paragraph  109,  "Joint  Action  of  the  Army  and  the 
Navy.    The  Joint  Planning  Committee  report  was  approved. 

Serial  665-11 — Allocation  of  Mpchanical  Time  Fuze  M43A2  to  the  Army  and 
the  Navy.  The  Joint  Planning  Committee  report  recommendation  of  October 
30,  1941,  was  accepted  and  the  Committee  of  Experts'  report  was  approved. 

Serial  72.5 — Coordination  of  Local  Defense  Measures  in  Bermuda  and  the 
West  Indian  Islands  where  United  States  Bases  are  being  established.  The 
Secretary  announced  that  the  Joint  Planning  Connnittee  report  before  the 
Board,  recommended  certain  revisions  in  the  United  States — United  Kingdom 
initial  agreement,  which  was  approved  by  The  Joint  Board  on  September  19, 
1941;  and  that  the  revisions  now  requested  by  the  British  had  been  accepted  by 
the  United  States  representatives.  Following  a  properly  seconded  motion,  the 
Board  voted  to  approve  the  Joint  Planning  Committee  report  of  O^'tober  29.  1941. 

Action  of  the  United  States  in  the  Far  East  in  Support  of  China — At  the 
request  of  Admiral  Stark,  Captain  Schuirmann  gave  a  statement  of  the  action 
taken  at  the  State  Department  meeting  on  Saturday  morning,  November  1,  at 
which  a  discussion  was  held  on  the  Far  Eastern  situation.  Captain  Schuirmann 
states  that  the  meeting  was  occasioned  by  messages  from  Chiang  Kai-Shek  and 
General  Magruder,  urging  the  United  States  to  warn  Japan  against  making  an 
attack  on  China  through  Yunnan  and  suggesting  that  the  United  States  urge 
Great  Britain  to  support  more  fully  opposition  to  Japan.  He  pointed  out  that 
on  August  17,  following  the  President's  return  from  the  meeting  at  sea  with 
Mr.  Churchill,  the  President  had  issued  an  ultimatum  to  Japan  that  it  would 
be  neressary  for  the  United  States  to  take  action  in  case  of  further  Japanese 
aggression.  He  further  stated  that  Mr.  Hull  was  of  the  opinion  that  there  was 
no  use  to  issue  any  additional  warnings  to  Japan  if  we  can't  back  them  up,  and 
he  desired  to  know  if  the  military  authorities  would  be  prepared  to  support 
further  warnings  by  the  State  Department.  A  second  meeting  was  held  at  the 
State  Department  on  Sunday,  November  2,  at  which  time  it  was  proposed  that 
the  British  should  send  some  planes  to  Thailand  and  that  Japan  should  be  warned 
against  movement  into  Siberia. 

Following  Captain  Schuirmann's  presentation.  Admiral  Stark  read  a  Navy 
Department  estimate  of  the  recent  dispatches  received  from  Chungking.  Admiral 
Ingersoll,  gave  his  personal  review  of  the  situation.  A  summary  of  this  revie'w 
was  that : 

.  a.  The  decision  on  the  Far  Eastern  situation,  made  several  months  ago,  is  to 
make  the  major  effort  in  the  Atlantic,  and  if  forced  to  fight  in  the  Pacific,  to 
engage  in  a  limited  offensive  effort.  This  policy  was  stated  in  the  U.S. -British 
Staff  Conversations  Report  ABC-1. 

6.  A  major  war  effort  in  the  Pacific  would  require  an  enormous  amount  of 
shipping,  which  would  have  to  come  from  the  Atlantic  and  other  essential  areas. 


1064    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

c.  A  U.  S.  war  in  the  Pacific  would  materially  afiEect  United  States  aid  to 
England. 

d.  The  requirements  in  tankers  alone  for  support  of  a  Pacific  war  would 
create  a  serious  oil  shortage  in  this  country,  and  the  United  States  flset  cannot 
be  supported  in  the  Pacific  without  auxiliary  shipping  and  adequate  supplies. 

e.  The  shortest  line  of  communication  is  flanked  by  Mandated  Islanus,  and  is 
vulnerable  to  Japanese  attack.  Two  other  routes  are  available  for  communica- 
tions to  the  Far  Eastern  Theater :  one  via  Australia ;  the  other  via  Cape  of 
Good  Hope. 

f.  Assuming  that  the  fleet  could  be  moved  to  the  Far  East,  no  repair  facilities 
are  available  at  either  Manila  or  Singapore;  while  there  are  docks,  nevertheless 
the  necessary  machinery  and  facilities  for  making  repairs  are  not  present. 

g.  Manila  is  not  as  yet  a  secure  base  for  the  Fleet  due  to  the  lack  of  adequate 
antiaircraft  protection  for  the  anchorage. 

This  review  pointed  out  that  Japan  is  capable  of  launching  an  attack  in  five 
directions;  viz.,  against  Russia,  the  Philippines,  into  Yunnan,  Thailand  and 
against  Malaya.  Considering  that  Japan  might  initiate  one  or  more  of  these 
five  operations.  United  States'  action  should  be:  In  case  of  Japanese  atttack 
against  either  the  Philippines  or  British  and  Dutch  positions  the  United  States 
should  resist  the  attack.  In  case  of  Japanese  attack  against  Siberia,  Thailand 
or  China  through  Yunnan  the  United  States  should  not  declare  war.  The  study 
concludes  that  the  United  States  should  defer  offensive  action  in  the  Far  East 
until  the  augmentation  of  United  States  military  strength  in  the  Philippines, 
particularly  as  to  the  increase  in  submarines  and  army  forces,  becomes  available. 

Discussing  the  situation  Admiral  Ingersoll  pointed  out  that  the  fleet  strength 
at  the  present  time  is  seriously  handicapped  by  the  absence  of  certain  naval  units 
of  major  category  which  are  in  the  repair  yards,  and  it  was  felt  that  the  present 
moment  was  not  the  opportune  time  to  get  brash.  Explaining  further  the  State 
Department  conferences.  Captain  Schuirmann  stated  that  the  State  Department 
did  not  feel  that  it  was  necessary  for  the  United  States  to  take  immediate  action, 
even  if  stern  warnings  should  be  issued.  In  this  connection,  he  read  Mr.  Horn- 
beck's  statement.  Admiral  Ingersoll  felt  that  the  State  Department  was  under 
the  impression  that  Japan  could  be  defeated  in  military  action  in  a  few  weeks. 

General  Marshall  felt  that  the  main  involvement  in  the  Far  East  would  be 
Naval  and  that  under  this  assumption,  due  consideration  should  be  given  to  the 
fact  that  the  Navy  was  now  fighting  a  battle  in  the  Atlantic.  It  was  his  informa- 
tion that  the  Japanese  authorities  had  not  as  yet  determined  the  action  to  be  taken 
under  the  present  situation.  The  information  which  he  had  received  indicated 
that  the  Jaj-anese  authorities  might  be  expected  to  decide  upon  the  national-  policy 
by  November  5.  He  then  read  General  Gerow's  analysis  of  the  strength  of  the 
United  States  forces  in  the  Far  East  and  emphasized  the  danger  of  moving  Army 
AJr  Forces  away  from  their  present  station  in  the  Philippines.  It  was  his  belief 
that  as  long  as  the  augmented  Army  Air  Force  remained  in  the  Philippines,  Japa- 
nese action  against  the  Philippines  or  towards  the  south  would  be  a  very  hazard- 
ous operation.  It  was  his  belief  that  by  the  middle  of  December,  the  Army  Forces 
in  the  Philippines  would  be  of  impressive  strength,  and  this  in  itself  would  have  a 
deterrent  effect  on  Japanese  operations. 

Admiral  Ingersoll  gave  a  summary  of  naval  reinforcements  scheduled  for 
the  Philippines.  A  stated  number  of  submarine  units  en  route  to  tbe  Philippines 
were  now  in  Guam.  Other  submarines  scheduled  for  transfer  to  the  Philippines 
were  about  to  leave  Hawaii.  With  reference  to  Japanese  decision  on  National 
policy  he  felt  that  United  States  forces  and  shipping  now  being  moved  to  the 
Philippines  might  be  in  danger  If  a  decision  adverse  to  United  States  interest 
should  be  made  on  November  ftth.  General  Marshall  emphasized  the  point  that 
Japan  could  hardly  take  the  risk  of  military  operations  with  a  powerful  air  and 
submarine  force  directly  on  the  flank  of  their  supply  lines,  and  that  when 
United  States  power  Is  sufficiently  developed  In  the  Philippines,  we  would  then 
have  something  to  back  up  our  statements.  Until  powerful  United  States  forces 
had  been  built  up  In  the  Far  East,  it  would  take  some  very  clever  diplomacy 
to  save  the  situation.  It  appeared  that  the  basis  of  U.  S.  policy  should  be  to  make 
certain  minor  concessions  which  the  Japanese  could  use  In  saving  face.  These 
concessions  might  be  a  relaxation  on  oil  restrictions  or  on  similar  trade 
restrictions. 

Following  these  discussions  the  Board  adopted  the  following  proposal  sub- 
mitted by  Admiral  Ingersoll  and  amended  by  suggestions  made  by  Admiral  Stark 
and  General  Marshall : 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1065 

War  Plans  Division  of  the  War  and  Navy  Departments  would  prepare  a  mem- 
orandum for  the  President,  as  a  reply  to  the  State  Department's  proposed  policy 
in  the  Far  Eastern  situation.    The  memorandum  would  take  the  following  lines : 

Oppose  the  issuance  of  an  ultimatum  to  Japan. 

Oppose  U.  S.  military  action  against  Japan  should  she  move  into  Yunnan. 

Oppose  the  movement  and  employment  of  U.  S.  military  forces  in  support  of 
Chiang  Kai-Shek. 

Advocate  State  Department  action  to  put  off  hostilities  with  Japan  as  long 
as  possible. 

Suggest  agreements  with  Japan  to  tide  the  situation  over  for  the  next  several 
months. 

Point  out  the  effect  and  cost  a  U.  S.-Japanese  war  in  the  Far  East  would  have 
on  defense  aid  to  Great  Britain  and  other  nations  being  aided  by  the  U.  S. 

Emphasize  the  existing  limitations  on  shipping  and  the  inability  of  the  U.  S. 
to  engage  in  a  Far  Eastern  offensive  operation  without  the  transfer  of  the  major 
portion  of  shipping  facilities  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific. 

On  the  question  of  gas  and  oil  for  the  Philippines'  Army  Air  Forces,  General 
Arnold  explained  that  the  military  authorities  were  building  up  reserves  and 
were  investigating  reports  that  the  Dutch  East  Indies  were  capable  of  supplying 
all  United  States  and  British  requirements. 

At  this  point.  General  Marshall  presented  a  list  of  items  of  equipment  con- 
sidered necessary  by  the  China  Mission  to  enable  China  to  maintain  her  war 
effort.  He  pointed  out  that  the  War  Department  was  beset  with  many  trials 
and  difficulties  in  the  allocation  of  Lend-Lease  items  as  related  to  Great  Britain, 
Russia,  Dutch  East  Indies,  China  and  other  countries.  In  the  case  of  Russia, 
a  large  amount  of  equipment  allocated  to  that  country  would  have  to  go  via 
Archangel,  Vladivostok  or  Basra.  The  shortage  of  shipping,  the  long  lines  of 
communications,  and  the  difficult  transport  situation  ^rom  the  ports  of  debarka- 
tion might  cause  an  inability  to  make  prompt  delivery  of  all  equipment  to  its 
final  destination.  Under  some  conditions,  this  would  mean  piling  up  unused 
equipnaent  at  various  localities,  while  at  the  same  time  other  localities  would 
suffer  from  shortage  of  equipment.  The  matter  resolves  itself  into  a  question 
as  to  whom  Lend-Lease  material  should  be  released.  It  was  General  Marshall's 
opinion  that  control  of  Lend-Lease  distribution,  and  diversions  incident  thereto, 
is  a  strategic  decision  which  should  be  made  by  The  Joint  Board.  Since  the 
matter  of  ocean  tonnage  is  a  critical  feature  in  the  delivery  of  Lend-Lease  items 
and  is  related  to  the  strategic  situation.  General  Marshall  felt  that  Admiral  Land 
of  the  Maritime  Commission  should  be  called  in  to  sit  with  The  Joint  Board  in 
deciding  matters  of  this  nature.  The  Board  agreed  that  Admiral  L''-nd  should 
be  asked  to  detail  a  member  of  his  department  to  work  with  the  Joint  Planning 
Committee  on  reports  involving  the  disposition  of  Lend-Lease  materials.  Navy 
members  agreed  to  take  the  necessary  steps  to  inform  Admiral  Land  of  this 
request. 

Referring  to  the  merchant  shipping  situation,  Admiral  Stark  felt  that  merchant 
tonnage  is  so  short  and  prospective  requirements  are  so  great  that  an  effort  should 
be  made  to  get  the  1942  merchant  vessel  construction  program  moved  up  to  an 
A-l-a  priority. 

At  the  direction  of  Admiral  Stark,  Commander  Sherman  then  read  a  report 
from  War  Plans  Division,  Office  of  Naval  Operations,  to  the  Chief  of  Naval  Opera- 
tions concerning  the  movement  of  airplanes  to  the  Middle  East  for  ultimate 
delivery  to  Russia.  This  report  recommended  that  the  Normandie  be  acquired  to 
meet  future  requirements  for  transporting  aircraft;  that  three  additional  sea 
trains  also  be  acquired  and  placed  in  service  without  conversion ;  and  that  de- 
livery of  aircraft  to  the  Middle  East  be  effected  by  the  use  of  these  three  sea 
trains  plus  the  two  sea  trains  U.  S.  S  Kitty  Hawk  and  U.  S.  S.  Hammondsport, 
already  acquired  and  converted  for  Navy  use.  Copy  of  this  report  was  furnished 
to  the  Deputy  Chirf  of  Staff  for  Air. 

Alternate  route  via  Canton  Island  for  movement  of  airplanes. — Following  a 
discussion  of  this  subject  the  Board  instructed  that  the  following  directive  be 
given  to  the  Joint  Planning  Committee : 

It  is  directed  that  the  Joint  Planning  Committee  submit  a  report  as  to  the  action 
to  be  taken  to  complete  the  establishment  of  an  additional  landplane  route  be- 
tween Hawaii  and  Australia,  less  vulnerable  to  hostile  interference  than  is  the 
existing  route  via  Wake  Island,  and  as  to  the  defenses  of  additional  airdromes 
and  landing  fields  acquired. 

W.  P.  SCOBET, 

Colonel,  G.  8.  C, 

Secretary. 


1066    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

November  3,  1941. 
Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff : 
Subject:  Far  Eastern  Situation. 
I.  Discussion. 

1.  A  conference  was  held  at  the  State  Department  during  the  morning  of 
November  1,  1941.  Present  were  Secretary  Hull,  Under  Secretary  Welles,  Mr. 
Hornbeck,  other  lesser  State  Department  officials  and  Captain  Schuirmann, 
U.  S.  N.  The  subject  of  discussion  was  the  action  which  should  be  taken  on  the 
Magruder  radiogram  of  October  28,  1941.  Question  arose  as  to  the  strength  of 
U.  S.  forces  in  the  Far  East  as  affecting  diplomatic  pressure  on  Japan.  Measures 
were  discussed,  such  as  sending  U.  S.  Army  Air  Forces  to  China,  which  might 
lead  to  immediate  involvement  in  war  with  Japan.  Apparently,  the  statement  of 
Chiang  Kai-Shek,  that  an  immediate  Japanese  attack  on  Kunming  threatened  and 
that  this  could  be  defeated  only  by  the  intervention  of  air  forces,  was  accepted. 

2.  fl.  The  War  Department  G-2  estimate  (Tab  A)  does  not  support  Chiang 
Kai-Shek's  conclusions  as  to  immediate  initiation  of  a  Japanese  move  toward 
Kunming.  G-2  believes  that :  the  movement  if  contemplated  will  not  be  initiated 
in  less  than  two  months  ;the  movement  will  be  vei'y  difficult  over  nearly  300  miles 
of  roadless,  broken  country ;  the  Chinese,  in  favorable  defense  terrain,  can  defeat 
this  offensive  by  proper  concentration  and  use  of  ground  troops  alone. 

&.  Gr-2  (Col.  Bratton)  agrees  with  the  Magruder  statement  that  with  the 
fall  of  Kunming,  Chinese  resistance  to  Japan  would  be  very  seriously  affected. 

c.  The  G-2  estimate  also  covers  the  broader  viewpoint  of  expected  Japanese 
action. 

3.  An  air  estimate  of  the  Far  Eastern  situation  (Tab  B)  brings  out  the  follow- 
ing :  the  most  effective  air  aid  to  China  can  be  given  by  units  based  in  the 
Philippines ;  there  are  at  present,  many  shortages  in  ammunition  and  gasoline 
supply  which  will  militate  against  a  sustained  effort ;  logical  difficulties,  aside 
from  general  policy,  make  it  undesirable  to  undertake  operations  of  United  States 
Army  Air  Force  units  in  China. 

4.  The  status  of  the  Lend-Lease  program  for  China  is  shown  in  Tab  C. 

5.  The  status  of  ground  troops  and  defense  reserves  in  the  Philippine  Depart- 
ment is  shown  in  Tab  D.  The  garrison  has  not  reached  the  effective  strength 
desired  by  General  MacArthur.  Deficiencies  are  being  overcome  by  the  dispatch 
of  personnel  and  supplies  from  the  United  States  and  by  accelerating  the  train- 
ing and  equipping  of  the  Philippine  Army.  The  present  combined  air  and 
ground  forces  will  make  attack  on  the  islands  a  hazardous  undertaking.  The 
dispatch  of  any  considerable  portion  of  the  air  garrison  to  China  would  leave 
Luzon  open  to  serious  risk  of  capture. 

6.  Informal  contact  with  officers  of  the  local  British  Staff  Mission  indicate 
that  the  British  have  incomplete  air  forces  for  the  defense  of  Singapore,  would 
refuse  to  allow  units  of  the  Royal  Air  Force  to  snpiwrt  Chinese  troops  in 
Yunnan,  and  are  of  the  firm  opinion  that  the  British  Chiefs  of  Staff  would 
strongly  disapprove  any  action  in  China  which  might  bring  on  war  with  Japan. 

7.  War  Plans  Division  is  strongly  of  the  opinion  that : 

a.  The  policies  derived  in  the  American-British  Staff  conversations  remain 
sound,  viz : 

(1)  The  primary  objective  is  the  defeat  of  Germany. 

(2)  The  principal  objective  in  the  Far  East  is  to  keep  Japan  out  of  the  war. 

(3)  Military  counter-action  against  Japan  should  be  considered  only  in  case 
of  any  of  the  following  actions  by  Japan  : 

(a)  A  direct  act  of  war  by  Japanese  armed  forces  against  the  Territory  or 
Mandated  Territory  of  any  of  the  Associated  Powers.  It  is  not  possible  to  de- 
fine accurately  what  would  constitute  "a  direct  act  of  war."  It  is  possible  for  a 
minor  incident  to  occur  which,  although  technically  an  act  of  war,  could  be 
resolved  by  diplomatic  action.  It  is  recognized  that  the  decision  as  to  whether 
such  an  incident  is  an  act  of  war  must  lie  with  the  Government  concerned. 

(b)  The  movement  of  the  Japanese  forces  into  any  part  of  T^hailand  to  the 
west  of  100°  East  or  to  the  soutij  of  10°  North. 

(c)  The  movement  of  a  large  number  of  Japanese  warships,  or  of  a  convoy 
of  merchant  ships  escorted  by  Japanese  warships,  which  from  its  position  and 
course  was  clearly  directed  upon  the  Philippine  Islands,  the  East  coast  of  the 
Isthmus  of  Kra  or  the  East  coast  of  Malaya,  or  had  crossed  the  parallel  of  6° 
North  between  Malaya  and  the  Philippines,  a  line  from  the  Gulf  of  Davao  to 
Waigeo  Island,  or  the  Equator  east  of  Waigeo. 

(d)  The  movement  of  Japanese  forces  into  Portuguese  Timor. 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  1067 

(e)  The  movement  of  Japanese  forces  into  New  Caledonia  or  the  Loyalty 
Islands. 

b.  Germany  must  be  defeated.  If  Japan  be  defeated  and  Gerpiany  remain 
undefeated,  decision  is  not  reached.  The  means  to  defeat  Japan  (Army.  Navy, 
and  tonnage),  must  be  withdrawn  in  quantity  from  the  effort  against  Germany. 
To  defeat  Germany  will  require  the  utmost  total  effort. 

c.  It  is  desirable  that  large  Japanese  forces  be  kept  involved  in  China.  How- 
ever, from  the  larger  viewpoint,  prospective  Chinese  defeat  would  not  warrant 
involvement  of  the  United  States,  at  this  time,  in  war  with  Japan. 

d.  Political  and  economic  measures  should  be  used  wherever  effective  to  deter 
Japanese  action. 

e.  Most  effective  aid  to  China,  as  well  as  to  the  defense  in  Singapore  and 
the  Netherlands  East  Indies,  is  now  being  built  up  by  the  reinforcement  of  the 
Philippines.  The  safety  of  Luzon  as  an  air  and  submarine  base  should  soon 
be  reasonably  assured»by  the  arrival  of  air  and  ground  reinforcements.  Strong 
diplomatic  and  economic  pressure  may  be  exerted  from  the  military  viewpoint 
at  the  earliest  about  the  middle  of  December,  1941,  when  the  Philippine  Air 
Force  will  have  become  a  positive  threat  to  Japanese  operations.  It  would  be 
advantageous,  if  practicable,  to  delay  severe  diplomatic  and  economic  pressure 
until  February  or  March,  1942,  when  the  Philippine  Air  Force  will  have  reached 
its  projected  strength,  and  a  safe  air  route,  through  Samoa,  will  be  in  operation. 

/.  Material  aid  to  China  should  be  accelerated  consonant  with  the  studied 
needs  of  Russia  and  Great  Britain  . 

ff.  Aid  to  the  Volunteer  Air  Force  in  China  should  be  continued  and  accelerated 
as  far  as  practicable. 

II.  Recommendations. 

Substitution  of  the  words  "War  Department"  for  "War  Plans  Division"  in 
paragraph  7  above  and  approval  of  that  paragraph  as  a  statement  of  the  War 
Department's  position  on  the  Far  East  situation  at  this  time. 

L.  T.  Gebow, 
Brigadier  General, 
Acting  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff. 

6  Incls.* 

#1— Tab  A— G-2  Estimate 

#2— Tab  B— Air  Estimate 

#3 — Tab  C — Lend-Lease  Program  for  China. 

#4— Tab  D— Ground  Troops  &  Def.  Res.  Phil.  Dept. 

#5— Tab  E — Ground  Reinforcement,  I'liil.  Dept. 

#6— Tab  F— Rad,  fr.  Gen.  Magruder  (10-28-41) 


•Tab  A  is  included  in  Exhibit  No.  33 ;  other  tabs  not  included. 


1068    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1069 


THE   WHITE    HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 


r 

I 


1070    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


'^ 


DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 
WASHINGTON 


v----iIJiit 


November  10,  1941. 


Kg.HCRAM)UH  FCR  iH£  PRESIDSNT 


i-  consideration  a  draft 
•'lleeimo  Chiang  Kai-ahak 
■  of  Novi»taV:'«r  2   vhtch  wiaa 
N-^vf  ..ber  •).  by  the  Chinese  Amb««««aor.   If 
oval,  it  Is  Buggeated 
-   :'"f  to  call  and 
■-.dor  vitn  :;he 
!*  *-         r  to  CrenerRllsfllaio  Chiang 


m«98»^e . 


EXHIBITS    OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  1071 


1072    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


I  h*if«  for  •oM  Akj^»  1ia4  bsfsr*  m  fms'  »»»«*,, 
SovMilwr  S  w&isJi  wms  &«llT»r»«  %o  »•  tnrouffe  year  ite*«* 

»•  ^T«  tiM  for  ««»•  tl«»  'r«ry  s»»h  la  alsd  %*.»    ■ 
•SftlASt  Iti«Bt8«  froa  XrAo«1»1iui  to  lAiielt  yeti  eall  ifp#igia.i 

<Uwr  t«  fir*  j»»#rti»«  Kaa  a)>g«»%  «©a«i«w«6itMi  %p  $3.1  *»' 
mm  WeMP  ««u'  Mi»«la«i«a  tiiat,  ««£!«  it  «9«1A  tMr  a 

•  Itmk  Muipy^n  mrnlMt  S«M«&i«  b»&  a«Tiia«««  %»  ft  {nkI^* 

muL^  wiit<  i»fti«*t«  ys>efeaM«  H8^^.u*»  s,wrt»»a««  «f  m 

as; 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE 


1073 


*^ -ii*^  ^-1  J»anaa,  *a  ir.v««tcn  of  that  prmXae* 

P^^P''  '^  •  :t«r«iir«  ?jp«r»t'i.on«.     At  tb«  C4Ui«   tls« 

*•  '■■  *••   '»«t  It  la  laiportuit  that  yo«y  far««« 

^  "  ar««,   eq«lp|M»<!  nM  <li«j>o««d  is  all 

br&«<*-'«.     ai»a»p  •Klatinf  •ir«us«tui«««,  tadtlnt  Into 
«»R8'!3  «))•  world  attit&tleci  is  itt  pelltlMa, 

*i'^i^  -coBonle  «kat«»1sa,   wa  f««l  xh«t  th«  ae«t 

•ffa«s.  ■  'ributloe  ifJaleh  we  e«fi  auk*  m%  tM»  ••Mat 

la  «l»:i«  a.»  llwa  ©f  apcNlinx  up  tit*  flew  to  taiiu  of 
•ur  l,«R<^--,«iiaa  nuitarUla  cad  fasllitatlnf  th»  bwllitjig 
•f)  «f  %h^  Amrima  ▼«l\«ta«r  adir  fvrM,  ts«th  is  paraoa- 
■•I  «»£  la  ttwipwmt.     !•  atr*  ««¥J«««i»A  at  praa«a«,   »• 
rem  Icadv,   f  aawaada  flran  aftajr  tuart*r«  moA  in  aaAj^ 
«««n«e«l«.a».     *•  art  (Wndlag  aMilwrt*!*  '■««  •»ljr  t9 
dttiiai  aaa  firM«  Brltato,   U«t  to  tJ»  lHit«A,   tl^a  i®»l«t 
6)a««  HMi  MHM  twmtr  •tter  aviMtrlas  that  «>•  •alllRg 
wPCMttr  for  Mpipmnit  fer  Mlf^Asfviim.     Zk  •ASitten, 
•»r  ^r«fPM  r»r  evor  «m.  t«f»sa«,  •^^••iailjr  tin  a«*4« 

•qp&IMmt  1»  i«pv«  iwMiit  aM  wltk  trtttt  iMPea»tMM. 


t«v«rtiMl»sa.  I  «h*tl  4 
IMNULtiiM  Of  ia«NMk«ll« 


tttlKMt   tWHMTd  MMVVlat  tX. 

stfl  ef  aatarial  f«r  yosr  «••. 


1074    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


m 


ef  0rf»rt*  m  tis» 


Sir*  *»•   f 


fer^'"» 


EXHIBITS    OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE 


1075 


f»#3 — *mfi 


79716  O — 46 — pt.  14 — —12 


1076    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  1077 

EXHIBIT  NO.  16A 


THt    WHITC    HOUSE 


A_ 


1078    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


THE  SECRETARY  OF  THE  TREASURY 

WAS  H  I  NGTO  N 

October  30,  1941 


My  dear  ^ir.  President: 

The  enclosed  >aesr>ag;e  from  Ganeral 
Chiang  Kai-Shek  has  just  been  handed  to 
me  at  11:15  o'clock  this  morninr  by  i.'r. 
T.  V.  Soong. 

Yours  sincerel;;', 


y 


yjy 


The  President, 
The  Vvhite  House. 


^     ^      RBSOEIVED,     ^  \ 


MAR  1  5  1944 


^\-6. 


^'^, 


EXHIBITS    OF    JOINT    COMMITTEE  1079 


CXTOBEr.  SO. 


DEFINITE  iiiy  .T::jri.:::  ?i;^:;;}.L  ;.:}.  .'apa:^'.?.  jesi  ;..  ,;   , 

YUNNA:^   in  NO'Tl-frER  (STOP)     TrlS  V.C)\1.  IIAY  POSSIBLY  BE 
AVERTED   IF  ^:F:FICA  i'AKLS   IM;.5,DIA'!T:  ACTION  hY  INFOR}<INa 
";.?AN  THAT  AT':'ACK  Y^'NNAN  "hFDT'-';   I'JDO-CHINA  W{.)rLD  PE 
VIE-.-.T.D  =^'  ^\:^:-.IOA  A3  DEFINITE  STF.?  IN  30ITn\VAF.I)  KXPAhSIO.N 

a::I)  t-at  America  ta-^nc"  f-r'Ai:;  indiffeket^  (stop) 

SIMULTAM013LY  :.'ILITAPy  PPJlFAr^TIOXS  S'-^OULD  BE  ^'APE  TO 
.V.-.ET   n-:i3  E\i:;*T"ALITV  (STOI')   I  WS'^  E\THASinE  THE 
CRITICAL  :;ATmRE  of  THE  n'NNAN  SITUATION  SINCE   IF  Ynr;AN 
IS  L03T  AND  UST  LIFE  LINE  FO-l  WiTEKIAL:^  YKOV  '"IW.  <iUToII)E 
7<0hLD  SEVERED  THE  CHIIIE^IE  PEOPLE  AM  Ai-}.T  MATEhlALLY 
AND  MORALLY  "^OULI-  RE  'IjaHIJ  TO  Oj-i-Kk  FURTHKR  AKiED 
hEoI3TA;.CE   (G'^OP)      I  AM  CONFIDE!^  WITH  FORCES  IN  Yl^iriAI^ 
Aril'  AVAILA^Lh   NEARPY  CHI-n-SE  A^Lh  TO  HOLL^  "^hKIR  (Wi  WZ 
rliHTlH';  IF  REI')FORCED  AIRWARD   (STOP)     COLOIiKL  Cm^hUl'' 
■'".-S  o'iLY  4?  PIT,0"-S  Go.NSEQlT.IJTLY  STRoN';  AIR  HEirFOr.CE??E:r 
^  :iE;.TL.L   (JTGP)     urge  AilRICA  1"SE  STROfi^  PRESSURE  ON 
--.ITAli.  TO  .;E..D   3I.*"AR0!J-   AIR  FORCE  TO  O^^PEFA'^E  VrlTH 
COLONEL  CIIIRNA^T.*^  IN  ORDER  SAVE  DEMOCRATIC  POSITION;   IW 
FAR  EAST   (STjP)   Pkl'^AlN  rJID  Ai-T'  I''A  EOT  AII.V  CONCET'IEI) 


1080    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


-  2 


TO  PREVENT  LOSS  OF  Y^I.xiiAN  A3  C'lril'SE  }«ECAc3E   IF  JAFA:ii::>E 
OCCUPY  YUNIUN  TKEIR  I.-EXT  STOP  V/OrLD   i:,"-.:r,T  ;.^^ACK  ON 
BRITISH  FAR  EAST  COLONIAL  PO.iSKSSL'-,  ;  a:.1  PKKCiriTATE 
WAR  IN  THE  PACIFIC   (STOP)    IF   nri-tEDIATE   nCTION  T'AJSN  ^Y 
BRITAIN  IN  SE-TjIN(1  AIK  REIliHsRCKTlEHT  '^?:E:-;E  FOJSEnsiONS 
WOULD  BE  SAVED  AT  A  FRAC^I;);,  OF  ^-i;"  COST  THAT  TKEIR 
DEFENCE  WOULD  INVOL\-E  LATK:-      '  '  PACIFIC   PKO-IFM  '.VmULD 

THUS  BE  SOLVED  (STOP)  JAPANESE  ■./ILL  C  ACF/.TRATE  LAHOEST 
AIR  FORCE  IN  INI)0-CHI!.'A  AND  IF  DESTRO^'ED  COirt^InED  AIR 
FORCES  THREAT  TO  FAR  EAST  FIia.LLY  Ii:;.'OVED. 


EXHIBITS   OF    JOINT   COMMITTEE 

EXHIBIT  NO.  16B 

Telegram  Sent 


1081 


X    (ONf  lOf  NTiAL  COOK 
NONCON' lOCNTiAL   COUt 


Brpartutriit  of  -^tatr 

H  u}hington, 

N-  ■.■•..:  -:    7,    i;-)-u. 


'oC" 


iKiSi-:;?:^^  FKc.-: 


-M'  •- 


Af,. 


1082    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


TO  M  TKANWIirTCO 


TELEGRAM  SENT  co«..oc«T.-a  coo, 

(Full  rite 
C«ll*et  lOtf  fetttt 


NOMCOHFIOCNTIAL  COOC 


^,    „    .    .  department  of  ^tate 

0»r  iKttfr  _P_  tVasklnflcn, 

NIfilit  IfHor 
Chirftr  to 

*        talcing,  tngeth<*r  vith  continuing  efforts   to    ntrengthen  our 
defenaea    In    the   PhlllD-^ln**    Islnnda,    -eralleled   by    alnllar 
ef forte   by  you   In    the   Slng^nore   ares,    vill    tend    to   increase 
Jaonn'a   healtptlon,    whereas    In  Jnppn'n   r)r(?<!ent   rr.ood   new 
formalized   verbnl    wftrnlnr   t   remonstrances   ml^ht -hpve ,    vl  th 
''t    leant    even    ch«>rce,    pn   '^.o-^-^pS  ' "    eifect. 

T.hrn   wh.>le    orobl-n-   v^  i  1    Jirve    our    cortlnulnr    nnd 
errnegt    a  tt<T.*.l  ",1 ,     Rr;Jy    nr.c    offoi-t. 

1    shall    orobftly    not    I'Lent    not    .i.n'f-    e/-,re.  -■     jeoly 
'■o    Cnlm^'   K»l-^(,'-/.    l-fnv    Hi"    fl'«t.    of    next    \.»»:<.      Fierce 
^^^o»,     ,,  .  .  V, .  ^    ,.,„    p.,.- r>  ;>..(,^    ,1"   y-,_i^   rlose    -mc'rl    r'.rcle 


fLAil 


/.?' 


Untl/thneJ  iij 
Sent  iy  ofKralni 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1083 

EXHIBIT  NO.  17 

November  27,  1941. 

MEMQRANDtrM   FOB  THE   PBIESIDENT 

Subject :  Far  Eastern  Situation. 

If  the  current  negotiations  end  without  agreement,  Japan  may  attack:  the 
Burma  Road;  Thailand;  Malaya;  the  Netherlands  East  Indies;  the  Philippines; 
the  Russian  Maritime  Provinces. 

There  is  little  probability  of  an  immediate  Japanese  attack  on  the  Maritime 
Provinces  because  of  the  strength  of  the  Russian  forces.  Recent  Japanese  troop 
movements  all  seem  to  have  been  southward. 

The  magnitude  of  the  effort  required  will  militate  against  direct  attack  against 
Malaya  and  the  Netherlands  East  Indies  until  the  threat  exercised  by  United 
States  forces  in  Luzon  is  removed. 

Attack  on  the  Burma  Road  or  Thailand  offers  Japanese  objectives  involving 
less  risk  of  major  conflict  than  the  others  named,  and  clearly  within  the  means 
available,  if  unopposed  by  major  powers.  Attack  on  the  Burma  Road  would, 
however,  be  difficult  and  might  fail.  If  successful,  the  Chinese  Nationalist  Gov- 
ernment might  collapse.  Occupation  of  Thailand  gains  a  limited  strategic  advan- 
tage as  a  preliminary  to  operations  against  Malaya  or  the  Netherlands  East 
Indies,  might  relieve  internal  iwitical  pressure,  and  to  a  lesser  extent,  external 
economic  pressure.  Whether  the  offensive  will  be  made  against  the  Burma  Road, 
Thailand,  or  the  Philippines  can  not  now  be  forecast. 

The  most  essential  thing  now,  from  the  United  States  viewpoint,  is  to  gain 
time.  Considerable  Navy  and  Array  reinforcements  have  been  rushed  to  the 
Philippines  but  the  desirable  strength  has  not  yet  been  reached.  The  process  of 
reinforcement  is  being  continued.  Of  great  and  immediate  concern  is  the  safety 
of  the  Army  convoy  now  near  Guam,  and  the  Marine  Corps'  convoy  jiist  leaving 
Shanghai.  Ground  forces  to  a  total  of  21,000  are  due  to  sail  from  the  United 
States  by  December  8,  1941,  and  it  is  important  that  this  troop  reinforcement 
reach  the  Philippines  before  hostilities  commence.  Precipitance  of  military 
action  on  our  part  should  be  avoided  so  long  as  consistent  with  national  policy. 
The  longer  the  delay,  the  more  positive  becomes  the  assurance  of  retention  of 
these  Islands  as  a  naval  and  air  base.  Japanese  action  to  the  south  of  Formosa 
will  be  hindered  and  perhaps  seriously  blocked  as  long  as  we  hold  the  Philippine 
Islands.  War  with  Japan  certainly  will  interrupt  our  transport  of  supplies  to 
Siberia,  and  probably  will  interrupt  the  process  of  aiding  China. 

After  consultation  with  each  other.  United  States,  British,  and  Dutch  military 
authorities  in  the  Far  East  agreed  that  joint  military  counteraction  against 
Japan  should  be  undertaken  only  in  case  Japan  attacks  or  directly  threatens 
the  territory  or  mandated  territory  of  the  United  States,  the  British  Common- 
wealth, or  the  Netherlands  East  Indie,  or  should  the  Japanese  move  forces 
into  Thailand  west  of  100°  East  or  south  of  10°  North,  Portuguese  Timor,  New 
Calenodia,  or  the  Loyalty  Islands. 

Japanese  involvement  in  Yunnan  or  Thailand  up  to  a  certain  extent  is  ad- 
vantageous, since  it  leads  to  further  dispersion,  longer  lines  of  communication, 
and  an  additional  burden  on  communications.  However,  a  Japanese  advance 
to  the  west  of  100°  East  or  south  of  10°  North,  immediately  becomes  a  threat  to 
Burma  and  Singapore.  Until  it  is  patent  that  Japan  intends  to  advance  beyond 
these  lines,  no  action  which  might  lead  to  immediate  hostilities  should  be  taken. 

It  is  recommended  that : 

prior  to  the  completion  of  the  Philippine  reinforcement,  military,  counter- 
action be  considered  only  if  Japan  attacks  or  directly  threatens  United  States, 
British,  or  Dutch  territory  as  above  outlined  ; 

in  case  of  a  Japanese  advance  into  Thailand,  Japan  be  warned  by  the  United 
States,  the  British,  and  the  Dutch  governments  that  advance  beyond  the  lines 
indicated  may  lead  to  war;  prior  to  such  warning  no  joint  military  opposition 
be  undertaken ; 

steps  be  taken  at  once  to  consummate  agreements  with  the  British  and  Dutch 
for  the  is.suance  of  such  warning. 

/S/    G.  C.  Marshall  /S/    H.  R.  Stabk 

25-66654-200 


1084    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

EXHIBIT  NO.  18 

TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

1.  Draft  Suggestions  (Nov.  11,  1941)  to  the  Secretary  of  State  prepared  by  Far  Eastern 

Division  concerning  proposed  "Modus  Vivendi."  No  action  was  taken  on  these 
suggestions. 

2.  Memorandum  dated  Nov.  19,  1941  from  Mr.  Hamilton  to  the  Secretary  of  State  con- 

cerning an  attached  revision  of  a  proposal  by  Secretary  Morgenthau  for  an  agree- 
ment between  the  United  States  and  Japan. 

3.  Memorandum  dated  Nov.  24,   1941  by  Brig.  Gen.  L.  T.  Gerow  for  the  Chief  of  Staff 

concerning  the  "Far  Eastern  Situation." 

4.  Memorandum  dated  Nov.  21,   1941  by  Admiral  H.  R.  Stark  for  the  Secretary  of  the 

Navy  concerning  "Outline  of  Iroposed  Basis  for  Agreement  Between  the  United 
States  and  Japan,  of  Nov.  19,  1941   (See  Item  No.  2,  supra). 

5.  Memorandum  dated   Nov.   21,   1941   by  Brig.  Gen.  L.  T.   Gerow  for   the  Secretary  of 

State  concerning  the  "Par  Eastern  Situation." 

6.  Pencilled  memorandum  given  by  the  President  to  the  Secretary  of  State   (Not  dated 

but  probably  written  shortly  after  Nov.  20,  1941). 

7.  Tentative  draft    (not  used)    dated  Nov.  22,   1941   of  a  proposed  oral  statement  and 

Modus  Vivendi  to  be  handed  Japanese  Ambassadors. 

8.  Tentative  draft  dated  Nov.  22,  1941  of  an  "Outline  of  Proposed  Basis  for  Agreement 

Between  the  United  States  and  Japan." 

9.  Memorandum  dated  Nov.  22,  1941  of  a  conversation  between  Secretary  Hull,  British 

Ambassador,  Australian  Minister,  Netherlands  Minister  and  Chinese  Ambassador 
concerning  "Japanese  Prof>osal  for  a  Modus  Vivendi  and  suggested  reply." 

10.  Tentative  draft  (not  used)  dated  Nov.  24,  1941  of  a  proposed  Modus  Vivendi. 

11.  Tentative  draft  dated  November  24,  1941  of  an  "Outline  of  Proposed  Basis  for  Agreement 

Between  the  United  States  and  Japan." 

12.  Memorandum   dated  Nov.   24,   1941   by   Secretary   Hull  for  the  President  with  an  at- 

tached draft  of  message  from  the  President  to  the  British  Prime  Minister  describing 
the  Japanese  proposal  for  a  Modus  Vivendi  and  a  suggested  alternate  Modus  Vivendi, 
and  closing  sentences  added  by  the  President. 

13.  Memorandum  dated  Nov.  24,  1941  of  a  conversation  between  Secretary  Hull,  British 

Ambassador,  Chinese  Ambassador,  Australian  Minister  and  Netherlands  Minister, 
concerning  "Proposed  Modus  Vivendi  for  Submission  to  Japanese  Ambassador." 

14.  Tentative  draft    (not  used)   dated  Nov.  25,   1941  of  a  proposed  Modus  Vivendi  to  be 

submitted  to  the  Japanese  Ambassador,  and  attached  "Outline  of  Proposed  Basis 
for  Agreement  Between  the  United  States  and  Japan." 

15.  Message  dated  Nov.  25,  1941  from  Owen  Lattimore,  Chungking,  to  Lauchlin  Currie. 

16.  Copy  of  Message  from  General  Chiang  Kai-Shek  transmitted  to  Secretary  Stimson  by 

Mr.  T.  V.  Soong,  under  cover  of  a  letter  dated  Nov.  25,  1941. 

17.  Memorandum  dated  Nov.  25,  1941  of  conversation  between  Secretary  Hull  and  British 

Ambassador  concerning  "Suggested  Changes  in  Modus  Vivendi,"  and  an  attached 
memorandum  from  the  Ambassador  commenting  on  the  Japanese  proposal  (of  Nov. 
20,1941). 

18.  Memorandum   dated   Nov.   25,   1941    of  conversation  between   Secretary  Hull  and  the 

Chinese  Ambassador  concerning  the  "Opposition  of  Generalissimo  Chiang  Kai-Shek  to 
Modus  Vivendi."  with  attached  copy  of  telegram  dated  Nov.  24,  1941  from  Minister 
Quo  Tai-Chi,  Chungking,  to  Ambassador  Hu  Shih. 

19.  Memorandum  dated  Nov.  25.  1941  of  conversations  between  the  Chinese  Ambassador 

and  the  Netherlands  Minister,  and  Stanley  K.  Hornbeck. 

20.  Memorandum  for  the  President  dated  Nov.  26,  1941  from  the  Secretary  of  State  sug- 

gesting withholding  Modus  Vivendi,  and  proposes  handing  Japanese  Ambassador  "a 
copy  of  the  comprehensive  basic  proposal  for  a  general  peaceful  settlement." 

21.  Memorandum  from  the  Netherlands  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  handed  to  Secretary 

Hull  on  Nov.  27,  1941. 

22.  Memorandum  of  Conversation  dated  Nov.  27,  1941  between  the  British  Ambassador 

and  Sumner  Welles  concerning  "Japanese-American  Relations." 

23.  Memorandum  of  Conversation  dated  Nov.   27,  1941   between  Secretary  Hull  and  the 

Australian  Minister  concerning  "Proposed  Modus  Vivendi." 

24.  Message  dated  Nov.  27,  1941  from  Secretary  of  State  to  Ambassador  Grew,  Tokyo. 

25.  Memorandum  of  Conversation  dated  Nov.  28,  1941  between  British  Minister  and  Stanlev 

K.  Hornbeck. 

26.  Message  dated  Nov.  28,  1941  from  Secretary  of  State  to  United  States  Ambassador, 

Chungking,  China. 

27.  Memorandum  of  Conversation  dated  Nov.  29,  1941  between  Secretary  Hull  and  BritlBta 

Ambassador  concerning  "United  States-Japanese  Conversations." 

28.  Memorandum  handed  to  Secretary  Hull  by  the  Chinese  Ambassador  on  Dec.  2,  1941. 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1085 


DRAFT  SUGGESTIONS    (NOVEIiBER   11,    1941)    TO   THE 

SECRET/ HY      ••  STAT-.      !!0   ACTION  WAS   TAKSi;   OIJ   THESE 
SluuiCSTLiIlS.       iX-.lAHED    III  FS. 


a 


S    L@  '^ 


1086    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


If,  aB  Beans  aliBost  oertals,  th«re  1a.jqo  poBeiblllty 
,  at  tha  present  time  of  reaohlog  with  Japan  a  oomprelienslTe 
settlement  covering  the  entire  Paoifio  area.  It  is  highly 
probable  that  after  a  certain  point  further  efforts  to 
ireoonoile  differences  on  the  essentials  of  such  a  oompre- 
hensive  settlement  will  lead  only  to  a  rupture  of  the 
oonrersationa  followed  by  a  further  and  perhaps  sudden      M 
deterioration  of  relations.  Such  a  prospect  prompts  the 
question  lihether  it  might  not  be  possible  to  propose  some 
tentative  or  transitional  arrangement  the  very  disoussion 
of  whioh  might  serve  not  only  to  oontinue  the  oonversatioaa 
pvaAlag  the  advent  of  a  awre  favorable  situation,  even  If  the 
]^:«poMl  is  not  aventaaHy  agreed  to«  but  also  to  provide 
the  entering  wedge  toward  a  coaprehenelve  settl«MRt  of 
laie  nature  soac^t  providisg  t^e  proposal  is  aoeepted  by 
Japan  and  provided  farther  that  Qhina  is  able  to  obtain 
satisfftotory  terms  from  JepaA. 

With  ti»ee  thoo^te  la  Mad*  thero  is  saggeated  for 
eoaaldoratlos  a  proposal  along  th9  lloea  of  the  attaohed 
draft. 

Xt  la  probable  thai  tb»  Jlapaaeae  will  not  agree  to 
the  attaohed  proposal  ae  it  staada  wltboat  ooaciderable 
medlfloatlon,  au&  It  i»  even  more  probable  that  aegotlatioiM 
betw«i«ai  Japan  aad  Shlaa  a&der  these  olroaaatanoea  will 

oome 


i 

a 

® 

St 


EXHIBITS    OF    JOINT    COMMITTEE  1087 


-2- 

come  to  nothing.  NeTerthelasa,  It  la  hop«d  that  a  pro- 
posal along  the  auggeated  linea  might  offer  a  baala  vhloh 
■Ight  keep  oonveraatlons  going  for  aometliBe  longer  than 
othervlae,  and  If  aocepted  by  the  Japaneae  might  lead  to 
an  eventual  oompreheneiTe  aettlement  of  a  nature  ooapatlbla 
with  our  principles. 

It  is  suggested  that  the  foregoing  proposal  wotild 
have  more  chance  of  reoeiTing  oonslderation  by  the  Japa- 
nese (and  of  thus  gaining  time)  if  it  were  presented  to 
them  before  feelings  had  beoome  further  aroused  over 
fruitless  discussion  of  natters  we  assume  will  not  be 
agreed  upon. 

In  presenting  the  proposal  to  the  Japanese  wa  might 
say  that  we  offer  it  with  reluctance  as  we  realize  that 
it  is  of  a  patchwork  nature  and  imperfect,  but  that  we 
feel  that  under  the  circumstances  it  is  better  to  have 
something  on  which  we  can  hope  to  build  in  the  futui^ 
than  to  end  with  no  agreement  at  all,  as  would  aaem  to 
be  otherwise  inevitable  in  view  of  our  present  dlvergentag 
of  views  on  certain  fundamentals. 

If  the  Jepenese  should  decline  to  consider  such  a 
proposal  we  should  te  no  worse  off  thaji  we  otherwise 
would  have  been.  At  the  saune  time,  it  is  believed  that 
by  presenting  a  proposal  of  this  sort,  we  shoiild  make 

clear 


1088    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


to  obtala  oil  Ktmmv  «h«a  ©oatfla^att--  .  -  ,  ^ ,    . 

In  3Mt£«ur<t  to  tfaat  point,  it  M^t  b»  poiMR£l>l«  %«  tio3%- 
out  «a  *s>r«sg«iH»xit  viiereby  w«  ootil^  allov  tSb^R  to  hgmi 
p9trol9xm  in  aSKmsts  e<|tti.Tsa«nt  to  amoaj&t»  at  p»%r?^lmm 
prodaota  r«l«ased  in  Supan  tor  aonaal  |^iio«ti«e  eocSsia^tlQa. 
fhio  would  safc«  possible  tfe»  noraai  faaotloatng  4»  iJ«|)aa 
of  buees;   ooiBBeroial  tmoks,  taxia  axA  priirat*  atttosobllos 
as  veil  as  JapaQeso  fishing  XttaaolMic  and  «orararol«X  boat* 
and  would  aai^xasise  to  tb«  fTiQ>anefle  pablio  the  advaatas** 
of  conditions  of  peace. 


~» 


} 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  1089 


(DRAFT) 
I. 

A.  The  G-overnmente  of  the  United  States  and  of 
Japan  accept  Joint  responsibility  for  the  initiation  and 
conclusion  of  a  mutual  unQer8tai:dlng  and  QeclaraJtlon  of 
intention  and  policy  for  the  resumption  of  traditional 
friendly  relations. 

B.  Without  reference  to  specific  causes  of  recent 
estrangement,  it  is  the  sincere  desire  of  both  Govern- 
ments that  the  incidents  which  led  to  the  deterioration 
of  sunicable  sentiment  between  their  countries  should  be 
prevented  from  recurrence  and  corrected  in  their  unfore- 
seen and  unfortunate  consequences. 

C.  It  is  the  eernest  hope  of  both  Governments  that 
by  cooperative  effort,  the  United  States  and  Japan  may 
contribute  effectively  toward  the  establishment  and 
preservation  of  peace  in  the  Pacific  area. 

D.  Both  Governrnents  affiriu  that  their  national 
policies  are  directed  toward  the  foundation  of  a  lasting 
peace  and  the  inauguration  of  a  new  era  of  reciprocal 
confidence  and  cooperation  between  the  peoples  of  both 
countries. 

E.  Both  Governments  further  affirm  that  in  their 
national  policies  they  will  actively  support  and  give 
practical  appllcetion  to  the  following  fundamental  prln-" 
ciples  upon  which  their  relations  with  each  other  and  with 

all 


1090    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


llity    of    territorial 

"    '  "        .1.1  one, 


-  ty 


red  by 


.  re-  ,.    ..    :  \.    li.   order  to 

-,  Irrdnf-te   chronic   politlcel 

i^ilUy  :-,crlf    con^rre,    t>-ey   will 

:tivel"    -;■--:-  -  ,.    fcllov.1.'. 

v:lth    p.-  r 

•r   natic;  : 

"   (  rinciple   of  non-cll  scrlmlnatlon   in   inter- 
"     '  '     '    ^"elations. 

K.  .:       ■    •  •rn«tional   economic   ■; -/ 

"1  :'   extrerre  nationalism  ;•  • 

TV.    '^   ■-    '•  •-Motions. 


inte;rests 

•hrDUf?h 


orocesses  of 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1091 


(In   oraftln^.;   the   acstract   princlp.lrp   on  vrhieh  comr.;it- 
:?:.ts   ai-e    to   ce   pxchanfVfd,    pr.   effort   h^'S   been   '"-cl6   to    enibody 


!  ^-■les   to   whlc'..    It   i 
read'  in^-   to    pgree.  y 


*re 


II. 

A.      ri.5    init_     ' 

practical    -^'r;  -lie- •.! :;,.    ;:"    tr^'    I'ur'i  t    e.t-: 

U;Von,    "; :  t      -ovrr..;.e-  ^  ;„•":. 

-cf^?ure:r : 

l'  ?   Gover/r.ent    -.f    t'e   Ur.ited   Stst-:^?    v;l^.  -St 

to    t'.e    -jvern'.ents   of    C'l-..:  ;.       .,    t      t    '.  istely 

enter   i  ,tj   oircct    "nicr''        -  tion  for   --    •  • 

'-    ""    :-    t.  elr   uif'-er'^-::'--? . 

\1.':    oi"f  erl:.  -   to    ':■:■'""  -  -    .       .  y  . 

Js'v  :ere    i-overn":e:.t  *    ',  ->.- 

r' -    -   t'-"    -    -'-■^•'leii.e.xt  ,. ;       ..i .  er'':.cF  =  , 
'    to    tel  ir  ^■^trce   ter.r 

.      ^      ,  -     .li    a    DOSiw^.  -      -  ^'   '      ^'  ft    C:;i!:.- 

'- :  :--    J-.  .-^Ins   no   Irr.'  _  ar^prov 

•    :  ..rse  mij; :  "  ■    :  ■    •-  -ue 

■  r  if   aid  to    c  i^pF- 

rlc-  ;  ■     :  t    if    t.-.p  r 


..  er..  o;.  '  r"c  .1 

V    ;       --.^    joveriir^e  .t    0.'    -  th,   -iov- 

er:i-e::t    of    -^.:in      -  ;.      ri'dstice   duri         '  eriou    of   p"ic-~l-e 

r., -.-otir  tlon. 

(.5,       -     -     :    ■  -",      _   ."     --     :..•     '':.ited   ~t^te'^    (.'url;. 


79716  O — 46 — pt.  14 13 


1092    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


-4- 


(4) 


•*i:".«een   China    and   Japan 
'    ey  ._ce    s'".lpnient    of 
irr cter  to   China. 

u  ;  1,,      t  .e    Ci.'urse   of 

^hina  under  an  '^ 
.:•*.  y   reenf orcement  of  Its 
■:  Indochina  and 
■  '.  ^      r   '■   Ellitpry 


co.iCi-.stun 


'•re  —    -  ., 
r..ent   of   no 

nese   ndlit 
-Tovlcl 
of  cert 
Ya^.^';tz^' 
of   cle  s  *; , 


for   tr.e   rfsu,-.  r-tion  of 
-  -    -  -  -  '  "  e-  e^t    ue- 

:ent   whereby 
■;  ■    s  c  ^  1  e 
s   froci 


?tion  of  Japanese   tn'Tcu-  iion 
'hin?    or   Ghlnp    Fcut::      f    ti;e 
•  en  h.  ve  cert--^!  itles 

=   oil   rtna  iron. 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1093 


In   z'r.-^    .'.c    jtl'.tiorii    for   <'•■.    im""oul    te    roEun.    tlor:    of 
lirriif^cV  trice   in   co'nr.o.  i  t/,  "       r   tlirn  wrr  sunr,lier-,- 

:<e    .-..  .ulC     .•  ve   in  .T.ind   xl'.  urpose  of   settirii^:  Jav- 

f 'Ct^ries    r-nc    shiool.-;, '    r    .:-_._:-■  ^    to   r^roc^uctio;;       :       -    >,_ 
vices   vhicli  vould    ■  i.'-^   i  .  -_  .      our  prescit    a*'-  ;lci 


Chlr."    ^-  "  '-e    ■  ...-■- 

:uch  Japrnere     ;r*:-uuct  •    ruch   ?•'.     cnane 
.ol,    ccr-phor,    pyref.rur,  flover:^,    plriit 
-int:,    tna  snd  ootterl-s    :  .r  A;.-,ericn;i   crov.ucts    fuch 
■;    :  ertilizers,    foodstuffs,    -  -    r  .-^ceuticals,    cotto:.      ..d. 
tobaco).      >«.rraiv:ementB   :ni      '  ;    oe  m- ue   for   th':^   ch.-^rter 

01    J:   /  .  ese   ves.-cis,    if   .  ^   to  JaprTn,    .-.nu   for  the 

c  3  ..;t  r-.c^^  ;ri  of   vesse^:      *  -  -  order   in  J;- 

..1:      .     ,     with    Rtecl  ^       :  :^1  ?1 .  3Upolic- 


■-■  .te  jT    J'  •     ..    ■    .       :  ■"     "  lt"0 

it-  t--  -.--.ly    -o.    -./■■-    ^    .-..-.'  -  ■         .    .  r-t 


Fi.'.'.'  y^/u  'iiL  :  LJH 
11-11-41. 


1094  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


STRICTLY  CONFIDENTIAL 

I.  Commitments  to  be  'given  mutually  by  the  Governments 
of  the  United  Stat^p  and  Japan. 

(a)  The  (Vovernment  of  the  United  States  and  the 
Government  of  Japan  subscribe  to  and  actively  support 
the  following  principles  and  the  practical  aryollcatlon 
thereof  as  the  foundation  upon  which  their  relations 
with  all  other  nations  are  based: 

(1)  Respect  for  the  territorial  integrity  Bnd. 
the  sovereignty  of  each  and  all  nations. 

{?.)  Support  of  the  prlnr^lple  nf  non-interference 
in  the  internal  affaire  of  other  countries. 

(3)  Support  of  the  principle  of  equality, 
Including  equality  of  commercial  opportunity. 

(4)  Non-disturbance  of  the  g.t^gitug  aj^g  except 
®s  the  .states  fliia  may  be  altered  by  peaceful  means. 

(b)  The  Japanese  Gorernment  and  the  Governmsnt  of 
the  United  States  hereby  mutually  pledge  themselves 
that  Japanese  activity  and  American  activity  in  the 
Pacific  area  shall  be  carried  on  by  peaceful  means  and 
In  conformity  with  the  principle  of  non-dlacrlflslnatlon 
in  international  conunercial  relatione.   In  pursuance  of 
this  policy,  the  Japanese  Q-overnment  and  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  agree  to  cooperate  each  with  the 

other 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1095 


nref '^^    : 

II.    '■  rhe   oart   of   th^-  •  '    - '■■  "at. 

cessa- 


it^ama»m:S'iS'^*iS!^^a^x9s.sf^t^'^, 


1096    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


-5- 

«?* 
'J 

restoration  of  all  of  the  noraal  actlrltlea  of  national* 
of  the  United  States  In  China  and  Manchuria  and  for  the 
progresalre  relaxation  and  remoTal  of  all  restriction* 

on  the  actlTltles  of  nationals  of  the  United  States  In 
China  vh' ch  hare  been  Imposed  directly  or  Indirectly  as 
a  result  of  Jananese  military  activities  In  China,  and 
will  complete  this  program  as  rapidly  as  possible  In  ' 
order  to  provide  full  Implementation  and  practical 
application  of  the  principle  of  non-dlscriminatlon  In 
International  commercial  affairs. 

III.  Commitments  on  the  part  of  the  GoTernment  of  the 
United  States. 

The  GoTernment  of  the  United  States  will,  pari 
passu  with  the  removal  or  alterations  of  those  condi- 
tions and  slturtlous  In  the  Pacific  area  which  gave 
rise  to  the  taking  by  It  of  certain  -oolltical  and 
economic  measures,  alter  or  discontinue  those  political 
and  economic  measures. 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1097 

DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 
DIVISION   OF  FAR   EASTERN   AFFAIRS 

:xove:;.ber  15,    l^W.. 

>Ti J  CTUY  cc:tidzntial 

T  ere  1.-  <'=•:•: a  ■■-.";.  ■  ■^e.,jfij'ppo8Pl  vlilch  ^' 

'•■.'"'■'  -  r.-.e  proposal  stiii  '~ 

r ther  rev'glon  and  elaboretlon. )  ^ 
^ropQsai  is  the  aost  co-.£5truc-lve 

r 

-e  orooosal        9 


1098    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


STRICTLY   CGKFIDSMTIAL  :£K?ATIV£. 


OUT LI  IS 

^* 

FROFC 

5£D 

BASIS 

FOP  AaR; 

l-Ei*: 

ZKT ■ 5£ 

«^.,-r-. 

z:,  IHE 

UNITED 

O* 

AT'.d  A 

rx 

JhPAI-*' 

A 

On   it-    _    /      the   Gov'rnnient    :.        .  ^-       States 

oroposee   to   ta'sce    the    folloxvlr.j;   steos: 

1.    To  reduce    to   p   mr.Tial   footl  .':  var.   navel 

forces   nov  In  Pacific  vaterB,    wltho^.^'.    of   co.Tse    liiLlt- 
lig-   in   fry   ;;p-    'I'le    freed'  ^  *     '  of 

the   v^ov.-'r'naent   of   the  Ur.'tea   States   vith  re,?ard.   to   the 

'       '     '  '.lor.   of   naval    fi-rces   cf    the   un' ted   States. 

* 

r.    To   n£'-otlate   c  multiltaterel  non-a£::-rp<^rion  r.act 
'■  -  ■-  ,    China,    t;-.e  3.if  sh  Empire,  -s, 

Tliailan-  -.oviet   RuBBia. 

£.    To    -  ;■    to   the   Clilr.eee   Go\-   rnr;.ent   end.   to   the 

J^r'sneae  G-ovJi^,,ent    tliat   those  G-ovein.-.'-jnts   enter   into 
peacef."'       -         '     •  '_  -h  recarci   *:o   the    future    statue 

of    .-.Anch.r-ia. 

4.    To    enter    i  -tlptionB   •  -    B-!"lt'-h, 

concl.;  ■;  •;ch    3f   t-f-   Jov- 

■;lf    t,3    ,  "orial 

i  .       :       ch   Indoc- 

■•-;    develo-.    <  : -jrial   In- 

tei-frity   of  Indochina,    to   enter   Into   i.-n-ediate   consulta- 
tion  vlt:-;  a   vlev;  to   taking   such  measures  as  ir.ay  be 


e 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  1099 


deeded  necessary  ^n.-  "avl<=acl?  to  neet  t..e  f-rent  in 
Question.   Such  -  re  .-..t  would  -;>rovlde  --leo  Ihr.t   erch 
of  the  3-overn~er.ts   .  rt ,  to  the  r,tree:r.ent  v;ould  -.:.t 
seek;  or  ^-^cceT^t  t^ref erer.tirl  treat^.ent  in  its  tr'-^e  re- 
lations with  Ind^ochinp  and  would  u.-^e  its  influence  to 
obtain  for  each  of  the  si»-:iptories  niost-f avored-natlon 
treatment  in  trade  pnd  comnierce  with  French  Indochina. 

5.  To  give  up  all  extr.-^territorlal  rights  in  Ghin?, 
Including  rights  and  interests  in  and  with  regard  to  th. 
Internationai  Settlexents  at  Shanghai  and  Amoy,  and 
rights  under  the  Boxer  Protocol  of  1901. 

To  endeavor  to  obtain  the  agreement  of  the  British 
Government  to  give  up  British  extraterritorial  rlthts 
in  China,  Including  rights  in  International  settler^ents 
and  in  concessions  and  under  the  Boxer  rrotocol  of  1901. 

To  use  its  influence  toward  causing  the  British 
Ooveraisent  to  cede  Hong  Kong  to  China.   (This  provisio 
might  talce  the  form  of  an  undertaJcing  to  use  our  influ 
ence  with  the  British  G-overnraent  to  cause  the  British 
Government  to  sell  Hong  Kong  to  China,  the  purchase 
price  to  be  loaned  China  by  the  United  States.) 


n 


6,  To  reconmend  to  Congress  enactment  of  legislation 
to  amend  the  Immigration  Act  of  1924  so  as  to  place  all 
peoples  of  all  races  on  a  quota  basis. 

7.  To  negotiate  a  trade  agreement  with  Japan,  giv- 
ing Japan  (a)  raost-favored-nation  treatment  and  (b)  such 
concessions  on  Japanese  imports  into  the  United  States 


1100    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


- "         ■  '  \.  ^:>ill;  .:'d,    Incluulng 

'■iit    t'--,    I  •■  '        •■■  ^  :  re f*    ";  ist. 

lo    (■•liter   Into    r-     '    '-  ''^  .--4.,,„,^j.,    ^.^^g 

United    Strte?    '>nd    J:i-'-!.>    v;ll,.    i>'-..;rr  •  ..,'^,t_    policy 

olonr   the    llno'^    of    the    '.iraft   i.nadeJ  '.  i-^-^e   Aa^bas- 

sridor  on  November  15. 

3.    T  > -.1   to   J/.^'in   p    ^2,000,000,000  20-year    ■ 

•3^                ■  ■'ro':-t ,    ''                 ■           :■■■..'       ■  t    the 

ro  ■                  •  .      -^OOO    ')    I'epT   €•:■■                ;  th 

npprovnl   of  tho   Prerldent    of    the   United   Stnt'-^p. 

{::0T£:  T'--^   United   Statec    -should   be                ■  >d  to 
extend   -    r-l^nllnr  credit   to    Chin-i.) 

(IXTh:  f^ovlslon   nreBu:r-uly   viulu    reoulre 

:.        :■  vol.) 

p.  Ti  <^:-t  un  P  5"0::;,000,00:  '=t  i:  ilisation  fund 
n^ilf  ^'     I    .  "■  :   ,    :•;'  "nlted  Sf^tee, 

to  be  use<'i  for  "t"      .  1.1  i.r->tio:.  r-yen  rate. 

(nOTi:.:   T.>-  Unlied  Stnte?^  /;.    .-   -■   ired  to  act 
pl'^dlnrly  in  r'^-'->r.i  to  Chlnr.) 

{■:0T.:.:   "h-ls  :  ro  vision  m-y  r^^^ulre  C        ._-al 
'•onrovnl.  ) 

10.  To  rerove  "^  ■  '■  •^:'lr,   rp  -  trictloMP  on  Jaooneae 
fund 5  in  the  Unit f^- '  - 1  1 1 •? s , 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  1101 


B 
On  its  part  the  Gove'-r;!.' -,*  -f  Janan  proposes  to 
toke  the  follcving  ste^s: 

"I.  Tc  withdraw  all  allitsry,  navel,  filr  and  poirce 
forces  from  China  (excl-.Klir.g  r'.anchurla  —  eee  Separate 
provlrlors)  pn^   froa  Incochlna. 

?.'Tc  vithdrav  all      :  ^  —  xilltary,  political, 

econoM.  ic  —  froT,  or.y  :ovfi.\..':'."      r  regi  i.e  i".  Or',  na  ether 

than  the  G-ovei-niiient  of  the-  '  c  of  China 

vith  car.itpl  \f 

^.  To  .-  :   -::c^  9-     ■■-     :  e 

a^Teec    uoor".  -  ■^urlep    of    .  •      ^ 

^•■1*    •  ..  -  ze^=    all   J; 

«ci  5  -. ,    yer.   ,  .e    note?    cij  ^       -  .      . 

t.  io  ■  Ive  up  all  extraterrl toilal     •   in  China, 
i-ci  ■■  '     ■gi'-ts  ir,  international  pertb  .,.r,.t,e  «nd  con- 
cxif.f  \  '  ^  -  .  -   .    ■(■-:. 

fro:r.  kpnchurin 
exct-'  '.  for  r   -  -"acp"^ 


1102    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


Up   to    cO   ':ei^cent    zt   J/  ^f-.'f    Ow-'-r.t    -  ;       r       ,■    ■'  : 
IncluLlnfc    ;.?.vp]     :   :  .    .  _       .        ■  -  -    , 

perce;;t   be  si  3   ns    '...-"    U,  "  1  - .'    c  *. :     e '?    ,.r  y      .  :     ;  .  , 
undex'stooc    Z'r.p'..    :  ";"   U:.l^c,:    o".-:v;?   'Ill    ."'fll   J--    - 
rav:  .r.eterielp   rs    i:    ...r,/   le   r.ece3i-f-ry   f:.-   J:     ;..    t- 
for   tl;e  =  e    -^ur:-?    -^i. 

7.  To   negotiate   0  :^ultll£ '.erel   r.or.-s.  .-.  r.  '-si  _. 
vlth   ihe   urilted   SteceT,    Cr.inr.,    rl.-^   i,it',v 
Nethex'lpnds,    Th8il?nG   P!-,r.    oovl.t  R^s.-la. 

8.  To  remove    the   freezing-  regtrlcti:;.-.t=   en  A.. 
funds  In  Jaosn. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  1103 

NOTEMBEB  24,   1941. 

Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff : 
Subject:  Far  Eastern  Situation. 

A  conference  was  held  in  the  State  Department  at  9 :  45  a.  m.,  November  21, 
1941.  Present:  Secretary  Hull,  Dr.  Hornbeck,  Mr.  Hamilton,  Admiral  Stark 
and  General  Gerow.  Secretary  Hull  requested  the  Army  and  Navy  representa- 
tives to  express  their  informal  views  from  a  military  standpoint  on  a  draft  of  a 
tentative  outline  of  a  basis  for  agreement  with  Japan.  (Tab  A).  He  explained 
that  the  outline  was  in  a  formative  stage  and  had  not  been  adopted  by  the  State 
Department. 

The  various  provisions  were  discussed.  Both  Admiral  Stark  and  General 
Gerow  were  of  the  opinion  that,  in  general ;  the  document  was  satisfactory  from 
a  military  viewpoint.  They  requested,  however,  an  opportunity  to  make  a  more 
detailed  study  of  its  possible  effect  on  the  military  situation.  It  was  agreed  that 
comments  would  be  submitted  early  the  same  afternoon. 

The  comments  of  Admiral  Stark  (Tab  B)  and  my  own  (Tab  C)  are  attached.  I 
informed  Admiral  Stark  verbally  that  I  regretted  the  reference  to  Army  forces  in 
the  Navy  comments  on  provision  A  1.  I  feel  that  no  restrictions  should  be  placed 
on  Army's  preparations  to  make  the  Philippines  secure. 

I  informed  the  Secretary  of  War  and  General  Bryden  verbally  of  the  confer- 
ence. 

L.  T.  Gebow, 
Brigadier  Oeneral, 
Acting  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff. 

3  Incls : 
Tab  A. 
'   TabB. 
TabC. 

[Pencilled  notation  :]  Enclosures  not  reed  in  Records  Sec  for  recording.    JRB. 

[Pencilled  notation  in  margin  of  first  paragraph :]  Gen.  Marshall  was  out  of 
town.    (Initials  illegible.) 


1104    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


ShtHET 


Op- 10  Hu 


Navt  Department 

OFflCE  OP  THE  CBICT  OF  NAVAL  OPEBATtONS 

WASUINGTON  JTsovwaber  1941 


MBMORANPUM  FOR  THB  SBCRETABY 


'1^ 


Sub^aoti  Goauaeat  oa  "Outllae  of  Propos«d  Basis  for 

Agreement  bstvieen  the  United  States  aa& 
Japan,  of  November  19,  1941. 

I  respectfully  submit  the  following.  Reference  la 
made  to  aimilarly  numoered  sections  and  paragraphs.  Where 
paragraphs  are  not  mentl  ned,  concurrence  is  implied. 

far.  A-l»  i'arther  study  of  this  paragraph  'comf  iras 
the  feeling  I  expressed  to  you  this  morning  that  it  is 
unacceptable.   It  commits  the  United  States  to  naval  re- 
strictions wtttiout  imposing  compensating  naval  restrictions 
on  Japan.  I .think  under  no  ciroomstanoes  the  word  "reduoe" 
should  be  employed,  since  oar  naval  forces  in  the  Pacific 
are  inadequate  and  should  not  have  t6  undergo  additional 
loss  of  strength.  I  again  note  that  this  paragraph  makes 
no  reference  to  lend  or  air  components j  I  assume  this  was 
intentianal  and  of  course  I  wish  we  could  get  away  with 
it  but  I  doubt  It.   If  some  such  paragraph  is  necessary 
I  suggest  a  wording  approximately  as  follows: 

"Hot  to  increase  United  atates  com- 
batant nf5v.:l  (and  military)  forces  in  the 


to 
w 

i 

m 

01 
OJ 


^  i;iv.j.aied  the  (and  military)  in  case  they 
brin^.'  the  point  up  and  we  have   to  acquiesce.   I  strongly 
hope  that  present  pl'^na  for  rwrmy  increases  in  planes, 
which  will  be  largely  carried  out  by  1  t.;aroh,  could  be 
excluded  from  any  liratation  agree.-^aent  but  this  too  mis-cht 
have  to  be  aocepte;. 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1105 


Q» 


Par.  A-g.  As  I   mentloaed  this  morning  I  just  don't       5 
like  the  idea  of  our  buying  Hongkong  from  the  British  and     '. 
giving  it  to  China.  Ir  this  is  to  be  done  I  think  the 
British  at  least  oai=;ht  to  make  tiiis  contribution  to  a 
cause  more  important  for  the  British  Commonwealth  than  for 
the  United  States.  Portugal  should  likewise  give  up  litocao. 

Par.  A-8  &  9-  This  is  somewhat  out  of  K'avy  province  but 
I  assume  that  in  view  of  the  present  unfavoraole  financial 
status  it  has  been  considered  these  two  paragraphs  should 
be  Inserted.  I  can  realize  their  great  importance  and  the 
desire  to  have  them  form  an  inte.yal  part  of  any  agreement 
that  nis^t  be  reached. 

Par.  3-1.  Change  the  period  to  a  conma  and  add  the 
words  "including  Hainan,  ..lacao  and  the  ialanis  of  the  China 
Sea  to  the  southward  of  Formosa."  This  'would  include  among 
others  the  highly  important  opratley  Islands. 

Par.  B-2.  Suggest  the  following  addition  to  this  paragraph: 

"To  refrain  from  estabxishlng  or  supporting 
any  government  or  regime  in  Indo-China,  other 
than  the  regularly  established  French  Government." 

This  is  to  make  clear  our  objection  to  any 
puppet  regime,  etc. 

Par.  B-$.  I  doubt  the  usefulness  of  this  paragraph 
believing  that  it  would  prove  unacceptable  to  both  Russia 
and  Japan.  This  morning  I  expressed  it  -  "If  I  were  a 
Russian  I  would  not  trust  them."  If  good  faith  could  be 
assured  there  aicht  be  something  to  it.  I  believe  it  lalgJit 
better  be  left  out. 

Par.  B-6.  I  confirm  ay  comment  this  morning.  I  do  not 
believe  Japan  could  accept  it  and  certainly  not  with  regard  to 
their  naval  vei.sels;  it  would  be  a  humiliating  procedure  from 
their  standpoint;  I  would  not  mention  it.   There  might  be  some 
chance  of  utilization  of  some  of  their  present  shipping  if 
world  conditions  present  their  full  utilization  of  it.  nowever, 
this  merchant  shlppin.s  is  an  inte- ral  part  of  Japan's  economic 
system  and  naa  built  at  gr^at  expense  and  difficulty.  At  the 
most  the  only  proposal  I  woul'l  sulwit  would  be  to  buy  a 
specific  total  of  merchant  3hij>  tormage;  this  might  refer  only 
to  future  construction  if  present  construction  could  not  be 
obtained.  Chartering,  as  mentioned  by  some  one  this  morning, 
might  be  considered. 

Qeneral.  Hot  in  the  paper.  The  provisions  of  the  paper  may 
be  aasumei  to  abrogate  the  tri-partite  treaty  on  the  part  of 
Japan,  out  ii'  it  could  ue  specifically  so  stated  it  would  be 
helpful  on  tile  side  of  the  water. 


,.  yV7^Ci^w->f. 


1106    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


3S^K.'S'>'  Sia^SS*"16#  mJiJi.'Vji:&^\. 


WAR  DEPAFTTMENT 


SECRET 


WAH  PLAN*  DtVi«Km 
WASHINGTON 


HoTomber  21,   X941. 


V^ 


MKHORAHDUK  FOR   THE   SECHETAffY  CF  STATE  j 

Subject  J     F«r  Eaatem  Situation. 


i 


War  Pliuia   Di'vision  has  made  »  h*sty  study  from  a  military  view-  • 

point  of   your  tentative   "Outline  of  Proposed   Bases  for  Agreement  be-  <£. 

tween  the   United   States  end  Japan,"  and  perceives  no  objection  to  its  4^ 

use  as  fi  basis  for  discussion.     The  adoption  of  its  provisions  would 

attain  one  of  our  present  major  objectives  ~  the  avoidance  of  war  I      |\) 

with  Japan.      Even  a  tesiyortiry  peace   in  the  Pacific,  would  permit  us  to  j       CJ1 

complete  defensive  preparations  in  the  Philippines  tind  at  the  same  tiae  '      ■(*. 
insure  ooDtlnuanee  of  material    assistance  to  the  British  —  both  of  O 

which  are  highly  ifflportont.  I 

The  foregoing  should  not  be  construed  as  suggesting  strict  ad-  4^ 

,  iT  herenos  to  all  the   conditions  outlined  in  the  proposed  aKrecroent.     "Kar  *^ 

Plans  Division  wishes  to  emphasize  it  is  of  grave  importiince  to  the  OJ 

*: '  suoeess  of  our  war  effort  In  Europe  that  we  reach  a  Bodus  Vivendi  with  05 

Japan. 

War  Flans  Division   suggests  the   deletion  of  Par.   B.   -  S.      The 
proposal  contained  in  that  paragraph  would  probably  be  entirely  un- 
acceptable to  Russia.     The  geographical  lay-out  in  the  Uaschurlan- 
Siberlan  area  ia  such  that  military  time  and  space  factors  are  all  in 
favor  of  Japan.     Furthermore,    it  would  be  most  difficult   to  reach  an 
agreement  as  to  what  are  "equivalent  forces"  and  the  measures  to  be 
taken  to  insure  that  no  unauthorimd  increases  are  made  in  those  forces. 
Such   an   arrangement  would  Increase  the  vulnerability  of  the  Russian 
position,   particularly  in  the   Karitine  Provinces,    and  at   the    sane  tiae 
remove  the  very  real   threat   to  Japanese  cities   of  the  RusEian  Air  based 
therein.     From  the   V.   S.  viewpoint,    it  ia   greotly  to  our  advantage  to 
have  the  possibility  of  access  to  Siberian   airfields   securely  guarded 
by  a  pot«itial  ally. 

The  paper  has  been  considered  as  a  whole.      If  major   changes 
are  made  In  its  provisions,   it   Is  requested   that  the  fim-   Dapartaent 
be  given  an   opportunity  to   consider   the  military  aspects  of   such        -  '"' 

changes. 


SBCRii.x 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1107 


:it;.'    hiid    cons<-nuf>ntlv    this 
.c erf- '.ion.      Apr  Pls-as 
.    »  nt'    rifrws    exrr  en  *•»<:; 


k/       -r^  <^, 


79716  O— 46 — pt.  14 14 


1108    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


PaWILUE)  ICBIORANDtJll  OITBK  BT  THB 
PBSSIDSRT  TO   IHS  SB0B3TABY  Oy  STATK 
(HOT  DATED  BUT  PROBABLY  WRITTSN  SHORTLY 

arm  hotsmber  zo,  1941} 


M 
O! 

o 

I 

to 

04 
01 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1109 


/. 


''■V    jXi'- 


^f 


-'■  /. 


Oi'^'^'^/.ue    J/.M     '     '" 


y 


1110    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


IT  fl<n  V    tWKWt  nSMVT  u 


'4  i.^/.^>ii  W.VjTOii  y^k 


t^U^' 


Tsmimm 


loTSB^r  es.  1941. 


#lM  i^tprcflcmtatlvvt  of  Xh»  %vwrtaiMmt  of  tlw 
9mito4  ft«t«t  Mid  ef  th«  OoTtntttrnt  of  Japoa  taaTo  taoa 
(Munri'lac  oa  durlnf  tlM  past  atvoral  ■eatho  lafonul  aad 
txploratorjr  oearoraatleao  for  %ho  parpooo  of  arrlTlag 
•%  a  MtUoaoat  if  pooolMo  of  tho  qmootioao  rolatlac 
to  tlw  oatlro  Paolflo  aroa  teao4  upon  tho  prlneiplot  of 
lav  aad  ordor  and  fair  doalliy;  aaong  nations.     Thoto 
yrtaalploa  inalado  tiM  prlaoipla  af  iaTlolaMlity  of 
tarrttorial  latogritr  and  ■ovaralffnty  of  oaoli  aad  all 
a*%ioBi2  tho  priiiolpia  of  noa^lntarforonoo  ia  tteo  Ia- 
tarmal  affaira  of  othor  ooontrloa;  tho  prlnoiplo  of 
oqaallty,  Ualttdlag  o^aality  of  oooMroial  opportuaity 
aad  traatMsti  aad  tlM  i^riaaipla  of  rollaaoo  apoa  ia- 
taraatioMl  oa^oratloa  aad  ooaoiliatioa  far  tm  pr#- 
voatlaa  aad  paalfla  aottloaoat  of  aaatravaraioa  aad  far 
lapravottoat  ef  iatoraatloaal  ooaditloao  ^  poaoafal 
a«tlMda  aad  praaaaaat. 

9m 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1111 

On  lloT«Bb«r  20   tlM  Japaa^tt  AstettiiAor  iadi««t«4 
that  tti*  doTcnuMBt  of  Japaa  !•  d*«lrott»  9t  folaff  •!»•»& 
with  fttoh  a  prograa;  that  tb*  AoMattle  polltiMl  •!««». 
tioR  within  Japan  la  oztr^nt;  and  that,  in  orAar  to  flTO 
tha  Japan* so  OoTanmant  eppartttaitr  to  doTtlap  aaA  pra« 
aot«  public  aontiaaat  in  Japan  in  auppert  of  a  amt^o- 
honalTe  and  liboral  profraa  of  paaaa  tuah  aa  hat  baan 
undor  dlfiouaalon  batvaan  oar  tvo  SoTamaanta,  it  aeald 
ba  halpfvl  if  thara  aould  1m  takan  aoaa  Initial  stapa 
toward  raaoaptlon  of  trada  and  noraal  Intaraoaraa  ba- 
twean  Japan  and  tha  Unitad  Stataa.  At  that  tlaa  tha 
Japanaaa  Aabaaaador  ooaattnieatad  to  tha  Saeratary  of 
Btata  propoaala  in  ragard  to  mmtigva^*   to  ba  takon  r«<- 
apaetlvaly  hj   tha  CbTamaaat  of  Japan  and  b]r  tha  (loYam<» 
aant  of  tha  Dnltad  fltataa,  whlah  aaaauraa  ara  aiidar- 
atood  to  hara  baan  daaignad  to  oraata  an  ataoaphara 
faTorabl*  to  puraulng  tha  oonvaraationa  tmioh  hava  baan 
takinj^  plaoa.  Thaaa  propoaala  oontain  faaturaa  vhi«^ 
froa  tha  point  of  Tlav  of  tho  OoTamaant  of  tha  Unitad 
Stataa  present  diffioultlaa  in  T9tmrmn99   to  tha  broad- 
gauga  orinciplaa  tha  praotioal  applleatloa  of  i^loh  r«p- 
raeanta  the  dOHires  of  both  (Hsrernaanta  aa  aanifaaiiad  in 
current  oonYoraationa.  In  aa  auoh  as  tha  Sovamaaat  of 

tha 


1112    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


t^  li«l%#A  itftt«e  ft««ty«»  lf#  mn%r%m%%  te  tm  p^mm  «f 
thm  ?*«irid  ikr««  abA  to  «ff©r«  fr^ry  «pp«rt«Mty  %« 

tfe«  »iilt«fl  St«t«ii  0rf»i*«  f&r  th«  »@»«t«.#r*ti#r 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  1113 


-4- 
H0IHJ8  VIVENDI 

1.  Th«  OoTemmont  of  th«  United  St<it««  and  th« 
&oTernm«nt  of  Jftpan,  both  b«ing  solioltou*  for  th*  p«&9* 
of  th«  Paoiflo,  Affirm  that  th«lr  nattlonal  pollol««  «r« 
dlrootvd  toward  lasting  and  axtonalYa  p«ao«  throughout 
tha  i'aolflo  araa  and  that  thay  hav*  no  territorial  daiilgnt 
tharaln.   Thay  undartaka  raolprooally  not  to  maka  by  foro* 
or  threat  of  foroe»  unleee  they  are  attaoked,  any  adTanoe- 
ment,  from  polntu  at  vhloh  they  have  lallltary  eatabll8hinenta« 
noroee  any  International  border  In  the  Paolflo  area. 

2.  The  Japanese  Oovejmment  undertakea  forthwith  to 
withdraw  its  armed  forces  now  stationed  in  southern 
Frenoh  Indoohlna,  not  to  engage  In  any  further  reilitarx 
activities  there,  Inoludlng  the  construotion  of  military 
facilities,  and  to  limit  Japanese  military  forces  in 
northern  French  Indochina  to  the  number  there  on  July  26, 
1^41,  which  number  in  any  case  would  not  exceed  26,000 
and  which  number  would  not  be  subject  to  replaoenent. 

3.  The  Government  of  the  United  States  undertakes 
forthwith  to  remove  the  freezing  reetrlotions  iriiioh  were 
placed  on  Japanese  assets  In  the  United  Statee  on  July  26 
and  the  Japnnese  Oovernment  agrees  simultaneously  to  re- 
move the  freeilng  measures  which  it  imposed  in  regard  to 
Amerlonn  assets  in  Japan.   Exports  from  each  oountry 
woulci  thereafter  remain  subject  to  the  respective  export 

control 


1114    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


eontrol  rpo^suran  whloh  ©aoh  country  -'"y  h'-np  In  effect   for 
reasons  of  national  ^»f«ns». 

4.  "^e  Oov®rru8«»nt  of  the  Hnit*^   States  und#rtr,,\<»« 
forthwith  to  pT»pro«oli  the  Bpitl<»h  and   th«  Dutch  Ocvern- 
ments  with  «  viet-r  to  thoffe  <>ovemf»»nt8*    taklnp-,    or.  a 
bftsie  of   ywplprcolty  with  Jf-pan,    meneur^B   similar  to  thoit 
provide*^  fnr  In  p^racr.-*?*!  thr*«»  abovw* 

5,  Thp  OoTwwiment  of  the  United  ^itrtfti  would  not 
look  vlth  di.efpvor  upon  tb«  Inr'ugumtlon  of  oonvartatloni 
batween  the  &overnmftnt  of  Chlnp   rn<*  th©  C>ovemi««nt  of 
Japan  fllrect»rt  toward  ?»  p^jreful   Eottlement  of  their 
aifferenc#B  nor  woul^  t^e  OoTernfjient  of  the  United  9tat«i 
look  vith  fll«fpTor  upon  i»n  rrmlttlce  <!urlng  th»  period 

of  any   puoh  <11(«o«»mlonj».      The  fundpnMrntRl   interest  of  the 
^vtrnm«nt  of  the  0nlt«4  Ststee  In  reference  to  eny  tuoh 
dlsou88lone  ie   slwply  that  they  be  beeed  upon  and  exeaqpllff 
the  funflomentnl  principle*  of  reace  %rtiloh  constitute  the 
oentrel  spirit  of  the  current  oor.Terertione  betiwen  the 
Sovernraent  of  Jep«n  and  the  ftovernfflent  of  the  Unlte<i 
States. 

In  08B«  pny  auoh  di«cuB8ion«  are  entered  Into  between 
the  Government  of  Jsp*%n  Rnd  the  Govemaient  of  China,   the 
aovernffient  of  the  United  States  1»  agreeable  to  euch  dle- 
ouseione  teklng  plaoe  in  the  PMllppine  Islands,    if  so 

deeireA 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  1115 


d«8lr*<l  by  both  China  anA  Japan. 

6.   It  la  tmuaratood  th&t  thla  iactftyyl  yi^*nai  la  of  a 
temporary  natura  and  shall  not  ramaln  In  affaot  for  a 
'period  longar  thifiti  thraa  months  unlaaa  ranawad  by  oowaon 
agraamant. 


1116    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


i&sji  mnwttiisi^i 


mwmmv  m,  it^i, 


IXMM  ^.mmmam  wamm  fm, 


m£Mj*mmmiMMmm.M:immMtMm: 


KCHiwl  1 fiii.¥i8fftifcriJrWlBMtftl*wlt.i,Sn    ffiWiiiiiiiB»i 

««at  of  impmrn  teoth  iNiLug  «©liQlt«ni«  f»3r  tJNr  |»«at««  ®r  tii# 
?»@iri«  mftirm  thAt  tl»«lr  a«tl©a«a  i»oIl«l«»  me*  S4r«e%#4. 

4Mr*«,   that  t)Msr  h«¥«  no  ttrritarial  S«8liii»  la  lli«le;.  «r«m, 
that  %h»f  hm'W9  no  ii^ttfttlon  of  tt!r**t«aliif  Qtirnr  ootuk- 

praetieal  *pplle«t;io«  %®  t&»  follevlnf  fa»awi««%iil 
prinei    "  •<$»  whlth  tli»ir  relation*  with  amtik  @%h»r 

•nd  V.;..-  «...   .^thsr  f0v«rtai«Bt«  »p«  b«««dj 

.^  »cT«3*«lf35ty  of  «aefe  ana  all  smtloai. 

f  a©«~lattrf#i^R»«  Iss  th«  iattnuOL 
...-r  «s©uatrl«f. 

j"h«  prlnel'olif  af  ©duality,   ineluAiaf:  •quail tf  of 

C4) 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1117 


-2- 


(4)  Tta*  prlnelpl*  of  r«llait««  upon  intoraatioaal  eo<- 
op«r«tion  and  oonelliatioa  for  tht  pr«T9ation  aaA 
paoifle  tottlomaat  of  eoatroTar«i»s  and  for  la> 
proToaent  of  Intamational  ooadltiona  by  paaoafal 
aathodt  and  Droeattat. 

Tha  OoTemaant  of  Japan  and  tba  OoTerwiant  of  tha 

Unltad  Statas  ha^a  agraad  that  toward  allalnatlnc  ahronla 

polltieal  Instability,  prtTanting  raeurraat  aaoaoaie 

eollaoaa,  and  proriding  a  bail*  for  paaaa,  thay  vlll 

aatlTOly  auppert  and  oraotlaally  apply  tha  follovlns 

orlnelplat  In  thair  aeonoale  ralationa  vlth  aaah  othar 

and  vlth  othar  nations  and  paoplat: 

(1)  Tha  prinaipla  of  aon-ditarlaiBation  In  intar- 
national  ooottarelal  ralationa. 

(?)  Tha  prineipl*  of  intamational  aaoaoaie  ooopara- 
tion  and  abolition  of  aztraaa  natlonaliaa  aa  ax« 
Drattad  in  axoaaaira  trada  raatriotioaa. 

(5)  fha  prineipla  of  non-ditarlalnatory  aoaaaa  by 
all  nations  to  rav  aatarial  auppliaa. 

(4)  Tha  prineipla  of  full  protaetloa  of  tha  intar- 
aata  of  eonsuaini;  eoontrlaa  and  populationa  aa 
regards  tha  operation  of  intamational  ooaaodity 
agreeaenta. 

(6)  The  rrlneiple  of  astabllalniant  of  aua^  lnatittt> 
tions  and  arrangaaenta  of  interttational  fiaanea 
aa  Bay  lend  aid  to  the  eanantial  enterpriaea 
and  the  oontinuoua  deraloptaant  of  all  oountriea 
and  say  perait  payaenta  through  proeesaea  of 
trade  conaonant  with  the  waif are  of  all  oountriea. 


1118    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


■3- 


Saotlon  II 


3t»P9  to  b>  Tmken   by  the  ^Qvemniant  of  th»  Unlf^ 


A 
Th9  Ooverruaent  of  th«  United  -'t-^tes  proposes  to  take 
eteps  as  followe: 

1.  To  endeavor  to  conclude  p   multilateral  non-«ggre«8ion 
pact  with  Japunt    China,  the  Bfltleh  Kapire,  the  Netnerlande, 
Thailand  and  the  Soviet  Union. 

2.  To  suggest  to  the  Chinese  OoTemment  and  to  the 
Japcneee  GoTemment  that  those  (Joyemments  enter  into 
peaceful  negotiations  with  regard  to  the  future  status 
of  Manchuria. 

3.  To  enter  into  negotiations  with  the  British, 
Chinese,  Dutch,  Thai  and  Japanese  Qovemmenta  for  the 
oonolusion  of  an  agreement  thereunder  each  of  the  C^ot- 
emments  would  pledge  Itself  to  respect  the  territorial 
integrity  of  French  Indochina  and,  in  the  event  that 
there  should  develop  a  threat  to  the  territorial  integ- 
rity of  Indoohlna,  to  enter  into  iareediate  ooneultation 
with  a  view  to  talcing  euoh  measures  as  may  be  deeaed 
necessary  and  advisable  to  meet  the  thz^eat  in  question. 

Such 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  1119 


SKieh  acreestnt  v^ulA   provide  also  that  •»©h  of   th«  Skj-r- 

•rna«nt«  party  to  th«   a^«««eR%  wouia  not  ••«!(  or  ««««pt 
pr«fer«nti»l  tr8«t«»Rt  In  lt«  tr»««  or  »eono«l®  riil«~ 
tlon*  with  Indoehlna  «ina  would  ui»»  It*  laflu«ne»  %&   ob- 
tain for  eaeh  of  the  «ignctorla«  aqualitjr  of  traatsant 
ia  trad*  ikn<\   comaerca  with  Franeh  Indoohlna. 

4.  To  flva  up  all  extratarrl torlal  right*  In  China, 
Including  rights  and  lntar#it«  In  and  with  regard  to  t.<, 
International  Sattleaenta  at  Shan^^hai  mnd   Aaoy,  and 
rights  under  the  Boxer  Protoool  of  1901. 

To  endeavor  to  obtain  th«  agreement  of  the  British 
and  other  govemaents  to  give  ud  extraterritorial  rlghta 
In  China,  including  rights  In  international  settleaenti 
ani  in  eonceeeions  and  under  the  Boxer  Protocol  of  190l. 

5.  To  enter  Into  negotiations  with  Japan  for  the 
conclusion  of  a  trade  agreeaant  between  the  two  caun- 
triee,  "based  r         ■•>oal  mo  at- favored- nation  treat- 
ment and  reduniion  of  trade  barriers  by  t«>th  oountrlee. 
Including  an  undertaking  by  the  United  States  to  bind 
raw  «tiiR  on  tiie  free  list. 

6. 


1120    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


6.    To  Agi»«©  «poR  «  pl&n  for  th«  stabllitation  of 
th«  dollar-f«n  rat*,    irlth  the  allooAtlon  of  ftin^i  «p  to 
f500,CXK),000  for  thif  -purpotff   half  to  be  •upFli*^  by 

Japan  and  half  by  th#  Unitad  Stata*. 

?»   To  reaioYt  th»  fr««iilng  rastriotions  on  Japaiiaaa 
fundi  In  th«  Unitad  3tat««. 

S.    To  taka  staps,   upon  the  eoneluaion  of  thii 
agre«sant  and,  upon   the   signing  of  tha  jEultllataral  aon- 
aggrasslon  paot  fsantionad  und«r  item  on*  abov«,   dlrtotad 
tewartl   tarmlnation  of   th«  Nine  pQwmr  traaty  ralatlng  to 
Frlnoiplcs   a.m  rolioi««  oonctj*nlng  3hlna  ilgnad  at 
Washilngton,    February  6,   1982. 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1121 


-6- 

B 
The  •■Government   of  '~opo"<»8    to    t.">-«»    et"^ 

follows : 

1.  To   w*thf'rnv   ill    -illt«ry,    n«T«l,    nlr  nnd    pollo« 
forc»«   from   Ch.inp    ('•■^olvKUnF   M.onohurla   --   se*   p«-pr.r"t« 
nrovlulon  A-g)    '  nd  frose  Int"!oohln>». 

2.  "^o   withdr=!w  <-4jl    Rupport  —  .Tllltf ry,    po31tlc^l, 
"oonomlc  —  fron'  f*ny  government  or  r«gl««  In   Chln^   a''h<»r 
than  the  National  C>overnment  of   the  Hepubllo  of  Chin» 
vlth   cwpltsl    temDorftrlly   nt   Chungking. 

3.  To  give  up   '11   extraterritorial   rlghte   in  China, 
Incluc'lnp-  rlghtp   in  intern-'tlonfll    settl^^-'-nt «   «nd   oon- 
oeeslorx   «n<'    rli-fht«  under  t're   Hoirer  ^'rotoool. 

^,    To   ♦^ndeovor  <"■->   '^-'•'C'^  Md"  "  ^  1  "--t^r*!   non- 

.  .  I  •^'' el  0,';    ■  «f"^     -.it  ..the 

British  ■^mp.lr'^',  '-fiet 

Hnlon. 

5.    To   r>  rf>stri''tlon«i  on  Aaierlo/in 

funds   in   J«r»ri. 

'  ;.      •  .•    .'.*■    *  .-n- 

olude-  ■    temb*»r  2'!^,    1^40   n  ,->'-"!!-'   -■'n.r'-.n.  snd 

Itrl.,    -  ..';11   not  be  interpreted 

Htere€.:.u..t,    the   astaj-il^hrr:.?'  ^  "<»3-rTatlon  of  p«moe 

throughout   the  J'Aciflo  ares. 


1122    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE  """" 

—  ^^' 

Memorandum  of  Conversation 

DATrKOVSiBSH  22,    1941 
SUBJECT:        JAPANESE  PRDPOaAL  FOR  A  MODUS  VIVEHDI  AND  SyOQESTBD  REPLY 

PARTICIPANTS.-    SSCr2!SAK£  Hlrt^L,    THE   BRITISH  Ai-IBASSADOR,    LORD  HALIFAX, 
THS  AUSTRALIAN  MIIIISTSR,    RICHARD  S.    CASEY,    THE 
I.'ETHERUUJDS  MINISTER   ,    DR.   A.    LOUDOK.    AND  THE 
CKi:;S3S  AiiBASSADOR,    DR.    HU  SHIH 

',  f  '. 

COPIES  TO:  /- 

r 

The  British  Ambassador,  the  Australian  ;:inl8ter  and 
the  Netherlanda  Minister  called  at  my  request,  the  Chinese 
Aabassador  Jolnlne  us  later  on.  1  enuraerated  the  high 
points  In  the  conversations  which  I  have  been  carrying  on 
with  the  Japanese  officials  here  since  the  soring  of  this 
year.  They  are  fully  set  forth  In  records  of  my  oonveraa- 
tlone  during  that  time  and  need  not  be  repeated  here. 

'  I  concluded  with  an  account  of  the  Japanese  proposal 
for  a  modus  vlvendl .   I  showed  It  to  them  to  read,  with 
the  exce;3tlon  of  the  Chinese  Ambassador  who  had  not  yet 
arrived,  and  then  pi^oeaded  to  outline  my  proposed  reply 
in  the  nature  of  a  substitute  for  the  Japanese  proposal. 
There  seemed  to  be  general  agreement  that  a  substitute 

w»e 


to 
ro 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE 


1123 


was  more  desirable  than  a  speolfic  reply  to  the  Japanese 
proposal,  section  for  seotlon.  The  substitute  reply  was 
substantially  what  le  contained  In  the  present  final  draft, 
which  I  am  conalderlng  handing  to  the  Japanese.  Each  of 
the  gsn'^lea'en  present  eeeraed  to  be  well  pleased  with  this 
preliminary  report  to  them,  except  the  Chinese  Aabassador, 
who  was  soiaewhat  disturbed,  as  he  always  is  when  any  ques- 
tion concerning  China  arises  not  entirely  to  hie  way  of 
thinking.  This  reaction  on  his  part  is  very  natural.  He 
did  not  show  serious  concern  in  view  of  the  provision  in 
our  proposed  modus  Vivendi  which  would  block  a  Jananeae 
attack  on  China  in  order  to  destroy  the  Purma  Hoad.  He 
inquired  whether  this  would  comnit  the  Japanese  not  to 
further  invade  China  durinc  the  coning  tliree  months,  to 
which  I  replied  in  the  negative,  addl<ig  tlmt  this  was  a 
question  to  be  decided  under  the  pennanent  agreement  now 
receiving  attention.  I  made  it  clear  that  this  proposal 
was  made  by  the  Japanese  and  that  there  was  probably  not 
one  chance  in  three  that  they  would  accept  our  reoly  even 
though  it  does  provide  that  this  proposed  temporary 
arrangement  constitutes  a  part  of  the  general  conversa- 
tions looking  toward  a  general  agreement  on  the  basic 
questions. 


C.H. 


S:CH:AR 


79716  O — 46— pt.  14- 


-15 


1124    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


HZl^iA'xl'iE 


jKlif  ''- 

Ko  veinb  e  r  24,    1 ".  4 1 


EXHIBITS    OF    JOINT    COMMITTEE  1125 


1126    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


,    cc:j- 


;i  i 


'•■    i-C".    =■  c'      } -•::'..■      -it    ,.■  ;■    .-ec'  ':'"..,    Z:J''^    Lz    Ir    co  "'■■1 1;:;':^; . 

ri;p     ■'•.\''--         •  »:    of    ';;;e   I'nltec    3trit;"'i'     ':     ear^nrrtly 
cerirc    ■'    r,^    - :    :,rl.lut-^    to    tii^     "■'■'o~ -- tion    :  •    .    -■  l-iten-^nce 
of    ■~«-  ce    1  r.    ■.:::^^-   ppclflc   area  r-r.d    tc    rff or,"    tW'r;-    c^    ortunlov 
for    ul.-'-    cci.tlriii.- noe    of   v.  1  ecus  si  on?    '■•It,:,   t.:--    J^      ;;.-:■ 
5overr;"C'  t;    vlirffitei"    tov^-Tw   '•'orkiri  '    our,    :■    l:r'0"'^:     :m--c    ~ro~ 
^^~    of    -e.-ce    t;:r-:;u -l-.out    t'e   Frclflc    rr»-^a.      '.'/ith   these 
ends    in  viev;,    the   Scverri-^ent   of    I'-.c  UnluPd   States   offers 
for    tLe    conpluerptlon    of   the  Jni-'neje   3overn-:ient    an 
ftlternptlve   su,c"-cstion   for   a   terc^'^orpry  t. o clu s   vlvendl .  - 

"  S     foil  O'-'t'  ". 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  1127 


. IV£wDI 


1.   The  3-overnment  of  the  United  Strtes.  nnd  the 
C>overn.T. -tit  of  Cjinoi':,  t..ot;.  L-sir.  -  pollcltoufi  for  the  peace 
of  tiie  Pacific,  r<f:'lrm  *   •  '  _  ir  n;!tional  policies  pre 
directed  towprd  lastin;^  rnd  extensive  peace  tixrout'hout 
the  Pnclfic  area  snc  th.^t  they  have  no  terrltorlsl  designs 
ther>eln. 

C.   Th'-y  undertr>.'  reclTorocolly  not  to  make  from 
re,  lor.v  in  whic:i  they  hove  military  eets    lishments  any 
r.J;v.".nce  ly  force  or  f.:rent  of  force  into  any  areas  in 
3  i:.;' ;:-nE*:ern  or  lioi-thv.-eotern  Asia  or  in  the  southern  or 
*.:.;'  :.'--thern  Pacific  prea. 

.'' .   Th'^  •^r---.  J-overnment  undertakes  forthwith  to 

withdraw  its  -.r-ed  'orces  now  str-tioned  in  southern 
Freno;.  In--3:..i:.a  or.:   r.ot   to  I'enlace  those  forces;  to  re- 
duce trx-    to'.rl  of  i'e  forces  in  French  Indochina  to  the 
naT.ter  th<^re  o..  dul;;  .IC,    1941,  which  number  in  any  case 
nirll  not  ex.^eed  2.  ,000;  and  not  to  pend  additional  forces 
to  Indochi;.'-'  for  rooj.ace"ents  or  otherwise. 

4.   Th.;  'j-jvoi^nm^nt  of  the  United  Strtes  undertpjtee 
f  orthv.'ith  tc  modify  the  noolic-  ".ior.  of  its  existing 
freeiiin-"  oni   export  restrictio..?  to  the  extent  necees.-ry 
to  oer:-it  txie  follov;!-.  -  r'':;u.mTDtlon  of  trcde  hetveen  the 

United 


1128    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


-5- 

United  States  and  Japan  in  articles  for  the  use  and 
needs  of  their  peoples: 

(a)  Iir.porte  from  Japan  to  be  freely  permitted  and 
the  proceeds  of  the  sale  thereof  to  be  paid  into  a 
clearing  account  to  be  used  for  the  purchase  of  the 
exports  from  the  United  States  listed  below,  and 

at  Japan's  option  for  the  payment  of  interest  and 
principal  of  Japanese  obligations  within  the  United 
States,  provided  that  at  least  two- thirds  in  value 
of  such  imports  per  n.onth  consist  of  raw  silk.   It 
is  understood  that  all  Araeri can-owned  goods  now  in 
Japain  the  movement  of  which  in  transit  to  the  United 
States  has  been  iriterrupted  following  the  adoption 
of  freezint:  rneasurep  shall  be  forwarded  forthwith  to 
the  United  Ststes. 

(b)  Exports  fro-  the  United  States  to  Japan  to  be 
permitted  -.s  fcllowc: 

(i)  lies  for  ^'■esFels  engaged 

^r  and  for  such 
•ecFels         in  other  tr?des  as  the  two 
^  0  '•  • 

(ii)   -  roducts  from  the  United 

3t;!tet       -t.  to  such  limitationn  as   the  apnro- 
T)rtf-te  -ut;.  r-tles  .xay  prescribe  in  rescect  of 

commodities 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1129 


-e- 


cor.-.odltles    Ir    s.orl 


--]■•    \-    '-    -    U'lt-'-d   States. 
(ill)      Haw   cotton   fro      t  .      -,.:--   -trtef    to   t?^e 
extent    o-f    .,5':3,'./JC    in  value   ner   T.-nth. 
(iv)    Medical   and  ohariHRceutlcpl    suodII'  r    sub- 
ject   t^    cucn   llmitrtlonc    ?:■    the    ---roori- te 
ou"  .'.rl* -^'s   lary  ■'prescribe    In  resnect   cf   co:r.- 
r;.o_..^'--       m   ?:--ort    Bun-nly   in   t:'if>   United   States, 
(v'    Fetrol'^um.      Tne    United   ^tr-tes    •.■:■-.'-     ^    .■  .it 
the    ex'^ort    to  J?'nsn    vf   '-'■^troleuir.  unon   a   monthly 
bar^lf    ■^or   civilian   ne^^ds,    th'--   -oro-nortionote   ar.ount 
of        -,"    ;,     •     -  -x-^orted    fro-n   tne   United   St<!te8 

for    ^uch    n-^eds    t.   b.>    deter::iined    --rter   cor.sulta- 
tion  wit  .   the   British   pv.  '    '-  .f"    'Jute:;    -iov^ern-ents. 
It   i6   understood   th,'»t   by    civilirn   needs   in  Jaoan 
Ir   ~    -int    pucn  rvurnoseE   nr    t  .e    onerptioh   of   the 

:■    '.    'y       ""        *;■•:.••  ort    rv^tPrr;,    l'.:*:lr.:-, 
-■''■'  1:    I'^r'Tl"'!    ■  :' ^  cul tur."!    Ui-''-'S,    .''ad 

ot:.'-r   Giviii,';n   uses. 

(vi)  Tne  p.ov-  -i -.r^  ■!  "-ounts  of  '^X'jorts  m,-^y 
V,:.  «,•,.., ,v!'^fd  ;  ..  .  •  :  r^onr:^0;li*  ICF  a  ded 

, 'T.t  :,etv   .  *.  ■  ■      •.'•-■rar.iente  rs"  it 
■,   .-  .  ■        -  -ion  of  thlK 

aK'ree.aent  i."  furtherln--  the  neacefjl  pnd  eouitahle 

solution 


1130    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


-7- 

eolution  of  outBt;  iiCiin.  ■  ,roble:r.s  la  the 
Ppclflc  prer. 
5.   Tiie  Joverrii..ent  of  Jpnan  uacert'  >er  f ort-n-.-lth 
to  moclify  the  .-^pDllcptlon  of  it'^  frl?tlw.  rrc-rl:-)-  mo. 
export  resti'lctioris  to  the  extent  cecevcpry   to  permit 
the  refiunption  of  trade  betvreen  Jnpan  and  the  United 
St^^tten  "S  provided  for  in  nr.r?.L'i'"Ph  four  above. 

G.   The  Government  of  the  United  States  undertakes 
forthv;ith  to  n^;proach  the  Austrrllrn,  ::;rltish  and  Dutch 
Govern-T.ents  v:ith  r,  view  to  those  G-overnn-.ents '  taking 
rnenFurec-  Bin-.llar  to  those  i^rovided  for  in  paracraph  four 
above. 

7.   With  reference  to  the  current  hostilities  between 
Japan  and  China,  ti.e  fundamental  Interest  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  in  reference  to  any  discusBlons 
vhich  rnr.y  be  entered  into  betveen  the  Janpiiepe  ana  the 
Chlner-e  G-overnir.ents  Is  simply  that  tr.ese  dlpcussions  and 
any  settlement  reached  ae  t-  result  tr.ereof  be  based  upon  and 
exenolify  the  funuamental  prlnclpleF  of  peace,  Inw,  order 
rnd  Justice,  which  constitute  the  central  spirit  of  the 
current  conversations  betveen  the  Government  of  Japan 
and  the  Sovernment  of  the  United  States  and  which  are 
rpplicable  uniformly  throughout  the  Pflcific  area. 

8.   Thle  mpdus  Vivendi  shall  remain  in  force  for  a 
period  of  three  months  with  the  understanding:  that  the 

two 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  1131 


I't'cr    r-    :  ;■     co'ifs^r      ■  ■<.-'    of    eltrer   to 

.  .  '  i-:     ...    v.et.icj'    X:  f    :i-:h.,QClr    :>•;    reacin,     a    ■  eaceful 
ftetliPHPnt    c-->vrrl         ^     .    .a^iii'e   i-"clfic   area   .'ustify 

^^S  llIS^AL   ^'^  :'   furtr.er  period. 


1132     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


STRICTLY  GONPIDSNTIAL      , 

November   24,    1941 

OUTLINE  OF  PROPOSED   BASIS   FOR  AGRSEME?IT 

Section    I 

Drart  Mutual  DQclar&tlon  of  Policy 

The    Gavei'nxaertt    of   the   United  States   and   the   Govern- 
ment  of  Japan  both  being  aolicitoua   for    the   peace   of   the 
Pacific   affirm      that   their  national   policies    are   directed 
toward  lasting  and  extensive   peace  throughout   the   Pacific 
araoi,    that   they  liave  no  territorial  designs   in  that  area, 
that    they  havo  no  intention   of  threatening     other  coxon- 
tries    or  of  usin/^  military   force  ar.greaa  .vely  agairsst    any 
neighboring  natiun,    and    that,    ac.-.ordingly,    in    their  na- 
tional policies    they   will  actively   3upi  ort   and  give 
practical   application    to  the    following   fundaniontal 
prlncip-f'3    u;."  II   v.-liich   tlioir  rel  ■       ;■ 

and  wl ih 

iiity    oj 


^-r     4- 


.r;  alra    uf    ci.: 


1 1 


S) 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  1133 


(?)   Z)\Q    .rincipltj   of   e.iuality,    i:icludln^;  equality  of 
coia'.orciul   oi-portunlty   and    troatncnt, 

(4}    The    principle    oi'   relijinco    upon    ifitornai  i' i.ul    co- 
o;;oration  and   conciliati    n   for   the   prevention   aid 
■uicli'ic   settler.ient   of  controversies   and    ''or  iin- 
provoment    of   international  conditions      ';/  r>oricoful 
;Tv.:titod3   an-,   proceasoa, 

-he  -JOve  mninnt  of  Japan  and  the  r/ovornnet.t  of  tlx 
nited  Jta'en  have  a(:r.;-  d  tliat.  t.wari  eiiminatinij  chronic 
;:!0.itical  ir:s  tab!  li  ty,  ;  r  •  vontinf';  r>^curront  ocononlc  col- 
la]  ue,  an.;  ■  -  -i  .  >  baa^.s  for;£;ace,  Ihay  w'll  i-tivoly 
sup.  ort;  "ally  a]-  ly  tlie  followin-  principles  in 
thc'l:  oach  other  arid  with  other 


of   non-d iiicrininatio 


n  €-::co33lv- 


1134    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


Se^ctlon    II 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1135 


1136    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


to    the    C'r.  1*. PRP 
thfl'.    thnpe    '^o\" 


-5- 


'-ited    Ststep   will    ^ufreet 


np  1 1 '  r.    tre  s  * 
both    co'jrtr' 


*f    tr»de  bRrrl«"rf   bv 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1137 


1138    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


DEPARTMENT  C    STATE 


f 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE 


1139 


Telegram  Sent 


iruii  tii« 

Collfct  jO.y  Wtfc 

[mjiht  letter 
Ct»r^e  Ocpartmentt 
Full  rale 

0»)f   l»ttlT 

Nipilt  l«tt«r  .^-    A, 


Qi^O 


Bppartntent  of  ^tatr 


TO  Mt  -mAMMITTEf) 

X  conriocHTiAi.  coot  X 

MOMCOMriDCNTIAL  0OO« 

runum 


njkii 


1k«  rtk't 


•    ■-•i,    1941 
3.   "AVAL   P2H30N. 


-■ner.e    AT.'.:''S3;'.lor    oommunlcntftd   to 
vcnii.      ':  •■■■'^re-'entsd   t-^t 

i::ii  Xill-  ■■      ■    t      Ive    t':i?    J'-o-nc; 

•   ~  -  .Ic    pcntiment    In  Jaonn 

Ive    orotTf.'.   of   "jeroe 
;,r:f   do-Tietttic     5.vlJ.t,lo?l 
-'    to   rende:-   ur  -en ',    s't-.e 

■  >-osnl.      "  -    •  1 


Sfnf  ^y  opfraim 


79716  O — 46 — pt.  14 16 


1140    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


_.  ^  TO  BC  TKANSMimO 

TELEGRAM  SENT  «)wipeim«.  coot 

1f»tl  r»t«  : liONCOWIOCMTIM.  COO* 

0*}  latter  punMn 

!.*<.» !,««  ®Miarttt«nt  of  #tate  ~..- 

Ckvf*  0«|»rtin*ntt  ' 

0«y  letter  '^  rr»««.««wfc 

Ntglit  letter 
Ctiarge  to 

J      toward  obtaining  goods  reouired  by  either  In  the  Netherlands  ■ 
East  Indies  and  to  restore  comraerclal  relations  to  tnoee 
prevailing  prior  to  the  ado-otion  of  freezing  measures. 

This  Government  proposes  to  inform  the  Japanese  G-overn- 
ment  that  in  the  opinion  of  t-.l?  ^^overniBent  the  Jawaneee 
proposals  contain  features  not  in  harmony  >ix^.ir   tr.e   fundamental 
principles  which  underlie  the  nroposed  :-er.errl  settlem.^nt  and 
to  w:;ich  each  Governmpnt  has  declared  thp*  i'  1?  comEltted. 
It  le  also  DFoposed  to  offer  to  the  Joppne  e  ^overnmen^  an 
alternptive  tsropoeal  for  a  mod^ifj  vi  vi?-..li  v.-;:l"r.  will 
mutufl  -^It'i.  •-  ■  '•'  -^---.---^  '  •  -' -  .  '  •  -.  -  ■-^-   ■ 
not  •  ..  :,.  ..-L  ^  rr.:   _.:,,■ 

northeastorn  Asia  '  nd  t'..e   nort.-.ern  i'nclflc  ■:;■»:•',   &ut.^-  ;-* 
Asia  and  the  southern  Fr-clfic  ->rea,  :■  ■■ 

to  witndraw  Its  tor-c"    ♦■''■--•  <-  ■;•:■■. --r         ■      -  ...  ,  .-. 
to  rr-plpce  t:iOg«  f-  -  ;  r-  In.lochlr.B 

t:,  the  number  tn'-T      ''^  .  . 


.S',-n(  h  ••ptruUr. 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1141 


Telegram  Sent 
Drjjartnti'iit  of  .^tatr 


^ent  hi/  optratuT  M.,  ./*?.. 


1142     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


THE  WHITE  HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 


i'^T^^MJU^^ 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE 


1143 


■ 

Dk^'ARTMENT   OF    STATE 

{ 

i 

t- 

Memorandum  of  Conversation 

DATi 

!SSIIIH 

Sur.jccT 

fl 

COS-lfc  i   TO 

r,  ^ 

1 

-- 

CO 

>> 

.I'lH. 


1144     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


not    reco,';iiize    t.xe   rlgMt   of  Japan    to   keep  a    sinj-le    soldier 
in   Inrtochlna,    we    wsre    strivin;:   to   reach   tnis    proposed 
temporary   agreement    primarily  because   the  neads   of   our 
Army   ai^n    :.avy   ol'ten   emphasize    to   me    tiiet    time    is    the   all- 
importfcin     _-te.tio.i    for   tiien,    t>nd    tiie  t    it    is   necessary 
to  be   more   fully   prepared    to  deal    effectively   witn   the 
situation    in   the   Pacific   area    in   case   of   an   outbreak    by 
Japan.      I   also    empnasized   the   point    tiiat,    evon    if  we 
a,.3ree    that    tae   chances    of    sucli  an  outbreak   eri;   not   great, 
it   must    be  adrriltled    tuat    taere   ar.j    real   pcsdiolllties 
tnet    sucr;   tin   outbre^K    may    soon  occur   -    any    aay   ai'ter 
t.ily    vi/f-ek    -    r,-ii.    ■  ■    f     tc-T.ion-  '■•/   hi-rBu.-":'\('.nt     ia    e.'I'ected 
t.'iat.    w :  1  "I  ■      '     ■.    fi-ItHted    s!i:tf!     ■:         .ill'  '  ■   i  -   •.    t.o 


:■•     ,r       ■    .■  :.  1  >' 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  1145 


1146     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


^H 


t.i*  aiodus  Vivendi  proposal.   I  tnen  inaioated  that  I 
was  not  sure  tnat  I  would  pi*esont  it  to  the  Japanese 
Ambassador  witxiout  knowing  anything  about  the  views 
and  attitude  of  their  Governments.  The  meeting  broke 
up  in  this  fashion. 

There  were  other  details  discussed  but  they  were 
not  of  major  consequence  nor  did  they  constitute  any- 
thing new  in  the  record. 


C.H. 


S  CH:MA 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1147 


>eace. 


1148    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


It  If.  ,;e";leved  that  In  our  dlscueslone  soce  proj^reee 


the  entirp  Ppclflc        -ecently  the  <-'  _r 

vernment  1b  desirous  of  con- 

tlnul  -  ■    ■  ...  , 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  1149 


■ont->ln 


1150    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


in   ■ 
force      I' 


Ir.. 

on  Jul. 
forcep 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1151 


1152    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


-6- 

commodltles  Ir.  short  supply  in  the  United  States, 
(ill)  Raw  cotton  from  the  United  Stetes  to  the 
extent  of  $500,000  In  value  per  month, 
(iv)  Medical  P.ri&   p.harmaceutlcel  supplies  sub- 
ject to  euch  llmltptions  as  the  appropriate 
authorities  mey  nrc  scribe  Ir.  respect  of  com- 
modltles  in  short  suoply  In  the  United  States, 
(v)  Petrc ■"."•■■■  -   "^'".e  United  States  will  perrclt  th« 
excort  tc        :  petroleum,  within  the  cate- 
gcrlee  permitted  general  ex-ort,  upon  a  monthly 
basis  for  civilian  needs.   The  proportionate     ' 
amoun*  -be  exported  froa  the 

■:-.'*-  _,. -J-  -•;^^^  --  -^-termlned 

'■- :  '  ■  :  *  ■     '■  'he 

Dutc..  inderetoc  - 

civ* ; ■  •  5s 


al 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  1153 


1154  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


two  Dartl?3  shell  confer  at   th'->  Inet-^nce  of  either  to 
cacerteln  whether  the  wrosoects  of  re-'Ching  a  peaceful 
settlement  covering  the  entire  Pacific  area  Justify 
en  extension  of  the  modus  vlvendl  for  a  further  period. 


There  Is  attached  In  tentative  form  a  plan  of  a 
coiBor.ehensive  peaceful  settlement  covering  the  entire 
Pacific  area  as  one  oractlcal  exemplification  of  the  kind 
of  proeram  which  this  Sovernaent  has  In  mind  to  be  worked 
out  during  the  further  conversations  between  the  Govern- 
ment of  Jaoan  and  the  Govern:aent  of  the  United  States  while 
this  modus  vlvendl  would  be  in  effect. 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1155 


stoic tly  confidential. 
TIjIOTa'i'IVjs  and  V/ITHOUT 

C01/iIIT^ENT 


Novenber  25 »  1941. 


OUTLINE  OF  PROPOSED  BASIS  FOR  AGREEMENT 
^yy/BJgN  Ms  UNITED  STATES  AND  JAPAN 


Section  I 

Draft  Mutual  Declaration  of  Polloy 

The  Governicent  of  the  United  States  and  the  Govern- 
ment of  Japan  both  being  solicitous  for  the  peace  of  the 
Pacific  affirm  that  their  national  policies  are  directed 
toward  lasting  and  extensive  peace  throughout  the  Pacific 
arefa,  that  they  have  no  territorial  designs  in  that  area, 
that  they  have  no  intention  of  threatening  other  coun- 
tries or  of  using  military  force  aggressively  against  any 
neighboring  nation,  and  that,  accordingly,  in  their  na- 
tioiial  policies  they  will  actively  support  and  give 
practical  application  to  the  following  fundamental 
principles  upon  which  their  relations  with  each  other 
and  with  all  other  governments  are  based: 

(1)  The  principle  of  inviolability  of  territorial 
integrity  and  sovereignty  of  each  and  all  nations. 

(2)  The  principle  of  non-interference  in  the  internal 
affairs  of  other  countries. 

(3) 


79716  O — 46 — pt.  14 17 


1156    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

-2- 

(3)  The  principle  of  equality,  inoluding  equality  of 
oooimercial  opportunity  and  treatoent. 

(4)  ^e  principle  of  reliance  upon  international  co- 
operation and  conciliation  for  the  prevention  and 
pacific  settleoient  of  controversies  and  for  im- 
provement of  international  conditions  by  peaceful 
methods  and  processes . 

The  Oovernment  of  Japan  and  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  have  agreed  that  toward  eliminating  chronic 
political  instability,  preventing  recurrent  economic  col- 
lapse, and  providing  a  basis  for  peace,  they  will  actively 
support  and  practically  apply  the  following  principles  in 
their  economic  relations  with  each  other  and  with  other 
nations  and  peoples: 

(1)  The  principle  of  non-discrimination  in  interna- 
tional commercial  relations. 

(2)  The  principle  of  international  economic  coopera- 
tion and  abolition  of  extreme  nationalism  as  ex- 
pressed in  excessive  trade  restrictions. 

(3)  The  principle  of  non-discriminatory  access  by 
all  nations  to  raw  material  supplies. 

(4)  The  principle  of  full  protection  of  tne  inter- 
ests of  consuming  countries  and  populations  as 
regards  the  operation  of  international  commodity 
agreements. 

(5)  The  principle  of  establishment  of  such  institu- 
tions and  arrangements  of  international  finance 
as  may  lend  aid  to  the  essential  enterprises 
and  the  continuous  development  of  all  countries 
and  may  permit  payments  through  processes  of 
trade  consonant  with  the  welfare  of  all  countries. 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1157 

-3- 


Section   II 


Steps  to  be  Taken  by  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  and  by  the  Governjient  of  Japan 


The  Government  of  the  United  States  and  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Japan  propose  to  take  steps  as  follows: 

1,  The  Government  of  the  United  States  and  the  Gov- 
ernmexit  of  Japan  will  endeavor  to  conclude  a  multilateral 
non-aggression  pact  among  the  British  Empire,  China, 
Japan,  the  Netherlands,  the  Soviet  Union,  Thailand  and 
the  United  States. 

2.  Both  Governments  will  endeavor  to  conclude  among 
the  American,  British,  Chinese,  Japanese,  the  Netherland 
and  Thai  Governments  an  agreement  whereunder  each  of  the 
Govornments  wjuld  pledge  itself  to  respect  the  territorial 
integrity  of  French  Indochina  aiid,  in  the  event  that  there 
should  develop  a  threat  to  the  territorial  integrity  of 
Indochina,  to  enter  into  immediate  consultation  with  a 
view  to  taking  such  measures  as  may  be  deemed  necessary 
and  advisable  to  meet  the  threat  in  question.   Such  agree- 
ment would  provide  also  that  each  of  the  Governments  party 
to  the  agreement  would  not  seek  or  accept  preferential 
treatment  in  its  trade  or  economic  relations  with  Indochina 

and 


1158  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

and  would  use  Its  Influence  to  obtain  for  each  of  the 
signatories  equality  of  treatment  In  trade  and  oommerce 
with  French  Indochina. 

3.  The  Ctovernment  of  Japan  will  withdraw  all  mili- 
tary, naval,  air  and  police  forces  from  China  and  from 
Indochina. 

4.  The  Government  of  the  United  States  and  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Japan  will  not  support  --  militarily,  politi- 
cally, economically  —  any  government  or  regime  in  China 
other  than  the  National  Government  of  the  Republic  of 
China  with  capital  teaporarlly  at  Chungking. 

5.  Both  Governments  will  give  up  all  extraterritorial 
rights  In  China,  including  rights  and  interests  in  and 
with  regard  to  International  settlements  and  concessions, 
and  rights  under  the  Boxer  Protocol  of  1901. 

Both  Governments  will  endeavor  to  obtain  the  agree- 
ment of  the  British  and  other  gpvernments  to  give  up 
extraterritorial  rights  In  China,  Including  rights  in 
interna tlonad  settlements  and  in  concessions  and  under 
the  Boxer  Protocol  of  1901. 

6.  The  Government  of  the  United  States  and  the 

Government 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  1159 

-5- 

Government  of  Japan  will   enter   into   negotiations  for 
the  conclusion   between   the   United  States  and  Japan  of  a 
trade  agreement,    based   upon  reciprocal   most-favored- 
nation   treatment   and   reduction  of   trade   beo-riers   hy 
both  countries,    including   an   undertaking  by  the   United 
States   to   bind  raw  silk  on  the  free  list. 

7.  The  Governmeht  of  the  United  States  and    the 
Government  of   Japan  will,    respectively,   remove   the 
freezing  restrictions   on  Japanese  funds   in  the  United 
States  and  on  American   funds  In  Japan. 

8.  Both  Governments  will  agree   upon  a  plan  for  the 
stabilization  of   the  dollar-yen  rate,  with  the  alloca- 
tion of  funds  adequate  for    this   purpose,    half   to    be 
supplied   hy  Japan  and  half  by  the  United  States. 

9.  Both  Governments  will   agree   that  no   agreement 
which  either  has   concluded  with  any   third   power  or  powers 
shall   be   interpreted   by  it   in  such  a  way  as   to   conflict 
with  the  fundamental  purpose  of   this  agreement,    the  es- 
tablishment and  preservation  of  peace  throughout   the 
Pacific   area. 

10.      Both  Governments   will   use  their   influence  to 
cause  other  governments   to   adhere    to   and   to  give  practical 
application   to  the  basic   political    and   economic    principles 
set  forth  in  this  agreement. 


1160    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Lauchlin  Currie.  Chungking,-  November  25,  1941. 

After  discussing  with  the  n-eneralissinio  the  Chinese 
Ambassador's  conference  with  the  .Secretary  of  <^tate ,  I  feel  you 
should  urgently  advise  the  President  of  the  '"reneralissimc 's 
very  strong  reaction.   I  have  never  seen  him  really  agitated 
before.   Loosening  of  economic  pressure  or  unfreezing  would  dan- 
gerously increase  Janan's  military  advantage  in  China.   A  relax- 
ation of  American  pressure  while  Japan  has  its  forces  in  China 
would  dismay  the  Chinese.   Any  "Wodus  Vivendi"  now  arrived  at 
with  China  would  be  disastrous  to  Chinese  belief  in  America  and 
analogous  to  the  closing  of  the  Burma  Road,  which  permanently 
destroyed  British  prestige.   Japan  and  Chinese  defeatists  would 
instantly  exploit  the  resulting  disillusionment  and  urge 
oriental  solidarity  aeainst  occidental  treachery.   It  is  doubt- 
ful whether  either  past  assistance  or  increasing  aid  could  com- 
pensate for  the  feeling  of  beins  deserted  at  this  hour.   The 
Generalissimo  has  deep  confidence  in  the  President's  fidelity 
to  his  consistent  policy  but  I  must  warn  you  that  even  the 
Generalissimo  questions  his  ability  to  hold  the  situation 
together  if  the  Chinese  national  trust  in  America  is  undermined 
by  renorts  of  Jat5an's  escaping  military  defeat  by  diplomatic 
victory . 

Lattimore . 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE 


1161 


1162    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 


Memorandum  of  Conversation 


-^v^. 


:vs  v:v:::di 


OAii   liCViilrEr".    '.'h,     1'  41 


Sr^CrJ^'iAF.i    nULL  k'.'.J    l.::':'.    ";-.-.:. I9H   AI^zASSADOK,     IL?2    :  ALIF/vX 


COPIES  TO: 


hereto    at-t,»ic;,ec  .       -vj 


CO 


^rltl:       ..:    ■  ;;-•.! 'lor    '-il";rr.    't    -.ip    ri>'iu08t    and 
H    rne'.)orar,du' 1,    n    r^ - 
I  -•  *  -'f-f^y    on    the    '  '     '^  '. 

.     ,          ■  ,-  8 1 V  e 

cou"a^   outBldp   of   C^s"  no   ^ro'or  fLiriri-    trjp    nf'-<t    three  ^ 

•  -;  (1.       '  ■  idcr    triP    aUvir.tHp-es                3> 

f     ■    ■                      resnect    t'^    t.,'-    .   ..'"in    foflc    ant'.    '-  -'■■]» 

dPt;tr-;Ci:  :i.    ,'!-.                   -      "     '       ■  .                   -"    ' '■    '«'"'-■    ->'"->^'i 

on    '.r^a   wr!lc;4   -       .  '          '    aovni?tf!f-e 

rltaln,     ^.  ^^^ 

ri-                      ^:lted    3tftt.  "    -ir     ".'.  .  .  • 


EXHIBITS    OF    JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1163 


I    emphasized   tliat    this   vrononed  r.odus   Vivendi   wae 

really    a   part   of  what    t;u;   Jananese    claliaed  to   be   a   con- 
tinuance   Tf   tjie    eaae   convertsatlone   held   heretofore   rf»la- 
tlve   to   a    oeriaanent   agreement   on   a   peaceful    settlenent 
for   the   entire  Pacific  area.      I  also  pointed  out   the 
utter   luiMractlcablllty   of   requeetlni;   ri    BUF-.enslon   of 
further  -illltary   advances   !n   China   In   addition   to    the 
preceding-  .Hsaurances. 

Tiie   Anibaeeador  referred    to    the   -rovlelon    In   the 
nrcnosed  draft   if  a  aodua  v,lvendl_  limiting-   the  Japanese 
troops   in   Indochlria    to    "5,000  and  urged   that    that   ntimber 
brt  reduced   in  our  draft,      I    said   that  we  would  do   the 
best   we    could    in    the   .Matter,    that   our  Ar-'iy   and  liax'y 
experts    feel   that   2S,000    In   ■Jcrti;   I:uioc!-.lr.i   would  not 
be   a  menHCo    to    the   Burma   Road,    and   that    even   double   tnat 
number  would    not    be   a    serious   :.'ienace. 


C.H, 


S:GH::iA:A-H 


1164    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


,Iw  ,jfinf"it^    ;/ri)po.:il    i;-,    fli^nrly   ur'iccftptable    «nd    the 
inly     lUest.i    r>    •.,  ;►(.:■,.    f.  i   he    ., '  f  liif.-r  : - 

(  .,         ,     .•■■jt'ct    it   tiva    (■•.hlle    ;,iMkln-'    it    i-Aenr    thiut    u 
Iii,it''i":    «..  Tf^t'iert    i?    not,    ritl-^d    out) 'to    leave    it    to    the 
.''.;.  -r."  ;■•-    to    p'^n.'i^f    •■    Y>»*tfr    aff'f^r,       or 


,"T    h.'ive    fo.'.;l^fe    ,;<ini  i   >T  o*^    Iri    .„r.     'i'jll'r>   hiin<!linK         _ 

•  t'    fie  .<■    P'^-  '.'ti"'  1    n.     ■.;.;    n-^    i;     ill    Llie   be:  t    !jo;;ition    to    judge      » 

(0 

:  ••••     •  ■.•    •       :■-■■...       1     .  'Tot-iI.CS     ;  ■.  .  !      L: 
'••p.    ,!■.    ■     .;     iriter    ;p>,.iS!il     -ve    rtill    ru.;'Oi't    t!;!;-.    ijoursie. 


i;     -i?.'-    '.'ii  1  tr-y    to  [^ 

..  .    ,  -N 

•     itingers    o:  uelby.  ,^ 

'nii-    Int.i    jgc  -I'l*     "i"    f"el,-i    it    best    to  put 


:.     ..!•    fft»l,    b-^    regarded 

.   ■    •■...)■.-(-: i-.it. v.;.  It     puts 

*!  ■■    rrice    Ht    H    ninlmui'i. 
•    :.i, :•.-,.'.    t,  .,at    this 
; "    "      •  cs    shi-ialci   be 


(/) 


> 


.i       "       ;..n'al      .f      ,,«rel,.      "th>:     rjUi/."     i.I'     .Ji.Mnttif     trCvU'S 

:•.;       ';.:■:•■    ..     .1:    <illo.     *    o    .»!.,►'    "t    l.-!u.h--le.         I*,    is 
ill  li     ...■*,■•■    ,.-     .  ■i.    :1  :    ^  ■■     ^  i-*^r:i'C     lit   >.  :-cej't  in;.'    thii-    fi  6 

"..-•■     'V    •.-,         -il.    ;>>o:^    1-       i  ---■,:tin.     11.         /.vj^.rt    froin  the 
rMV'.llt,^.    .}■:      Itc'ui-K-   ft    oii-^lrr    jP  !i-.' >iitil    higher   tUftn   i*e    .:sny 
I'l,    it    see.-i.'-    -acv  1  .,tjr  i "    I'roi  .    tni'     ;hiT:';3''    »iP~l-;    so    to    frai'ie 
•   '    :r.c*r..'-         ,  .  ■     M  ty    o;'    'iiiy    a'.tacr:    on   Kuaiilr'.f: 


EXHIBITS    OF    JOINT    COMMITTEE 


1165 


n    til;-    Vi^s  '■  .. 
of    thf         .  • 
shSulc    stipulate    ^op    ;  *;• 

■    ■■■ '       of    '■■he    •  •■ 

^■i\-i  ,..  ,,  ^     Oii  t    of    .'u:  ■-.     .    . 
their   e^iiii;  :i<-rt    >,■  •;    frr 


•  oii^i:    ;■  .i.-    est,    :  -,r 


ret'iTc  i.n~    ot  nr 


it.nltecj     ;• 

c  I V  i ,  i 
t'-.-     ..    - 

re  1  ■;■.•;  t  i    i 
,«  i  th  '  r-i*fj  i 
e/p-M-t    in 
,- :    ■  r     if 


'  " '  '■r'. 


1166    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


I 


EXHIBITS    OF    JOINT    COMMITTEE 


1167 


DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 


Memorandum  of  Convenathn 


SUBJECT:      OyPOJlTlOK   cr  o>» rtlULI iJOlMO    CHIAJIO    .<Al-3KiiK    TO   M0PCKJ>tVi3<D^ 


PARTICIPANTS; 


»..CKw7A-'lY   KULL   tUij^gfifc   CHINK3E  -VKHAOIADOn,    Dn.    jfU    3H1K 


COPliS  TO: 


\A 


/ 


The  Chlnts*    '>Bba«s«dor  sailed  at  hli  request.     He 
30t^(ht  Xo  Bako  profuse.  pj*«llainary   s^lanations,    stating 
a.u')r%-  other  things  that  the  Forelf?)  Minister  of  Cl\lna 
ttsuorstoou  fry  well  the  broad  inteimatlonal  aspaets  of 
the   'apanese  situation  as  it  relates  to   several  oountrles, 
Inolv  .ln£,  China  and  the  United    itates,    but  that  the 
oenerallssl»o  vss  not  so  veil  aoqualnted  with  the  situa- 
tion,  ail .  henee  his  reiiorted  oppoaltion  to  our  aodue 
Tlvendl.      la  then  handed  ae  a  telegraa,    dated  HoTeaber  2<, 
1.>«1,    fPo«    .Is  rorelfin  ..inlster,    a  oo-iy  of  wnloh  is  here- 
to attaahad. 

I   replied  that  in  the  firet  place  the  offieial 
heads  of  our  hmj  and  Nary  for  eoae  weeks  have  been  r«ost 
earnestly  ursla,    that  we  not  s«t  in^^  ^v  with  Japan 

until 


1168    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


untll  th«7  have  had  an  opportunity  to  inoraaa*  further 
th«ir  nlans  and  methods  and  aoana  of  dafanaa  In  tha 
Paolfle  araa.     In  the  aaoond  plaoa,   at  tha  request  of 
tha  ^ora  paaoafal  eleaenta  In  Japan  for  oonTarsatlona 
with  tuie  i>ovsFraBant  lookine  toward  a  broad  paaoaful 
aettlei&ent  for  tha  entire  }'aoifie  area,   ve  have  bewi 
earrylnj;  on   oonvarsatlone  and  cuiklng    aoae    >rogre»8  thus 
far;    and  the  Jatmnasa  are  urginp  tha  oontl nuance  of 
theae  ganervl  oonTeraatlone  for  the    >urpoee  of  a  broad 
Paoifio  araa  aettleaant.      The   situation,    therefore,    is 
that  tha  -(roposad  modus  TiTai^i  is  really  a  part  and 
paroal  of  the  efforts  to  carry  forvard  theae  general 
oonversations  for  the  reasons  that  baTe  been  fully  stated 
froQ  tiae  to   tiae,   and  recently  to  the  Chinese  Aabasaador 
and  to  others.  * 

I    said  that  Tery  recently  the  Ueneralissiao  and 
:.adacia  Caian^;  Kal-ahak  aJlBOst  flooded  Washington  vith 
stronf7  and  lengthy  cables  tallinr,  us  ivov  extrenely  dan- 
gerous the  Japanese  threat  is  to  attack  the  Buraa  Hoad 
tnrou(^h  Indochina  and  appealing;  loudly  for  aid,      whereas 
practically  the  first  tlilnt;   tais  nreaent  -ronosal  of    aine 
and  tha  j resident  does  is  to  require  the  Japanese  troops 
to  be  taken  out  of  Indochina  and  thereby  to  protect  the 
hunsa    load  froa  what  Chiang     al-shek  aald  waa  an  i  I'-inent 
danger.       mv,    i   added,    Chlan<:   '  ai-ahek  If-nores  that 

situation 


EXHIBITS    OF    JOINT   COMMITTEE  1169 


-3- 

■Ituatlon  vbtoh  «•  ha.r»  t«K«n  ear*  of  for  hilB  and  InTolf^s 
loudly  about  anoUxar  aattor  relating  to  th«  relaasa  of 
eartaln  oovRoditlos  to  Japan  oorraipondlnc  to  ths  r^ronreas 
■ad*  vtth  our  oonraraationa  oonoomlnc  a  f^anaral  paaoa 
a(r««B«nt.     Ha  alae  oTorlooks  th«  faat  that  our  proposal 
vottld  raliare  the  aanaoa  of  Japan  In  Indoehlna  to  tha 
vbola  '.iouth  Paolfie  araa,    including   r^lni^apora,    tha  Methar- 
lands  ijiat  India*,   Australia  and  alae  the  United  states, 
with  the  rhlllpplnas  and  the  rubber  and  tin  trade  routes. 
All  of  this  relief  froa  aenaae  to  eaoh  of  the  oountrles 
ifould  continue  for  ninety  da/s.      One  of  our  leading 
a4Blrale  stated  to  oe  reeantly  that  tha  Halted  amount 
of  oere  or  less  Inferior  oil  ,>roduots  that  we  alf^ht  let 
Japmn  havs  during  that  period  would  not  to  any  appreolable 
extant  Inerease  Ji4>aiiese  war  and  naval  preparations.     I 
said  that,   of  oours*,^we  oan  eaneel  this  <->roposal  but  It 
Bost  be  with  tha  understanding^   that  we  are  net  to  be 
otaarged  with  failure  to   send  our  fleet  Into  the  area  near 
Indoehlna  and   Into  Jar>aneee  waters.    If  bT  **^7  ahanae  Japan 
•akes  a  Bllltary  drive  southward. 

The  Aabassador  was  very  Insistent  in  the  Tlew  that 
be  would  send  baak  to  his  Oorerrasant  a  fuller  explanatloa 
whioh  he  hoped  islght  relieve  the   situation  more  or  leaa. 
Our  oonTeraatlen  was,   of  ooorse,    Vn  a  friendly  eplrlt. 

CM. 
2i>CHiHA:AB 


1170    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


V       <  .:  sit.     -,Al>wi.     aO        .liU 


K«ir«r«no«  is  taMAm  to  your   t*l*gr*a  of  Jlove»i»«r  2;.'. 

Aft*r  r««c^ix]^  70ur  t«lsf,r«.v:,    UiO    JMicrftliatilao   saow«d 
r«th«r   atroiig  reactiwi*      H«  >;ot    Ui«   l;ipr»eh^oii  that    Um 
l>nlt*<l   :  tatas   Jovamaant   ii*a   .ut  aaida  tha    ^liluaa*     ^uas- 
tlon    III   ita   couvaraation  alt-i  Japaxi   l^ataaa   of   aockiiit;  a 
aolutlon,   and   is   atlll    iuclinad   to  appsasa  Japen  at   tao 
•x.p«na«  of   vhixia.      i  aibva   axplalnaA  to  ^ai  th«t    Uia     ao- 
ratar/  of   ^tato  iiaa   aX««/a  ttad  tua   f.r**taat  raapact   for 
tua   fuQuaaiantal  principlaa,   ana   that    i  baliava  h«  ita* 
'aada  no  coiicnaaXon  to  Japaa.     Ttia  fact   tiini  h*   Inri  liraa 
of   ttut  po-  aibllity  ol    a  aodtta  vlvaqdl   ahowa   ttiat  ua  t4*a 
aot   ..at  ravaalad  inythln,;    lo   txta  Japanaaa.      'e  aro,    aow^ 
•WTf   firaljr  oppoaad  to  t-nj  aaaaura  wiiich  rut./  .lava   tha 
affaot  ox    Incrcaairvr   ^2ilua*a  difficulty  In  ua:    «ftr  of 
raalatanca,   or  of  atx>anKtu«nlAe  Japan**  powar  In  hor 
•g.-raaaion  a^alnat  ^nlna. 

Plaaaa   Infom  th«  Saoratazy  of   r>t«ta* 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE 


1171 


DEPAFH-MENT  OF  STATE 


Alefltoranc/ufn  of  Convenathn  ^     ''- 

DATE:    November  i5,    If-*!, 


PARTICIPANTS:       Dr.  Hu   3hih,    Chinese  «.?.>> 'lo'^.  ad  or. ' 

l-'.r.  Stanley  K.    Hornbeck. 

Dr.  A.    Loudon,    Newierlsnde.  Mlni^Wr 

Mr.  otaniey  K.    Hornbeck 


i.el:  ;, 


.  1 1: 1  ^  - 
.  e  c  "  i''  I 


ubrr  "'d  >r    ciip.'  oi  :i.e  ''."'■t  evening,  Pt 


""  referred  t,o  tne  conference  v;:".ioh  hnd 


r 

,o..-e '•'.:".•/  pftern  .  \'i  ri  v.liicji  the   Secretary  of   State   p' 
;    reprc-entr-tlvep    jf   ti.e    r,    C    ?  iic"    0   oovers    of  "^ 

'f.-r;-;    -f:it^    lp---^in~  t'-r'-nr'"!    -O'^rlfcle   conduF^-m 

:.i'."      3t''P'-    ■    iJ    J'    ,-r;    -f    -      ;1ag   Vivendi. 

r    '  «1'    tj.vt    *  •=    J  '•'    -    V*"-;-    r*^-^!   a-.i  irpcl-'t  Von   of 
ne-'-    an"   ■U""lc    It.,    -f   tii-     ■r-ble.T.  vlilch  confront? 
•".    C-?vern-'=nt    -'nd    s  rncf^i-n^-    -^]j    the  countriep  '' 

;    r.r.      ..e    eyrrfi--e.i    -i      rocjTtlon   of  the   pttltude  '^ 

-t-r;,     -)f    St'-te    Ti"    cor.oletf   conflOp.ioe    tii^t    tiie 
•.•:-;■  ,  .tr.t    ■•.;.!,     yle]:.    ..'.thlnr    In    the   I'leld    of 

sirincloljis    y 


:^ 


79716  O— 46— pt.  14 18 


1172    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


-S- 

prinolples  and  pursue  no  oouree  of  "appeasement*.   He  said 
the  he  wished,  however,  to  repeat  to  me  what  he  had  said 
In  the  conference  regarding  articles  II  and  III  of  the 
American  draft  proposal.  Article  II,  he  said,  prerumably 
does  not  apply  In  reference  to  the  conflict  between  Japan 
and  China:   It  presumably  leaves  Japan  free  to  continue  her 
operations  against  China;  and,  article  III  leeves  Japan 
free  to  maintain  ae   much  be  25,000  troops  in  Indochina  and 
to  conduct  operations  agalnet  China  from  Indochina.   He 
went  on  to  eay  that  In  the  conversations  thflt  vere  helfl   on 
Saturday,  the  Secretary  had  spoken  of  permitting  the  Japc- 
nepe  to  malntpln  in  China  "a  few  thouBPnd"  trooos;  and  that 
in  hie  reoort  to  hie  Oovernment  he  np.cl  aeed  thft  eyprcolcn, 
ar.Q  he  understood  that  the  other  reprepentative?  had  rerorted 
in  the  samp  terme  to  their  Oovernment  p.   Now,  it  speired  to 
hioi,  a  force  cf  25,000  Javir.epe  trc^oe  in  northern  Inc'.cr.lna 
w-uld  ccftlt'ite  a  ..e.nr.ce   to  CMnn.   Supio^e,  he  rsid,  the 
jj^.fr.pp?  Fh  •■■Ir',    prr;'  i^-.^sly  live  uo  t'j  the  :'_etler  cf  this 
.'.rovl  =  ion--wr.lcn,  If  they  c"!-',,  v-uld  be  <^iir..»'l  plnr.- - ;  pr:d 
ou-- .or"  tr.ey  '--er^  tc  c?n;^°  t-'.-t  niLtt^r  of  tri-.p  tc  cj  Pl6t 
tprrely  '.t   r.ot  altogether  of  :  (^c:  io.nl  c,  enclnf-TP  snd 
r.vlntl?'.  -,i;-t<-,  —  puc;.  -  f  icp    r  ."  :  ^■^r'-'.'^ly  r<^r.'rce  the 
c'..:-.  -^  '  ■   r  ,   t  prri '.^  "'■''•:- r '■■' '~  r.  !  .e '  F  '_'-r.S'    f-rcp'-  jn 
■/'.-i.'.Hn.   If  ti-.p-  Jr. -;.«>-»  ^r.    \.'  '    cl~i   ^f-  t -J  c  "induct  I'.riO 

"■yerptions 


EXHIBITS    OF    JOINT    COMMITTEE  1173 


■  n-  -.f 


•—         -    ■ 

.  ,    .f 
'_..■•.:-.'                  ■-    r.      T;i«= 

•  : . '      V  ! 

._.    .       .   ,          ..             . 

':     .,  ~    . . 

,.      -,         f  -. 

■-'    "-t     jt,    -.;,e   irrloc.'.iiia    ?lt.-.t:tr. 

T-. 

r     ■-  i'..- 

-     ■.■    "^ 

-  \-  ^"      •:    ,:  •■ 

;i.  .■■     t.v--^-    'f    ■■':;il..-apnt    fir 

.■,:l.lvv 

r-t-t\ 

,: ^    -f    it'     - '  - 

•  i;;.-,    t;.e    ^:.r-.^    ac-rl,    ti  o 

■/ 

• .  ',  r  v^- 

.jci;    if     .•■    vU 

•  •;    1  .  .  >i  r.-nc.p    t:    It    oc" 

,-    r  •;,     e 

in?«?rn   t  /    ti. 
.-..■,:    •     ■  •     !  t   '■■ 

'.  .    -.I'l    via    th.'.  t    R..-:. .      Hr 
the 

1174     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


je  Jap'TiPrc  *'.  sagpen?e  for  arother  three  nonthp,  but  he 
Soubted  vhetner  thpt  ^-lulci  be  rcnle-vffrt.   He  concluded  v.'.th 
^an  aseurance  thet  he  would  try  to  co.u<;'?  his  Government  to 
je  the  .problem  In  the  light  In  :.'hlch  the  American  Grovern- 

lees  It,   He  exprensed  hipe  tbr.t,  if  he  t?ld  not  succeed 
Jiipletely  in  that  effort,  ve  would  realize  th.-^t  aifficultieg 
which  confront  China  inevitably  look  eomewhRt  different 
vhen  vieved  from  Chungking  than  when. viewed  from  YJaehington. 

Lftter  in  the  evening  the  Neth^rlnnds  Minister  drooped 
In  on  me.  He  made  vith  regard  to  article  III  obpervatione 
not  dieslmllrr  to  those  vhich  the  Chinese  Ambr.psador  had 
made,  as  regarding  the  queptlon  of  the  number  of  Japanese 
troops  that  might  be  left  in  Indochina.  He  alco  raised  a 
question  whether  the  matter  of  materiel  might  not  be  quite  as 
Important  a?  -r  even  more  important  than  the  queption  of 
the  number  of  troops.  He  eaid  thrt  he  had  on  Saturday  made 
a  long  report  to  hie  Government,  thet  he  h?d  received  since 
then  Bfcveral  telerrame,  and  thcit  he  erpected  to  pend  to  the 
Department  tcc^ay  two  or  three  ireiioranda. 


Z'^*^, 


PA/H:SJtHtFLB 


EXHIBITS   OF    JOINT    COMMITTEE 


1175 


0«?T  OP 


M.   IMl  , 


/ 


£ 


1176    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


^t  --^ik 


NOTMb«r   26,    1«41      ( 

IWi  referono«  to  oar  two  prooosaJL*  prap-wert  for 
(laUnisfilan  to   the  Japan* s«  OoTorraattnt,   natMljri 

(1)     A  proposal  In  the  wa/  of  «  draft  &i;r*«a«nt  for 
a  broad  baalo  p*ae«ful  aflttloaflnt  for  the  Paelflc  area, 
whlr^h  1«  h«ne«forth  to  t>e  aad«  a  part  of  the  g«ner!il 
oonTonatlonn  nov  colnc  un  and  to  b*  oarried  on.    If 
agritatibie  to  both  JOTemBants,   with  a  Tt'^w  to  a  {^onurftl 
agraonant  on  this  aubjflot. 

(^■)      The   Aoeond  propowil   i«  raalljr  olosfsly  onnnaotad 
v/lth  the  oonvaraattona  looking;  temrd  a  f^anAml  {3.|rr««-> 
aont,  whl<^h  14  tn  tha  nntura  of  a  y^^p  vlTondl  intandad 
to  an^e  'nor-   feasible  th«   oontlnuanea  of  thn   <;onT0ra»» 
tlr^nii. 

In  vlaw  of  thfl  op  oaltlon  of  tha  Chln«««  OoTarnaent 
and   althr  tha  h«lf-honrt«td    jup  ort  or  the  aotitfil  opj«o«l- 
tlon  of  the  iiirltlnh,   thc^  ><at')<irlnnKla  and  thA  Australian 
^overmanta,   and  In  vtaw  of  the  wlda  publlalty  of  tha 
o.  oaltlon  and  of  the  a-l^ltlo-ml  op  "iltlon  that  vlll 
naturally  follow  throuf^b  utter  lack  of  >»n  undvratandlng 
of  ths  v«9t  laportanae  and  va-ue  ntijorwlsa  of  the 

»od»^f  yjyand^. 


EXHIBITS    OF    JOINT    COMMITTEE 


1177 


■odna  yivadi.   wltiMut  In  aoiy  wmj  d«pwr%las  fras  iqr 
Tlaws  about  the  nXaAom  ^aA  ui«  banaTit  of  ttxls  at*p 
fco  all  of  Um  countrlaa  oppoaaA  ^  ttaa  asgrasaer  na- 
tlona  vijo  ara  Intaraatad  la  tha  Paelfla  araa,   I  daalra 
vary  aamaatl/  to  raeeoyMud  Utat  at   tltla  tlaa  Z  oall  la 
Uia  Japaaaaa  Aabaaaadora  aad  laand  to  tbmk  a  eeyy  of 
taa  ooaprataaaalva  baalo  pr»peaal  for  a  gaaar*!  p««o«- 
txil  aattlaaant,  aad  at  tlia  aaaa  tta*  withhold  Um 
aodua   tlTandl  propeaal. 


1178    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE 


Department  of  state 


Memorandum  of  Conversation 


1179 


.Ler    ;,7,    1-j41 


PARTICIPANTS: 


1180    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

V 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1181 


.^ 


1182    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 
Memorandum  of  Conversation 


rARTlClPANTb 


COPSES  TO; 


Tlie   :,'.lni'itft;-    ol    Austri.llii    called   « (       •  .^al. . 

ilis    pai'pnf;!^    was    to    Inquire    wrietnei'   trie    p    :         •         ra-is 
Vivendi   haa  beeti   abana.iiieu    :.'f,:r  ,v.ii'"itly ,    to   »;,•  iCii    1 
replied    tlifit    I    so   considered    it.      tif;    ax-.n'e:  see    .^reat. 
concern   and   desli'ed    ■■  're    !>oo-at    iue   movements 

oi'    Culan,;,   r^ai-ansrc    aru.  iat,e!v.'ied   to   disooursge 

trie    iurtiiex'   conaidoi'atiou   ol'    tlie   tnoaus   Vivendi .      1   re- 
ferred   to    CO  rltl-'-h    cotm-ituil '::stions   on    the    sub- 
ject,   adJiii      i,n«,.   ii.iii,Ljas3!i(Jt,,»'    .iCiiirax   was    sti'oaij;   Tor    ti 
ij.-opossi   all    tno   w&i    and   tiuit    i    sympatiiizsd   wiui  iiis 
sitoBtloii   but    I  did  not   i'eci   tnat    the   co.tun'unications 
from  Cnurctiill   and   Lden,    witn   qualil'ications    such.   6s 

were 


X' 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE 


1183 


were    in    the:n,    wouIg   tie    very   neipl'til    in   a   bitter   fifiht 
that   would  be    projected  by   Ciilan_3  Ka'-ahek   and   carried 
ror*8rd    ay   all   oX    t;ie  malcontents    in   tue   iJfiited   States, 
alt.'iiju   .1    1    lolt   unreservedly   that   Churchill   end   Eden, 

like    l,.ie     -Titian   /ciiaaaaaQor   nere,    womIu   be    lor    whatever 
we   mi -at   ao,    evon  t.vou^h  not    entirely   to   their   llkln,!; 

ir-,  :■    inquire 

l'  •^asioo.fj    ro    '  SAe   up    *ii.i-,      .:  •'.•?r    iiU't..--.r 

.. ;  -.r.'iB^   *»nu   i   replied    i;.>.:    1    :.i'\  nol    thlnic   so, 

-    .;      ofir.ar.'iea.       j.    lattuAna    t,i.'t    ...ii.^jtcrr   lor 
;.-■      :oopert.i  ioii  anu    tn'.t    oi    hlr>    JoV'     ■.    •■  .'  . 


1184     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

*  ■  ^:i.Jf>    ■  -  -  . 

\      '       -    •  > 

t                        whTX^^JKS-.  telegram  StHT                         ,  y^m-m*mmmm 

(full  t«t» 

Co«»etJDtylrt1»f  »««ioo»ii«irrM».  ooo« 

c...lrr  Bepartm.ntrf»tate  ,  ^^ 

Fall  nU  ^^ 

Nlf*t  letttr  *" 

Cktnt.to  ^^  loTember  "Sj^    1941. 

TOKYO   (JAPAN). 


*  AKEKBAS3Y, 


7^5 

CONFIDENTIAL  FOR  THE  AMBAB3AD0R. 

In  the  light  of  the  attitude  of  Admiral  Nomura  and  "" 

,.vi     Mr.  Kurusu  when  they  were  handed  on  November  86  for  con-  * 

_\V       elderatlon  the  document  described  In  a  separate  telegram  -^ 

and  of  such  Indlcetlona  as  we  have  cumulatively  had  of  1^ 

the  general  attitude  of  the  Japanese  CJovernment,  It  ap-  *^ 

peare  that  the  dlecuBSlons  up  to  the  present  time  have  ^ 


not  repeat  not  yet  afforded  any  basis  which  gives  much 
promise  of  e  satlefaetory  comprehensive  settlement.   It 
Is  of  course  too  early  to  eciopt  any  definitive  opinion 
whether  the  dlscuselonp  will  continue  or  will  lapse, 
but  the  orobablllty  that  they  may  lapse  should  not 
repeat  not  be  lost  sight  of. 

The  existence  of  such  orobablllty  makes  It  appear 
advisable  that  we  give  soTie  advance  consideration  to 
varlo'is  orobleme  wh' ch  msy  as  a  consecuence  arise  In 
connection  with  -lur  Forel^r.  Serv'.ce  estsbllshment  s  in 
Jnpaneae  territory.   As  lar-se  of  the  conversatl'-r 

EnclphertJ  hy 

Stnt  it/ optraiur  M..  .  19        . 


to 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  1185 


TEUEGRAM  SENT  r,n...,.m„-,,.,  

fMlftt*  comw»tm»t.ate€ 

6#MT    Pij  |>(tii  ■OKOOwuwtn-mt  ooM 

«^isr:         »«it«rfiiwttiiif  #firf»  "r: 

f •"'»»•  ... . 

Ok»(a  to 

t         Bight  r«aalt  1b  vlthar««««l  of  our  dlploawtlo  «od  eonsu- 
lar  rttpr«««ntatlon  froa  Jupac,    It  tmuld  •«•«  to  a*  that, 
without  may  Intention  of  to«ln«  al«r«l«t  or  of  too 
h*«tlljr  •nviCRgli^  sarlou*  oontlQg«noi«>«,    thl»  question 
•hvttld  b*  broui^ht  to  rowr  Attention  «r>  th«t  yon  wqr 
h&T*  it  w«ll  iB  Bind  in  o«««  It  should  bcooiM  ncoataary 
for  th«  X>*partB«nt  to  oonsalt  you  In  r«giirA  to  the  aak- 
Inf  of  arrimgMBvntt  for  th*  paokln^  of  offlolal  and 
paraonal  •ffvota  and  the  •^q^Krdltlou*  handling  of  otbtr 
aattara  which  would  ba  InvolTad  In  tha  eloalng  of  our 
Imbasay  and  Oonsulatea.     It  la,   of  oourae,   daalred  that 
all  phaaaa  of  tha  oMttar  ba  oonaldeirad  confldantlal  and 
that  discussion  of  It  ba  kapt  to  a  alnlauK. 


^\ 


nS:GA:HES  f%  PA/H  .  -T 


1186    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 


\^ 


Mtmoranelum  of  Conversation 


DATE;  November  28,    13-rl. 


PARTICIPANTS: 


T   of  tha  British  Subasay 


'Jr.    5.,-nley   K.    Hornback, 
/ 


-4 


I-?.    x,:\-^   course 


•Ti'int    nor   t;,^ 


e-'.   on  tne   »«   nl?    request.  ^ 

;v..r-i    :;;.'!:.    ;.e    ;.larer    tfK.t    trie  yj    ^ 

■■.■■v-,eii    ^lovn"  ,    It    nov    boco  aes 
.9 truaxi on>    to    trie   -TTied   lorces; 
.:s    to     in-ulre   of   us 

ascl/;red    07'    lnii;;-<ted  4 

■ '    t..  ■  t    I   -r.rxB    not    In 

.  tt?l    lited  ■^-    any  : ; 

.  ^*      „ 

illon^  ■i:--<vf;-    -'t'T-oken       U'J 

•■ovn"  . 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1187 


79716  O— 46 — pt.  14 19 


1188    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


Telegram  Sent 

TO  *m  T]|AttflM(T*rr 



•tONtONf  :OtMTlAt  OCTt 

^tpBxfmtnt  ni  #tatr 

! 

MO  m^:                         Wmhirr 

! 

i 

'•a 

o 

o 

rc'iriieu    Frenc. 

r> 

> 

M .                      ./?... 

Charge  D^-paftm^^t: 


Sent  A;.  „t.„^-jr 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1189 


Telegram  Sent 


Scpartmrtit  of  #tatr 


1190    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


Telegram  Sent 
U'^partniPiit  at  S'tatp 


.  (  f  <  r-    o>"» 


Waskingion, 


'.'Jf;  \fct    Zr     re- 


«ir    forofB    * 


'  a  .       ihl ''    jf;v 


r.srma- 
rsw   co'.t:,".   up   to 
■  *  •  !  n 


nee^s. 


i   i 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE 


1191 


1192     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


I 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE 


1193 


Bcparlmritt  v 


1194    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


PARTICIPANTS: 


COPIES  TO: 


■■^-    K 


DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 
Memorandum  of  Convenation 


•^\ 


Tiie    i.rltlsa  Ainbart^ec.  -3    requesi    and 

i    soor;   uisccvereo    UiRt    lio 
to   ciiecK    on    tnu   afteriiiati.   .- .     i...     .....Li.:   .:!    , 

tae.   President   auG  mysell    er.ci   tise.   Ca.'&iif.si    wli, 
rofei'enc©    to    the    uuusticn   ox    tae    propoi-<?a   :;:oqv;?    vlvendl  . 
liiia    caused  me    to   reinerk    .Iti   a    i  .  :r_,    -^.u j    tuRt    \:.e 

-nechanlcs    for    the    carryln.-   on    ..  „     :..,  <!.;    rKiatioiis 

between    tiie    ^'oveitiment  s    resistii'      .'.,:    re.=>.sor    iu.t  Ions   Si'c 
so    complice '  ©d    that    it.    is   noeriy    iiapoi.;;  iole    to    cai'iy    . 
such   relatlojis    in   t.   maruie;-   at    aXi  sfclV 

and    sound.      X   referred    to    tiie   fact    t  .^  ,.>:  I-f i.e^: , 

I'cr 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1195 


1196  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


zeal  as  the  Japanese  and  the  Sermans  are  displaying 
instead  of  weakening  8n*i  telling  tne   Cninese  people 
ti»at  all  of  the  friendly  countries  were  now  s:riviri^; 
primarily  to  protect  tbemaelves  and  to  force  an  aijree- 
ment  between  Cains  ana  Japan,  every  Chinese  shoulc 
understand  fro:r  such  a  procedure  that  the  best  possible 
course  was  .j^-ii,  ■  jui-sued  anu  tiiat  :,        ^  lor  reso- 
lute fiB;htin,_^  aiitll  tiie  liii-.-erl-  .  .r  .<  -  e  »ei-T  cv 
peace  negotiations  w;,!  ■   _'^  ".   ...  ..  , .  .c-j..e  vn  v.i-  ..c 

obliged  to  enter  Int ;         .?  . 

X  expressed  tae  viev.  ■  i  t-  of 

oui-  relatic-  ^  -  :'.rt^ti-^ij  '-   '  :i« 

inettf.-  *!:•  "  .,_   ,.l.:luls  cf  1...  -:  .  '  .le 

:  "■  .hV>-     Ifelked    arc    to   who.;;    .    uPvu     -ivsjr. 

mv    views    for    wiit- '  ai  .'l:..         i  r^-      i-  ."-t.! 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  1197 


;>  'WR:»i/». 


1198    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


M^ 


HimdM  me  by  the  Chinese   AabaBBsdor, 

Oecember  2,    1941.  ^.-.— -*' 

\7 


in    threti    i.'jle  :r  .i:i.;    uulea   i.cweraber  27  uini    ^d,    ^r.    ^uo 
■i'al-c.;l    ...J     Jciiertlisdiiuo    >-    j.ii'     I'li -;3l.  t.,.    t.:  if  l,.;  j  Cv.    t   >  Ir 
coaVl  ufc.!  .e    in    t'.c  ^rusiaoiit    ^:ij>^    t;.t    .ccrtt   ..-.     jl     '  L^te    and 
in    im,    f  ana  allien  t.vl    i-r  j  :icj  ule  j    oi    t.-.tir    itrti  -:i   jj^jUc/. 

..olii    u      t!:er:i    ivve   dtu<:if<i   n.v    ion-    telt    x- i ...    oi     .  oviiPiorr 
i,4   r^yorlij      Ine    ji  aoui -t>lui<3    ueti-nie.i    t-^e      ecr-.t.i'.y   tirni    Uie 
four   cavo^.s    lit    t'*    o;fice   ui     t:.o   ..ecre t-.r.,-,    and   ulso   my 
riTiJort   of    U:e    conver-satj  uu    oet'.vet-n    t-.>.      t;cr<,tir.7   ujid   .'lyself 
in   nia    ■.ptii-t::ii.nt    on    li.t   cvenin:    o:     t  ,e    ^fai::.       _oth    ti,  e 
jeiier '.lidai.  .0   ^um     li.t   :orei  .'n      ijiiol-.r    .>rft    rtiiyaux-ea   uy 
ti  .e    d..  ..i>>a  ti.eti  c   iiuu    n._li.-t:,l    Cj  irit    uiiJtrl.vin ,;   tneae    coiivcrsationa. 

»  .t  .,■    *ici.fet.    .. -.    to    ucint    oat    ti.    t^.ti      nitea    -tutes    jovtrn- 
■r---.it     t.,-;     lulio  .    .1  ,    .uc;tii     v.iCi.,     i-.cu.d',    oi    Vfcj\.'    .-rf.it    a  f -;  l.?;f:ce , 
•  i---.t     1^1   ;ii:vt    MCt;      li.  lo-j    iipii-'.  oj  -1-.  a    o  .    t..  ii.     .ijc    oi'    t,.c 
0  c  ei.n : 

!i)    ^  .tt    iii.;,OBt    iuc.-eai  uly    ;;r«'»t    faitn    o"     toe 
iyi.iii«;a<;    Mi-vj'lt    iu    -.c    tiLic;-.c      oV    K.  fe   '.conuraic 
p»c^L-  J.--,    oa  '  .1  i    t-.At.  ;.■     ..ic."     .   I'    get.!    In    I'Oi'ce 
lor  t-ie    i-jat   lou.-    .^.,  Ui.     i.j    o.  ci.    -,.  ..i  i..c  mere 
ruiiio.'   V  >.■  J-...V    i^a.iol  0 1 1 'i  t..    o      it      rel^i:,  ilioa  iias 
nli'tuvj'    ot  ;  ;n    ti.'    proviuct   ,-     tr  .1.'    i  ..'iic.y    fcel- 
iii-;    liii-.'  J--.  ■-'  .1    ^  .i   iS. 
(_t     ,;.-,..      '-..ji  'J  ..'     f    -ir:        i.     .,     l  t  tii    C'jl.at;d 

(,i.rti..    .,;    v      c  ..■  >-•     ■  i'-;        -ii    ■■    ••■ic  ..    aur,  ,.      t;.  e 
p-'.al    •  ,c..        J    ■  -    ■  i  i;.'    on   .  ove.iJur   -.  ; ■-•/ , 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1199 


I'el.  :.L-t  .  0      u      ;f--_    ..        --       '..•>-.. t    .-fcSlr;  c  13  01.3 

t..-       ,:;  .  Ci-J  l:.;;  ui  .'I  ■     l..!,t     cil    <    ..     .- .    .'^  ....LrL>/-.e     aOt 

to     -C'/r.    ^  c-  ;  t,  .    •_  r  ;  t»  ixj     I  .t.  t    t.  tr       iilt.',a       '„'!  tes 
.vui-ild    uot    i..lt.-fe:'u    .      •       '     •  .■    In    ...;:.'... 

(.  )    Vi.t.-    wj.ult    vjucdtiu.     ^^    (  i  ,;c  .1.  lo  -•  c  ii    i-„a 
Bpiritat^l:      It    it    H    .question   o'     t.  e   .T.oj'-.le    of 
a   wiiole"  f.fco  pli   wiica   as    ut-t  i  li-aliu      a    very 
ijard  wur  5  ':r    ii.  ir  ,:en^-.--  >,(.'    t    ..il'',    t.  c;     .,.  Ic, 
In    its   i.'-.ruj:.i  p     ani    Icr:  •   .,  .::-ri;.  ;,    i.--      ,lr,nea 
It.-)    .<i.'eut    ni-t-t    u;i   t..t-,    i.,"-crii:.t   o..    j    situation 

turaiii-    ill    (-■  .r    Xt-vor    ■ .     .^..■-.^■,    un    trie 

eco;i<j(r,ic    w^tiitiCo    t.i    I  t  •  •-.    jc.:.,  c  n, ".,  c     .j/z'^ra 
;.;xVt:     Dte       -.Oil      Ic     LUl     it.lv       iC/i'-c    a. riff     t  ..fc 
it.il    ;::-':    -:. ,       it    J :;       .lO   exa   rtrft.  li  u».    l^^    s-..      t;.at 
I,:. is     laest^oa    .  i.injUii.erjtiill,,    afi'ccts    l^.i.    ^  -irit 
o:    ouj-    .i  •i.t.it.      'orces  ui,^    i.  ;.    ;.<  ople  . 
(■»)    Xi.      i :;    t-rlt-ri.    X      .'..  ,    t.t.    _.rcJ-:i    ..;iiatcr 

telle      -icr      •...■    I      ,..<,        C.'- "       ..         .    .      _■         ll"-.      t.;:at 

a  C'-rttii;i    ltu.;ejc-   in    ti.e    ..ort„    i^.l-I    i.tclfita   by 
na~ie)    ::ii  •.•]  l    u-.    so   yua^fed    l,.    c    ice.  ;  u,  ,    -.t,-,  .;e;;ing 

o;     our    i;.tor.,a',  :i^>  ..i.I      ^'.iuc.i    t_.     *.     "  -_.-     ,i>'.'tB 


uetri  -.t  ,1    . 
r«c'  .  3 1'.»  .ce. 


.  c.  tio:i    o;     c    r   .var   o-i" 


1200    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


t,  ,t    I0.1  •    .v:ii-    jti     ^-Ai 


^v1..    -rtjic-r    1  i    ,■    ■  ■      .    1-  :, 
COr.V'j;       .0     '-   .':      ,r  _/     ■.     i 

oy    I'.T    '.-..inorsic    ;.r    - .  .  i-n    o ;    v  •       •  ;  ,     •  .■       'it 

s.-fe    ctnaot    '■::';.•:    '.-    ;'it-i.   a    ■.•r      .1  .    1,    ij     T'  ■  *    ..■  v:-l 
po.vttre. 

IZI     U.     l':\>o",      L-    -       -.■;-•:      '  .'         ^.         .-.  .l  .     -•  ■       o  Teat 

«r4i  tii  i  •. -I  I   o  .       .    I..';    ii.i,...t    .f  ,1      ^      I  t..'  I  r,,    to   t-'-.fc 

t;...ija  j-jii  t'-.l    ;'f  1  .ici  !'i-.£'    r      iit,-;."...    •-:.   ..ci'  t-,  j    l.    i   .<        .,ii- 
•;t.-it«;ii    jo.' trjirae  nt  . 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1201 

EXHIBIT  NO.  19 


1202        CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


■& 


There  is  attfechf* 
Congress , 

thfi  off.toor«  of  t; 
tlone,  *:,'■:;  *':vv 
pot>»»d  message. 


r    oX'    tlse   pro- 

>u   toda:y    It   has   not    b«en 

'  -    irsft   a    socr.'i'    •'  • ,, 

to  read  it,  «■  ■ 
r  thfl  week-end  and 


tiOJiS, 

I   also   onclo"-"   "■    -'»•'»■       -;■    -■  •■    '^'■■r    ;  b «.•-;.« ^,    -,  ■  .  >  ,  <  ,,  • 
of   a   possible   mes; -.  -  r,., 

Jr'y    p"rso:;Rl    view  continues   ea   or;   yesterday   tc   b«   ttifit 
Its    sendin-   «111    be   of   doubtfv 
fur;  oae   of  riakirif*   a   r^-corc,         Tt    5!i.;;-.i.    ev?;..   cs-.iSf-   such 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1203 


79716  O — 46 — pt.  14 20 


1204     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1205 


1206    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


\.  t  ft 


that    1- 


worl<5 


In  the  PhlllDpl'  f 

acquainting  an  Asia*  --ith  the  f  tsersoaal 

freedo.-n  .'  self-government   that  -»d 

by  our  own  Rec-iablic,      Our  oonr-' 

the   Filipino   people   inl  ind©pender'.t 

cosn  nonwealth.       At   the    B^me    ri-sri,    t-jB    ''trst.ntf'd   experiment 

has  bern  and    la   of   f  *  •?-    to   ua     , 

other  people!".      It    is   i  ,        ■  . 

of   the   Unit'?C    "'..t^a    l..  -IeI    lii   •  ^rn 

Pacific   a   nation   frlenaly    '  ■   ,         -   c^' 

a?TOci^tlon   rtn^l    -—-f «  -  .-.^-^  -  y^^  ,     ,-..,.-,^ 

the   Orient    tr.^    ;  ,«   n--3^t.\:-  -if* 

good   r^-'px:*.^  •  .  ■• 

and    to    Ptabl    .    •  •  .  .        ■    In   genet-  .,    .         • 

ree'i*^'^* 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1207 


at  lone 
.>nt 

_,.,-,  ...,-i  of  interests  in  the 
,f -,,_,,,  ,^,,  ^  »v,,.  '!rated  states  B'Tiov,^, 
.  .   :"he  a'll- 
•■■.fc'T^'nc--'   wTs  .-nalntenftnce 
envlsai.  ■  ;  act  Ion  of 

-tlon  of  co-Bp*'tltion  In  the  Pacific 


1208    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


i 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1209 


entere- 


.hem»«iv 


''OTTfi     O? 


1210    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  1211 


?nd! 


1212    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1213 


1214    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


and  ■■  ■  .  I 


!r  they 
/  s  e  8  . 


=  "attacked" 
-rr  s  Hies 
oonj.T.lc,  political 
leaders  declare 
Ions  under  this 
■  deer,  beet  suited 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1215 


-11- 

"a-^      -Tfl  q  ♦-      >    n      p      ^  -^T~,  p  <■  ^   ■>•  ',    Tfl     ■•<■''      t  "^1  -•      t  ft  '"•  ' 

y-v   /.o-^o^^    oonfl^t,    of   ■'*    f^r^'"'''!    1  p^— no-.-' 

wn-'    expc-itn'   -nro^roa  5l  vp    Infiltration,    '->pn«='trMr  j  on   and 
enclrc""  e'lont    ^-r^n-h   which   '^ne    natl'^n   a'tpr  Bn^Vr.r^r   is 
'ubdiiP'"^    an^    onfli.ivetl    e'th^r  bv    PCtu^l     force   o-^   ty 
fv.pcq*ci    r)f   fore?. 

Aft«>r  this    fwhlon   orn^    ^urouln-r  thlp   nolicy   of 
connurPt   bv    "^orce,    Tanan   estsbli'^hed    herself   in   'forea; 
v'orked  her  vay  into   pnfl   ■*"',  n«il  Tv   spi''ed   Mfinchurl?;   has 
^.'^Mrr-ht    for  t>^e   '-last    four   ami    a  half  year?    to    subjuc^ate 
''^hinn;    has,   flurln"'   th»    ne~^  ofl    of   our   nesrsti't  ions  '«'ith 
her,    invidec*    Tn-iochlna;    pnr"    now,    threatens   with   Imiilnent 
attac^*:   v-^riou'^?   nel<7>hborl  n.-/   area**   lnc''u<1inff'   even  the 
Phillnnlne  <^ . 

This    situation,    t>recir>itatef^    solely   bv  Jaryinese 
ao'B:re?='ion,   hol<1?!   unmistakable  threats  to   our   interests 
eq-oeci-^lly   our   interest   in  neace  and    In  •peaceful   trade, 
RTir^    to   our  reorionaibility    for   the   sectirity   of  the 
Phllinoine   Archlr>elairo.      The "  puccespful    defense   of  the 
United   <?tate8,    In  a  military   sense,    la   der>eni3ent   uron 


1216    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


-12- 


suonlles   of  vltnl   materials  which  ve    I'^^nrr-t    in  l^rge 
ouantit'.»=?    from   t^:  18    r»rl  on  of    th^  world.      To  rif»rmlt 
Ja-nane?e   domjnation  an^^.    control   of   thf»    r-a.^or   Pources    of 
worln    gu-ir>"'J^8    -^f  tin  a  n-^    rubber  nnfl    +:unf«t'»n  would 
Jeopardize  -our  safety    in  «   manner   nnd    to    sn   px'i"«>i.'"    ^>-:-i* 
cannot   bp   tolerated.      Aion*^  '-rit-h    rhi='    vou'''^    to  — .ract"lc?l  ■ 
Ja-^anese   C''>ntrol    of    th'^    Pacific. 

r'nlp-'a    th*^   -nresent    course   of  cvpnt?    in  t^e    Far   "n^t 
Is   halted   and    consir'er-'tl  on<^    of  ,'u3tlce,    humanity   '^nd 
fair   denlini^  are  restored,    v^  vrill  vritn«>  "=!    in  thpt    r^pp-ion 
of  the   v;orld   precisely  what   hi?  alr^Tdy   trnnp-ired 
throu-^.o\'t    t:~.'^    continental    lif^lt'^   of  "urone   %*iere  ^Itler 
8ee'<fi   domln' on  by  ruth"'?'"!^    ■^orce. 

A  nroc-rsm   on  the  -oert    o-f   sny  country    for    publue-atlon 
and    ex-ololtatlon  of  a   hu«re  oonuTRtion  and    a   vn--'-   '^ortio^ 
of  the  world    i«    of   incfll  cul^ '  1  e   concern   to  every   other 
nn  t  i  on . 

'^nrou'-''" '^'■.t    the--    period    in  vVsirv   .■^a-sn  hap   be^n   ToVin''" 
it    clcr   th  Bt    such   le-   her  n-^o  n^nm ,    the    H-ov^rn'ri'^nt    of 
the    United    St  "tea  had   endeavored    to   •n'='r=!uade   thf^-    "rovprnwent 
of  Jaran   thp  ■^     'a-^-^n'"   'f^^t    'nr^r^'-'^'^    Me    in   maint-i  ni  nr 
and   cul^lveti.nc   friendTv    reV'>:ion"    w' th    the    ''n1  ted    "t.-tA? 
and    vlth  a""  1    other  countrlet'    t'^       "-    ~  Ipvp    in   r^r-r'a-r'^- v   ^^nd 
•oeaceful   nrocesaea. 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1217 


-13- 


^ov  the   ^5Bt   f*  c-ht   •TT^nth",   conversations  have  been 
carT\fr*    on   ■'-*»-->--"n   the    SecretaTn"-    of   3tPte  and    the 
pr.po«^ont^    on  behalf   of  •■>-..-•   ■•-.i*-p-^    ^i-oi-pa,    pfid    the    ''orels^ 
Vln'_''tpr  p  Tf?    r>-nc~'PT   o'    'n-^-n,    for    t^  f^  -^u-n-^ope    of   8rrlvia<^ 

'^^ov  •"'  rn  "po  *  -• . 

"^•"ou.-h  ^M^   t'^io   f:,r,<^ij.n  'i-'t'. -ir*^    th"    "Tovorr. Tent    of   the 
-^'nlt-ori    3':.^*-p^   h"°   "-pc^    c. -^  -  -  -  f--  ..-^    >^^^  ^ «- ^    ?uo>->ort    of   bapic 
orlnclnXP''  v*-'ch    s'-o-.j''"    ~   -.,-.>--';    j  ?.*>-■  rn' t  ^onnl   rel'tion". 
"^h?    -r".  n?*oie-    '"-■r   v'-- \r'-   -.-o   ^-^v^^    stoid    In   theae   ^-1  «<  cur  plans 
ffi°y  be    =u'^  ~ni"l  "prl    rp    •'"r'-o''---. 


1218    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


•14- 


:--The  principle  of  iuviolabillty  of  territorial  lnt.v:rlty 
and  sovereignty  of  each  axid  all  notions;  the  principle  of 
non-interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of  other 
countries;  the  principle  of  ei'iality,  i.  =   ;'      .::'t:,y 
of  comiaercial  opportii.iity  aud  treat'iifat ;  i:.,  j-ple 

of  reliaiue  upon  international  cooperation  mal    j-..-  .  •  i  ^xa- 
tion  for  the  prevention  and  pacific  settleaent  of  contro- 
versies and  for  iiaprovdiaeat  of  international  conditions 
by  peaceful  methods  and  processes,   basically  ti.ese  are 
the  principles  of  peace,  law  and  order  and  fair  oealing 
anong  nations. 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1219 


'.i   vjltjn   r'jpture, 
-    ,      •'  : -:  n    :,TP-'.'^riiod    to"  t.As   country   alon,/ 

.t^r-douiln -tpd    movem'-nt 
•  f   vorl'.i    concueat    In    that   of    r,nlf-def enr,c, 

Th'^   fundament-*  '- ry   onr    Ja.-.    n 

ilffTent    froiiithe   fundr!m»^ntal    Issue   between 

tnls 


79716  O — 46 — pt.  14 21 


1220    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


/L 

this  country  ;  r.d  ]1bz1   Gernaany.   Concleely  strted,  It  Is 
an  Issue  of  autocracy  versus   self-0eterniln8tlcn,  en 
Issue  of  master  and  slave  relationship  amon^:  the  peo^^les 
of  the  earth  versus  independence  of  nations  and  freedom 
of  peoples. 

The  whole  vorld  is  presented  vith  the  Ipeup  v.hether 
Germany,  Italy  and  Japan  are  to  conquer  and  rule  the 
earth  or  are  to  be  dissuaded  or  orevented,  by  whatever 
procerreB  may  be  necessary,  fium  pursuit  of  pollclec  of 
com^uest. 

The  question  immediately  presented  in  our  Far  Eastern 
affairs  Is  vhether  the  United  States  is  or  la  not  to 
stand  by  vhlle  Japan  goes  forward  with  e   program  of 
conuueet  by  force*-ln  dipret;r.rd  of  lav,  In  disregard  of 
treatle'-,  In  clpret^rd  '^f  others'  i'lf;,hts  and  Interest, 
In  disregaiNi  of  any  and  all  conventions  or  conslderptlcns 
of  morality  and  of  hurLanity--now  in  -^-otfrn  Apia  on^.    the 
"ectern  Pacific,  ultl.Ti  tely  furthnr  -.:'l  ".  ,.   ^r.  our  own 
councils  there  are  a  d^itummmkiy    -.ni  -:  •    :  .  -  ^^     lapueo: 

There  are  IsaueD  bptwe*^ 
between  confldenc-"   '  '  '"far;  i.  p  ■  •■; 

brtveen  clear  un  %-.  ■:    •  . 

between  wlsdoii  :na  :o..-,,    .,._l.-.'  ;.  ,.  ^;,- 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1221 


-17-    . 

bei  ir   s:i:T'  ,    netw^aen   the   concept  of   peace   at   any 

price   ■•■:-  -  f   peace  at   a   price   coimuensiorate  with 

the   rnVrn   -^f   rs'-ce;    between   accur:;te   -^ppriisal   and 
inf:  ar  cvn  .;    bet.veen  full 

use      • .  :    "^r  ■        r.erial    and  morMl   resources. 

-•;icn  which   is 
liy  utterly  destroyed 
the    i.or'"  ipied  by  Jaoan   the    peaceful   and 

I'itsbl"  -.ations  whicr.  the  United  States  had 

■.?ly   en:     ■-  -•.   Sevrtstated   a    natioa  v.-r;lch 

-   many  cent'..  .  •       devotion   to   the  arts- of   peace    ..r.-,! 

-.•r''luence   vn  the  we.'rt^  "n 
ireaten  ■  nsrorrn  a 

..   c-:nt    '  .v_    oae   dc  .incited   b-  .litary    and 

•      '         '  .  '     ■  /  -of  war . 


1222    CONGRESSIONAL  IN\'ESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


-18- 

of  the  Fil-      ::cw  depends.   It  would  ruin  the  lifelong 
efforts  and  iav«3taients  of  thouaauda  of  American  citizens 
who  have  transferred  their  homes  and  busi^ass  activities 
to  the  Philippines  on  the  faith  that  A-aerican  principles 
of  freedom  and  A.'aerican  methods  of  government  would  contiau* 
in  those  Islands.   It  would  forever  terminate  the  prestige 
and  influence  of  the  United  States  which  the  American 
experlieent  in  the  Fhilirnine  Islands  has  been  establishing 
throughout  the  Orient. 

If  the  Japanese  should  carrj  out  their  now  threatened 
attacks  upon  and  were  to  succeed  in  conquering  the  regions 
w  ich  they  are  menacing  in  the  southwestern  Pacific,  our 
comaerce  with  the  Netherlands  East  Indies  and  Malaya  would 
be  at  their  mercy  and  probably  be  cut  off.   Our  imports 
from  those  regions  are  of  vital  Importance  to  us.  We  need 
those  imports  in  time  of  peace.  V/ith  the  spirit  of  exploi- 
tation and  destruction  of  commerce  which  prevails  among  the 
partners  in  the  Axis  Alliance,  and  with  our  needs  what  they 
are  now  in  this  period  of  emergency,  an  interruption  of  our 
trade  vdth  that  area  would  be  catastrophic. 

V/e  do  not  want  war  vdth  Japan,  and  Japan  does  not 
want  war  with  this  country.   If,  however,  war  should  come, 
the  fault  and  the  responsibility  will  be  those  of  Japan, 
The  primary  cause  will  have  been  pursuit  by  Japan  of  a 

policy 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1223 


-19- 

,  olicy  of  f-.-.',i^,Te   .;:ion--in  t;. 

-lilitant  inilitLU'lstic  leadership  iies  .  ■•, 

violated  tre.iti  ■,  .  i-  :  i  .  r-  _:  :■ ;  -.'r.' -u    aeatroye:*   ■    -ty 
and  lives  of  cur  nrtior.als,  inflicted  ho-rible  suf f eT-i:i-'.:3 
upon  peoples  who  are  our  frit-nds,  interfered  with  our 
trade,  ruined  the  lesiti-nate  bu.^ine.-s  cf  r.iany  of  our 
nationals,  compelled  us  to  make  h':  •     ■  r.dituren  for 
defensive  armament,  made  threats  :^^,■-^ir\.^t   us,  put  and  kept 
many  of  our  people  in  a  constunt  stftte  of  anxiety,  and, 
in  general,  made  Japan  a  world  nuisance  and  nude  of  Japan 
a  nenaoe  to  our  security  and  to  the  cause  of  peace,  of 
freedon  and  of  justice. 

Our  policy  in  relations  with  Japan  should  be  and  is 
influenced  net  by  fear  of  what  attacks  Japan,  acting 
ujilawfully  and  with  resort  to  force  may  make  upon  us 
but  by  determination  on  our  part  to  7ive  the  ut-.03t  support 
of  v/hich  we  are  reasonably  capable  to  the  fundamental 
principles  of  order  and  security  and  justice  to  which  we 
have  been  and  are  cc:-'jTiitteQ,  with  confidence  that  it  is 
within  our  capacity  tc  withstand  any  attack  wnich  anyone 
may  make  upon  us   because  of  our  pursuit  of  that  course. 


1224  CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


8TRICTLX  CONFXPEWTIAL  NoT«mb»r  29,  1941 


PROPOSED  HKSSAaE  FROM  THE  PRSSIDKNT  TO  THE 
EMPEROR  OF  JAPAN 


Almost  a  oantury  ago  th«  Pre8ld«nt  of  th©  Unitvd 
States  addre8>«d  to  tha  Eaparor  of  Japan  a  masaaga 
extending  the  offer  of  friendship  of  the  people  of  the 
United  Statea  to  the  people  of  Japan.   That  offer  waa 
aooepted,  and  in  the  long  period  of  unbroken  peaoe  and 
friendship  whioh  has  followed,  our  respective  nations, 
through  the  virtues  of  their  peoples,  the  sound 
ohar&cter  of  their  respective  Inatlttitlons  and  national 
structures,  and  the  wladoaj  of  their  leaders  and 
x*ulers  —  espeolally  in  Japan  your  illustrious  grand- 
father the  Emperor  Melji  —  have  proapered  and  risen  to 
a  position  of  being  able  substantially  to  Influence 
humanity. 

Only  in  situations  of  extraordlnery  importanoe  to 
our  two  countries  need  I  address  to  Your  Majesty 
messages  on  matters  of  state.   I  feel  I  should  now  so 
address  you  because  of  the  deep  and  far- reaching 
emergency  which  appears  to  be  in  formation. 

I>evelop»©ntP  are  occurring  in  the  Pacific  area 
which  threaten  to  deprive  each  of  our  nations  and  all 

humanity 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1225 

-2- 

huraanlty  of  the  benaflolal  infXuono*  of  th«  long  p«ao« 
between  our  two  countries.  Those  deTelopoents,  oontaln 
traglo  poBilbllltlee, 

The  history  of  both  our  oountrlee  affords  brilliant 
examples  In  which  your  and  my  predecessors  have,  at  other 
tlMSB  of  great  crisis,  by  their  enlightened  deolslons  and 
flcts,  f-rrefited  trends  nnd  directed  national  polloiea 
plong  new  onri  better  oourses  —  thereby  bringing  bless- 
ings to  the  rvftoples  of  both  countries  and  to  the  peoples 
of  oth«r  lands. 

fftelin£^  cleanly  concerned  over  the  r- re  sent  trend  of 
events,  I  nddreas  rnyself  to  Your  Majesty  nt  this  isoment 
in  t'  p  fervent  hopfi  thnt  Your  Majesty  may,  ns   1   mm   doing, 

thouKht  to  w.^yp  of  dispelling  the  dark  clouds  which 

over  the  relations  between  our  two  countries  and  of 
T^ntorln.-  '>n'-l  -^Int'^inlnF  thf  trn^dltionil  etpte  of  amity 
'.''herein  t.'Oth  our  people g  rr^-^y  contribute  to  lasting  peace 
nn«l  es^c-.jrlty  thrnu|£;hr)ut  the  Pacific  Ter^. 


1226    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

EXHIBIT  NO.  20 


COPY  OF  A  MiCMORANDUM  FOR  THE  PRESIDENT  COVSRINQ 
A  PROPOSED  MESSAGE  FROM  THE  PRESIDENT  TC  THE 
EMPEROH  OF  JAPAN,   THIS  MEMORANDUM  WAS  3ENT  TC 
THE  PRESIDENT  ON  OCTOBER  17,  1941.  T'rit.   PHCP03ED 
MESSAGE  WAS  NCT  oEN'i  a::  J  N'  FUKTHH-K  ACTIC'N  WAS 
TAKEN. 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1227 


Cctob«r  17,    1941. 

KEH.CRA.NPIIM  rOR  THE  F'^Ka^DEilT 
Th«r«   IB  attachtd  »  virmTX  of  your   prooof^id    aeo- 

In  Tls-*   of   («)    the  ettltui*   ehevn  by    th«  Jnonntn* 
Mli'.sttr  h«r«   In  a   two-hour  oonva/'aatlon    lust   »r»nlng 
*rlth  Kr.    Wall»3   and   ■ytalf,    i.nUo«tlng   that    t;ia  Jaoaneaa 
<JoT»rfUi«n":   lailre?    to    oontlnu*    lt»   exoVorj»tory   conreraa- 
tt-n*   v'lth  u«,    ccu-Ve    '-Ith    ■-h'?    f«ct    tnat    the  Jaoansna 
Mn'Bt»r  '^,    at  his   requeat,    ooatn^  to  call   aipsin   thla 
wftemocn  for  a  further  extonflad  d^lacuflalon,    (b)    tha 
■•^•aga   rpct'ved  by   Aitbaaaador  Orew   fr-^a  Prince   Konoya 
(through  I'lirce   Kcnoye'p    crivnte    sacratary)    (raportad   In 
Mr.    Orev'fl   tela^r^m- 1«4«,    October  17,    11   a.m.)    that    tha 
new  J».r»r\fe   cabinet   vi^uld   be    -sne    alnearaly   daslroua   of 
ImnroTlng   rel»tl-na   with  the  United  Stetea  and  of   oon- 
tlnulog    the   •xclor^tory    oor.vsrsatl.T.a,    and    (c)    tha   word 
■'9  t\!i¥t   tb-t   O^ri'trsl   Tojo.    •   <ono>e   adnerent  and  a 

*»oderata". 


1228    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


-e. 

"■odtrat**,  ha«  b«*a  d*«lj{n*t«A  hj   th«  Eaparor  to  fora  a 
ntw  oablnat,  w»  inolln*  to  th«  tIbw  that  It  *iould  ba  pra- 
■atura  to  aand  tha  px*opoaad  aasaag*  to  tba  Eaparor  pand- 
IRC  furthar  elarlfle'^tion  of  the  tltustion  in  Japan  and 
of  tha  probabla  attituda  of  tha  aaw  goTemaant. 


balMMT*: 
ll««i«ft  af 

prayoMd 


fiswiiin  '  ^-  J        ^*'^ 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1229 


FHOPOJiD    MJt:ioAa*   FROM    TH^  ]?Rk.'olJmf  fO   THE 
^HF'£HOh  or   JAl^AM 


Only  ono«  and   in  person    <n4  on   -"n  «»iB«r{'enoy  »ltu«tlon 
hft»«   I.  nddr*afl«d    ^our  lapsrlal   Kajtsty   on   mstt«re   of    'tnt«. 
I   f»«l    I   should   <igftin  sdcrtSB  Your  Majesty   because  of  •» 
fieeper  find  ipore  fur- reaching  eaergency  which  appears  to 
be   In   the   prooene   of   foifwatlon.      As   Your  Majesty   knows, 
conver«»".tlone  nnve   been  in  progress  between  reprefisnt-tlTes 
of    iur  two   OoTernments   for  irany   rsonths   for   *•'?   '•urr.oee   of 
preventli  t;    »ny   prtenslon  of  .irc«d   conflict   In   the   I  "lolf  lo 
aren.      Th^t   hae    ^  esn   our  tjre«t   ourpose   ea    I   think   It   h«8 
equally   been    the   ►re   t   purpose   of   Your   ^<-'Je8ty. 

I   reraonally  would   h.nte  been   h':-)'->y   even   t  ■>   tr-'vel 
thousands   of   miles   to   meet   with  your  Prime   Minister,    If 
In   Hd»Tnce   one   or   two   b«3lc   nccorda   -^ould   h'^ve  been 
realized    so    that   the   suo'ceas   of   siiich    r.   oonfererce   ''CJld 
hj»ve   teen   sfceured.      I   bope<^    th-  t   f  ,-■   p   :  f-orc'e   v'ulc!   be 
re«ched.      ""hr    fir-t    rel   tef'    *  p    '■  *'    r!t.       f   H^lns 

'iiiC    the   seccnt    re!  'teC   to  .  It      p^^^-er  Jftf^an 

r.or  t'e  Hnlted    3t    tes    voi.:  .         ,       -    '    to 

the  f-'clflc    :rei. 

If  T'ereistent    reports    are    true   tjv  t    the   .'-r    f«-ae 
Governii.ent    la   cci.Qideri;i(i   arred      t'c-s   »t:lr.8t    the 
-ovlet     "i-lon   or  r.galnrt   i^rltlp}    or   -utch  or  Incependent 

territory 


1230     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


fwrifrf  i«  tk*  wmHk,  «Im  •kAriimi  99mX%  wmIA,  •# 

FMlflA  «»•«.     liMii  AttMk*  WM134  ■••••Mirlljr  i»f«iv« 

fh*  0«i««A  itatM  oppoaM  uy  fnrmiayt  ^f  oeAMMt. 
It  «9«14  lik*  to  •••  |Ma»«  iMtwMa  •'^NM  •«•  0Ik&««.     2t 
«9«ia  Ilk*  to  •••  t9—4k9m  of  tho  Mfto  wtatid— i  aai 
tra4«  eon4«oto«  o«  «  fikir  buoio.     If  J^aptti  MMlA  |«i« 

vith  «•  to  pFosorvo  poaoo  tii  tho  famltf  «•  «m1«  %•  i 

001/  too  totppy  to  ronuM  aonMl  ooMOMNiial  p[a«ti«M«  v&tll  :!-; 
tho  oolo  oxeoptlM  of  eortoitt  ortloloa  ittiXth  w  wot  kMV  m 
•t  ho»o  for  ottr  ova  dofonoo  tni.  that  of  oil  ml  tho  p 

Aaorlooa  agMlnst  potolblo  «(iTO«clon  froa  oMiPoA. 

If  on  tho  othor  hand  Japna  «or«  to  otairt  now  atU- 
tary  opanttlont,    tho  0nlto4  Stntoo,   la  •ooordaaoo  vttli 
her  policy  of  poaeo,   wowlrt  ho  oory  oofioaoly  AOft««NMt 
ana  ifOtt!.<5  h«Te  to  aotlt,  by  taking  «iny  and  nil  otoyo 
Khioh  It  Blgit  4oon  neooaamry,   to  wporvnt  «(iy  oirt*noi«a  of      ^f 
auch  oondltlon  of  war. 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1231 


D«e«Hb«r  6,    1941. 


USMOMSDW   FOR  TH£  PRESIPgHT 

Purduaat  to  your  request,  th*r«  la  aeat  you  here- 
with a  dreft  of  e  ■eeea^e  froe  fou  to  the  Eaperor  of 
Jepan. 

I  uBderetend  that,  prior  to  eendlrig  the  seaeege 
to  the  Eaperor,  you  here  In  alnd  aendlng  e  oieaaaige  to 
Chleng  Kal-ahek  in  vhlch  you  vould,  vithout  quoting  the 
text  of  the  aeeaeee  to  the  Emperor,  outline  to  hla  the 
aubatenoe  cf  the  "atand-atlll*  airrengeaent  vhleh  you 
oonteaplate  propoalng  to  Jepeo. 

Trom   point  of  view  of  enauring  the  eonflAentlel 
nature  of  ysur  aeaaagc  to  Chiang  Kal-ahek,  It  la  aug- 
geated  that  you  eight  eare  to  call  la  the  Chlneae  Aa- 
beaaador  and  i>r.    doong,  to  leoreaa  upon  both  of  thee 
the  urgeaoy  and  eecreey  of  the  atatter,  and  to  aek  the 
Aabaaaadnr  ta  ooiuiunloate  to  Chiang  Kal-ahek,  by  his 
•oat  aeoret  coda,  your  aeaaaga. 


Kneloaure : 

Draft  neB»a<;e  to 

the  Eaperor  of  Japan. 


1232     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


D«e«ab«r  6,   1941 . 


IP  THE  mimpf  m0 


I  f*el  X  should  «ddr«sa  Xour  Majssty  b«oaus«  of  th* 
d«*p  and  f«r-r»aehlng  •acrgcney  whloh  appear*  to  b«  In 
foraatlon  In  relations  between  our  two  countries.   Con- 
▼ereatlon*  imrm   been  In  progreee  between  representatlTes 
of  our  t»fo  (JoTernaieHte  for  aany  aonthe  for  the  purpose 
of  preTentlng  any  extension  of  armed  conflict  m  the 
Pacific  area.   It  hae  been  ay  sincere  hope  that  *hl« 
would  be  aehlered  and  I  aa  sure  that  It  has  equally  been 
the  alneere  hope  of  Xour  Majesty. 

Deyelopaente  are  now  occurring  In  the  Pacific  area  - 
which  threaten  to  deprive  eaoh  of  our  nations  and  huswin- 
ity  of  the  beneficial  Influence  of  the  long  and  unbroken 
peace  which  has  been  aalntalned  between  our  two  coun- 
triee  for  al«io»t  a  century.   Those  derelopaents  are 
auggeetlTe  of  tragic  ooseiblllties. 

In  theee  olrouastarces,  where  continuance  of  pres- 
ent trend*  Imperil  the  now  tenuous  threads  which  still 
hold  our  two  countries  In  ansloable  rel«tlr^n«hip,  I  feel 
that  no  possibility  should  be  oTerlooked  which  might 

serre 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1233 


Bsrr*  to  relieve  the  lme(!l«t*  situation  and  thue  enable 
our  tvo  Oovernnents  to  work  out  In  a  oalmer  ataosrihere  a 
■ore  perjuinent  eolation.   I  mm   eure  Your  Kajeety  will 
share  asy  feellntrs  in  thle  regard. 

The  hlstorj  of  both  our  oountrles  afforda  brilliant 
ejouaplee  in  which  your  and  »y  oredeceaeore  have,  at 
other  tiaae  of  great  oriaia,  by  visa  decisiona  and  en- 
lightened aote,  arreeted  harmful  trends  and  directed 
national  oolleiea  along  new  and  farelghted  ©oufsea  — 
thereby  bringing  bleaelnge  to  the  people*  of  both  ooun- 
triea  and  to  the  neoplee  of  other  nations. 

With  the  foregoing  considerations  in  Mind  I  propose 
now  the  conelualon  of  a  teaoorary  arrangeaent  vhleh 
would  envisage  cessation  of  ho9tilltl«s  for  a  period  of 
ninety  days  between  JaD<*r  and  China  and  an  undertaking 
by  each  of  the  OoTernaents  aost  concerned  in  the  Paoifio 
area  to  refrain  froa  any  aoTeisent  or  use  of  ar»ed  force 
against  any  of  the  other  parties  Suring  the  period  of 
the  teoBTjorsry  arrsngeasent .   If  the  Jaoanese  OoTernment 
is  favorably  disoosed  toward  conclusion  of  such  an  ar- 
rangement I  would  be  glad  oroBiptly  to  approach  the  other 
SoTernments  concerned  with  a  view  to  obtaining  their 
assent  and  oo^ltsent. 

In 


1234    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


-?- 

In  order  to  glTO  thone  aovernaent*  an  Ineentlrt  to 
•nt«r  into  this  arrangement,  I  further  "roisoae  that, 
toward  rallerlng  existing  aprirehensions,  Jaosn  reduce 
har  arsad  foroes  in  French  Indochina  to  the  nuaber 
whioh, Japan  had  there  on  July  r-6,  1941,  and  that  Japan 
agree  not  to  eend  new  oontingenta  of  tin&^i   force*  or 
■atarlel  to  that  area  during  the  ninety-day  neiioCi  of 
the  taaoorary  arrangeaent . 

If  the  coiunltwents  abore  entleaged  can  be  otatain«<!, 
1  wouia  undertake  as  a  further  part  of  the  general  ar- 
rangeaent  to  auggeat  to  the  OoTemment  --^f  J«t^«n  find  to 
the  Oovern«ent  of  China  that  those  Oorernaenti  enter 
Into  direct  negotiations  lookln»T  to  a  'peaceful  settle- 
ment of  the  difficulties  wh' ch  exlut  between  them.   Such 
negotiations  might  taJke  plaaa  In  the  Phllloplne  Inlands 
should  the  Japanese  and  the  Chinese  OoTernmants  «o  desire. 

In  as  mueh  as  the  Chinese  Ckivemaent  has  be6n  cut 
off  from  Its  orlnolpal  Industrial  areas,  I  believe  It 
equitable  that  during  the  temporary  period  of  the  pro- 
posed arrangement  the  United  States  should  continue 
sending  matarlal  aid  to  China.   I  may  add  that  the 
amount  of  material  which  China  le  able  under  urenent 
conditions  to  obtain  Is  email  In  comoarlaon  with  the 

ajaount 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1235 


•■ouBt  of  uitcrlal  that  Japan  would  tava  through  Alaoon- 
tlnuanea  of  oparatlona  for  a  parlod  of  thraa  sontha. 

It  la  my   thought  that  whlla  thl*  tasporary  arranga- 
aant  would  ba  In  affaot  our  two  Oovernaanta  eould  oon- 
tlnua  thalr  oonvaraatlona  looking  to  a  paaoaful  aattla- 
■ant  In  tha  antlra  Paalflo  araa.   tha  k.lna  of  aolutlon 
I  hava  had  and  oontlnua  to  hava  In  alnd  la  ona  In  whleh 
Japan,  on  tha  Itaals  of  apr>llcatlon  of  tha  prlnolnla  of 
aquallty,  would  ba  provldad  thiv>ugh  aonatruotlTs  and 
paaoaful  nethoda  opoortunlty  for  tha  fraar  aece**!  to  raw 
■atarlals  and  msritata  snd  ganaral  axohsni?"  for 

tha  IntarohAnge  of  Idaae,  and  for  tha  davelopaant  of  tha 
talanta  of  har  paopla,  and  would  thus  t>a  anablad  to 
aohlere  tho««  national  airlrationn  whtch  Japan's  laadara 
hara  of tan  proelalaad. 

In  aaklng  thlt  proposal,  I  exoraas  to  tour  Msjasty 
tha  farrant  horsn   that  our  two  {JoT^rnaanta  aay  find  waya 
of  dl»p«Hln«  tha  dark  olom**  which  loo»  orar  tha  raia- 
tlona  betwaan  our  two  countries  and  of  reatorlng  and 
maintaining  the  tradlt'nna"!  condition  of  aalty  KharaVn 
both  ■''-   "■-■-■--  --•■  ---trlhuta  to  laatlng  .  neaca  and 
aaeurS.- .  aolflo  araa. 


.aMiiiiiifiiii^^^^ 


79716  O — 46— pt.  14 22 


1236    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1237 


1238    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEAKL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1239 


1240    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1241 


1242    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1243 


1244     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1245 


''....//..  JfA^ 


f**ii- 


1246     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

EXHIBIT  NO.  21 


TELEGRAM  RECEIVED 


to-^ 


-::::/ 


/ 


-4 

O 


O 


m 


x 


JmA, 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1247 


TELEGRAM  RECEIVED 


T| 


1248     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR 


:s5 


ATTACK 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1249 


DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 
Memoran<ium  of  Conversation 


U  ., 


PARTICIPAN  ! 


o 

o 
o 


COPIES  TO: 


V^ 


o 

o 


si'-.- 


Ainbasfiadcr    oRiii^o    &t   nls    re  j^uest    fend 
ompanyln-    memory ndum,    wnloh    is    sell- 
wp  f-    veij'    doEirour    of   asoeit^iliil:.:     was 
veiTi.T.ont   v.oalc    do    il    tn«    :rltisn 
asiOF.f;   ujiCerthkliii/    to  ostahllsh   a 
•u«. .      1    Rsld   that    the    President   vff: 
••r;ifi-   aiio    tnot.    i.    v,oal..    In.    »-il 
-'foj'e    nl: 

:  ■  ■  "C    to 


^^ 

(7) 
-J 


> 


1250     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1251 


O 

o 
O 


-0 

c 


> 

CD 


79716  O — 46 — pt.  14 23 


1252    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


Royal  Netherlands  Legation 
washington 


-^ 


^ ) 


O 


> 

o 

Tl 

o 


o 

G) 

01 


v.»«  rtX-^*^ 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1253 


Collect  'D«y  Sctv. 
iMljjitl.ltr- 

fuil  tlte 
Day  lettf 


Telegram  Sent 


Bepartnimtt  of  ^tatr 


O  »€   TBAN»W!T7eO 


JftwA  in^^ofi. 


.V? 


~t<. 


EncifAtnd  is  . 
Stnliy  <^m(d<x 


.A. 


c /Oi- erv*^  r.iJr7  0.    dX^t-c 


il^ 


f^ 


i^V 


1} 
> 
o 


:i3 


■"1 


1254     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

EXHIBIT  NO.  22 


(Seal  of  Prime  Minister) 


10,  Downing  Street, 
Whitehall. 


Draft  of  Parallel  Communications  to  the  Japanese  Government 

Declaration  by  V.  8.  Government  that: 

1.  Any  further  encroachment  by  JAPAN  in  the  South  West  Pacific  would 
produce  a  situation  in  which  the  U.  S.  Government  would  be  compelled  to  take 
counter  measures  even  though  these  might  lead  to  war  between  the  U.  S.  and 
JAPAN. 

2.  If  any  Third  Power  becomes  the  object  of  aggression  by  JAPAN  in  conse- 
quence of  such  counter  measures  or  of  their  support  of  them,  the  President 
would  have  the  intention  to  seek  authority  from  Congress  to  give  aid  to  such 
Power. 

Declaration  by  E.  M.  O. 

Same  as  above,  mutatis  mutandis,  the  last  phrase  reading : — "*  *  *  their 
support  of  them,  H.  M.  G.  would  give  all  possible  aid  to  such  Power." 

Declaration  by  Dutch  Oovernment. 

Same  as  that  by  H.  M.  G. 

Keep  the  Soviet  Government  informed.  It  will  be  for  consideration  whether 
they  should  be  pressed  to  make  a  parallel  declaration. 

August  10,  1941. 


U.  S.  Naval  Communication  Service 


N.  C.  S.  387 

From :  The  President 

To:  OPNAV     "160115" 


SRS 


RESTRICTED 


For  Secretary  Hull  X  I  land  Saturday  afternoon  and  hope  to  reach  Washing- 
ington  Sunday  morning.  I  suggest  you  come  to  White  House  about  eleven  or 
eleven  thirty  Sunday  and  that  you  ask  Nomura  to  see  us  at  White  House  about 
four  thirty  in  afternoon.     All  well  best  regards 

Rooseivelt. 


121645 


Atlantic  Fleet 
Secret    Secret 


Outgoing 
Routine 


It  seems  highly  desirable  that  you  and  I  should  see  Nomura  as  soon  as  I  get 
back  X  Please  ask  the  Ambassador  to  be  ready  to  come  to  the  White  House 
either  Saturday  or  Sunday  X  I  shall  let  you  know  the  exact  time  as  soon  as 
possible  X     White  Twenty  X     For  Secretary  of  State  from  the  President. 


TOD: 

From: 

AUGUSTA 

Date 

Aug  12,  1941 

Originated 

Released 

Action: 
OPNAV,  Washington 

Routine: 

Priority: 

All  Despatches  considered  DEFERRED 
Unless  Originator  Checks  Higher  Class- 
ification. 

Formation: 

EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1255 


Draft  of  a  proposed  ooBinunloatlon  to 
the  Japanese  Ambaas&dor  brought  to 
the  Departaent  by  Mr.  Welles  following 
conference  between  the  President  and 
Mr.  Winston  Ohurohlll 


NOTE 

This  draft  was  not  given  to  the  Japanese 
^baseador.   See  cowaunloatlone  Riven 

by  the  President  to  the  Japanese 
Ambseaador  on  Axiguat  17,  1941. 


m 


M 


1256    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1257 


1258    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1259 


1260    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


1 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1261 


1262     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

EXHIBIT  NO.  22A 


to  tb«  <2oT««isis«n%s  of  3rei 

mSi  of  Cbim  that  thftsr  ««.' 

tion  thftt  '18I»^  bftA  M  «gfT«»eH^  3.n*#ftt*c'- 

to  IndO*lRl^MI  OKI  thftt    ^sea^  •vma^'K^   Hgr'--^<t^    t^^" 

«na'  rav  Materials  of  lisdooMndE  alNBOlJ  M  ^^sst'^ 
all  poy/mro  on  equal  t«ni#,     Th»  Prt«i<?l«v5t  et; 
that  ha  mmla  b«  vUling  to  «igg«8t  to  t£%  pc'^;^r': 
tionad  that  timf  ttndartaJca  t^a  ^adaratlss, 
tha  Ohltad  Stataa  would  be  isllllEig  tc   .Ics 
unAaFatandit^  that  th«  (h/rmvxxmni  ot  v«p£- 
dlqpoaad  to  sake  a  aisllar  dadlaration  and  waald 
ftti'thar  disposed  to  witbdr&ir  Its  silXtery  «?!■• 
foroee  froa  Indoohlna. 


3 


'i 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1263 


■ '.  ass  S'i  a.1.  x  iS'i 


1264    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


-3~. 
..u   the  southwestern  J^clfto  areas  ezoept     ■'^ 
n.a'    tits  Japanese  troops -now 
in  ??enoli  ladocfc-ina  will  i?e  witMrawii  fostb'l 
th  c  -ileitieiit  of  tiae  <JhlRft  Ir.cldeat". 

«t  months  the  Owemaenteof  tlie  Ucited 
of  Japs.n,   frurou'-'b  tjae  Secretary  of  State  afiyA^^ 
Japmieoe  AialbaEr-ict'.-_    ^,  -   v^ii^iiinj^to?:,   have  angaged  _«,   .„.-^„ 
'pi'otyaottd  conver8.atlons.     "Riese  conreraatioris  had 

vltlniate  r'-achiflr  't  a;rr<=>fn}<5nt»  Isfteed  upoa  M 
.>'-:^      J   V  jj  laoiplas  and 


3B  tjis 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1265 


1266     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


.^•BOtt  IS*  the  ?ap8ae»»  ^toir».waaes£t  Jm«  la  .©^«fflpl«ti©a  am^ 

.&»»  »t®pa  auoi  ««  tJuiti  whl^k  it  M«  3r*««atX3f  talt^ji  -si^ 
regflupd  to  Indoohisa  <«>  it  It  i&t«Me  to  ium  tbe  fOjslti«a& 
wliioli  it  )»■  attalatd  la  t»4oo£dfi«  la  f«£tlH»r«i&B#  of  Ss&stil^' 
«otl<»i  «gal3ut  flueqr  oelgb^oria^  atml;  aad  afecnild  s«e&  90a,« 
▼ematiocui  a®ftta  b#  •atered  up<m«  tho  Oovc^aBeat  osf  t}i« 
l&tlted  St«t«0  ivoaXd,  in  ««•«  t^  rajMrnttso  doTeniwiat  i^^^s 
lJBdi«ation  of  *  oootrftry  lat«tttlosi»  te  »<mj^XXmii  immi3M%*l:sr 
to  witbdrav  fron  tli«  mild  eocsTarnfttlcnut. 

AasuirflAo«8  o&  t]ies»  point*  ^  tb«  aor«xi3i&»at  of  Jft^t» 
«](>•  3*9gard«d  ^  the  Oov«7ia«nt  &f  t&«  tZalttd  3t«t««  as  ka 
indispettseble  pr9r«<3iuisit3  to  •atry  ^«&  aajr  disousslo^  of 
aasr  new  proposals  v^tioib  tbe  rapanese  tSorsngnoHBtt  wKf  f»eX 
oored  to  aike  Ioold.»e  tomrd  eo&oXusion  of  tm.  m$x9matmt  for 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1267 


i,i»«  ^d^  &S£^^etu?&%«Ml  tlitee  aM  tiss  atjSiaJ.&  ifio^x^  s$c«jst 
weM,  'ti^o%&^l^  «d  simj^Um;  ^««at  iKnesto*    1%  bftlirrts  li^t  eol$r 

ft  policy  «f  -ertt^sraft  of  BdliiMury  SQaiis».tiote  T&t  fafi*  OS- 
««iatXAa&  ^  Asia?  ^^to  €kr7d3(>3;si«at  of  tiu»  "Qftli^at  SS4)t««  xAM  W 


79716  O— 46— pt.  14 — —24 


1268    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1269 

EXHIBIT  NO.  22B 

DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE  'r' 


'    Mtmorandum  of  Conversation 


/v 

Sunday,    August   10,    1941 
SUBJECT:       Brl tl sh-A-Tierl Can   Cooperation.  At   sea. 


PARTICIPANTS:  31^  Alexander  Cadogan. 

The  Under  Secretary  of  State, 


COWE8TO: 


I'.lnlster  was  giving   for  the  President  on  the  PRINCE 


I   accomnatiled  the  President   this  raorninp   to   attend  ^ 

o 

the  religious  services  and  the  lunch  which  the  Prime       O 

OF  WALES.   Sir  Alexander  Cadogan  told  me  before  lunch      ^Sb 

01  3< 
that  in  accordance  with  the  conversation  which  was  had        '' 

between  the  President,  the  Prime  ::inl8ter.  Sir  Alexander 

and  ayoelf  at  the  President's  dinner  last  night  he  had 

made  two  tentative  drafts  covering  oronosed  oarallel 

"    ■  J, 

and  simultaneous  declarations  by  the  United  States  and 
British  Governments  relating  to  Jaoanese  nollcy  In  the 
Pacific  and  of  a  proposed  Joint  declaration  to  be  made 
by  the  President  «uid  the  Prime  Minister  when  their         *P 


3 


present  meeting  was  terminated.  The  two  drafts  read 


CO 


1270     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


-2- 

ae  followe: 

"Draft  of  Parallel  Comrnunl  cations  to  the 
Japanese  Government. 

"Declaration  by  the  United  States  Government 
that : 

"1.   Any  further  encroachment  by  Janan  in  the 
Southwestern  Pacific  would  produce  a  situation  in 
which  the  United  States  G-overnnent  would  be  compelled 
to  take  counter  measures  even  though  these  nilght 
lead  to  war  between  the  United  States  and  Janan. 

"2.   If  any  third  Power  becomes  the  object 
of  aggression  by  Japan  in  consequence  of  such 
counter  measures  or  of  their  aupfort  of  them,  the 
President  would  have  the  intention  to  seek  authority 
from  Congress  to  give  aid  to  such  Power." 

"Declaration -by  His  ITaJesty's  Governnent  that: 
"1.   Any  further  encroachcient  by  Japan  In  the 
Southwestern  Pacific  would  produce  a  situation  in 
which  Hie  Majesty's  Government  would  be  compelled 
to  take  counter  measures  even  though  these  might 
lead  to  war  between  Greot  Britain  and  Japan. 

"2.   If  any  third  Power  becomes  the  object 
of  agt"res8lon  by  Japan  in  consequence  of  such 
counter  measures  or  of  their  support  of  thez,  His 

y.ajesty '  e 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  1271 


Kajesty'e  Governjient  would  £:lve   all  possible-  aid 
to    such  Power." 

" Declaratlor.   V;y    the    ;.ethKj-land s   Government: 
"1.      Any    further   eiicroaci'.i.ent   by   Jar)an    In    the 
Southwestern  Pacific  would   '.roduce  a_  situation   in 
vi.lcr.   r.cr  ..ajeaty'e   GovernT;ent   would  be   coa;.elled 
to    talce   counter  -aeaaures   ever   thourli   these   ;nlght 
lead    to   war  between    the   ::etiierlari'fip   and    Jar.an. 

"C.      If   .'^.'ly    tiilrd   rower   becoijes   the   object 
of  a(.-;f^,re88lon    by   Ja'^an   In    consequence   of    such 
counter    .'caeures   or   of   their   eupnort    of   them,    Her 
'-'.ajesty's   ^vemnent  would  plve   all    rosBlble  aid 
to    puch  Power. " 

■'een  the   Soviet    ioverr.aent    Informed,      It  will 
be   for   consideration  whether  they    should  be  pressed 
to  :r.a}-.e  a  parallel   declaration. 

The  draft   of  the   proposed  Joint  declaration 
reads  as   follows; 

"The  President   of  the  United   States  of  America 
and  the  Prlt.ie  :'.lnlater,    Xr.    Churchill,    represent-. 
Inr  ;:i8  ..ajesty's  Governaent   In   the  United  Klnf;-dO!i:, 
belnij  .^et   together  to   resolve  and   concert   the 

means 


1272    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


-4- 

meana  of  providing  for  vhe  safety  of  their  respec- 
tive countrlti  s  in  face  of  Nazi  and  German  aggression 
and  of  the  dangers  to  all  peoples  arising  therefrom, 
deem  it  right  to  make  known  certain  principles  ndilch 
they  both  accept  for  guidance  in  the  franing  of 
their  policy  and  on  wMch  they  base  their  hopes  for 
a  better  future  for  the  world. 

First,  their  countries  seek  no  aggrandizement, 
territorial  or  other; 

Second,  they  desire  to  see  no  territorial 
changes  that  do  not  accord  with  the  freely  ex- 
pressed wishes  o:'  the  peoples  concerned; 

Third,  they  respect  the  right  of  ell  peoples 
to  choose  the  form  of   government  under  which  they 
will  live;  they  are  only  concerned  to  defend  the 
rights  of  freedom  of  speech  and  of  thought  without 
which  such  choosing  must  be  illusory; 

Fourth,  they  will  strive  to  bring  about  a  fair 
and  eqxiitable  distribution  of  essential  produce 
not  only  within  their  territorial  Jurisdiction  but 
between  the  nations  of  the  world. 

Fifth,  they  seek  a  peace  which  will  not  only 
cast'  down  forever  the  Nazi  tyranny  but  by  effective 
Intemational  organization  will  afford  to  all 
States  and  .peoples  the  means  of  dwelling  in  security 

within 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1273 


-5- 

wlttxin  their  own  bovuads  and  of  trevarslng  the  seas 
and  oceans  without  fear  of  lawless  assault  or  need 
of  getting  burdensome  armaments." 

A.S  I  was  leaving  the  ship  to  accompany  the  Presi- 
dent back  to  his  flagship,  Mr.  Churchill  said  to  me 
that  he  had  likewise  given  the  President  copies  of  these 
documents.   He  iiqpressed  upon  me  his  belief  that  some 
declaration  of  the  kind  he  had  drafted  with  reapeot  to 
Japan  was  in  his  opinion  in  the  highest  degree  important, 
and  that  he  did  not  think  that  there  was  much  hope  left 
unless  the  United  States  made  such  a  clear-cut  declara- 
tion of  preventing  Japan  from  expanding  further  to  the 
south,  in  which  event  the  prevention  of  war  between 
Great  Britain  and  Japan  appeared  to  be  hopeless.   He 
said  in  the  ao^t  emphatic  manner  that  if  war  did  break 
out  between  Great  Britain  and  Japan,  Japan  immediately 
would  be  in  a  position  through  the  use  of  her  large  nuB- 
ber  of  cruisers  to  seise  or  to  destroy  all  of  the 
British  merchant  shipping  in  the  Indian  Oceaii  and  in  the 
Pacific,  and  to  cut  the  lifelines  between  the  British 
Dominions  and  the  British  Isles  unless  the  United  States 
herself  entered  the  war.   He  pled  with  me  that  a  dec- 
laration of  this  character  participated  in  by  the  United 
States,  Greet  Britain,  the  Dominions,  the  Netherlands 

and 


1274    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


-6- 


and  possibly   Uie   Soviet   Union  would  definitely  restrain 
Japan.      If   this   were  not   done,    the  bio*  to   the  brltlsii 
Oovernment  might  be  almost   declalve. 


Sumner  Welles 


U    Sfi.ltM 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE 

EXHIBIT  NO.  22C 


1275 


DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 
Memorandum  of  Convenathn 


Brltleh-A;aerlcan   Cooperation. 


Monday,    August    11,    l'?41 
At    see  . 


PARTICIPANTS: 


COPIES  TO: 


The   Preslrent. 

The    British  Prime  iClnlBter. 

Sir  Alexander  Cafogan,    British  Permanent  Under 

Secretary  of   State   for  Foreign  Affairs. 
The    Monoraijle    Harrj    Honklns. 
The  Uncer   Secretary   of    State. 


The  President  rec^-lver    Ur.    Caurchlll  this  morning 
on  the  A'J'jUSTA   at   li:00  a.m.      Tt«re  were  present  at   the 
aeetlng  Sir  Alexander  Cadogan,    Harry   Hopkins  and   myself. 


O 

o 

I 
(A 

01 


s 


rt. 


The  conference  oonienoed   with  the    sut Jeot  of 
Portugal.      The   President    read    to   Mr.    Churchill   the 
letter  ai^dressed   to  the   former  by  the  Prime  Minister 
of  Portugal.      It  was  agreed   by  both  that   the  content* 
of   the   letter  were   nlghly   eatlefactorj'  and   made  poaslU* 
without  any  difficulty   the  carrying  out   of  arraa6«a*B«« 
for  the  occupation  of  the  Asores  as   a  means  of  •••az 
t.^-tat   the   Islands   would    not   be  occupied  by  Oermany. 


Miu. 


•-yV- 


3 


CO 


1276    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


-  8  - 

;.'r.    Churchill    statec   that  a  highly   secret  operation 
had    been  «>t»tiiaBf.   upon  by   the   British  G-overrment ,    namely, 
tr.e   occupation  of  the   Canary    Isljnde   curing  the   days 
inmediately  after  the   September  full  moon.      This  date, 
as  Mr.    Churchill    remembered    It,    woulc  be  about  the 
15th  of  September.      The  British  Orovemnient  were  under- 
taking, thla  operation  with  full  knowledge   that  tiie 
iBlands   had   been  recently  heavily   for-tlflec   and   that  a 
very  large  numbei'  of  German  officers  were  en^_ag.ec  ttiero 
In   the   training  and    precaratlon  of   the   Spanish  troops. 
It   wae  iindertaken  with  the   further  i^alizatlon  that   this 
etep   would   almost   Inevitably   Involve   a   Spanish  attack 
either  In  conjunction  with  or  upon  the   Instigation  of 
German  military   forces  and   that   such  attack  would   render 
untenable  by  the   British  Navy  the   harbor  of  Gibraltar. 
The   British  Government,    however,    had   decided   upon  the 
step   In  view  of   its  belief  that   the  situation  In   Spain 
fron   the   British  standpoint   wae  goln».  from  bad   to  worse 
and    that   Hitler  almost   Inevitably  would    undertake   the 
occupation  of  Spain  and  Portugal  with  the   subsequent 
penetration  of  North  Africa  If  any  collapse  took  pl*oe 
on  the  part  of   the  Russian  Army  or  even  If  a  winter 
stalemate   resulted.      In   that   event  Mr.    Churchill   st*t»d 
Gibraltar  would   be   Isolated    anjTray  and    the  occupation 
by  Great  Britain  of  the    Canary  Tslanda   was  of  the  utmoet 

Importance 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1277 


-  :^  - 

importance   in  guartHn*;  a   gouthem  Atlantic  convoy   route 
Into   the  British  Islee. 

In  view  of  this  opei-atlon,    the   British  Government 
would   not  be   In  a  position  conveniently  to   carry  out 
the   commltaent   they  had   mace   to   the  Portu>;ueee  Govern- 
ment to  aesist   in  the  defense  of  the  Azorea. 

In  view  of   the   contents  of  Dr.    Salazar's   letter  to 
the  Pi-eeirient,    it  was  tnerefore  ag.reed   tl-at  the  British 
Government   lasmec"  lately  upon  the  return  of  Mr.    Churchill 
to   London  woulc    notify  Dr-    Sala:ar  that    the  British 
Govemaient    could   not  conveniently  undertake  to  assist 
m  the  defense  of   the  Azores  and   would    further  Inform 
Dr.    Salaiar  that  they  therefore  desired    him  to   request 
the  United   States   for  auch  assistance.      It  was  agreed 
on  the  part  of  tne  P-ealcent    that   i.^medVately  upon  the 
receipt  of  such  notification   from  Pr.    Salazar  the  United 
States  would   send   the  necessar-y   forces  of  ocoupatior.   to 
the   Azoree   anr    ttBt  tl.e   Brazilian  Governi.ent   would   be 
simultaneously   requested   to    send   at   least   a  token   force 
to  take  oart   in  the   expedition. 

T.-.e   P:-eEident  stated    to   V.r     C-iurchill   that   i:.   view 
of  our  present  njiXitary    situation   if   the  United   States 
undertook  to  occupy  the   Azores   it  would   not  be   in  a 
position  in  the   near  future  at   least   to   undertake  the 

orotectlon 


1278    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


protection  of    the    Cape   Vev6e    I<-.  lands.      Mr.    Churcnlll 
stated   that   t.he   Brltleh  aovprmr.ent   would  be   In  a  posi- 
tion to  occupy  the  Cape  Verde   Isla.Tcs  with  the  unfier- 
Btanolng  that   It  would    later  turn  over   the  protection 
of   those   Island e   to  the  United    States  at   such  time  ae 
the  Unltec    States   was   In  a  position   to   take  those 
aseasures.      Ur.    Churchill   further  state'?   that  during   the 
tliue   that   the  Unltec   States  was   landing   the  necessary 
forces   in  the  Azores,    the  British  Navy  would  ;:.aintaln  a 
l".rge   force  between  the  Azores  and   the   mainland   of 
Pprtugal   In  order  to   render  imposaltle   the   sending  of 
any  Gennan  expeditionary   forces   snould   Portuj^al  at   that 
time  be  already  occupied  by  Oermany. 
II 
The  Prime   Minister  then   said   that   he  desired    to 
discuss  the   situation  In   the   Far  East.      He  'na.^'  with  nlm 
a  copy  of  a  draft  memoranDum,    of  w'-.ich  he   h.ac   already 
given  the   President  a   copy  and   which  suggested   that    the 
t'nited    States,    British  and  Dutch  Oovemments   simultaneous- 
ly warn  Japan  that   further  military  expansion  by  Japan 
In  the   South  Pacific  would    lead  to   the   ta/.lng  of   counter 
measures  by  the   countries  named   even   though  such  counter 
measures  might   result   In  hostilities  between  them  and 
Jaoan,    ar:d,    second,    provided   that   the  United    States 
declare  to  Japan   that    s-.ould   Great  Britain  ko   to   the 

assistance 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT  COMMITTEE  1279 


asBletance  of  tP  NetherlPnrs  East   I.-.c.es   ae   a   result 
of  a^,  re!?8lon   «<.galr,st   t-.e    .atter  on   trie   oart  of  Japan 
the  Freeicent  woulo   reaueat   from  the  Conftrese  of   the 
U;.ltec    States  antriorlty  to  assist  the  British  ano   Dutch 
G-overnmente    In  their  defense   against  Japanese  afijjreselon. 

7;;e  Preeldent  cave   ;^r.    Churchill   to    read    copies   of 
the   two   etatemente   handec   to    Secretary   Hull    by  the 
Japanese  Ambassacor  or.  August  6. 

The  Prime  Minister  react    theE  carefully  sine    then 
resarKec    that   the    implication  was   that  Japan,    r,avlnt 
al;'ead>   occui'lec'    Incoc.ilna,  sale    that   BT.e   would   move   no 
further  provider    t.'.e  United    States   would    abandon   their 
eoonoiElo  and    financial    sanctions  anr    take   no   fu^'ther 
allltar.y  or  naval   defensive  xeasures  anc    further  agree 
to   concessions   to  Japan,    ir.clucln^  the  opportunity   for 
Japan  to   8t;-aRfcle   tne   Chinese  Governiiient,    all   of   which 
were  particularly  uriaooeotable. 

The   Freslnent   rerllec    tJ-at   that  was   about   the 
picture  as   ne   saw  It,    tnat   he   felt   very   strongly  that 
every   effort   shoulci  be  made  to  prever.t    the  outbreak  of 
war  with  Japan.      Me   stated,   tlftt   what   he    Intender"    to   do 
was    to    request   Secretary   Hull   b..    r»dlo   to    inform    the 
Japanese  Aatbassador  that  the   President  would    return  to 
ffashlng^ton   next    S&turv;ay  or   Sunday  and  desired    to    see 
•  th*  Ambassador  lasmed lately  upon  his   return.      The 

Freslf'ent 


1280    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


-   6   - 

Prceiaent   stateci   that   Ir.  that   inteirviaw  he  woulti    Infona 
tr^e   Japanese  A.-Lba3sacor  that  pnDvlded  the  Jaoft'iese 
Government  wouia   give   the  commitment   cor.tainea   In   the 
flrat  para-'.raoh  of   the  proposal   of  the  Japanese  G-overn- 
ment  of  Au^;  wt   6,    namely,    thst   the  Japanese  Govern.aent 
"wli:    not   further  station   its   troops   in   the   5out-iwe?tem 
Pacific  areas,    exceot   French   Indo.chlna,    and    that   the 
Japanese   troops   now   stationed    in   French  Indochina  will 
be   withdrawn" ,    specifically  and   not  contingently,    the 
United    States   iovernr.ent,    while  Miking   it   clear  that 
the   other  conditions   set   forth  by  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment  were   In  general  unacceptable,    the  United   States 
woul-i,    nevertheless,    In  a  fr'.endly   spirit   seek  to   ex- 
plore  the  Dosslblllties   inherent   in  the   various  pro- 
posals made  by  Japan   for  the   reachlni.-  of   a   friendly 
understanding  between  the  two   ioveriwents .      The  Presi- 
dent would   further  state  that   should  Japan    refuse  to 
consider  t/ils  procedure  and  undertake   further  steps 
in  the  nature  of   "1    Itary  expansions,    the  President 
desired    the   Japanese  Govern.aent    to   kno-*   fnat   in   such 
event   In   nls  belief  var_oue    steps  would   have  to  be 
taken  by  the  U.dted    states   notwithstanding   the  Presi- 
dent's  realization  that  the   taking  of  such  further  measures 
might   result   in  war  between   thp  United    States  and  Japan. 

Mr. 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1281 


-   7  - 

Mr.  Chur<Shlll  Imnaciiately  declared  that  the  pro- 
oedure  eufegesteo  appearec.  to  him  to  cover  the  situation 
Afery  well.  He  said  it  hao  In  It  an  element  of"faoe- 
savlng"  for  the  Japanese  and  yet  at  the  eaaie  time  would 
constitute  a  flat  United  States  warning  to  Japan  of  the 
oonaequenoes  Involved  in  a  continuation  by  Jaoan  of  her 
present  course. 

There  was   then  discussed    the  deairablllty  of  In- 
fonain*',   Russia  of  the   steps   which  would    be   taken  as 
above   set   forth  and   of  ooaslbly  including   in  the  warn- 
ing  to  Japan  a   statement  which  would   cover  any  aggressive 
steps  by  Japan  against   the   Soviet  Union. 

I    stated    that   In  oiy   Judgnent   the   real   Issue  which 
was   Involved   was   the  continuation  by  Japan  of  Its 
present   oolloy  of   oonouest  by   force   in   the   entire 
Pacific  region  and    regardless  whether  such  policy  was 
directed   against   China,    against  the   Soviet  Union  or 
against  the  Pritlsh  Dominions   or  British  colonies,    or 
the   colonle?  of   the  Netherlands   in  the   Southern  Pacific 
area.      I    said   it   seemed   to  me  that  the   stateiaent  which 
the  Preslrent   intended   to  make  to  the  Japanese  Govern- 
aent  nslght   acre  ftdva:itag'>ouel..-   be   basec;    on  the   question 
of  broad   policy   rather  t'lan  be  prenlsed    solely  upon 
Japanese  moves   In  the  Southwesteri.  Pacific  area. 

The 


1282    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


-  8  - 

The  President  and  Mr.    Churohill  both  agreed    to   this 
and    It  was  decided   that   the   step  to  be   talcen  by  the 
President  would  be   taken  In  that  sense. 

The  question   then  arose  as  to  the  desirability  of 
the   President's   makln^J   reference   in  his  proposed   state- 
ment  to   the  Japanese  Ambassador  to   British  oolicy  In 
the   southern  Pacific  region  and   specif loally  with  regard 
to  Thailand.      The  President   said   that  he   thought   it 
woulo   be  advantageous   for  him  to  be   in  a  position  at 
triat    time  to    state   that  he  had  beei.  inforaed  by  the 
British  Government   that  Sreat  Britain  had  no   aggressive 
intentions  whatever  upon   Thailand.      Mr.    Churohill   said 
that   Ir.  this   tie   heartily  concurred. 

I  askec   wheth<^r  it  would   not  be  better  for  the 
Presicent   to  be   in  a  position  to   state  not  only  that 
Oreat  Britain  hac    no   intentions  of  an  aggressive  charac- 
ter with  regard   to  Thailand,    but  also  that   the  British 
Groveraiient    had    Inforoed    the  United    States  Qovemnent 
that   It   supported   wholeheartedly  the  President's  pro- 
posal  for  the   neutralisation  of  Indochina  and   of  Thailand. 

Mr.    Crturchlll   stated   that  he  agreed   that   it   would 
be  well  to  aiaie  an  all-inclusive   statement  of   that 
character  with  respect  to   British  policy,    that  he   trusted 
toat   fie  President  would,    therefore,    l.nforQ  the  Japanese 
Ambassador  tiiat    he  had   consulted  the  British  Govern;nent, 

and 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1283 


and    that   the  BrItlBh  Goverriraent   was    In  ooiaplete   accord 
with  the   neutralization  r^t^oooaa.!,    n.nc   that   It   had   ll'/.e- 
w'.se   Infonaec    the  Presicent    that   It  woulrt    In  no   event 
undertake  any   Initiative   In   the  oocuyatlon  of  Thailand. 

It  was  agr'^ed  that   Sir  Alexander  Gadogan,    after 
further  consultation  with  '.'r.    Ciurchlll,    would  jclve  me 
In  writing;  a   statement  w.'.ch  the  Pritlsh  (}ovem::ient  was 
preparer    to  make  with  re»'arc    to  tr.ls   Issue. 

Tiie  Prenlcent   exoreesed   tne   belief  that  by  adopting 
t.-dB   course  an./   further  move   of  agc^resslon  on  the  part 
of  Japan  wnich   iil.:.ht   result    in  war  could  be   held   off   for 
at   least  thirty  days.      Ur.    Cnurchill   felt  that   if  nego- 
tiations or  conversations  aotua.ly  took  place  between 
the  United   States  and   Japan  on  the  basis  which  had   been 
formulated,    there  was  a   reasonable  chance   that  Japanese 
po.lcv    sir ht  be   modified  and    that  a  war   in  the  Pacific 
alght  be  averted. 

Ill 

y.r.    ChurcAlll  then  said    that  he  desired   to  bring 
up   for  discussion  the  pz>3->08ed   Joint  declaration  by  the 
President  and   hlaeelf. 

The  P.-eaicent   s^ld    that  he  believed   the  best   solu- 
tion of   t   is  problem  was   for  an  identic   statement    to   be 
aade   in  London  ane   in  the  United   States,    probably  on 
Thursday,    August   14,    to   the   effect   that   the  Prime 

lUaietjsr 


79716  0—46 — pt.  14 25 


1284    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


-  10  - 

Minister  and   the  President  hac  met  at   eea,    accomoaniefi 
by  the  various  members  of  their  respective   staffs;    that 
these  members  of   the  two   Governments  had   discussed  the 
question  of  aid   under  the  terras  of  the   Lease-Lend  Act 
to   nations   resisting  aggression,    and   that  these  military 
and   naval   conversations   had    in  no   way  Involved  any 
future  co^iunltiiients  between   the  two  Oovernments,    except 
as  authorized   under  the  terms  of   the  Lease-Lend  Act; 
that   t;ie  Prims  Minister  and    the  President   had  between 
them  discussed   certain  principles   relating  to  a  better 
future   for  the  world  and   had   agreed  upon  a   Joint  de- 
claration whlcn  would   then  be  quoted  verbatim. 

Mr.    Churchill  dissented   very   strongly  from  the  form 
In  which  the  President   had  desired  to  make  It  clear  that 
no    future  commitments   had  been  entered   Into.      The  Presi- 
dent  statec   that  t.iat  portion  of  the  proposed   statement 
was   of  extreme   Iraporta.nce   from  his   standpoint  Inasmuch 
as   a   statement  of   that  character  would   make  It  Im-  • 
possible   for  extreme   Isolationist  leaders   In  the  United 
States  to  allege  that  every  kind  of  secret  agreement 
had  been  entered    Into  during   the  course  of  these  con- 
versations. 

Mr.  Churchill  said-  that  he  understood  that  side 
of  the  question,  but  that  he  believed  that  any  cate- 
gorical  statement  of   that   ohai^oter  would  prove  deeply 

dlscoursiglng 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1285 


-  11  - 

dlecouraKln*;  to   the  populations  of    the  occupied   oountrlea 
and    would    haVe  a   very  serious   effect  upon   their  morale. 
He    likewise  made   It   clear  that  a   similar  effect   would 
be   created   by  BrAlsh  public   opinion.      He   aaKec    if   tne 
Btate.'aent   coulr    not   be  worded   In   s  loM  a   way  ae   to  make 
It  poeltive    rather  than  negative,    namely,    that   the  rne.uberB 
of   the   staffs  of  the  Prime  Minister  and  of  the  President 
haa    solely  dlecuesed   questions   relative   to   the  furnishing 
of  aid   to   the  countries   resisting  aggression  under  the 
terms  of   tne  Lease-Lend   Act.      The  Pr-eeldent   replied 
that   he  believed    that   the   statement   could   be  drawn  up 
In   that  way   and   that   If   he   then  were   queried    In  the   United 
States  he  neejci   merely  reoly   that   nothing  had   been  dis- 
cus aed   or  a^reec    unon  oth«r  than  that   which   had   already 
been   inclcated    i.i   iiis  public   8tatem>-'nt. 

I   then  gave   t.ie  Presld  ent.Mr.    Churchill  and    Sir 
Alexander  Cacogan   cooles  of  a  redraft  which  I   had   made 
this  morning  of   the  proosec    Joint  declaration  before 
'j.r.    Churchill    hao   arrived    and    nac    had   an  opportunity   of 
going  over  It   with  the  Preble  ent,    '^n'--  the   latter  had 
aporoved    It.      Mr.    Chu.-^chlll    then   co:-iT.enoed   to   read   It. 
He    suggested   that   t-ere  bp   Inserter^    In   the   text  of   the 
third    DOlnt  before   the   word    "self-governraent'   the  wor^e 
"sovereign   lights   and".      This   wa's   agreed   upon. 

!!r. 


1286    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


-  12  - 

Mr.    Churchill   then   read   th«  fourth  point  irhloh  read 
&8   follows:      "Fourth,    they  will   enoeavar  to   further 
the   enjoyment   by- all  peoples  of  aoceea,    without  dle- 
orlmlnatlon  and   on  equal  terms,    to   the  markets  and   to 
the   raw  materials  of   the  world  which  are  needed   for  their 
eoonoralo  prosperity." 

He  imraedlately   Inquired  whether  this  was  meant   to 
apply  to   the   terms  of  the  Ottawa  agreements.      I  replied 
that,    of   course,    it  did,    sir.oe   the  policy  which  the 
United    States  OoverTuient  had  been  pursuing  for  the 
better  part  of  nine  years  had  been  addressed  primarily 
tqwards  the  removal  of  all  of  those  artificial 
rcBtriotlons  and   controls  upon  International  trade 
w.loh  had   created   such  tragic  havoc  to  world  economy  dur- 
ing the  past  generation.      I    said  I  understood  fully  the 
Immediate  difficulties  which  this  occasioned  him,   but 
I   pointer   out  that   the   phraseology  was    "they  will 
endeavor  to   further"  and    that  this  naturally  did   not 
Imply  a   formal   and    Itamcdiate   contractual   obligation  on 
the   part  of  his   Government.      The  President   stated   that 
he   believed  the   point  was  of  very  great   Importance  as 
a  measure  of  assurance   to   the  Clerman  and  Italian 
peoples  that  the  British  and    the  United    States  Govern- 
ments desl.-ed   to   offer  them,    after  the  war,    fair  and 
•eoual  opportunity  of  ajn  economic  character. 

The 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT  COMMITTEE  1287 


The   Prlne  T.'.lnlster   said    mat,    of  course,    he  was 
without   any  power  hlaself  to  agree  upon  this   point. 
Ke   set  forth   In  considerable   detail    the  position  of   the 
United  r.ln,-dom  vis-a-vls    the  Dominions    and    eBiphaslzed 
his   Insblllty,    without    tije  arreeEent   of  the  i^onlnlons, 
to  enter  into   the  proposed   declaration  insofar   as    tills 
point  was  concerned.      !!o   said   t:;at  Insofar  as   he  himself 
was    coicerned   the    Issue  was    one    with  which  hla   own  per- 
sonal  life  hlstorr  vtaa   conrjected.      He  referred  to  the 
rial's    at    the   outset   of  the  centurj'  when   Joseph  Chaaberlaln 
first  brought  up  the   proposal   for  Er.pire  preferences   and 
the  predoninant   part  which  this   issue  had  played  in  the 
political  history  of  Great  Britain  during  the  past  forty 
years.     He  said  that  he  felt  that   the  proposal   as   now 
phrased  would  have   the   enthusiastic  support  of  all   the 
liberals   evorj-where.      He   said  that  he  himself   was   hearts- 
lly    in   accord  with   the  proposal  and   that  he   himself  had 
always   been,    as   was  well  known,    emphatically  opposed   to 
the  Ottawa  ajjreements.      He   said,   however,    that    It   would 
be   at   least   a  week   before   ho  could   hope    to  obtain  by 
tolccroph  the  opinion  6f   th3    Dominions  wltJi,   recard   to 
this    question. 

Harry  Hopkins    then   suxested   that   Sir  Alexander 
Cadocan   and   I  be  requested  to   draft  new  phraseology  wliich 
would   take   care  of  those   difficulties    and  prevent    the  de- 


1288    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


-  14  - 

lay  of  which  Mr.   Churchill  spoke.      Ke   said  It  was   Incon- 
ceivable  that   the   Issuance  of  the    joint  declaration  should 
be  held  up  by    a  matter  of    this  kind. 

I    aald  that   In  m^'   own   Judcpnent   further  modification 
of   tl»t  article  woulJ,  destroy   completely  any  value   in  that 
portion  of   tJie   proposed  declaration.      I   said  that   It  was 
not  a   question  of   phraseology,   that   It  was   a   question  of  a 
vital   principle  which  was    Involved.      I  said  tluit  If    the 
British  and   the  United  States  Governiaents   could  not  agree 
to  do  everythinc  within  their  power   to  further,    after  the 
termination  of  the   present  war,   a  restoration  of  free  and 
liberal   trade  policies,    they  mlgjit   as  well  throw  In  the 
sponge  and  realize  that  one  of   the  greatest  factors    In 
creating   the   present   traj^lc   situation  In  the   world  was   go- 
ing to   be  permitted  to   continue  unchecked  In  the  post-war 
world.      I    said   that    the    trade  policies   of    the  British  Ha- 
plro   durlnc  the   latter  portion  of    the  nineteenth  century 
had,    I  felt,    contributed   enormously  t:    the   sane  and  pros- 
perous  condition  of    the  world  at   that   time,   and  that,   of 
coxirae,   I  realized  tliat  the   tariff  policies   pursued  by   the 
United  States    and  many  other   countries   during  that   period 
had  played  an  Important  part  In   the  creation  of  the   evils 
which  had  sprung  up  after   the   last  war.      I  said,   however, 
that   it  seemed  to  be  imperative  that   we  tiry   to   agree 
now  upon  the   policy   of  constructive  a&nlty   In  world 

economics 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE 


1289 


economics   as  n   func-sunei-.tal  factor  in  the   creation  of  a 
new  a»d  better  world   anc    that   except  throug,h  an  aigree- 
"ment   upon  such  a  policy  by  our  two  govern;. ente   there 
woulr   be  no   hindrance  whatever  to  a  continuation  later 
to    the  present   CVennaii  pmctloes  of  utllltliig  their  trade 
and    financial  policies  In  orcfer  to  achieve  political   ends. 

Mr.    Ct.urchlll   agreed    ver,,-  eaphatlcally  to  thle 
policy.       He   anc    Sir  Alexancer  Cadogan  both  agreed    that 
It   was  not  a  qurstlon  of  p.-.raseology,    but   that  they  were 
up  against  a  material  obstacle  which  Ur.    Churchill   had 
already  Incloated.      The   Do.'lnlons  would    have  to   be  con- 
sulted.     It  ml^ht  well   be   that  an  agreement  could   r,ot  be 
had    froa  the  Dominions  and    that   conBcauently  the  pro- 
popec    J -Int  declaration   could   only  be   issued    sone   time 
after  newF  of   the  meeting  between  the  President  and    the 
Prime  Minister  had    been  ►;lver.  out.      Mr.    Churchill 
euggeeted  t.-at   the   Inclusion  before   the   phrase   't.aey 
will  endeavor  to   further"   of  the  phrase  which  would 
read    "with  due   regard    foi'  our  present  obligations" 
xlfht   eaee  the   situation. 

The  P:'eElt  ent    suggested',    ani    ''r.    Chu.-cnill  agreed, 
tliat  the   latter  would   try  snr    draft   sciae   phraseology  which 
would  .-Dake  tnat   situation  easier,    ar.c   it   was  arranged 
t^At   I   woulc    call   later  In   the   f*fter:.oon  upoi.  the  Prl„.e 
-'.In'.eter  aiio    Sir  Alexander  Cadogan   to  go  over  with  them 
such   redraft  as   they  might   have   In  mind. 


1290    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  .HARBOR  ATTACK 


-  16  - 

Jlr.  ChurohlH  was  In  entire  aooord  with  points 

five  ana  8lx. 

He  then  reafl  point  seven  amd  after  dlscueelon  at  the 
meeting  of  this  point  It  was  agreed  that  the  phrase 
"to  use  force*  be  replaced  by  the  word  "a^jgresslon"  In 
the  eecono  sentence  of  the  seventh  point. 

ar.  Churchill  aald  that,  of  course,  he  was  heartily 
and  enthusiastically  In  favor  of  this  point  seven, 
which  had  been  initiated  by  the  President.   He  Inquired, 
however,  whether  the  President  would  not  agree  to  support 
some  kind  of  ■effective  international  organization*  aa 
suggested  by  the  Prime  Minister  in  hie  original  draft 
of  the  proposed  Joint  declaration. 

The  President  replied  that  he  did  not  feel  that 
he  could  agree  to  this  because  of  the  suspicions  emd 
opposition  that  such  a  statement  on  his  part  would 
create  in  the  United  States.   He  said  that  he  himself 
would  not  be  In  favor  of  the  creation  of  a  new  Assembly 
of  the  League  of  rations,  at  least  until  after  a  period 
of  time  had  transpired  and  during  which  an  International 
police  force  composed  of  the  United  States  a.no  Great 
Britain  had  had  tui  opportunity  of  functioning.  Ur. 
Ch srchlll  sale  that  he  did  not  feel  that  he  would  be 
candid  If  he  old  not  express  to  the  President  his 
feeling  that  point  seven  woulc  create  a  great  deal  of 

opposition 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1291 


-    17   - 

flODOsltlo:.  froa  the   extre-e   intemntlonallPts.      The 
Preslcent   reollec   that   he   reallzec   that,    but  that  he 
felt   that   the  time   had   ooae   to  be   realistic  and    that 
In   his    Jucr'-'-ent   the  aualn   factor  In   the   seventh  point 
was   C3aDlete   real  lam.      ."r.    Cr-.urchlll   then   remarked   tliat 
of  course   he  waF   wholeheartecly  In  favor  of  it  and 
shared   the  Preslcent 's  vle». 

The  meeting  then  broke  up  anc    I  arranged   with 
the   Preslcent  that  I  woulo   drop  hy   to   see  him  after 
my   conference   later  In   the   afternoon  with  the  Prime 
.''Ir.lster.      Tne   latter  statec   that  he  would   not  be  able 
to   leave  until   at  least  5:00  p..ij.  ,    toa-.Tow,   Auj^ust  12, 
an(.   that  as  he    felt   It  of  Importance   to   reach  a  com- 
plete meetlmi  of  minds  with  the  Prei=l6ent  upon  all  of 
the    Issues   Involved,    t.'\at  he   woulc   be  willing    to    spend 
an  additional   twenty-four   ':ours   snoulo    trat   be   neces- 
sary. 

Sumner  Welles 


U   SV.OK'. 


1292    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

EXHIBIT  NO.  22D 


DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 


Memorandum  of  Conversation 


I 

/ 


/         '^  DATE: 

/  Uonday,  August   11,    1941 

At   aes 
SUBJECT:       BtI tiah-Ani«rlc8n  Cooperation. 


PAFmciPANTS:     Sir  Alexander  Cadogan. 
Tii6  Under  Secretary. 


O 

o 
•si 

Ol 


1  went  by  arrangement  to  aee  Slv  Alexander  Cadogan 
on  the  PhXNCb  OP  WALES  this  afternoon.  He  gave  me  to 
read  memoranda  which  he  had  already  completed  on  the 
conference  between  the  Prime  Ulnlater  and  the  Prealdant 
tbla  morning  and,  with  a  few  changes  iblch  I  Indicated, 
they  appeared  to  be  a  correct  preaantatlon  of  the  dls- 
cuealon  and  of  the  agreements  reached. 

With  regard  to  the  draft  of  the  joint  declaration,     ^ 

Sir  Alexander  told  me  that  the  Prime  Minister  had  already    -j, 

TJ 

radioed  to  London  the  text  of  the  proposed  Joint  dec-        (^ 

laration  Incorporating  therein  modifications  of  polnta 
four  and  seven.  Sir  Alexander  gave  me  the  revised  text 
to  read.  Inasmuch  as  the  Prime  Minister's  draft  of 

point 


\ 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1293 


point  foul"  was  far  broader  and  more  satlafactoiTr  than 
the  mlnlmuBi  «blch  the  President  had  Instructed  me,  after 
our  conference  of  the  morning,  to  accept,  I  raised  no 
objection  thereto,  and  with  regard  to  the  proposed  change 
In  point  seven  I  stated  that  while  It  was  completely 
satisfactory  to  me  and  entirely  In  accord  with  my  own 
way  of  thinking  I  haid  no  idea  what  the  President  ■  s  de- 
cision might  be.   I  said  that  I  would  have  to  submit  It 
to  nim. 

^Ir  Alexander  stated  that  the  Prime  Ulnister  felt 
very  strongly — perhaps  exaggeratedly — the  opposition  iiiiich 
would  be  created  on  the  part  of  a  certain  pro-League-of- 
Natlons  group  in  England  to  the  contents  of  point  seven 
declaring  for  the  disai'mamant  of  nations  which  undertook 
aggression  outside  of  their  frontiers.   He  went  on  to  say 
that  while  he  believed  there  would  not  be  the  amount  of 
opposition  which  the  Prime  Minister  -anticipated  he 
nevertheless  thou£>ht  that  It  would  ue  a  tragic  thing 
to  concentrate  solely  upon  the  transition   period  after 
the  war  was  ended  when  some  kind  of  Joint  police  power 
would  have  to  be  exercised  by  the  brltish  and  by  the 
United  States  Oovernaients  and  omit  any  reference  to  the 
need  oi  the  creation  of  some  effective  and  practicable 
Intemetlonal  organization  which  would  Amotion  after 
the  transition  period  was  concluded.   1  said  that  as 

I 


1294    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


I  tuid  already  indicated  while  I  was  in  full  agra«n«nt  witb. 
hi  a  own  views  th»   natter  would  bave  to  be  determined 
by  the  Presidents 

We  discuaeed  the  deoirablllty  of  informing  the 
Chinese  Oovernaent  of  the  steps  which  the  United  States 
Oovemment  in  the  person  of  the  President  was  taking 
with  regard  to  Japan.  I  said  that  while  I  felt  very 
definitely  that  every  effort  shoiad  be  made  to  keep 
China  closely  informed  of  what  was  being  done  in  her 
interest  by  Oreat  Britain  and  by  the  United  States  I 
wondered  whether  telling  China  of  idiat  the  President 
Intended  to  state  to  the  Japanese  Oovernment  at  this 
particular  moment  woula  not  mean  that  the  Oovernment  at 
Chxugkin^  for  its  own  interests  would  make  public  the 
Information  so  received.   If  publicity  resulted,  1  stated 
I  feared  that  the  extreme  militarlatic  element  in  Tokio 
and  that  portion  of  the  Tokio  press  which  was  controlled 
by  Germany  would  immediately  take  advantage  of  the  sitiia- 
tion  30  created  to  inflame  sentiment  in  Japan  to  such 
an  extent  as  to  make  any  possibility  remote,  as  it  might 
anyhow  be,  of  achieving  any  satisfactory  result  through 
negotiation  with  Japan.   Sir  Alexander  said  he  was 
entirely  in  accord  and  would  be  governed  by  those  views. 
He  said,  of  cotirse,  1  realized  how  terribly  persistent 
the  Chinese  were  and  that  the  present  Ambassador  in 

London 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT  COMMITTEE  1295 


london,  or.   Tielllngton  Koo,  would  undoubtedly  press 
htm  day  in  and  day  out  to  Icnon  wnat  aad  transpired  at 
tx.e  meeting  between  tiie  Prime  Itlnister  and  the  Presi- 
dent wlt/i  regard  to  Cnine.   He  said  taat  he  felt  that 
tue  best  solution  was  for  him  mt^rely  to  say  in  general 
terms  that  the  two  governments  had  agreed  that  every 
step  should  be  taken  thet  was  practicable  at  this  time 
for  uhlna  and  its  defense  and  avoid  going  into  ajiy 
details. 

1  subsequently  went  to  see  the  President.   The 
Presiaent  said  that  he  was  entirely  in  accord  with 
the  redraft  of  point  four  which  was  better  than  he  had 
thought  llr.  Churchill  would  be  willing  to  concede.   He 
also  accepted  without  question  the  amendment  made  by 
Mr.  Churchill  to  point  seven  and  the  President  said  that 
it  seemed  to  him  entirely  desirable  since  the  amendment 
made  It  clear  that  once  the  war  was  over  a  transition 
period  would  have  to  taJce  place  and  thet  the  permanent 
internal loual  organization  would  only  be  set  up  after 
Uiat  egcperimontal  period  had  passed.   He  iiad  Jotted  down 
certain  minor  changes  in  the  text  of  the  proposed  Joint 
declaration,  most  of  itlch  were  merely  verbal  changes 
for  the  purpose  of  clarification. 

I  said  I  felt  it  necessary  for  me  to  aak  him 
whether  he  did  not  believe  that  a  very  considerable 

opposition 


1296    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


-5- 

opposltlon  on  the  part  of  extreme  isolationists  In  the 
United  States  would  result  from  that  portion  of  point 
seven  which  declares  in  the  Judgment  of  the  United  States 
that  it  is  essential  that  &g£;veaBOT   nations  be  dlsarced. 
I  said  that  if  a  great  Power  like  the  United  States 
publicly  declares  that  somethinf^  le  essential,  the  . 
inference  la  that  that  Power  is  polnp  to  do  something 
itself  about  it,   I  said  It  appeared  to  me  more  than 
likely  that  the  isolationists  will  insist  that  this 
public  statement  by  the  President  leant  that  the  United 
States  would  go  to  war  in  order  to  disarm  not  only 
Oem^any  but  even  possibly  Japan  and  theoretically,  at 
least,  even  the  Soviet  Union  If  that  country  should 
later  once  xore  embark  upon  aggression  on  its  neighbors. 
The  President  replied  that  the  whole  Intent  of  ooint 
seven,  as  he  saw  it,  was  to  make  clear  what  the  objec- 
tive would  be  if  the  war  was  won  and  that  he  believed 
people  in  the  United  States  would  take  that  point  of 
view.   He  further  said  he  felt  the  realism  inherent  In 
article  seven  was  one  which  would  be  apparent  to  the 
er.onuous  majority  of  the  American  oeople  and  that  they 
would  enthusiastically  support  the  need  for  the  dls- 
anneuiient  of  aggressor  nations, 

I  said  I  also  had  been  surprised  and  somewhat 
discouraged  by  a  remark  that  the  President  had  casually 

aiade 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  1297 


nade  In  our  siorning's  conference — If  I  had  understood 
nltr.  correctly — which  was  that  nothing  could  be  ir.ore 
futile  tl^ian  the  reconetltutlon  of  a  body  euch  ae  the 
Asdeaibly  of  the  League  of  Nations.   I  eald  to  the 
President  that  it  seemed  to  me  that  If  he  conceived  of 
the  need  for  a  transition  period  upon  the  terr.lnatlon  of 
the  war  during  which  rerlod  Jreat  Briteln  and  the  '.'nlted 
States  would  undertake  the  pollclnfe-  of  the  world,  It 
seenied  to  me  that  It  would  be  enomiouely  desirable  for 
the  smaller  Powers  to  have  available  to  them  an  Aasenibly 
In  walch  they  would  all  be  represented  and  In  which 
they  could  nake  their  co ..»  lalnte  known  and  Join  In 
recocmendatlons  aa  to  t!*.e  policy  to  ^   nursued  by  the 
siajor  Powers  w.ho  were  doing  the  r>ollce  work,   I  said 
It  seemed  to  le  that  an  orpanlsatlon  of  that  kind 
would  be  the  :..ost  effective  safety  valve  that  could  be 
devised. 

The  rrealdent  said  that  he  agreed  fully  with  what 
I  said  and  that  all  that  he  had  Intended  by  the  re'.ark 
he  made  this  uornlng  was  to  xa>-.e  clear  his  belief  that 
a  transition  oerlod  was  necessary  and  that  during;  that 
ti-analtlon  period  no  organizations  such  as  the  Council 
or  the  rvsse.-.bly  of  the  Lea^^ue  could  undertake  the  oowers 
and  'prerogatives  with  which  they  had  been  entrusted  during 
the  existence  of  the  League  of  '.'atlons. 

I 


1298    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


-7- 


I  further  eald  tJiat  while  from  the  praotloal 
standpoint  I  waa  in  agreement  that  the  United  States 
^  and  Great  Britain  were  the  only  Powers  which  could  or 
would  exercise  the  police  trusteeship  and  that  It 
seemed  to  me  that  It  would  be  Impossible  If  such  a  trus- 
teeship were  set  up  to  exclude  therefrom  the  other 
American  republics  or  for  that  matter  the  countries  at 
present  occupied  such  as  ;<orway,  the  Netherlands,  and 
even  Belgium.   The  President  said  that  he  felt  that  a 
solution  for  this  difficulty  could  probably  be  found 
through  the  oster.elble  Joining  with  Great  Britain  and 
the  United  States  of  those  Powers,  but  It  would  have  to 
be  recognized  tnat  It  would  *>e  ostensible  since  none  of 
the  nations  mentioned  would  have  the  practical  means  of 
taking  any  effective  or,  at  least,  considerable  part  In 
the  task  Involved. 

I  said  that  It  seemed  to  me  that  now  that  the  text 
of  the  Joint  declaration  had  been  agreed  upon,  since  I 
assumed  from  what  ;:r.  Churchill  had  told  me  that  the 
British  Ck)vernment  would  suprx>rt  his  recommendations 
with  regard  thereto,  all  that  was  left  to  do  In  the  way 
of  drafting  was  the  preparation  of  the  brief  statement 
which  would  be  Issued  simultaneously  In  London  and  at 
'.sari.-lr.gton  announcing  that  the  President  and  the  Prime 
Minister  had  met,  referring  to  the  discussions  under 

the 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1299 


-8- 

the  Lease-Lend  Act  and  the  Inclusion  at  the  termination 
thereof  of  the  text  of  the  Joint  declaration.   I  said 
that  ;-.r.  Caurcnlll  had  told  ae  that  he  had  cabled  hi  a 
ijovernnent  ti^at  he  was  iiot  leaving  Argent]  a  until 
■.I'edr.esday  afternoon  and  said  It  seetaed  to  ne  that  every- 
thing; could  be  definitely  agreed  upon  and  cleared  un  by 
1:00  p.. -a,  toraorrow,  and  I  could  see  no  practical  reason 
for  waiting  another  twenty-four- hours.  The  President 
agreed  and  said  that  he  would  try  and  get  a  decision 
reached  In  that  sense  when  he  saw  ;:r.  Churchill  this 
evening, 

Sumner  Welles 


'J  sw.aA>: 


79716  O — 46 — pt.  14 26 


1300    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

EXHIBIT  NO.  23 

HM :  This  telegram  must  be  i)araphrased  before  being  communicated  to  any- 
one.    (SC)  London 

Dated  November  26,  1941. 
Rec'd  12 :  55  a.  m. 
Secbettary  of  State, 

Washington. 
Triple  Priority 
5670,  November  26,  6  a.  m. 

MOST  SECRET  FOR  THE  PRESIDENT  FROM  THE  FORMER  NAVAL  PER- 
SON. 

'  Your  message  about  Japan  received  tonight.  Also  full  accounts  from  Lord 
Halifax  of  discussions  and  your  counter  project  to  Japan  on  which  Foreign  Sec- 
retary has  sent  some  comments.  Of  course,  it  is  for  you  to  handle  this  business 
and  we  certainly  do  not  want  an  additional  war.  There  is  only  one  point  that 
disquiets  us.  What  about  Chiang  Kai  Shek?  Is  he  not  having  a  very  thin  diet? 
Our  anxiety  is  about  China.  If  they  collapse  our  joint  dangers  would  enormous- 
ly encrease.  We  are  sure  that  the  regard  of  the  United  States  for  the  Chinese 
cause  will  govern  your  action.  We  feel  that  the  Japanese  are  most  unsure  of 
themselves." 

HM  WiNANT. 

EXHIBIT  NO.  24 

CJ:  This  telegram  must  be  closely  paraphrased  before  being  communicated 
to  anyone.     (SC)  London, 

Dated  November  30,  1941. 
Rec'd  1 :  28  p.  m. 
Seceetaey  of  State, 

Washington. 
5770,  November  30,  4  p.  m. 

PERSONAL  AND  SECRET  FOR  THE  PRESIDENT  FROM  FORMER  NAVAL 
PERSON. 

"It  seems  to  me  that  one  important  method  remains  unused  in  averting  war 
between  Japan  and  our  two  countries,  namely  a  plain  declaration,  secret  or  pub- 
lic as  may  be  thought  best,  that  any  further  act  of  aggression  by  Japan  will  lead 
immediately  to  the  gravest  consequences.  I  realize  your  constitutional  difficul- 
ties but  it  would  be  tragic  if  Japan  drifted  into  war  by  encroachment  without 
having  before  her  fairly  and  squarely  the  dire  character  of  a  further  aggressive 
step.  I  beg  you  to  consider  whether,  at  the  moment  which  you  judge  right  which 
may  be  very  near,  you  should  not  say  that  "any  further  Japanese  aggression 
would  compel  you  to  place  the  gravest  issues  before  Congress  "or  words  to  that 
effect.  We  would,  of  course,  make  a  similar  declaration  or  share  ifl  a  joint 
declaration,  and  in  any  case  arrangements  are  being  made  to  synchronize  our 
action  with  yours.  Forgive  me,  my  dear  friend,  for  presuming  to  press  such  a 
course  upon  you,  but  I  am  convinced  that  it  might  make  all  the  difference  and 
prevent  a  melancholy  extension  of  the  war". 

EDA  Winant. 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 

EXHIBIT  NO.  25 


1301 


f  ■ 


TEiLEGRAM  RECEIV^. 

Toitye 


f%> 


1302    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 

EXHIBIT  NO.  26 


1303 


l^ 


TEtEGKAM  RECEIVED 


-SEP?  11940 


f 


l^] 


^\^ 


t5 


1304    COXGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOIXT    COMMITTEE 


1305 


1306     CONGRESSIOJC  AL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS    OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  1307 


T!:li:giiam  received 


1308    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS    OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE 


1309 


1310    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


<-  «k^ 

TELEGR.\M  RECEIVED 

^ 

fROM 

, 

1 

\ 

^ 
^ 

4 

^         • 

*8 

CI 

T! 

EXHIBITS   OF    JOINT    COMMITTEE 


1311 


ia  clear 


1312    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  1313 


TELEGRAM  RECEIVED 


o 

!5 


1314    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  1315 

EXHIBIT  NO.  27 

"Peace  and  War,  United  States  Foreign  Policy,  1931-1941",  Intro- 
duction (Pamphlet  edition,  1942)  Department  of  State  Publication 
1853^ 

(Xot  reprinted  by  the  Joint  Committee.  For  sale  by  the  Superin- 
tendent of  Documents,   Government   Printing   Office,   Washington, 

EXHIBIT  NO.  28 

"Peace  and  War,  United  States  Foreign  Policy,  1931-1941",  In- 
troduction and  Documents  (Cloth  edition.  1943)  Department  of  State 
Publication  1983. 

(Not  reprinted  by  the  Joint  Committee.  For  sale  by  the  Superin- 
tendent of  Documents,   Government   Printing  Office,  Washington, 

EXHIBIT  NO.  29 

"Foreign  Kelations  of  the  United  States,  Japan,  1931-1941",  Vol- 
umes I  and  II  (1943)  Department  of  State  Publication  2008. 

(Not  reprinted  by  the  Joint  Committee.  For  sale  by  the  Govern- 
ment Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.  C. ) 


EXHIBIT  NO.  30 

"Ten  Years  in  Japan",  by  Joseph  C.  Grew;  Simon  and  Schuster 
(1944). 
(Not  reprinted  by  the  Joint  Committee.) 


79716  O — 46— pt.  14 27 


1316    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

EXHIBIT  NO.  31 


EMBASSY 
UNITED  STATES  Of 


'^■"'''^C---* 


.t^irftXT''^^^^''^'*'  - 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1317 


AiR  Mail. 


1318    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


Ito.    ''  ■ .     ^ , 


flu  •(MlWtarr  9t  St«t«  •aalos«s  for  th*  atriatljr 
•ottftAsatlal  laferawtloa  of  th«  Jmrnrismn  ABtwastuaor  a 
•opy  af  •  A*«pa««)i  (m.  971)  ot  April  4,  19U.  froa  tlx* 
AaariMja  AalMaaaAor  «t  1.1m  la  r«satr4  to  tha  attltad* 
of  tlM  Tmrmwlmm  a»T«raamt  In  tli«  •▼•at  thAt  tli«  United 
8««%Mi  wiA  /apaa  b««<Mi«  la:TolT«A  la  tiut  war  oa  oppoalag 
•Um. 


lB«l0««X«t 

BMfAMh  (a*.  971)                    * 
•f  April  4,  i9U. 

1             "^  ' 

f    »j»R        '.e*? 

fltGoTOJL             11                 4«j^4a 

EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1319 


1320    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


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EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1321 


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PAHAPHEABE 

Teiegran  no.      £00  Dated:    9-11-41,   6  p.*. 

trofflj  B«>m  Reo'd:    9-11-41,   2:46  p. 

It  is  reported  by  Levis  that  he  secured  the  folloM^ 
Ing  from  a  oontaot  conneoted  with  the  Intelligence 
Section  of  the  Army  of  Swltserland:   By  the  end  of 
October,  Japan  will  have  gone  into  the  war,  and  by  the 
end  of  the  saoe  month,  Oermany  will  hare  begun  a  campaign 
In  Africa  with  the  two  hundred  fifty  thousand  troops 
of  Poawiel  increased  to  a  million.  A  part  of  these  re- 
enforcements  who  have  now  finished  training  have  been 
recently  noted  in  Strasbourg,  Karlsruhe,  MainE,  as  well 
as  in  other  districts.   Likewise,  there  hare  been  received 
reports  of  troops  around  Bayonne.   Simultaneous  morsmente 
will  be  made  against  Cyprus,  Turkey,  Blzerta,  and  Dakar. 
Once  the  Japanese  are  involved  in  the  war,  it  is  figured 
by  the  Germans  that  the  United  States  will  be  busy  in 
the  Pacific  Ocean  and  will  ba  incanable  of  sending  an 
expedition  to  Dakar. 

It  is  requested  by  the  Military  Attach*  that  the 

above  infonnation  be  communicated  to  the  War  Deoartment. 

HARRISON 
U-L:SM:MPM 
9-12-41 
Copies  to  Major  Dusenbtary. 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE 


1323 


1324    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


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EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE 


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1326    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

EXHIBIT  NO.  32 

Messages  Between  Wab  Department  and  Hawah 

From  July  8  to  September  7,  1941 

rAU  dates  refer  to  1941) 


Date 

From 

To 

Subject 

Page 

8  July 

Adj  Qen...           .    . 

Short 

Japanese  Policy 

1 

25Jnlv      .. 

CNO 

Kiramel  et  al. 

Kimmel  et  al 

Economic  Sanctions  against 
Japan. 

Japanese  cabinet  range 

Estimate  of  Japanese  situa- 
tion. 

Warning  of  surprise  aggres- 
sive movement. 

Reconnaissance  mission 

Warning 

2 

16  Oct 

CNO  ...                  ... 

3 

20  Oct 

Adj  Gen 

Short 

4 

24  Nov  ..  . 

CNO 

Kimmel  et  al 

5 

26  Nov 

Adj  Qen 

Short 

6 

27  Nov    . 

Marshall 

Short... 

7 

27  Nov 

Marshall 

Western    Defense    Com- 
mand. 
MacArthur 

Warning 

8 

27  Nov    . 

Marshall 

Warning 

9 

27  Nov 

G-2.... 

Q-2  Hawaii 

G  -2  Warning 

10 

28  Nov 

MacArthur 

Marshall 

Reply  to  Marshall  warning. . 
Reply  to  Marshall  warning. . 
Sabotage         

11 

27No\ 

Short     . 

Marshall 

12 

28  Nov 

.\dj  Gen .".. 

Short 

13 

28  Nov 

Arnold 

Hawaiian  Air  Force 

Marshall 

Sabotage 

14 

28  Nov 

Western    Defense    Com- 
mand. 

Caribbean  Defense  Com- 
mand. 

Short 

Reply  to  Marshall  warning. . 

Reply  to  Marshall  warning. . 

Reply  to  Adj  Gen  sabotage 

cable. 
Reply  to  Marshall  warning. . 

Reply  to  Arnold  sabotage 
cable. 

Japanese  weather  code  broad- 
casts. 

Japanese  ultimatum.. 

15 

28  Nov 

Adj  Gen 

16 

29  Nov 

Adj  Gen 

17 

29  Nov  . . 

Caribbean  Defense  Com- 
mand. 
Hawaiian  Air  Force. 

G-2 

Adj  Qen 

18 

4  Dec 

Arnold 

19 

5  Deo. . .    . 

G-2  Hawaii 

20 

7  Dec 

Marshall 

Short  .  . 

21 

[i]        Secret 

94  WAR  BC  207  WD 

CO 


Washington,  D.  C,  152A,  July  8,  1941. 


Hawn  Dept.,  Fort  Shaffer,  T.  H. 
Nine  two  four  seventh  AGMC  for  your  information  deduction  from  information 
from  numerous  sources  is  that  Japanese  Govt  has  determined  upon  its  future 
policy  which  is  supported  by  all  principal  Japanese  political  and  military 
groups  period  This  policy  is  at  present  one  of  watchful  waiting  involving 
probable  aggressive  action  against  maritime  provinces  of  Russia  if  and  when 
Siberian  Garrison  has  been  materially  reduced  in  strength  and  it  becomes  evident 
that  Germany  will  win  a  decisive  victory  in  European  Russia  period  Opinion  Is 
that  Jap  activity  in  the  south  will  be  for  the  present  confined  to  seizure  and 
development  of  naval  army  and  air  bases  in  Indo  China  although  an  advance 
against  the  British  and  Dutch  cannot  be  entirely  ruled  out  period  Neutrality 
pact  with  Russia  may  be  abrogated  period  They  have  ordered  all  Jap  vessels 
in  U.  S.  Atlantic  ports  to  be  west  of  Panama  Canal  by  first  August  period  Move- 
ment of  Jap  shipping  from  Japan  has  been  suspended  and  additional  merchant 
vessels  are  being  requisitioned  ' 

Adams 
334P/720P/8 

Priority 


[■2]        Drafter:  Op-12. 
From :  Chief  of  Naval  Operations. 
Rleased  by :  H.  R.  Stark. 
Date:  July  25,  1941. 


Addressees 

For  Action 

CINCPAC 

CINCAF 

CINCLANT 

COM  15 

SPENAVO  LONDON 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1327 

252023 

This  is  a  joint  dispatch  from  the  CNO  and  the  Chief  of  Staff  US  Army  X  Ap- 
propriate adees  deliver  copies  to  Commanding  Generals  Hawaii  Philippines  and 
Caribbean  Defense  Command  and  to  General  Chaney  in  London  XX  You  are 
advised  that  at  1400  GCT  July  twenty-sixth  United  States  will  impose  economic 
sanctions  against  Japan  X  It  is  expected  these  sanctions  will  embargo  all  trade 
between  Japan  and  the  United  States  subject  to  modification  through  a  licensing 
system  for  certain  material  X  It  is  anticipated  that  export  licenses  will  be 
granted  for  certain  grades  of  petroleum  products  cotton  and  possibly  some 
other  materials  and  that  import  licenses  may  be  granted  for  raw  silk  X  Japa- 
nese assets  and  fund  in  the  United  States  will  be  fros^en  except  that  they  may 
be  moved  if  licenses  are  granted  for  such  movement  X  It  is  not  repeat  not 
exi)ected  that  Japanese  merchant  vessels  in  United  States  ports  will  be  seized 
at  this  time  X  United  States  flag  merchant  vessels  will  not  at  present  be 
ordered  to  depart  from  or  not  to  enter  ports  controlled  by  Japan  X  ONO  and 
COS  do  not  anticipate  immediate  hostile  reaction  by  Japan  through  the  use  of 
military  means  but  you  are  furnished  this  information  in  order  that  you  may 
take  appropriate  precautionary  measures  against  possible  eventualities  X  Ac- 
tion being  initiated  by  the  United  States  Army  to  call  the  Philippine  Army  into 
active  service  at  an  early  date  XX  This  despatch  is  to  be  kept  secret  except 
from  immediate  Navy  and  Army  subordinates  X  SPENAVO  informs  CNS  but 
warn  him  against  disclosure  X  Action  addees  this  dis  are  Cincpac  Cinclant 
Cincaf  Com  Fifteen  Spenavo  London  XX 
Secret 

[3]        Drafter :  Op-12.  Addressees  Priority 

From :  C  N  O.  For  action 

Released  by :  Ingersol.  CINCLANT 

CINCPAO 
Date :  October  16,  1941.  CINCAF 

(Acknowledge) 
162203  CR  0534 

The  resignation  of  the  Japanese  cabinet  has  created  a  grave  situation  X  If  a 
new  cabinet  is  formed  it  will  probably  be  strongly  nationalistic  and  anti 
American  X  If  the  Konoye  cabinet  remains  the  effect  will  be  that  it  will 
operate  under  a  new  mandate  which  will  not  include  rapproachment  with  the 
US  X  In  either  case  hostilities  between  Japan  and  Russia  are  a  strong  possibil- 
ity X  Since  the  US  and  Britain  are  held  responsible  by  Japan  for  her  present 
desperate  situation  there  is  also  a  possibility  that  Japan  may  attack  these 
two  powers  X  In  view  of  these  possibilities  you  will  take  due  precautions 
including  such  preparatory  deployments  as  will  not  disclose  strategic  intention 
nor  constitute  provocative  actions  against  Japan  X  Second  and  third  adees 
inform  appropriate  army  and  naval  district  authorities  X  Acknowledge  XX 
Secret 

[4]        Secret 

8    WVT    BC    47    WD 

Washkt.,  D.  C,  1234P.,  Oct.  20,  1941. 
20th    Following  War  Dept.  estimate  of  Japanese  situation  for  your  informa- 
tion stop    Tension  between  United  States  and  Japan  remains  strained  but  no 
repeat  no  abrupt  change  in  Japanese  foreign  policy  api)ears  imminent 

Adams 
1037A 

[5]        Sealed  Secret 

Drafter:  Op-12.  Addressees 

Frwn :  Chief  of  Naval  Operations.  For  action 

Released  by  :  Ingersoll.  CINCAF 

CINCPAC 
Date :  November  24,  1941.  COM  11 

COM  12 
COM  13 
COM  15 

For  information 
SPENAVO  LONDON 
CINCLANT 


1328    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

242005  CR0443 

Chances  of  favorable  outcome  of  negotiations  with  Japan  very  doubtful  X  This 
situation  coupled  with  statements  of  Japanese  government  and  movements  their 
naval  and  military  forces  indicate  in  our  opinion  that  a  surprise  aggressive 
movement  in  any  direction  including  attack  on  Philippines  or  Guam  is  a  possi- 
bility X  Chief  of  Staff  has  seen  this  dispatch  concurs  and  requests  action  adees 
to  inform  senior  army  officers  their  areas  X  Utmost  secrecy  necessary  in  order 
not  to  complicate  an  already  tense  situation  or  precipitate  Japanese  action  X 
Guam  will  be  informed  separately. 
Copy  to  WPD,  War  Dept.,  and  to 
Oi>-12  but  no  other  distribution 

[6]        Secret  '  November  26,  I941 

RCA    831     US  Govt 

Washington,  D.  C,  Nov.  26,  194I.    1149P. 
Commanding  Geotbral, 

Hawaiian  Department,  Ft.  Shafter,  T.  H. 

Four  Six  Five  Twenty  Sixth 
Reference  two  B  dash  twenty  four  airplanes  for  special  photo  mission  Stop 
It  is  desired  that  the  pilots  be  instructed  to  photographic  Truk  Island  in  the 
Caroline  group  Jaluit  in  the  Marshall  group  Stop  Visual  reconnaissance  should 
be  made  simultaneously  Stop  Information  desired  as  to  the  number  and  loca- 
tion of  naval  vessels  including  submarines  comma  airfields  comma  aircraft 
comma  guns  comma  barracks  and  camps  Stop  Pilots  should  be  warned  islands 
strongly  fortified  and  manned  Stop  Photography  and  reconnaissance  must  be 
accomplished  at  high  altitude  and  there  must  be  no  circling  or  remaining  in  the 
vicinity  Stop  Avoid  orange  aircraft  by  utilizing  maximum  altitude  and 
speed  Stop  Instruct  crews  if  attacked  by  planes  to  use  all  means  in  their 
power  for  self  preservation  Stop  The  two  pilots  and  copilots  should  be  in- 
structed to  confer  with  Admiral  Kimmel  upon  arrival  at  Honolulu  to  obtain 
his  advise  Stop  If  distance  from  Wake  and  Jaluit  to  Moresby  is  too  great 
comma  suggest  one  B  dash  twenty  four  proceed  from  Wake  to  Jaluit  and  back 
to  Wake  comma  then  Philippines  by  usual  route  photographing  Ponape  while 
enroute  Moresby  Stop  Advise  pilots  best  time  of  day  for  photographic  Truk 
and  Jaluit  Stop  Upon  arrival  in  Philippines  two  copies  each  of  any  photo- 
graphs taken  will  be  sent  to  General  MacArthur  comma  Admiral  Hart  comma 
Admiral  Kimmel  comma  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  comma  and  the  War 
Department  Stop  Insure  that  both  B  dash  twenty  four  airplanes  are  fully 
equipped  with  gun  ammunition  upon  departure  from  Honolulu 

Adams 
f7]        Secret 

Priority 
Priority  November  27,  1941. 

Commanding  General, 

Eawaiian  Department,  Fort  Shafter,  T.  E. 

No.  472 

Negotiations  with  Japan  appear  to  be  terminated  to  all  practical  puriwses  vrith 
only  the  barest  possibilities  that  the  Japanese  Government  might  come  back  and 
offer  to  continue  Period  Japanese  future  action  unpredictable  but  hostile 
action  possible  at  any  moment  Period  If  hostilities  cannot  comma  repeat  can- 
not comma  be  avoided  the  United  States  desires  that  Japan  commit  the  first 
overt  act  Period  This  policy  should  not  comma  repeat  not  comma  be  construed 
as  restricting  you  to  a  course  of  action  that  might  jeopardize  your  defense 
Period  Prior  to  hostile  Japanese  action  you  are  directed  to  undertake  such 
reconnaissance  and  other  measures  as  you  deem  necessary  but  these  measures 
should  be  carried  out  so  as  not  comma  repeat  not  comma  to  alarm  civil  population 
or  disclose  intent  Period  Report  measures  taken  Period  Should  hostilities 
occur  you  will  carry  out  the  tasks  assigned  in  rainbow  five  so  far  as  they  pertain 
to  Japan  Period  Limit  dissemination  of  this  highly  secret  information  to 
minimum  essential  oflBcers 

Mabshaix 

War  Department  message  center :  Please  send  same  radiogram  to :  Command- 
ing General,  Caribbean  Defense  Command,  Quarry  Heights,  C.  Z. 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1329 

[8]  •  Priority 

November  27,  1941. 
Commanding  General, 

Western  Defense  Command, 

Presidio  of  San  Francisco,  California. 
Negotiations  with  Japan  appear  to  be  terminated  to  all  practical  purposes  with 
only  the  barest  possibilities  that  the  Japanese  Government  might  come  back  and 
offer  to  continue  period  Japanese  future  action  unpredictable  but  hostile  action 
possible  at  any  moment  period  If  hostilities  cannot  repeat  cannot  be  avoided 
the  United  States  desires  that  Japan  commit  the  first  overt  act  period  This 
policy  should  not  repeat  not  be  construed  as  restricting  you  to  a  course  of  action 
that  might  jeopardize  your  defense  period  Prior  to  hostile  Japanese  action  you 
are  directed  to  undertake  such  reconnaissance  and  other  measures  as  you  deem 
necessary  but  these  measures  should  be  carried  out  so  as  not  repeat  not  to  alarm 
civil  population  or  disclose  intent  period  Report  measures  taken  period  A 
separate  message  is  being  sent  to  Q  dash  two  Ninth  Corps  Area  re  subversive 
activities  in  United  States  period  Should  hostilities  occur  you  will  carry  out 
the  tasks  assigned  in  rainbow  five  so  far  as  they  pertain  to  Japan  period  Limit 
dissemination  of  this  highly  secret  information  to  minimum  essential  ofllcers 

Mabshatj, 

[9]  Priority 

November  27,  1941. 
Commanding  General, 

U.  S.  Army  Forces  in  the  Far  East,  Manila,  P.  I. 
Negotiations  with  Japan  appear  to  be  terminated  to  all  practical  purposes 
with  only  barest  possibilities  that  Japanese  Government  might  come  back  and 
offer  to  continue  period  Japanese  future  action  unpredictable  but  hostile  action 
possible  at  any  moment  period  tt  hostilities  cannot  comma  repeat  cannot  comma 
be  avoided  the  United  States  desires  that  Japan  commit  the  first  overt  act  i)eriod 
This  policy  should  not  comma  repeat  not  comma  be  construed  as  restricting  you 
to  a  course  of  action  that  might  Jeopardize  the  successful  defense  of  the  Philip- 
pines period  Prior  to  hostile  Japanese  action  you  are  directed  to  take  such 
reconnaissance  and  other  measures  as  you  deem  necessary  period  Report  meas- 
ures taken  period  Should  hostilities  occur  you  will  carry  out  the  tasks  assigned 
in  revised  rainbow  five  which  was  delivered  to  you  by  General  Brereton  period 
Chief  of  Naval  Operations  concurs  and  request  you  notify  Hart 

Marshall 
Secret 

[10]  Secret 

P  2    War  WD  Prty 

Washington,  D.  C,  November  27, 1941. 
G-2    Hawahait  Department, 

Ft.  Bhafter,  T.  H. 
473-27TH 

Japanese  negotiations  have  come  to  practical  stalemate  stop  Hostilities  may 
ensue  Stop  Subversive  activities  may  be  expected  Stop  Inform  commanding 
general  and  Chief  of  Staff  only. 

MlLE^S 

144PM 

[ii]  November  28,  1941. 

453  AM 
From  :  Manila,  P.  I. 
To :  General  George  C.  Marshall 
No.  1004,  November  Twenty-eighth. 

Pursuant  to  instructions  contained  in  your  radio  six  two  four  air  recoD' 
naissance  has  been  extended  and  intensified  in  conjunction  with  the  Navy  stop 
Ground  security  measures  have  been  taken  stop  Within  the  limitations  im- 
posed by  present  state  of  development  of  this  theatre  of  operations  everything  Is 
in  readiness  for  the  conduct  of  a  successful  defense  stop  Intimate  liaison  and 
cooperation  and  cordial  relations  exist  between  Army  and  Navy. 

MaoArthck 
Secret 


1330    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

[12]  NOVEMBEB  28,  1941. 

557AM 
Secret 
Priority 

From  :  Fort  Shafter  T.  H. 
To :  Chief  of  Staff 
No.  959  November  27th 

Report  department  alerted  to  prevent  sabotage  period  Liaison  with  Navy 
reurad  four  seven  two  twenty  seventh 

Short. 

[13]  Secret  Priority 

114  War  Kr  189  WD  Prty 

Washn  D.  C.  842P  Nov.  28,  1941 

CG 

Hawn  Dept.  Ft.  Shafter  T.  H. 

482  28th  critical  situation  demands  that  all  precautions  be  taken  immediately 
against  subversive  activities  within  field  of  investigative  responsibility  of  War 
Department  paren  see  paragraph  three  mid  SC  thirty  dash  forty  five  end  paren 
stop  Also  desired  that  you  initiate  forthwith  all  additional  measures  neces- 
sary to  provide  for  protection  of  your  establishments  comma  property  comma  and 
equipment  against  sabotage  comma  protection  of  your  personnel  against  sub- 
versive propaganda  and  protection  of  all  activities  against  espionage  stop  This 
does  not  repeat  not  mean  that  any  illegal  measures  are  authorized  stop  Pro- 
tective measures  should  be  confined  to  those  essential  to  security  comma  avoid- 
ing unnecessary  publicity  and  alarm  stop  To  insure  speed  of  transmission  iden- 
tical telegrams  are  being  sent  to  all  air  stations  but  this  does  not  repeat  not 
affect  your  responsibility  under  existing  instructions 

Adams. 
Secret 
[14]  secret 

Priority 

Commanding  General.  Sent  No.  484,  11/28. 

Hanvaii  Department,  Fort  Shafter,  T.  H.: 
Attention  Commanding  General  Hawaiian  Air  Force  period  That  instruc- 
tions substantially  as  follows  be  issued  to  all  establishments  and  units  under  your 
control  and  command  is  desired  colon  against  those  subversive  activities  within 
the  field  of  investigative  responsibility  of  the  War  Department  paren  see  para- 
graph three  mid  SR  three  zero  dash  four  five  paren  the  present  critical  situa- 
tion demands  that  all  precautions  be  taken  at  once  period  It  is  desired  also 
that  all  additional  measures  necessary  be  initiated  by  you  immediately  to  pro- 
vide the  following  colon  protection  of  your  personnel  against  subversive  prop- 
aganda comma  protection  of  all  activities  against  espionage  comma  and  pro- 
tection against  sabotage  of  your  equipment  comma  property  and  establishments 
period  This  does  not  repeat  not  authorize  any  illegal  measures  period  Avoiding 
unnecessary  alarm  and  publicity  protective  measures  should  be  confined  to  those 
essential  to  security  period  Para  it  is  also  desired  that  or  on  before  December 
five  this  year  reports  be  submitted  to  the  Chief  Armiy  Air  Forces  of  all  steps 
initiated  by  you  to  comply  with  these  instructions  period  signed  Arnold. 

Adams. 
A.  F.  No.  461 
Secret  > 

U5] 

Secret 

Received :  November  28,  1941. 

11 :  18  PM 
From  :  HQ  WDC  Presidio  of  San  Francisco,  Calif., 
To :       General  George  C.  Marshall 
November  28th : 

Report  following  measures  taken  as  per  your  radio  Nov  twenty  seven :  Your 
radio  paraphrased  to  Commanding  Generals  ADC,  Second  Air  Force,  Fourth  Air 
Force,  Ninth  CAD,  Pacific  Coastal  Frontier  Sectors,  Ninth  Corps  Area  and  Com- 
mandants Eleventh  Twelfth  and  Fifteenth  Naval  Districts.     All  harbor  entrance 


EXHIBITS   OP  JOINT   COMMITTEE  1331 

control  posts  continuously  manned.  One  gun  battery  each  harbor  defense  con- 
tinuously alerted.  Protection  against  sabotage  and  other  subversite  activities 
intensified.  Six  infy  battalions  and  necessary  motor  transportation  alerted  so 
as  to  be  instantly  available  to  CG  NCA  to  carry  out  his  missions  under  Rainbow 
Five.  Constant  contact  being  maintained  with  corps  area  and  naval  district  com- 
manders and  full  cooperation  assured.  PCF,  sector  and  subsector  plans  Rainbow 
Five  practically  completed  and  necessary  reconnaissance  being  made  to  carry  out 
defense  of  critical  areas.  Two  rifle' companies  furnished  CG  SF  P  of  E  for  guard 
duty  and  one  company  furnished  to  CG  NCA  for  internment  aliens  at  Angel  Island. 
Paren  in  connection  this  report  see  my  radio  to  CG  GHQ  Nov  twenty  fifth  which 
recommended  that  WPL  five  two  be  extended  to  include  Pacific  coast  and  Jap- 
anese vessels  and  which  outlined  steps  taken  by  me  in  preparation  therefor.  As 
Air  Forces  as  well  as  other  Army  forces  will  be  involved  in  the  execution  of  WLP 
five  two  or  the  preparatory  stage  of  Rainbow  Five  it  is  strongly  urged  that  I  be 
authorized  to  direct  operations  of  Air  Forces  in  defense  [J5A]  of  the  PCF 
or  that  instructions  be  issued  specifying  air  action  and  that  I  be  furnished  a  copy 
of  such  directive.  Should  hostilities  occur  this  command  now  ready  to  carry  out 
tasks  assigned  in  Rainbow  Five  so  far  as  they  pertain  to  Japan  except  for  woeful 
shortage  of  ammunition  and  pursuit  and  bombardment  planes  which  should  be 
made  available  without  delay. 

DeWitt,  Commanding. 
[16] 

Secret 

Received,  November  29,  1941. 
346  AM 
From :  Panama. 
To :        The  AGO. 
Panama  No.  509  ;  November  28th  : 

Reurad  four  six  one  November  twenty  seven  signed  Marshall  report  requested 
being  forwarded  air  mail.     CDO  six  eight  seven. 

Andbews. 

[17]         Secret  Priority  29  November  1941. 

The  ADJUTANT  General 

War  Department,  Washington  D  C 
Re  your  secret  radio  four  eight  two  twenty  eighth  comma  full  precautions  are 
being  taken  against  subversive  activities  within  the  field  of  investigative  respon- 
sibility of  War  Department  paren  paragraph  three  raid  SC  thirty  dash  forty 
five  end  paren  and  Military  Establishments  including  personnel  and  equipment 
Stop  As  regards  prelection  of  vital  installations  outside  of  military  reserva- 
tions such  as  power  plants  comma  telephone  exchanges  and  highway  bridges 
comma  this  headquarters  by  confidential  letter  dated  June  ninteen  nineteen  forty 
one  requested  the  Governor  of  the  Territory  to  use  the  broad  powers  vested  in 
him  by  section  sixty  seven  of  the  organic  act  which  provides  comma  in  effect 
comma  that  the  Governor  may  call  upon  the  commanders  of  military  and  naval 
forces  of  the  United  States  in  the  Territory  of  Hawaii  to  prevent  or  suppress 
lawless  violence  comma  invasion  comma  insurrection  etc  Stop  Pursuant  to 
the  authority  stated  the  Governor  on  June  twentieth  confidentially  made  a  formal 
written  demand  on  this  headquarters  to  furnish  and  continue  to  furnish  such 
adequate  protection  as  may  be  necessary  to  prevent  sabotage  comma  and  lawless 
violence  in  connection  therewith  comma  being  committed  against  vital  installa- 
tions and  structures  in  the  Territory  Stop  Pursuant  to  the  foregoing  request 
appropriate  military  protection  is  now  being  afforded  vital  civilian  installations 
Stop  In  this  connection  comma  at  the  instigation  of  this  headquarters  the  city 
and  county  of  Honolulu  on  June  thirtieth  nineteen  forty  one  enacted  an  ordi- 
nance which  permits  the  Commanding  [17 A]  General  Hawaiian  Depart- 
ment comma  to  close  comma  or  restrict  the  use  of  and  travel  upon  comma  any 
highway  within  the  city  and  county  of  Honolulu  comma  whenever  tlie  Command- 
ing General  deems  such  action  necessary  in  the  interest  of  national  defense 
Stop  The  authority  thus  given  has  not  yet  been  exercised  Stop  Relations 
with  FBI  and  all  other  Federal  and  Territorial  officials  are  and  have  been 
cordial  and  mutual  cooperation  has  been  given  on  all  pertinent  matters. 

Short 

79716  O — 46 — pt.  14 2S 


1332     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

[iS] 

Secret  November  29,  1941. 

Subject :  Measures  Taken  for  the  Defense  of  the  Caribbean  Area. 
To :  The  Adjutant  General,  Washington,  D.  C. 

1.  In  compliance  with  radiogram  No.  461  from  the  Chief  of  Staff,  dated  No- 
vember 27,  1941,  report  that  the  following  measures  are  in  effect  for  the  pro- 
tection of  the  Caribbean  Area : 

a.  Naval  Measures.  At  the  present  time,  it  is  believe  that  the  defensive  meas- 
ures for  the  Caribbean  Defense  Command  center  largely  around  the  Panama 
Canal ;  however,  a  plan  for  furnishing  Army  support  to  the  Navy  has  been  worked 
out  and  coordinated  with  the  various  Naval  commanders  in  the  Caribbean 
Theater.  In  the  Panama  Sector,  the  Commandant  of  the  15th  Naval  District 
is  conducting  continuous  surface  patrol  of  the  area  included  within  the  Panama 
Coastal  Frontier,  supplemented,  within  the  limits  of  the  aircraft  at  his  disposal, 
by  an  air  patrol.  In  my  opinion,  the  Commandant  of  the  15th  Naval  District, 
does  not  have  sufficient  aircraft  or  vessels  within  his  control  for  adequate 
reconnaissance. 

b.  Measures  for  the  Defense  of  the  Panama  Canal.  No  additional  measures 
other  than  those  already  in  effect,  have  been  taken  for  the  defense  of  the  Panama 
Canal,  except  to  increase  Inspections  in  order  to  insure  the  alertness  of  troops. 
Measures,  in  effect  are : 

(1)  Earhor  Defense.  Troops  are  on  a  continuous  alert.  Harbor  defense 
is  coordinated  with  the  naval  defense. 

(2)  Aircraft  Warning  Service.  The  two  detectors  installed  are  on  a  24- 
hour  alert.  Seven  observation  posts  have  been  established  at  various  places 
in  Panama  with  direct  radio  communication  to  the  Aircraft  Warning  Service 
Information  Center.  Within  the  means  on  hand,  every  effort  is  being  made  to 
complete  the  installation  of  other  detectors  now  available  within  the  Department. 

(3)  Antiaircraft  Artillery.  All  available  antiaircraft  equipment  is  installed 
and  on  a  24-hour  alert. 

(4)  Anti^Sabotage.  Locks  and  other  sensitive  areas  are  continuously 
guarded,  and  all  approaches  tp  the  sensitive  areas  are  covered  by  mound  bunkers. 
Approaches  to  bunkers  and  between  bunkers  were  practicable  are  covered  by 
patrols.     Transit  guards  are  placed  on  all  vessels  transiting  the  Canal. 

(5)  Counter-espionage.  Active  counter-espionage  measures  are-  being  taken 
continuously. 

[18A]  (6)  Counter-s^ibversive  activities,  with  the  cooperation  of  the  Re- 
public of  Panama,  are  in  continuous  operation.  Plans  have  been  prepared  with 
the  cooperation  of  the  Republic  of  Panama,  for  the  internment  of  aliens,  and  a 
list  of  those  who  should  be  interned  ujwn  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  has  been 
prepared  and  is  in  the  hands  of  the  American  Ambassador,  to  be  transmitted 
to  the  Panamanian  Government.  The  Canal  Zone  itself  has  already  been 
cleared  of  any  known  suspects. 

(7)  Air  Force.  A  portion  of  the  pursuit  is  on  a  continuous  24-hour  alert. 
The  Bomber  Command  headquarters  maintains  a  24-hour  alert.  This  latter 
applies  to  the  whole  Caribbean  Area. 

c.  In  Caribbean  Theater,  other  than  Panama  Canal  Department. 

(1)  Air  Corps  units  with  from  three  to  six  B-18  or  B-18-A  medium  bombers 
have  been  stationed  at  St.  Croix,  Antigua,  St.  Lucia  and  British  Guiana.  The 
9th  Bombardment  Group  (less  squadrons  in  St.  Lucia,  British  Guiana,  and  Suri- 
nam), with  six  B-18-A  medium  bombers,  has  been  stationed  at  Trinidad.  These 
units  have  a  reconnaissance  mission  -in  the  vicinity  of  these  bases  and  a  mission 
to  support  the  Navy. 

(2)  A  composite  squadron  with  six  (6)  B-18-A  medium  bombers  and  eight  (8) 
P-40  pursuit  planes  will  arrive  in  Surinam  about  December  3,  1941. 

(3)  The  ground  elements  of  Force  "A"  consisting  of  Headquarters  and  Service 
Detachments,  three  composite  companies  of  infantry  and  three  antiaircraft 
platoons  (each  with  six  .50  Cal.  machine  guns)  are  enroute  to  Surinam.  Entire 
force  should  arrive  by  December  5,  1941. 

(4)  One  battalion,  33rd  Infantry,  with  certain  service  elements,  will  be  moved 
to  Trinidad,  departing  Panama  on  December  3  and  13,  1941.  One  pursuit 
squadron  will  be  moved  to  Trinidad  as  soon  as  transportation  is  available, 

2.  The  efficacy  of  the  measures  taken  for  the  defense  of  the  Caribbean  is 
qualified  by  certain  deficiencies  which  exist  in  the  Caribbean  Defense  Command. 
These  deficiencies  are : 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1333 

o.  Harbor  Defenses:  Less  than  one  complete  manning  detail  available  for  the 
harbor  defense  armament. 

6.  Aircraft  Wa7-ning  Service  is  totally  inadequate  in  personnel  to  supervise 
the  installation  of  detectors  on  hand  and  in  personnel  to  man  the  equipment 
when  installed  (see  1st  Ind.,  these  headquarters,  dated  October  17,  1941,  to  The 
Adjutant  General,  on  AG  320.2  (8/23/41)  M(>-C,  dated  September  2, 1941,  subject : 
"Air  Defense  Organization" ) . 

c.  Antiaircraft  Artillery  has  insufficient  personnel  to  man  armament  now 
being  installed  in  the  Canal  Zone,  and  inadequate  protection  against  low-flying 
aircraft,  particularly  at  night,  since  it  has  only  sufficient  ammunition  for  one 
minute  of  fire  per  gun  for  its  37  mm  guns,  and  no  barrage  balloons.  There  is 
also  a  lack  of  proper  searchlights  to  light  field  of  fire  of  automatic  weapons. 

[18B]  d.  Air  Forces.  No  night  pursuit.  No  VHF  radio  equipment  with 
which  to  direct  pursuit  in  the  air.  Only  eight  modern  long-range  bombers  and 
twelve  modern  light  bombers  are  available  within  the  Caribbean  Defense  Com- 
mand.    No  37  mm  cannon  for  P-39's. 

e.  The  situations  in  Puerto  Rico  and  the  Base  Commands  are  so  new,  and 
their  major  deficiencies  so  well  known  that  no  attempt  has  been  made  to 
enumerate  them. 

F.  M.  Andbewb, 
Lieutenant  General,  United  States  Army,  Commanding. 

im 

Secret 
11  WTJ 

1251P/4th 

Beceived  Decsicbes  10,  1941 
124  P.  M. 

From  :  Ft.  Shaf  ter,  TH 

To  :        Chief  Army  Air  Corps. 

No.  1033,  December  4th. 

Following  report  in  compliance  with  instructions  contained  in  agwar  four 
eight  four  dash  twenty  eight  colon  cinstructions  contained  in  subject  radiogram 
issued  to  all  establishments  and  units  under  control  of  Hawaiian  Air  Force  on 
twenty  nine  November  Stop  Entire  subject  of  protection  recently  received 
comma  and  continues  to  receive  comma  detailed  and  comprehensive  attention  as 
result  of  three  reports  prepared  by  special  inspector  during  June  and  July  for 
one  Stop  Para  additional  steps  initiated  specifically  to  comply  with  subject 
radiogram  substantially  as  follows  colon  assembly  of  intelligence  officers  of 
major  subdivisions  of  Hawaiian  Air  Force  twenty  nine  November  Stop  Per- 
sonal inspection  of  stations  and  activities  by  air  foix;e  commander  one  and  two 
December  Stop  Increase  in  size  of  guard  where  desirable  Stop  Instructions 
issued  to  expedite  overhauling  of  pass  system  comma  civilian  and  military  comma 
now  in  progress  Stop  This  entire  department  is  now  operating  and  will  con- 
tinue to  operate  under  an  alert  for  prevention  of  sabotage  activities  Stop  Para 
secrecy  discipline  being  given  all  emphasis  practicable  through  official  and  quasi 
official  agencies  Stop  Work  has  actually  been  begun  on  essential  protective 
fencing  and  flood  [19 A]  lighting  projects  Stop  Para  with  reference  to 
counter  propaganda  comma  the  problem  is  educational  rather  than  regulatory 
and  at  present  is  being  dealt  with  through  the  medium  of  squadron  talks  Stop 
Need  is  felt  for  a  War  Department  publication  paren  possibly  in  form  of  develop- 
ment and  expansion  of  foreword  to  soldiers  handbook  comma  FM  twenty  one 
dash  one  hundred  paren  suitably  arranged  and  worded  for  use  of  relatively  inex- 
perienced personnel  comma  dealing  with  status  of  soldier  as  citizen  comma  ideals 
and  doctrines  influencing  founders  of  American  Government  comma  structure 
of  government  eomma  place  of  military  establishment  in  the  structure  comma 
national  objectives  comma  both  domestic  and  international  comma  together  with 
discussion  of  those  forms  of  government  inimical  to  democratic  form  Stop 
Signed  Martin  end 

Seobt. 


1334    CONGRESSIOXAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

[20] 

S6cr6t 

Sent  No.  519,  12/5 

December  5, 1941. 
Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  Headquaetebs, 

G2  Hawaiian  Department,  Honolulu,  Territory  Haicaii. 
Contact  Commander  Rochefort  immediately  thru  Commandant  Fourteen  Naval 
District  regarding  broadcasts  from  Tokyo  reference  weather. 

Miles. 
[21] 

1549WS  Washington  DC  74/73  RCA  USG  ETAT  7  1218P. 

C  G 

Hawn  Dept  Ft.  Shatter,  T.  H. 

529  7th  Japanese  are  presenting  at  one  pm  eastern  standard  time  today  what 
amounts  to  an  ultimatum  also  they  are  under  orders  to  destroy  their  code  machine 
immediately  stop  just  what  significance  the  hour  set  may  have  we  do  not  know 
but  be  on  alert  accordingly  stop  inform  naval  authorities  of  this  communication 

Mabshaix. 

EXHIBIT  NO.  33 

MruTABY  Intelligence  Estimates  Pkepared  bt  6-2,  Wab  Depabtment, 
Washington,  D.  C. 

Military  Intelligence  Estimates,  1  July-t  December  19^1 


Item 

Date 

Subject 

1 
2 

7  July... 

llJuly 

Estimate  of  the  Eastern  Siberian  Situation. 
Strategic  Estimate  of  the  Situation. 

3 

17July    -        

Japanese  Movement  into  French  Indo-China. 

4 

17July     

Mobiliiiation  of  -Additional  Japanese  Manpower. 

5 

ISJuly 

New  Japanese  Cabinet. 

6 

ISJuly                 

Strategical  Estimate  of  the  Situation. 

7 

25July     

Sanctions  against  Japan. 

8 

SOJulv 

German-Japanese  Relations. 

9 

16  August 

Developments  in  the  Far  Eastern  Situation. 

10 
11 

20Au?ust.-   

2  September 

Chinese  Resistance. 

Conversation  between  the  Japanese  Military  Attache  and  the  Chief, 

12 

5  September 

Far  Eastern  Section. 
Brief  Periodic  Estimate  of  the  World  Situation. 

13 

11  September 

Political  Developments  in  Japan. 

14 

17  September 

Combat  Estimate,  Japan. 

15 

18  September. 

Strategic  Estimate  of  the  Situation. 

16 

23  September. 

Crisis  in  Japan. 

17 

2  October 

Jacarese-American  Relations. 

18 

16  October                 .  

Fall  of  the  Japanese  Cabinet. 

19 

17  October 

Japan's  New  Premier. 

20 

21  October . 

Kwantung  versus  the  Siberian  Army. 

21 

1  November 

Possible  Japanese  Drive  into  Yunnan. 

22 

2  November              

G-2  Estimate  Far  Eastern  Situation. 

23 

13  November 

Possible  Japanese  Drive  into  Yunnan. 

24 

25  November 

Far  Eastern  Situation. 

25 

26  November                 ..  .. 

Japanese  Naval  Task  Force. 

26 

27  November  ..  .  

Recent  Developments  in  the  Far  East. 

27 

29  November 

Brief  Periodic  Estimate  of  the  Situation  December  1,  1941-March 

28 

5  December 

31,  1942. 
Supplementary  Brief  Periodic  Estimate  of  the  Situation  December 

29 

6  December.-              

1.  1941-March  31,  1942. 
Estimate  of  Japanese  Strength  in  Indo-China. 

30 

6  December 

Estimate  of  Japanese  Air  and  Groimd  Forces  in  Indo-China,  Hainan 

and  Formosa. 

Note.— Items  2,  6,  8,  9,  12, 15, 17,  22,  23,  25  26  were  classified  Secret. 

Items  1,  3,  4,  5,  7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21,  24,  27,  28,  29,  30  were  classified  Confidential. 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1335 

I.  B.  93 

July  7,  1941. 
Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff: 
Subject :  Estimate  of  the  Eastern  Siberian  Situation. 

1.  Eastern  Siberia,  that  is  to  say,  the  region  lying  between  Lake  Baikal  and 
the  Pacific  Ocean,  is  a  distinct  entity  quite  separate  from  the  other  portions  of 
Siberia  and  old  Russia.  Remote  and  lying  behind  the  Lake  Baikal-Lena  River 
barrier,  its  terrain  is  not  that  of  the  swampy  railway-dominated  wilderness  of 
Central  Siberia  but  admits  of  normal  troop  deployments  and  operations.  It 
is  economically  distinct  in  its  mineral  deposits,  its  fisheries  and  its  self-contained 
economy.  Politically  and  psychologically  it  is  distinct,  little  changed  from  Czar- 
ist  days.  It  thinks  for  itself  and  will  act  for  itself  first,  and  for  the  rest  of 
Russia  only  secondarily. 

2.  It  is  quite  within  the  range  of  possibility  that  should  Stalin  and  his  com- 
munist regime  be  driven  out  of  Russia  the  retreat  would  be  to  this  Far  Eastern 
Region. 

3.  The  Russian  forces  in  this  region  are  a  homegenous  army  of  51  divisions, 
2,500  tanks,  1,600  airplanes,  94  submarines  and  220  coastal  boats  as  opposed  to 
Japanese  forces  of  10  divisions,  1,000  tanks,  300  airplanes  and  a  balanced  neet. 
The  distribution  and  relationships  of  these  forces  are  shown  on  the  accompanying 
map. 

4.  This  region  is  potentially  a  sufficiently  homeogeneous  one  to  constitute  an 
effective  buffer-state  between  the  Bering  Sea  Region  and  the  Axis  powers,  Ger- 
man or  Japanese. 

5.  A  German  occupation  of  Eastern  Siberia  would  require  the  employment  of 
combat  forces  of  such  size  as  to  be  very  difficult,  if  not  impracticable,  of  accom- 
plishment at  the  end  of  a  2,000  mile  single  railway  system.  The  Axis  alloca- 
tion of  this  region,  therefore  to  Japan  is  the  more  likely  procedure,  though  sup- 
ported perhaps  by  German  air  power  and  political  pressures. 

6.  With  the  memory  of  the  Russian  superior  fighting  ability  demonstrated  in 
the  border  affrays  of  1938-39,  the  Japanese  are  unlikely  to  take  aggressive  action 
against  Eastern  Siberian  land  forces.  This  is  confirmed  by  evidence  from  other 
and  highly  authoritative  sources  of  reluctance  to  change  from  their  present  south- 
ern orientation  to  a  northern  one.  This,  however,  does  not  preclude  increasing 
Japanese  pressures  through  Outer  Mongolia  towards  Verkhneudinsk,  of  naval 
blockades  of  the  entrances  to  the  Sea  of  Japan,  the  Sea  of  Okhotsk  and  possibly 
Bering  Sea. 

/s/     C.  H.  Mason, 
C.  H.  Mason 
Colonel  of  Infantry,  O.  8.  C, 

Chief,  Intelligence  Brcunch. 
Distribution : 

The  President 

Secretary  of  War 

Chief  of  Staff 

War  Plans  Division 

Office  of  Naval  Inteligence 

G.  H.  Q. 

General  Embick 

Mr.  McCloy   (Record  Section) 


I.  B.  103-2 

JlTLY  11,  1941. 
Memorandum  for  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  W.  P.  D. 
Subject:  Strategic  Estimate  of  the  Situation. 

1.  At  your  informal  request  there  are  attached  revised  data  on  the  foreign 
situation.  These  data  supersede  those  furnished  by  1st  Indorsement,  May  26, 
1941,  to  your  memorandum  W.  P.  D.  4510,  May  24,  1941. 

Sherman   Miubs. 
Brigadier  General,  U.  S.  Army, 
Acting  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  Q-2. 
1  Inel. — G-2  Data  for  W.  D.  Strategic 
EJstimate  of  the  Situation. 


1336    CO^NGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Data  fob  Wab  Department  Strategic  Estimate  of  the  Situation 
1.  summation  of  the  situation 

a.  Germany,  possessing  a  central  position  and  ground  and  air  forces  superior 
to  any  individual  opponent,  has  exercised  her  initiative  by  attacking  Russia. 
This  attack  will  be  at  least  so  successful  that,  subsequent  to  the  fall  of  1941,  Ger- 
many will  have  regained  her  ability  to  strike  outwards  from  a  central  position. 

b.  The  British  Empire,  widespread,  with  superior  surface  sea  power,  but  de- 
ficient in  man  power,  organization  and  battle  leadership,  is  necessarily  on  the 
defensive.  To  her,  the  German  attack  on  Russia  affords  a  breathing  spell  in 
which  she  can  buttress  her  home  and  Middle  Eastern  defenses.  Assumption 
of  the  strategic  offensive  in  any  theater  is  beyond  her  power. 

c.  U.  S.  S.  R.,  ill  organized  but  formidable  because  of  her  size,  is  exposed 
to  the  full  vigor  of  German  attack.  The  most  that  can  be  expected  of  her  is 
that  she  will  remain  in  being  in  her  distant  fastnesses  after  the  German  on- 
slaught has  been  spent.  However,  the  German  attack  has  cancelled  out  Russia 
as  an  Axis  source  of  supply  from  the  short-term  viewpoint. 

d.  The  United  States,  with  a  superior  navy  in  one  ocean,  but  without  effective 
.weapons  and  with  but  few  combat  organizations,  is  committed  to  opposition 
to  Germany,  is  providing  limited  material  support  to  the  Axis'  enemies,  but 
lacks  the  means  to  take  overt  battle  action  against  Gefmany  in  her  own  or 
anyone  else's  behalf. 

e.  All  other  countries  are  but  the  fringing  satellites  of  the  four  great  powers. 
China,  Italy  and  Japan  have  some  military,  but  indecisive  potency.  The  others 
are  themselves  trivial,  or  of  importance  only  in  combination  with  others. 

2.    SITUATIONS   OF   INDIVIDUAL   POWEatS 

a.  Oermany 

(1)  Germany  is  now  engaged  in  a  major  war  with  Soviet  Russia  and  has 
launched  an  offensive  on  the  very  broad  front  from  the  Arctic  Ocean  to  the 
Black  Sea.  In  this  offensive,  her  armies  are  supported  by  the  armed  forces  of 
Finland,  Slovakia,  Hungary  and  Rumania. 

(2)  A  large  part  of  the  German  Army  of  260  divisions  is  engaged  in  this  Russian 
offensive,  although  some  60  divisions  remain  on  guard  in  Western  Europe  and 
Norway  against  the  possibility  of  a  British  attack  in  the  West. 

(3)  The  bulk  of  Germany's  20  armored  and  20  motorized  divisions  are  also 
thought  to  be  engaged  in  this  Russian  campaign. 

(4)  A  large  part  of  the  German  Air  Force  of  some  11,000  planes  in  850  com- 
bat squadrons,  and  organized  into  seven  or  more  air  fleets,  is  conducting  of- 
fensive operations  against  Russia,  while  at  the  same  time  there  has  been  held 
a  considerable  number  of  air  units  in  Western  Europe  and  the  Mediterranean 
as  a  defensive  precaution.  Around  5,000  planes  in  combat  squadrons  are  believed 
to  be  participating  in  the  campaign  against  Russia.  To  provide  this  operating 
mass  of  aircraft,  the  air  forces  in  the  Western  European  and  Mediterranean 
Theaters  have  necessarily  had  to  be  greatly  reduced  below  the  levels  prevailing 
in  May,  1941. 

(5)  The  German  Navy,  much  inferior  in  tonnage  to  the  British  and  recently 
weakened  by  the  loss  of  the  "Bismarck,"  is  conducting  an  aggressive  submarine 
campaign  against  British  shipping  with  about  150  submarines.  An  unknown 
number  of  German  auxiliary  cruisers  are  also  aggressively  active  against  British 
seaborne  commerce. 

(6)  The  political  and  economic  situation  in  Germany  is  sound.  The  "Hess 
affair"  does  not  seem  to  have  affected  adversely  the  will  of  the  German  nation 
to  continue  the  war. 

(7)  German-French  relations  are  Improving  as  the  two  nations  draw  closer 
together.  Already  the  economic  resources  of  France  are  beginning  to  play  a 
considerable  role  in  the  German  war  effort. 

(8)  In  consequence  of  this  major  offensive  against  Russia,  no  German  offensive 
operations  are  to  be  expected  in  any  other  theaters  of  war  in  the  immediate 
future.  In  particular,  no  invasion  of  England  or  of  Iceland  is  probable  during 
the  remainder  of  1941.  Germany's  ground  forces  will,  undoubtedly,  remain  on 
the  strategic  defensive  in  both  the  Western  European  and  Mediterranean 
Theaters  until  she  can  spare  troops  and  aviation  from  Eastern  Europe. 

(9)  In  case  of  victory  over  Russia  during  the  summer  or  fall  of  1941,  one  may 
expect  as  logical  further  German  moves : 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  1337 

(a)  The  consolidation  of  the  German  hegemony  in  Europe  (less  the  British 
Isles). 

(b)  The  expulsion  of  Britain  from  the  Mediterranean. 

(c)  The  continuation  of  the  war  of  attrition  against  the  British  seaborne 
commerce. 

(10)  The  complete  entry  of  the  United  States  into  the  War  would  probably 
not  change  the  plans  of  the  German  High  Command  nor  affect  for  the  present 
Germany's  military,  political  and  economic  position.  It  would  undoubtedly  de- 
press somewhat  the  war  spirit  and  morale  of  the  German  people.  It  would  so 
stimulate  the  morale  and  hopes  of  Germany's  subject  populations  as  to  increase 
greatly  the  Reich's  problems  in  controlling  them.  On  the  other  hand,  our  entry 
into  war  would  cause  Germany  to  activate  her  existing  fifth  column  arrangements 
in  Latin  America. 

b.  Japan 

(1)  Military  Situation.  Japanese  forces  are  deployed  over  a  wide  area  from 
Karafuto  in  the  north  to  Indo-China  in  the  south.  The  Chinese,  in  spite  of 
internal  friction,  continue  to  resist  passively  any  advance  by  the  Japanese  forces. 
Japan  has  for  some  time  been  gradually  assembling  an  expeditionary  force, 
originally  for  a  possible  movement  into  southeast  Asia,  but  which  now  may 
eventually  be  used  in  an  attack  upon  the  Maritime  Provinces. 

(2)  Economic  Situation.  Japan  is  economically  weak  because  she  lacks  es- 
sential war  materials,  adequate  foreign  exchange,  suflBcient  foreign  trade ;  she 
is  also  encumbered  with  financial  problems  connected  with  the  war  in  China. 

Economically  Japan  will  be  no  worse  off  than  she  is  at  the  present  time  unless 
greater  obstacles  are  placed  before  her  economic  progress.  Availability  of  Ger- 
man technical  advice  and  the  acquisition  of  war  materials  from  Thailand  and 
Indo-China  will  improve  her  economic  position.  Japan  is  increasing  her  im- 
ports of  oil  from  the  United  States  instead  of  decreasing  them.  Japan  could 
not  be  thrown  into  bankruptcy  under  present  circumstances ;  if  she  undertakes 
a  war  with  a  major  naval  power,  much  greater  obstacles  would  immediately  be 
placed  before  her  economic  progre.«s. 

(3)  Political  Situ<ition.  The  Japanese  will  support  any  decision  made  by  the 
Japanese  Government.  The  military  and  naval  authorities  continue  to  be  the 
predominant  influence  in  Governmental  decisions.  It  is  believed  that  the  naval 
authorities,  and  business  interests  will  exert  every  effort  to  avoid  a  conflict 
with  the  United  States  regardless  of  the  latter'.s  participation  in  the  European 
War. 

(4)  Psychology  of  Japanese.  The  intense  patriotism,  the  remarkable  recuper- 
ative capabilities  and  an  indomitable  tenacity  of  purpose  along  with  a  frugal 
and  low  standard  of  living  have  enabled  the  Japanese  people  to  accept  and 
even  support  the  frightful  cost  of  the  indecisive  war  in  China. 

(5)  Lines  of  Action.    Japan  has  the  following  alternatives : 

(a)  Maintain  status  quo  in  China. 

(b)  Withdraw  her  armed  forces  from  the  area  south  of  the  Great  Wall,  make 
peace  with  Chiang  Kai-Shek  and  use  only  economic  penetration  into  south- 
eastern Asia. 

(c)  Withdraw  sufficient  forces  from  the  Chinese  mainland  to  facilitate  an 
advance : 

(1)  Southward. 

(a)  Contain  or  isolate  the  Philippine  Islands  and  Hong  Kong,  attack 
British  Malaya  via  Thailand  and  Indo-China  or  by  direct  attack  by  land,  sea, 
and  air. 

(b)  Contain  or  isolate  the  Philippine  Islands  and  Hong  Kong,  and  attack 
the  Netherlands'  East  Indies  or  Borneo. 

(c)  Reduction  of  the  Philippine  Islands  and  Hong  Kong  prior  to  movement 
to  the  south. 

(2)  Northward  against  Russia  to  secure  the  Maritime  Provinces  Japan 
has  long  regarded  as  indispensable  to  her  security. 

Actions  indicated  in  (1)  are  all  contingent  upon  the  success  of  the  Axis 
forces  in  the  European  War. 

(6)  Mo.<it  Probable  Action.  Japan  will  probably  continue  to  assemble,  by 
gradual  withdrawals  from  China,  a  field  force  for  possible  employment  either  in 
Southeastern  Asia  or  against  Russia.  Her  hopes  of  empire  are  bound  up  with 
an  Axis  victory  and  she  is  subject  to  strong  German  pressure  to  attack  Russia  at 


1338    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

once;  nevertheless  it  is  believed  that  she  vs^ill  avoid  precipitate  action  and  ■will 
continue  her  policy  of  avoiding  war  with  Russia  on  the  one  hand  and  wth  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain  on  the  other.  If  forced  or  if  electing  to  choose 
between  action  against  Russia  or  to  the  Southwest,  she  will  be  influenced  by 
Germany's  success  against  Russia,  particularly  as  regards  possible  Russian  troop 
withdrawals  from  Siberia,  and  by  America's  action,  particularly  as  regards  the 
distribution  of  United  States'  naval  strength,  and  as  regards  attempts  to  send 
supplies  to  Russia  through  Vladivostok.  Should  the  choice  be  the  southward 
advance,  it  will  probably  consist  of  a  containment  of  Hong  Kong  and  the  Philip- 
pine  Islands  while   attacking  British    Malaya   via   Thailand   and   Indo-China. 

c.  British  Empire. 

(1)  The  British  Empire,  at  war,  is  on  the  defensive;  its  army,  naval  and  air 
strength  dispersed  on  exterior  lines,  with  the  United  Kingdom,  a  theatre  of 
combat  partially  encircled  by  hostile  assault  positions,  absorbing  the  principal 
effective  military  strength.  The  Imperial  Forces  are  composed  of  an  equivalent 
of  84  divisions,  233  squadrons  and  some  360  war  ships.  The  Army  has  suffered 
severe  reverses  in  the  past  year  but  its  morale  is  still  high.  There  is  a  great 
shortage  of  supporting  weapons,  tanks,  antiaircraft  and  antitank  guns  and  am- 
munition in  the  Army  in  all  theatres.  While  the  Navy  has  lost  several  important 
vessels  in  the  Atlantic,  the  Home  Fleet  has  had  several  valuable  additions.  The 
Mediterranean  Fleet  was  severely  damaged  at  the  Battle  of  Crete.  Economically 
the  condition  of  the  Empire  is  not  satisfactory ;  unless  more  severely  restrained, 
German  attacks  on  the  vital  sea  lanes  could  make  the  United  Kingdom's  condition 
critical  in  less  than  six  months.  Politically  the  Empire  is  intact ;  so  far,  no 
important  territory  has  been  lost  to  the  enemy.  Psychologically  the  whole  people 
have  developed  a  will  to  win,  and  an  increasing  application  of  all  energy  to  the 
war  effort  is  noted.  At  present  the  Empire  is  not  able  to  assume  the  offensive 
except  in  air  raids  of  limited  depth  on  the  continent  of  Europe  and  in  minor 
areas  such  as  in  Syria.  Forces  in  the  United  Kingdom  have  limited  capacity  for 
raids  against  the  German-held  coast  line  of  Europe.  In  spite  of  many  defeats  the 
spirit  of  the  people  is  unperturbed  and  morale  is  unbroken. 

(2)  Great  Britain  still  faces  a  possibility  of  invasion.  Some  40  divisions  and 
an  estimated  180  squadrons  of  first-line  airplanes  are  in  a  state  of  readiness  to 
repel  a  German  attack.  The  Army  forces  are  well-trained  and  continuously 
exercised ;  the  air  forces  are,  in  fact,  constantly  engaged  in  combat.  The  Army 
is  supported  by  a  well  organized  and  partially  armed  Home  Guard  and  an  effec- 
tive civil  organization  to  counter  the  probable  German  efforts  to  create  confusion 
before  and  during  invasion.  The  Royal  Air  Foi-ce  has  successfully  restricted 
large  scale  German  air  attacks  on  England  to  night  operations.  While  it  has 
not  been  able  to  prevent  German  air  raids  on  shipping,  it  has  become  increasingly 
effective  in  a  narrow  zone  on  the  Continent  during  the  pre-occupation  of  the 
German  air  force  in  Russia.  The  principal  mission  of  the  Fleet  at  present  is 
to  reduce  shipping  losses  due  to  German  attack  on  vital  sea  lanes.  A  readily 
assembled  naval  force  is  a  vital  factor  for  the  defence  of  the  British  Isles  against 
invasion.  The  promptness  of  action  and  effectiveness  thereof  will  be  inci'easingly 
influenced  by  the  measure  of  relief  from  distant  patrolling  which  might  result 
from  American  naval  patrols  east  of  the  30th  Meridian.  The  reduction  of  ship- 
ping losses  is  one  of  the  keys  to  the  situation  of  Great  Britain.  In  addition  to 
the  importation  of  raw  material^  (some  30,000,000  tons)  to  keep  industry  going, 
the  United  Kingdom  must  import  an  absolute  minimum  of  10,000,000  tons  of  food- 
stuffs, per  annum,  for  human  consumption. 

(3)  In  the  Middle  East  (Mediterranean  area),  the  British  have  available 
some  16  divisions.  They  have  finally  dispo.sed  of  all  Italian  forces  in  East  Africa 
but  they  have  lost  their  previous  gains  in  Libya.  A  beleaguered  British  garrison 
at  Tobruk,  some  30.000  strong,  is  in  a  precarious  position.  A  recent  British 
offensive  with  one  of  its  objects  to  relieve  that  situation  ended  in  defeat.  It  is 
expected  that  the  Germans  will  concentrate  on  an  effort  to  reduce  the  British 
position.  A  British  offensive  is  not  possible  although  there  may  be  a  desperate 
effort  to  fight  their  way  out.  A  small  British  force  has  put  down  the  uprising 
in  Iraq  and  has  cooperated  with  other  small  British  and  the  Free  French  forces 
in  consolidating  Syria.  The  British  defeat  at  Crete  was  a  severe  one,  especially 
for  the  Royal  Navy.  Repairs  to  individual  ships  and  small  reinforcements  have 
enabled  the  fleet  to  participate  in  the  Syrian  campaign  and  to  continue  in  a  lim- 
ited fashion  its  attack  on  Italian  and  German  war  communications.  The  Cretan 
campaign  has  definitely  proved  that  the  Mediterranean  Fleet  is  no  longer  free  to 
operate  at  will  in  that  sea  so  long  as  German  and  Italian  shore-based  aviation 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1339 

are  maintained  in  their  respective  positions  in  effective  strength.  The  opportu- 
nities for  the  Fleet  and  its  future  usefulness  are  therefore  bound  to  more  and 
more  restricted.  Already  the  supply  of  the  British  troops  in  Malta  and  Tobruk 
is  a  very  serious  matter  and  the  supply  of  British  troops  in  the  Eastern  Mediter- 
ranean area  must  now  be  undertaken  through  the  Persian  Gulf  and  Red  Sea.  The 
withdrawal  of  the  Fleet  from  the  Mediterranean  is  likely,  especially  if  there  is 
sufficient  warning  of  a  resumption  of  a  major  German  threat  in  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean.  The  Royal  Air  Force  operating  in  the  Aliddle  East  consists  of 
approximately  30  squadrons.  The  principal  key  to  the  Middle  East  situation  is 
the  receipt  of  supplies  from  the  United  States.  It  is  problematical  if  these  will 
arrive  in  sufficient  quantity  or  time  to  enable  the  British  Command  to  arm  and 
equip  sufficient  forces  to  maintain  the  defence  of  that  area. 

(4)  In  the  Far  East  (Singapore  area),  there  are  approximately  41/2  divisions, 
2  Indian,  1  Australian,  and  the  remainder  made  up  from  local  forces.  At  Hong 
Kong  there  is  approximately  a  brigade  of  British  troops  and  a  few  local  units. 
The  Royal  Air  Force  has  about  13  squadrons  in  this  area.  There  are  also  minor 
naval  forces. 

(5)  Lines  of  Action  : 

To  continue  on  the  strategic  defensive  in  all  theatres  until  such  time  as  unfore- 
seen events  will  permit  the  offensive,  and  to  seek  by  every  possible  means  to 
bring  the  United  States  into  the  war  at  the  earliest  possible  moment. 

d.  Italy 

(1)  Italy,  although  previously  defeated  in  the  Mediterranean,  has  now  emerged 
a  tarnished  victor  as  tbe  result  of  active  German  support.  While  her  East  African 
colonies  must  be  written  off,  she  has  acquired  considerable  Balkan  territory, 
including  the  strategically  important  and  long-desired  Dalmatian  coast,  and 
her  North  African  colony,  Libya,  is  again  almost  in  her  possession. 

(2)  The  Italian  Army,  which  must  be  considered  second  rate,  consists  of 
approximately  86  divisions.  It  is  estimated  that  trained  man  power  is  available 
for  an  additional  64  divisions,  provided  Germany  could  and  would  furnish  the 
necessary  equipment.  Thei-e  are  about  1,500  so-called  first  line  planes  in  the 
air  force  which  are  inferior  to  those  of  Germany  and  Great  Britain  in  performance 
and  armament.  Pilots  are  not  well  trained.  The  Navy  has,  to  date,  made  a 
sorry  showing ;  however,  it  still  must  be  reckoned  a  potent  force  with  its  present 
strength  of  4  battleships,  11  cruisers,  75  destroyers,  and  72  submarines,  especially 
If  supported  by  ground-based  German  aviation  and  operating  against  a  weakened 
British  Mediterranean  fleet. 

(3)  Italy  lacks  practically  all  essential  raw  materials,  including  oil  and  steel, 
and  was  prepared  for  a  war  of  only  a  few  weeks'  duration.  Due  to  the  British 
blockade,  she  has  become  dependent  on  Germany  for  most  of  her  supplies,  food 
excepted,  which  is  resulting  in  German  control  of  her  industries.  With  rationing, 
she  has  sufficient  food  for  her  needs  and  is  able  to  furnish  a  certain  amount  to 
Germany. 

(4)  The  general  unpopularity  of  the  war,  coupled  with  disastrous  military  de- 
feats, resulted  in  rather  open  criticism  of  the  Fascist  Regime,  together  with 
considerable  discontent.  However,  recent  German-assisted  victories  and  the 
fact  that  if  Mussolini  goes,  the  Germans  will  take  over  completely,  have  strength- 
ened the  position  of  II  Duce  and  have  bolstered  the  morale  of  the  mercurial 
Italian. 

(5)  Italy  may  be  considered  a  second-rate  military  power  that  is  a  potential 
threat  as  long  as  she  is  backed  by  German  military  might.  She  is  now  in  the 
position  of  a  satellite  of  Germany,  to  be  employed  in  any  capacity  that  Hitler 
believes  will  further  his  aims.  In  this  connection,  the  obvious  and  almost  certain 
lines  of  action  open  to  Italy  are :  ( 1 )  to  maintain  the  defensive  Axis  position  in 
the  Mediterranean  until  the  completion  of  the  Russian  campaign ;  (2)  to  provide 
the  garrisons  for  the  recently  conquered  Balkan  countries;  (3)  to  send  a  con- 
tingent of  troops  (probably  a  "token"  one)  to  participate  in  the  Russian  cam- 
paign ;  and   (4)  to  assist  in  the  warfare  on  British  shipping. 

(6)  The  entry  of  the  United  States  into  the  war  should  have  no  immediate 
effect  on  Italy  other  than  causing  a  certain  lowering  of  Italian  morale  due  to 
the  fact  that  a  longer  war  is  presaged. 

e.  France 

(1)  Metropolitan  France,  politically  subservient  to  Germany,  economically 
impotent  and  faced  with  possible  starvation  this  Winter,  hating  the  Germans  and 
Darlan  and  beginning  to  criticize  even  Petain,  has  an  Army  (94,200  men)  and  an 
Air  Force  (273  planes)  of  no  combat  value. 


1340    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Fleet  (1  Battle  Cruiser,  7  Cruisers,  34  Destroyers,  30  Submarines)  has  poten- 
tial value.  It  is  conceivable  that  Darlan  might  order  it  to  aid  Germany,  Divi- 
sion of  opinion  among  oflBcers  is  accentuated  by  Vichy's  decision  to  collaborate. 

The  recent  creation  of  the  Croatian  kingdom  under  Italian  suzerainty  tends  to 
free  France  from  the  traditional  Italian  claims  in  Nice  and  Corsica  and  so  re- 
moves one  of  the  f^rench  fears  of  further  Axis  aggression. 

The  long-range  possibility  exists  that  growing  hatred  of  Germans  and  of  the 
Darlan  regime,  fanned  by  food  shortage,  will  produce  an  internal  crack-up  with 
obvious  repercussions  in  other  occupied  countries. 

Conclusions.  Ground  and  air  forces  will  not  fight  for  Germany  and  cannot 
fight  for  Britain  or  even  for  themselves. 

If  ordered  to  aid  Germany,  some  fleet  units  would  be  scuttled,  some  would 
run  for  North  ( or  West )  Africa,  some  would  follow  orders.  Potential  value 
of  fleet  as  such  would  be  destroyed. 

US  participation  in  the  war  would  not  alter  the  situation  except  to  hasten 
the  internal  crack-up — especially  if  accompanied  by  wise  radio  propaganda. 

(2)  Syria,  has  just  been  conquered  by  British  and  Free  French  forces.  Con- 
quest of  Syria  by  Britain  will  strengthen  Allied  geographical  position  in  Near  and 
Middle  East  but  will  increase  administrative  responsibilities  and  will  require  fair 
sized  force  for  occupation  and  police,  in  other  words,  dispersion  of  military  forces. 

(S)  North  Africa,  best  governed  of  French  territories,  is  short  of  food  and 
other  supplies,  and  is  subject  to  intense  Nazi  propaganda.  It  has  8  incomplete 
Divisions  (80,000  men),  lacking  mechanized  equipment  and  short  of  munitions  for 
major  operations.  General  Weygand  is  much  respected  and  strongly  dislikes 
Germans  and  Darlan.  Air  Force  has  286  planes ;  Navy  has — Algeria ;  7  Destroy- 
ers, 13  Submarines — Morocco  :  1  incomplete  Battleship,  7  Destroyers,  2  Cruisers,  4 
Submarines.  The  Navy  is  less  anti-British  than  the  Toulon  Force ;  the  navy 
commander  is  strongly  pro-Ameriean.     Combat  value  of  the  troops  is  high. 

Conclusions.  Weygand  will  make  every  effort  to  prevent  extension  of 
collaboration  to  Africa  but  lacks  means  for  aggressive  action  and  can  defend 
only  if  assured  of  prompt  and  adequate  aid.  He  would  not  accept  British 
aid  initially, 

US  participation,  if  accompanied  by  materialization  of  prompt  and  ade- 
quate aid,  will  enable  Weygand  to  hold  North  Africa. 

(4)  Dakar  is  the  headquarters  of  the  West  Africa  Government,  Anti- American 
feeling  is  current  there  now  due  to  unwise  press  and  radio  references  to  Dakar. 
A  vital  strategic  location,  with  excellent  port  and  air  facilities,  well  defended 
from  sea  and  air,  it  has  successfully  withstood  one  attack  from  the  sea.  West 
Africa  has  6  Divisions  (70,000  men),  96  planes,  1  immobilized  Battleship,  8  Cruis- 
ers, 2  Destroyers,  10  Submarines.  Dakar  is  vulnerable  from  land  side — forces 
landing  at  St,  Louis  (186  miles  North  by  good  road  and  railroad)  and  Bathurst 
(162  miles  South  by  good  road  and  ferry). 

Conclusions.  Dakar  will  resist  British  attack.  Navy  would  resist  strenu- 
ously any  US  Navy  attempt  to  take  it ;  Army  and  Air  Force  would  resist  in- 
itially and  half-heartedly;  public  would  welcome  US  effort  if  wise  radio 
propaganda  prepares  the  way. 

(5)  De  Gaulle  has  2  completely  equipped  Divisions  and  a  third  in  process  of 
formation.  Majority  of  his  forces  are  with  the  British  in  East  Africa  and  Egypt ; 
1  Division  is  operating  in  Syria, 

Conclusions.  Vichy  collaboration  will  accelerate  increase  of  Free  French 
forces.  Wise  radio  propaganda  will  step  up  the  acceleration.  Reported 
that  Weygand  dislikes  de  Gaulle  personally  but  it  is  believed  that — in  the 
event  of  US  participation — an  offer  by  de  Gaulle  to  place  himself  and  his 
forces  under  Weygand's  orders,  to  regain  French  independence,  would  be 
accepted.  But  all  these  forces  are  too  inherently  unstable  and  weak  to  form 
the  predicate  of  any  American  plan. 

f.  Netherlands 

(1)   Western  Hemisphere  possessions: 

Surinam:  950  troops,  mostly  black  and  mostly  at  Paramaribo;  inadequately 
armed  and  equipped.  The  threat  from  6,000  criminal  prisoners  in  adjoining 
French  Guiana  is  faced  by  50  Dutch  Marines  on  border. 

Curacao:  1010  troops,  including  618  British  Infantry. 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1341 

Aruba:  899  troops,  including  612  Cameron  Highlanders  (Flanders  veterans). 
Bonaire:  50  Military  Police. 

Conclusions:  It  is  believed  that,  preceded  by  proper  diplomatic  negotia- 
tions, U.   S.  occupation,  in  trust,  of  Netlierlands  possessions  in  Western 
Hemisphere  would  be  welcome. 
(2)  The  Netherlands  East  Indies,  well  governed,  prosperous,  untroubled  by 
native  difficulties  or  unrest,  has  about  80,000  men  under  arms,  mastly  on  Java 
but  with  garrisons  at  important  centers  on  Sumatra,  Borneo,  Celebes.    The 
Island  of  Java  and  main  centers  on  other  islands  are  well  fortified,  harbors  are 
mined,  oil  properties  are  adequately  prepared  for  quick  destruction  if  necessary. 
Navy  has  3  Cruisers,  7  Destroyers,  13  Submarines,  40  auxiliaries — all  modern. 
Air  force  has  about  450  planes,  mostly  American  and  with  large  proportion  of 
bombers.     Continuous  reconnaissance  flights  are  made  over  the  whole  archipelago 
constantly.    Defense  plans  are  coordinated  with  those  of  British  at  Singapore 
and  the  Dutch  have  a  firm  determination  to  defent  stubbornly. 

Conclusions:  The  Netherlands  East  Indies  will  ofiEer  stubborn  defense  to 
attack.  If  the  atack  is  determined  and  sustained,  outer  islands  will  have 
to  be  sacrificed,  after  destruction  of  oil  properties,  and  defense  will  concwi- 
trate  on  Java  which  can  be  held  until  adequate  naval  aid  arrives  from  U.  S. 
forces.  It  is  not  believed  that  Britain  is  in  a  position  to  give  the  required 
aid  alone. 

g.  V.  8.  8.  R. 

The  U.  S.  S.  R.  is  now  engaged  in  a  defensive  war  with  Germany  and  has 
available  for  operations  the  following  forces : 

(1)  Military  Forces. — 180  infantry  divisions;  44  cavalry  divisions;  79  tank 
brigades;  39  air  divisions  (total  number  of  planes,  6,600).  It  is  estimated  that 
5,000  planes  are  physically  present  in  the  western  and  sothwestern  frontier  dis- 
tricts.   General  effectiveness  estimated  fair. 

(2)  Naval  Forces. — Are  considered  a  negligible  factor  in  this  war  effort. 
The  definite  policy  of  the  Government  is  to  pursue  a  defensive  course  and 

provide  adequate  armed  defense  forces  in  the  critical  areas  of  the  Soviet  Union. 
Active  participation  in  offensive  operations  as  acts  of  aggression  are  not  the 
policy  of  the  Regime;  however,  in  areas  where  U.  S.  S.  R  vital  interests  and 
defense  demand  that  aggressive  military  operations  be  undertaken,  such  action 
has  been  taken  and  will  follow. 

(3)  Economic. — Major  effort  within  the  Soviet  Union  industrially  is  to  pro- 
vide for  the  immediate  self-suflSciency  of  the  nation  in  munitions  and  war  sup- 
plies. Transportation  and  production  are  inefficient,  due  to  faulty  production 
methods,  inadequate  supply  of  high-grade  machine  tools,  and  a  lack  of  qualified 
technicians. 

(4)  Morale. — Morale  within  the  Red  Army  is  good;  morale  of  the  population 
is  satisfactory  in  spite  of  the  low  standard  of  living,  purges,  etc. 

(5)  Political. — The  recent  pact  with  Japan  indicates  definite  agreement  with 
respect  to  the  Far  Eastern  situation.  A  declaration  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain 
supporting  Russia  as  an  ally  in  the  Russian-German  conflict  has  again  given 
Russia  a  definite  place  in  European  affairs. 

The  Comintern  through  the  Soviet  Regime  is  striving  for  a  world  revolution 
in  the  interests  of  Communism.  Unless  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  emerges  one  of  the 
victors  in  this  war,  Communism  will  definitely  be  on  the  way  out  in  Europe. 

The  U.  S.  S.  R.  has  the  following  lines  of  action  open  in  case  the  United  States 
entered  the  war  as  an  ally  of  Great  Britain  and  Russia:  (1)  Vigorous  offensive 
conduct  of  the  European  confilct.  (2)  Continue  a  defensive  war  as  at  present 
until  offensive  operations  can  be  conducted,  assisted  by  British-U.  S.  support. 
(3)  Continued  withdrawal,  if  necessary,  to  the  Urals  to  avoid  decisive  defeat  to 
lengthen  German  supply  difficulty.  It  is  believed  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  would  adopt 
action  (2). 

h.  Latin  America. 

(1)  The  Latin  American  republics,  while  able  to  defend  themselves  against 
internal  aggression,  cannot  do  so  if  the  subversive  elements  are  given  direct  sup- 
port by  the  German  air  forces.  These  countries,  due  to  their  geographical  and 
economic  situation,  their  insistent  demands  for  military  assistance  have  become 
liabilities  to  the  United  States. 

(2)  The  German  military  successes  have  increased  their  reluctance  to  permit  the 
United  States  to  establish  desired  military  and  naval  bases. 


1342    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

(3)  The  necessity  of  U.  S.  bases  in  Latin  America  has  become  not  only  essential 
but  urgent. 

(4)  The  establishment  and  occupation  of  bases  requires,  at  least,  several 
months. 

(5)  The  time  has  come  when  the  United  States  must  make  specific  requests  for 
immediate  concession  of  bases  at  Natal,  Brazil ;  the  Galapagos  Islands,  Ecuador ; 
Buenaventura,  Colombia ;  and  Acapulco,  Mexico.  Further  postponements,  par- 
ticularly as  regards  Natal,  might  prove  disastrous  if  the  Germans  seize  the  French 
naval  base  at  Dakar.  The  American  Republics  must  be  shown  that  further  delay 
in  the  concession  of  bases  might  not  only  be  interpreted  as  an  attitude  of  non- 
cooperation,  but  that  it  will  also  jeopardize  the  defense  of  the  Western  Hemisphere 
and  the  integrity  and  independence  of  their  Sovereignty. 


July  17. 1941. 

Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff: 

Subject :  Japanese  Movement  Into  French  Indo-China. 

1.  As  was  made  known  to  the  Chief  of  Staff  July  15,  1941,  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment on  July  12,  1941,  delivered  what  amounts  to  an  ultimatum  to  the  Vichy 
Government,  the  terms  of  which,  among  other  items,  provided  for  the  occupation 
by  Japanese  armed  forces  of  eight  air  bases  and  two  naval  bases  in  Southern 
Indo-China  (see  attached  map). 

2.  It  is  the  considered  opinion  of  this  Division  that  this  Japanese  movement  as 
planned,  while  opportunistic  in  conception,  was  also  strategically  defensive  in 
character  and  designed  primarily  to  prevent  British  and  American  influence  from 
shutting  off  supplies  of  rubber,  tin  and  rice  from  Thailand  and  Indo  China  which 
are  badly  needed  by  Japan. 

3.  The  French  were  given  until  July  20th  in  which  to  comply  with  Japan's 
demands.  Military  preparations  were  initiated  by  the  Japanese,  but  no  military 
pressure  had  been  put  on  Indo-China  up  to  midnight  July  15-16. 

4.  On  July  Iftth  the  Japanese  Cabinet  resigned  en  masse.  It  is  too  early  to 
attempt  a  detailed  explanation  of  this  act.  For  the  present,  it  must  be  taken 
as  further  proof  of  the  fact,  known  for  some  time,  that  there  was  an  element 
of  violent  discord  in  the  inner  government  circles  of  Jap^n- 

5.  Until  the  personnel  of  the  new  Cabinet  is  announced  it  would  be  futile  to 
attempt  a  prediction  as  to  Japan's  possible  change  of  policies.  One  fact  seems 
evident,  however,  and  that  is  that  Vichy  will  be  given  a  breathing  spell  and  the 
expedition  to  Indo-China  may  be  deferred  or  even  abandoned. 

SHimMAN  Miles, 
Brigadier  General,  V.  8.  Army, 
Acting  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  Ch-2. 
Enclosure  1. 
cc:  A.  C.  of  S.,  WPD. 

July  17, 1941. 
Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff : 
Subject :  Mobilization  of  Additional  Japanese  Manpower. 

1.  Prior  to  the  resignation  of  the  Japanese  Cabinet,  July  16,  1941,  a  large 
scale  mobilization  was  started  in  Japan  under  unusual  conditions  of  secrecy. 
This  mobilization  is  continuing. 

2.  The  Military  Attache  in  Tokyo  reports  that  a  part  (strength  unknown)  of 
this  new  force  is  being  shipped  to  Manchoukuo  to  join  the  Kwantung  Army. 

3.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  major  part  of  the  Japanese  Army  is  pinned 
down  in  China  without  a  large  mobile  reserve  and  the  further  fact  that  the 
Siberian  Army  is  about  twice  the  size  of  the  Kwantung  Army  (20-30  Divisions 
to  12),  the  strengthening  of  the  Japanese  force  in  Manchoukuo  appears  to  be  a 
logical  precautionary  procedure. 

4.  Whether  she  moves  south  or  north  Japan  needs  more  men. 

5.  In  the  opinion  of  this  Division  the  first  aggressive  move,  if  made,  will  be 
into  Indo-China  to  deny  this  region  to  a  DeGaulist  Pro-British,  Pro-American 
faction  steadily  growing  in  power  there.  Japan,  while  building  up  her  strength 
in  Manchoukuo,  will  then  await  the  outcome  of  the  German-Soviet  War.     If 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1343 

and  when  Germany  crushes  European  Russia  and  the  Siberian  Garrison  de- 
teriorates in  strength  or  morale,  Japan  will  probably  move  in  to  seize  the  long 
desired  Maritime  Provinces  of  Siberia. 

Sheibman  Miles, 
Brigadier  Oenerai,  U.  S.  Army, 
Acting  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  Ch-2. 
Copy  to  War  Plans  Division. 


I.  B.  99 

July  18,  1941. 
Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff : 
Subject :  New  Japanese  Cabinet. 

1.  A  United  Press  dispatch  from  Tokyo  dated  July  18,  1941,  states  that  Prince 
Konoye  has  selected  the  key  men  for  a  new  and  highly  militaristic  Cabinet. 
Vital  posts  are  reported  as  follows  : 

Premier Prince  Konoye 

War  Minister General  Tojo 

Navy  Minister Admiral  Oikawa 

Home  Minister Baron  Heranuma 

Foreign  Minister Admiral  Toyoda 

2.  The  first  four  named  above  are  hold-overs  from  the  former  Cabinet.  Admiral 
Toyoda  replaces  former  Foreign  Minister  Matsuoka. 

3.  Admiral  Toyoda  was  a  protege  of  the  former  Admiral  Baron  Saito 
(assassinated  in  1936  while  Premier)  and  is  regai-ded  as  a  moderate.  He  is 
known  as  a  clever,  able  oflScer,  a  specialist  in  Ordnance,  and  as  having  had  con- 
siderable experience  in  diplomacy,  particularly  with  the  British. 

4.  The  new  Cabinet  may  be  regarded  as  strongly  nationalistic,  and  while 
probably  more  moderate  and  conservative  than  would  have  been  the  case  had  an 
Army  Officer  been  given  the  portfolio  as  Foreign  Minister,  it  may  be  that  added 
impulse  will  be  given  to  Japan's  Southward  Advance.  In  this  connection,  it 
must  be  remembered  also  that  Admiral  Toyoda  has  just  completed  a  tour  as 
Minister  of  Commerce  and  Industry,  and  is  fully  aware  of  the  deplorable  con- 
dition of  Japan's  foreign  trade  and  internal  economy.  He  may  be  expected, 
therefore,  to  take  steps,  as  Foreign  Minister,  which  will  improve  foreign  trade 
conditions  since  such  trade  is  the  life  blood  of  industrial  Japan. 

Sherman  Mtt.es, 
Brigadier  General ,  V.  S.  Army, 
Acting  Assistant  Chief  of  ^taff,  0-2. 
Distribution : 

Secretary  of  War 

Chief  of  Staff 

War  Plans  Division 

GHQ 

ONI 

General  Embick 

Mr.  McCloy  (Record  Section) 


Jtn.Y  18,  1941. 
Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff : 
Subject :  Strategical  Estimate  of  the 
Situation. 

1.  The  following  estimate  has  been  prepared  as  requested  in  Memorandum 
from  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  WPD.  4570,  June  6,  1941,  which  requested 
information  on  the  Axis  Powers  as  of  July  1.  1941.  July  1,  1942,  and  July  1,  1943, 
as  a  basis  for  the  War  Department  STRATEGIC  ESTIMATE.  Specific  data 
requested  in  paragraphs  2  (1),  (2)  of  the  Memorandum  cited  and  (3)  on  Axis 
naval,  air  and  field  forces  are  enclosed.* 

2.  Estimate  of  disposition — military,  political,  economic  and  psychological, 
a.  July  1.  19jl. 

Germany,  with  the  initiative,  was  employing  the  mass  of  her  ground  and  air 
forces  against  the  U.  S.  S.  R.,  without,  however,  relaxing  her  campaign  against 
shipping   .serving  the  British   Empire.      Elsewhere   the   military   effort    of   the 

•Omitted. 


1344    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

European  Axis  was  at  a  minimum.  Japan,  her  army  practically  contained  by 
China,  was  contemplating  action  against  Indo-China,  but  her  policy  was  domi- 
nated by  the  uncertainties  arising  from  the  Russo-German  campaign  and  the  final 
outcome  of  the  whole  war.  An  Axis  political  offensive  was  in  full  swing  with  a 
view  to  consolidating  a  "United  States  of  Europe"  to  include  Spain  and  Portugal 
and  the  French,  Spanish  and  Portuguese  possessions  in  Africa.  Axis  propaganda 
was  being  used  effectively  in  Latin  America  and  throughout  Islam  and  with  less 
effect  in  the  United  States  and  India. 

b.  By  July  1,  1942. 

( 1 )  The  following  are  envisaged  : 

(a)  German  defeat  of  U.  S.  S.  R.  and  re-establishment  of  German  military 
initiativa 

(b)  Participation  of  the  U.  S.  in  the  war  under  Rainbow  5. 

(2)  Under  the  foregoing  the  following  are  estimated  to  be  the  Axis  disposition 
and  capabilities : 

[2]  German  occupation  of  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  to  Lake  Baikal  and  possibly  to 
the  Pacific.  Possible  Japanese  occupation  of  the  Maritime  Provinces  of  Siberia. 
Axis  control  of  Africa,  roughly  north  of  the  line  Fernando  Po — Djibout  is  either 
accomplished  or  imminent.  Continuation  of  the  aerial  and  naval  siege  of  the 
British  Isles.  German  attempt  to  invade  Great  Britain  or  (more  probable)  a 
broad  strategic  movement  through  the  Middle  East  toward  the  Indian  Ocean, 
possibly  in  conjunction  with  a  southwestward  advance  by  Japan.  The  political 
consolidation  of  Europe  under  German  leadership  will  have  been  accomplished, 
but  the  political  cohesion  of  this  entity  will  be  low.  Germany  and  Japan  will 
be  obviously  war-weary.  Economic  exploitation  of  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  will  have 
barely  begun.  While  still  debarred  physically,  militarily  and  economically  from 
Latin  America,  the  Axis  will  have  achieved  a  considerable  amount  of  political 
disunion  in  that  area  by  intrigue  and  propaganda.  German  propaganda  will 
tend  to  hve  become  less  effective  in  India,  the  United  States  and  the  Moham- 
medan world. 

c.  By  July  4  iO'fS.  Axis  dispositions  and  capabilities  are  estimated  as  follows: 
Germany  will  still  possess  superior  ground  forces.    The  invasion  of  the  British 

Isles,  if  not  already  achieved,  will  now  be  impracticable.  Germany  will  have  ex- 
tended her  penetration  southward  in  Africa  and  will  still  be  able  to  renew  the 
offensive  in  the  Middle  East.  Japan,  if  not  irrevocably  committed  to  war  on  the 
side  of  the  Axis,  will  tend  to  stand  aloof.  German  economic  exploitation  of  Russia 
will  have  progressed,  but  the  general  economic  condition  of  Europe  will  be  low. 
Axis  morale  will  be  generally  low  and  war-weariness  will  be  rife.  There  will  be 
no  real  political  cohesion  in  Europe.  The  Axis  propaganda  effort,  centered  on 
Latin  America  will  be  losing  ground. 

Sherman  Miles, 
Brigadier  Oeneral,   U.  S.  Army, 
Acting  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  Q-2. 
EJn  closure 
Distribution 

War  Plans  Division 
G.  H.  Q. 
General  Embick 
Mr.  CcCloy  (Record  Section) 
dya 

July  25, 1941. 
Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff : 
Subject :  Sanctions  against  Japan. 
I.  Discussion. 

1.  On  July  12,  1941  the  Japanese  Government  announced  that  it  had  decided 
to  take  over  control  of  the  nation's  capital  funds  which  are  to  be  mobilized  in 
the  interests  of  the  state.  The  new  policy  apparently  discards  the  past  economic 
set-up  and  calls  for  mobilization  and  distribution  of  capital  at  the  will  of  the 
government  in  order  to  attain  maximum  production  as  well  as  to  bolster  the 
defense  structure. 

2.  The  new  policy  is  obviously  a  belated  attempt  to  improve  the  deplorable  eco- 
nomic conditions  in  Japan — conditions  pointed  out  in  confidential  Economic  Esti- 
mate, Japan,  May  27,  1941,  compiled  in  the  Far  Eastern  Section,  this  Division,  a 
copy  of  which  is  attached  hereto  as  Tab  I.* 

•Omitted. 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1345 

3.  This  centralization  of  capital,  which  is  merely  an  extension  of  the  control 
which  the  government  has  already  secured  over  industry  and  other  branches  of 
Japanese  economic  life,  will  undoubtedly  bring  about  a  more  efficient  control  of 
Japan's  internal  structure,  but  will  contribute  nothing  toward  the  acquisition  of 
critical  and  essential  raw  materials  so  badly  needed  by  Japan's  war  industries. 

4.  A  step  toward  this  latter  end  is  Japan's  current  move  to  occupy  southern 
Indo-China.  In  the  opinion  of  this  Division  this  will  be  followed  by  an  exten- 
tion  of  Japan's  control  to  include  Thailand.  Further  aggression  by  Japan  after 
consolidating  her  position  in  these  new  points  d'appui  will  be  predicated  upon  the 
outcome  of  the  European  War. 

5.  For  some  time,  the  policy  of  our  government  has  been  based  upon  a  desire 
to  restrain  Japan  by  moral  embargoes  and  export  control,  neither  of  which  were 
stringent  enough  to  drive  Japan  into  further  aggressive  action  toward  Malaysia 
and  the  Netherlands  Indies. 

[2]  6.  A  discussion  as  to  whether  this  policy  was  sound  at  the  time  of 
its  adoption  is  immaterial  to  a  study  t)f  the  current  situation.  The  fact  stands 
out,  however,  that  Japan  has  now  burst  through  these  mild  restraints  imposed 
by  the  United  States  Government  and  is  now  embarked  upon  new  aggression  which 
endangers  the  safety  of  all  the  areas  in  the  southwestern  Pacific,  including  the 
Philippine  Islands. 

7.  Under  these  circumstances  the  last  reason  for  withholding  effective  sanc- 
tions against  Japan  has  been  brushed  aside. 

8.  Attention  is  invited  to  the  last  sentence  on  page  61  of  Tab  I  which  reads : 
"The  United  States  is  today  in  a  position  to  wreck  completely  the  economic 
structure  of  the  Japanese  Empire."  This  statement  is  as  sound  today  as  when 
it  was  written  in  May,  1941. 

9.  Effective  economic  sanctions  against  Japan  imxwsed  by  us,  today,  would 
not,  in  the  opinion  of  this  Division,  force  Japan  to  take  any  steps  in  the  way 
of  aggressive  action  which  she  does  not  plan  to  take  anyway,  when  a  favorable 
opportunity  arises,  nor  would  they  precipitate  a  declaration  of  war  on  us  by 
Japan.  Such  action  on  our  part  need  not  and  should  not  distract  our  attention 
from  the  main  theater  of  operations.  On  the  contrary,  by  adopting  such  a 
policy  we  will  be  able  to  conserve  for  Britain  and  for  ourselves  supplies  which 
from  the  viewpoint  of  our  national  defense,  are  being  worse  than  wasted  when 
we  place  them  in  Japanese  hands. 

Shebman  Miles, 
Brigadier  Oeneral,  U.  S.  Army, 
Acting  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  0-2. 
1  Enclosure:  Tab  I. 
Copies  to : 

Secretary  of  War 
Secretary,  Joint  Board 
Deputy  Chief  of  Staff 
War  Plans  Division, 
dps 

[Pencilled  notation:]  This  memo  was  written  prior  to  receipt  of  information 
regarding  embargo  decision. 

S.  M. 
H. 

JTJLY  30,  1941. 

Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff : 
Subject :  German-Japanese  Relations. 
I.  Discussion. 

1.  The  American  Ambassador  to  Japan  in  a  telegram  to  the  Secretary  of  State 
dated  July  23,  1941,  points  to  a  trend  in  Japanese  public  and  private  oponion 
indicating  that  Japan  is  no  longer  a  happy  partner  in  the  Tripartite  Agreement. 
He  states  that  there  has  been  a  gradual  weakening  over  a  considerable  period  of 
time  of  the  ties  binding  Japan  to  the  Axis  Powers.  He  further  states  a  feeling 
he  has  had  for  some  time  that  if  the  Germans  ran  true  to  form  they  would  sooner 
or  later  overshoot  their  mark  in  Japan,  and  that  the  praud  and  sensitive  Japa- 
nese people  would  eventually  realize  the  fundamental  contempt  and  scracely  con- 
cealed arrogance  of  the  Germans  for  the  Yellow  Race. 

2.  According  to  the  Ambassador  there  is  a  growing  feeling  among  many  Japa- 
nese that  Japan  is  being  treated  as  a  satellite,  if  not  as  a  dependent,  a  feeling 


1346    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

which  has  been  developing  as  the  result  of  the  increasing  influx  of  Nazi  oflBcials 
(including  members  of  the  Gestapo)  into  Tokyo,  the  efforts  of  these  oflScials  to 
exercise  a  controlling  influence  in  matters  of  domestic  concern  and  in  many 
aspects  of  Japanese  life,  and  the  constant  interference  by  the  German  Ambassador 
in  trying  to  regiment  Japanese  newspapers  along  Axis  lines. 

3.  The  Ambassador  remarks  that  as  usual,  the  Germans  have  overshot  their 
mark. 

4.  The  Ambassador  reported  in  a  telegram  to  the  State  Department  dated 
July  27,  1941,  that  Former  Foreign  Minister  Matsuoka  informed  the  Turkish 
Ambassador  that  he  had  cabled  Ribbentrop  48  hours  in  advance  of  the  Nazi 
attack  on  the  Soviet  a.sking  if  there  were  any  truth  in  reports  of  such  an  attack 
and  Ribbentrop  replied  with  a  categorical  denial. 

5.  Our  Minister  to  Thailand  in  a  telegram  to  the  Secretary  of  State  dated 
July  26,  1941,  reported  that  the  Prime  Minister  had  informed  him  that  Lt.  Col. 
Scholl,  German  Military  Attache,  had  called  and  warned  him  (the  Prime  Minis- 
ter) against  "going  too  far"  with  Japan,,  "because",  said  the  German  Attache, 
"you  cannot  trust  Japan".  The  German  Attache  stated  further  that  "Germany 
will  settle  with  Japan  after  she  has  won  the  war  in  Europe." 

6.  In  view  of  the  conditions  depicted  above,  the  time  appears  ripe  for  the 
judicious  use  of  information  which  will  have  as  its  aim  the  dissolution  of  the 
Tripartite  Agreement.  Any  action  on  our  part  which  will  make  Japan  an  even 
more  reluctant  Axis  partner  weakens  our  potential  enemies,  enhances  our  own 
prestige  and  authority  and  materially  and  favorably  affects  our  national  defense. 

II.  Recommendation. 

That  the  Secretary  of  War  confer  with  the  Secretary  of  State  with  a  view 
to  placing  the  information  contained  in  paragraph  5  above  in  the  hands  of  the 
Japanese  Ambassador. 

/s/    Sherman  Miles 
Shebman  Miles, 
Brigadier  General,  U.  S.  Army, 
Acting  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  0—2 
Distribution : 

Secretary  of  War 
Chief  of  Staff 
War  Plans  Division 
G.H.Q. 

General  Embick 
Asst.  Sec.  of  War 


L  B.  112 

August  16.  1941. 
Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff: 
Subject :  Developments  in  the  Far  Eastern  Situation. 

1.  It  is  believed  that  the  Japanese  Government,  with  the  sanction  of  the 
Emperor,  has  decided  upon  a  foreign  policy  whose  objectives  are  as  follows : 

a.  Adherence  to  Tripartite  Pact. 

b.  Establishment  of  a  Greater  East  Asia  sphere  of  co-prosperity  (under  Japa- 
nese domination  and  control)  regardless  of  other  developments  in  the  world 
situation. 

c.  Disposal  of  the  China  Incident. 

d.  Expansion  southward  for  reasons  of  economic  and  strategic  security. 

2.  In  implementing  the  foregoing  policy,  it  is  believed  that  Japan  proposes 
to  take  steps  as  follows: 

a.  Increased  pressure  on  China  from  various  points  in  the  south. 

b.  Seizure  by  Japan  of  all  Foreign  Concessions  in  China. 

c.  Politico-military  pressure  on  Indo-China  and  Thailand  to  facilitate  Japan's 
southward  advance. 

d.  Preparation  for  an  attack  on  Siberia,  but  to  be  made  at  her  own  chosen 
time. 

e.  A  resort  to  every  means  available  to  keep  the  United  States  out  of  the 
war. 

3.  Since  the  adoption  of  the  policy  outlined  in  paragraph  1  above  Japan  has 
secured  military  and  economic  control  of  Indo-China,  is  in  a  position  to  enforce 
her  military  and  economic  demands  on  Thailand  and  to  threaten  the  vital 
Burma  railroad  and  road,  and  has  increased  the  strength  of  the  Kwantung 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1347 

Army  (in  Manchoukuo)  to  about  600,000  officers  and  men  as  opposed  to  a  Russian 
force,  east  of  Lake  Baikal,  of  about  400,000.  The  following  factors,  however, 
unfavorable  to  the  successful  implementation  of  Japan's  aggressive  policy,  have 
been  injected  into  the  situation : 

a.  The  German  time-table  for  the  subjugation  of  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  has  gone 
awry. 

b.  The  United  States  and  Great  Britain  have  frozen  Japanese  assets. 

c.  Great  Britain  has  announced  an  embargo  in  exports  to  Japan. 

d.  The  American,  British  and  Dutch  armed  forces  in  the  southwestern  Pacific 
have  been  materially  strengthened. 

e.  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  have  pledged  aid  to  the  U.  S.  S.  R. 
and  additional  aid  to  China. 

f.  The  President  of  the  United  States  and  the  Prime  Minister  of  Great  Britain 
have  announced  accord  on  an  eight  point  program  which,  while  not  mentioning 
Japan  by  name,  presents  a  long-range  threat  to  her  position  as  an  Axis  Power 
and  to  the  retention  of  her  conquests. 

4.  The  great  danger  in  the  situation  lies  in  the  fact,  so  often  proved,  that 
Japanese  military  and  naval  authorities  are  not  under  the  complete  control  of 
their  Government.  We  have  seen  for  the  past  year  an  extraordinary  example 
of  discipline  and  self  control  exercised  by  the  German  military  in  conformity 
to  their  Government's  decree  of  avoiding  any  possible  armed  clash  with  the 
United  St^ates.  We  can,  unfortunately,  expect  no  such  self  denial  and  restraint 
on  the  part  of  the  Japanese  military.  We  can  only  hope  that  they  will  at 
least  follow  for  a  time  the  policies  of  their  Government. 

5.  There  are  clear  indications  that,  in  spite  of  the  decisions  outlined  in  Para- 
graphs 1  and  2  above,  the  Japanese  Government  is  willing  to  take  extraordinary 
diplomatic  measures  to  keep  the  United  States  out  of  the  war,  at  least  temporarily. 
There  are  indications  that  Japan  is  unwilling  to  commit  herself  to  the  extent  that 
Germany  would  like  to  see  her  committed.  There  are  indications  that  Japan 
realizes  that  she  must  make  some  concessions  to  the  strong  political  stand  now 
taken  by  the  United  States,  even  though  those  concessions  consist  largely  in  fur- 
ther conversations  and  negotiations. 

6.  Considering  all  of  the  above,  this  Division  believes  that  forceful  diplomacy 
vis-a-vis  Japan,  including  the  application  of  ever  increasing  military  and  economic 
pressure  on  our  part,  offers  the  best  chance  of  gaining  time,  the  best  possibility 
of  preventing  the  spread  of  hostilities  in  the  Pacific  area  and  of  the  eventual  dis- 
ruption of  the  Tripartite  Pact.  The  exercise  of  increasingly  strong  "power  di- 
plomacy" by  the  United  States  is  clearly  indicated. 

Sherman  Miles, 
Brigadier  General,  U.  8.  Army, 
Acting  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  Gf-2. 
Distribution : 

The  President  War  Plans  Division 

Secretary  of  War  OflBce  of  Naval  Intelligence 

Assistant  Secretary  of  War  General  Embick. 

Chief  of  Staff 

dya 

August  20,  1941. 
Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff : 
Subject :  Chinese  Resistance. 

1.  General  Chu,  Chinese  Military  Attache,  called  on  me  today  at  his  request  to 
discuss  the  general  situation.  He  was  evidently  worried  because  China  was  not 
specifically  mentioned  in  all  the  discussion  with  regard  to  the  conference  be- 
tween The  President  and  the  British  Prime  Minister.  He  seemed  to  feel  that 
China  is  being  forgotten  for  the  moment.  I  told  him  of  course  that  China  is  and 
will  remain  a  pivotal  point  in  the  war,  and  that  although  not  specifically  men- 
tioned in  regard  to  the  conference,  the  situation  in  the  Far  East,  including  China, 
was  undoubtedly  carefully  considered. 

2.  General  Chu  then  pointed  out  that  much  has  recently  been  said  about  halting 
Japanese  aggression  both  to  the  south  and  to  the  north,  but  nothing  specific  on 
stopping  Japanese  aggression  in  China  proper.  He  went  on  to  point  out  the  pos- 
sibility of  Japan  concentrating  all  of  her  efforts  on  crushing  Chinese  resistance 

79716  O — 46— pt.  14 25) 


1348    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION   PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

if  she  considers  herself  stopped  by  the  Anglo-American  front  from  further  ag- 
gression to  the  south  and  to  the  north.  He  said,  rather  pointedly,  "You  know  we 
cannot  hold  out  indefinitely."  I  pointed  out  to  him  that  the  present  emphasis  on 
aid  to  Russia  was  probably  due  to  Anglo-American  belief  that  the  Russian  crisis 
was  an  immediate  one,  a  question  of  holding  her  in  the  war  for  the  next  six  weeks, 
until  winter  comes  to  her  relief.  Chinese  resistance  on  the  other  hand  would  not 
appear  to  present  so  pressing  a  time  factor,  considering  the  long  period  of  four 
years  in  which  they  have  successfully  withstood  Japanese  pressure.  General  Chu 
admitted  this,  and  in  answer  to  my  questions  as  to  the  duration  of  Chinese  re- 
sistance he  said  that  undoubtedly  the  situation  would  hold  throughout  this 
calendar  year.  I  pointed  out  to  him  that  Japanese's  present  extension  of  her 
forces  both  in  the  north  and  in  the  south  precluded  the  possibility  of  her  con- 
centrating her  efforts  against  the  Chinese  at  this  time.  He  admitted  this,  but 
stated  that  he  believed  Japan  must  continue  her  aggressive  policy,  and  that  it 
was  possible  for  her  to  regroup  her  forces  against  China  if  she  were  barred  from 
the  north  and  the  south.  He  said  that  he  feared  that  the  Anglo-American  policy 
of  holding  Japan  in  the  north  and  the  south  might  force  her  into  a  last  desperate 
effort  to  overcome  Chinese  resistance.  In  his  opinion  Japan  cannot  stop,  and  in  all 
questions  of  major  policy  the  Japanese  Government  must  bow  to  the  decision  of 
its  military  forces.  He  cited  the  Chinese  proverb,  "He  who  rides  on  the  tiger 
must  go  where  the  tiger  goes." 

3.  General  Chu  professed  to  have  little  information  on  the  Russian  situation, 
but  said  that  what  he  had  was  encouraging.  He  thought  the  outstanding  thing 
was  that  Russia  had  successfully  taken  the  first  shock  of  war.  He  remarked 
that  the  first  few  months  of  the  Sino-Japanese  war  were  by  far  the  hardest, 
and  after  that  the  Chinese  had  settled  down  to  a  long  resistance. 

4.  General  Chu's  visit  undoubtedly  indicates  what  we  have  had  from  other 
sources — that  the  Chinese  here,  and  presumably  also  in  Chungking,  fear  that 
they  are  being  left  out  of  the  big  picture,  that  we  may  not  be  firm  in  our  present 
stand  vis-a-vis  Japan,  and  that  aid  to  China  may  become  more  difficult  in  the 
future. 

5.  This  Division  believes  that  considerable  morale  aid  might  be  given  to  China 
in  the  form  of  public  statements  emanating  from  high  officials  of  the  Government 
on  our  deep  interest  in  Chinese  resistance  and  our  policy  of  aiding  it.  An  oflBlcial 
anouncement  of  the  forthcoming  dispatch  of  a  military  mission  to  China  is 
suggested.  It  is  realized  however  that  such  morale  aid  would  have  to  be  con- 
sidered in  the  light  of  its  effect  on  the  critical  I'elations  now  existing  between 
Japan  and  the  United  States. 

/s/     Sherman  Miles 
Sherman  Miles 
Brigadier  OeneraJ,  U.  8.  Army 
Acting  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  0-2. 
Copies  to : 

Secretary  of  War  ONI 

Assistant  Secretary  of  War  Mr.  Currie 

Chief  of  Staff  General  Magruder 

War  Plans  Division 


Septembeb  2,  1941. 
Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff: 

Subject :  Conversation  between  the  Japanese  Military  Attache  and  the  Chief, 
Far  Eastern  Section. 

1.  Coincident  with  the  Japanese  Ambassador's  call  on  the  President  on  the 
morning  of  August  28,  1941,  Major  General  Saburo  Isoda,  Japanese  Military 
Attache,  called  by  appointment  on  Colonel  R.  S.  Bratton,  Chief  of  the  Far  Eastern 
Section,  Intelligence  Branch,  this  Division.  The  following  are  notes  of  Colonel 
Bratton  on  the  visit : 

"I  have  known  General  Isoda  and  been  associated  with  him  under  varioUjS 
circumstances  for  eighteen  years.  In  consequence,  our  conversation  was  friendly, 
informal  and  entirely  'off  the  record.' 

"General  Isoda  stated  that,  like  the  Ambassador,  he  was  exploring  ways  and 
means  to  relieve  Japanese-United  States  tension  and  bring  about  better  relations 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1349 

between  the  two  countries.  During  the  course  of  a  conversation  which  lasted 
for  an  hour  and  a  half,  General  Isoda  made  statements  to  the  following  effect : 

a.  Due  to  restrictions  imposed  by  our  export  control,  the  Japanese  have  begun 
to  use  a  portion  of  their  war  reserve  of  petroleum. 

6.  He,  the  Naval  Attache,  the  Ambassador  and  the  entire  Embassy  Staff  are 
in  accord  in  an  earnest  desire  to  better  United  States-Japanes^  relations. 

c.  Japan  made  a  great  mistake  in  joining  the  Axis. 

d.  The  Army  frequently  gets  out  from  under  control  of  the  Civilian  Government 
and  has  to  be  restrained  by  Imperial  Command. 

e.  Japan  has  her  back  to  the  wall.  She  can  be  pushed  just  so  far,  then  will 
have  to  fight  us  to  save  her  national  honor  and  integrity,  though  war  with  the 
United  States  is  the  last  thing  desired  by  Japan. 

'  "When  asked  flatly  my  opinion  as  to  what  assurances  on  the  part  of  Japan 
would  be  acceptable  to  the  United  States  Government  at  this  time,  I  told  him 
that  Prince  Konoye,  if  he  comes  to  talk  with  the  President,  must  come  with 
Imperial  sanction  and  armed  with  authority  to  speak  for  and  on  behalf  of  the 
armed  forces  of  Japan  as  well  as  on  behalf  of  the  Civilian  Government.  I  said 
that,  in  my  opinion,  nothing  short  of  this  would  be  productive  of  lasting  results 
or  be  acceptable  to  the  President. 

"General  Isoda  received  this  statement  of  opinion  on  my  part  with  entire 
good  will,  expressed  his  pleasure  over  the  opportunity  of  having  a  frank  talk, 
and  stated  his  desire  to  have  other  and  more  frequent  talks  in  the  future.  I,  in 
turn,  assured  him  that  I  would  be  glad  to  meet  him  in  a  private  and  unofficial 
capacity  at  any  time." 

2.  General  Isoda's  visit  clearly  parallels  the  conversations  now  in  progress  be- 
tween the  Japanese  Ambassador  and  the  State  Department.  In  effect  he  speaks 
for  the  Japanese  Embassy,  the  entire  staff  of  which  is  sincerely  working  for  the 
betterment  of  Japanese-American  relations.  He  obviously  did  not  feel  empowered 
to  speak  for  the  Japanese  Army. 

Sherman  Miles, 
Brigadier  Oeneral,  U.  8.  Army, 
Acting  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  Ch-2 
Distribution : 

Secretary  of  War 
Chief  of  Staff 
War  Plans  Division 
Office  of  Naval  Intelligence 


I.  B.  122 

Septembeb  5, 1941.    . 
Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff : 
Subject :  Brief  Periodic  Estimate  of  the  World  Situation. 

1.  This  estimate  covers  the  period  September  3-December  1,  1941. 

2.  In  this  period  the  dominating  elements  of  the  situation  will  be : 
a.  The  preoccupation  of  Germany  with  the  U.  S.  S.  R. 

6,  The  inability  of  Great  Britain  and  her  associates  to  take  the  strategic 
offensive. 

In  consequence  a  militarily  decisive  phase  of  the  war  will  not  be  reached. 

3.  Axis: 

a.  Germany  (see  Tab  A)  will  be  immersed  in  the  conflict  with  the  U.  S.  S.  R., 
either  in  terms  of  combat  or  of  large-scale  military  reorganization.  Victories 
over  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  may  tend  to  raise  her  national  morale ;  but  on  balance  her 
morale  should  be  lower,  because  of  losses  in  Russia  and  because  of  the  certainty 
of  prolongation  of  the  war.  Economically  she  will  continue  strained  but  stable. 
Specifically : 

(1)  She  will  be  unable  to  invade  the  British  Isles. 

(2)  She  will  be  unable  to  attack  in  the  Middle  East.     (See  Tab  B). 

(3)  She  is  and  will  be  able  at  will  to  occupy  French  Northwest  Africa,  but 
probably  will  not  do  so.     (See  Tab  C). 

(4)  She  probably  will  be  in  a  position  to  intensify  her  warfare  against  shipping 
as  compared  with  its  present  reduced  level.     (See  Tab  A). 

(5)  The  policy  of  the  United  States,  backed  by  growing  armaments,  particu- 
larly in  terms  of  sea  and  air  power,  will  be  an  increasing  factor  in  her  calculations. 

6.  Subsidiary  European  Members  of  the  Axis. — Their  subservience  to  Germany 
will  increase  and  their  influence  in  world  affairs  will  continue  to  diminish.    Italy 


1350    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

In  particular  will  garrison  the  Balkans  and  provide  Axis  communications  with 
Libya.    (For  Spain,  see  Tab  C) 

c.  The  Conquered  and  Occupied  Countries  of  Europe  may  develop  still  greater 
unrest;  but  this  element  in  the  total  situation  will,  for  the  time  being,  remain 
of  little  net  influence  on  the  general  situation. 

d.  Japan  (see  Tab  D),  beset  with  uncertainties,  may  do  nothing,  may  attack 
the  Maritime  Provinces,  may  seek  to  expand  to  the  Southwest ;  it  is  even  possible 
that  she  may  withdraw  from  the  Axis.  Japan  also  has  the  capability  of  concen- 
trating her  newly  augmented  forces  against  China  and  seeking  a  decision  there. 
No  indication  er  likelihood  of  this  is  seen.  In  the  general  picture  and  excluding 
China,  where  she  must  continue  to  fight,  her  most  likely,  but  by  no  means  certain, 
course  is  inaction. 

4.  Turkey,  the  most  practicable  land  corridor  between  Europe  and  the  Middle 
East,  will  find  her  position  increasingly  precarious  ;  but  in  this  period  she  probably 
will  evade  choice  of  definite  alignment  with  either  the  Axis  or  the  Anglo- 
Russian  bloc. 

5.  Anti-Acris: 

a.  U.  S.  8.  R.  (see  Tab  E),  with  limited  and  decreasing  ability  to  pass  to  the 
oflfensive,  faced  with  the  loss  or  dislocation  of  most  of  her  war  industry  and  with 
inadequate  conununications  to  the  outside  world,  is  destined  to  continued  military 
reverses,  while  exacting  a  significant  toll  from  the  German  armed  forces.  Her 
only  hope  is  to  bring  about  German  overextension  and  exhaustion.  Destruction 
of  her  armed  forces  and  overthrow  of  the  Stalin  regime  within  this  period  are 
possible  but  not  yet  probable.  (See  also  TAB  A  for  Russia  vs.  Germany  and 
Tab  D  for  Russia  vs.  Japan. ) 

6.  Great  Britain  has  a  continued  respite  to  perfect  her  home  defenses,  build 
up  her  air  force,  consolidate  her  Middle  Eastern  and  Far  Eastern  positions,  and 
to  a  limited  degree  improve  the  defense  of  the  Atlantic  sea  lanes.  She  will  have 
neither  the  ability  nor  the  opportunity  to  take  the  strategic  offensive,  other  than 
by  limited  air  attacks  on  Germany's  European  position.  She  has  the  opportunity 
to  launch  a  limited  offensive  against  Libya.    ( See  Tab  B. ) 

6.  Latin  America  is  momentarily  less  concerned  with  the  war,  since  its  center 
of  gravity  has  shifted  to  Eastern  Europe.  The  Axis  iwwers,  on  the  whole,  are 
losing  ground  before  Democratic  pressure,  political,  psychological  and  economic. 

Shebman  Milbs, 
Brigadier  General,  V.  S.  Army, 
Acting  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-2. 

5  Enclosures :  Tabs  A  to  E  Inclusive. 
Distribution : 

The  President 

Secretary  of  War 

Secretary  of  State 

Assistant  Secretary  of  War 

Coordinator  of  Information 

Chief  of  Staff 

Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  W.  P.  D. 

Director  of  Naval  Intelligence 

G.  H.  Q. 

Major  General  Embick. 

Under  Secretary  of  War 

1.  Tab  A— GERMANY— omitted 

2.  Tab  B — British  situation  in  the  Middle  East — omitted 

3.  Tab  C — A  German  drive  to  the  Southwest — omitted 

4.  Tab.  D. 

JAPAN 

1.  Lines  of  Action  Open  to  Japan 

Japan  has  the  following  alternatives : 

a.  Continue  to  withdraw  her  armed  forces  from  the  area  south  of  the  Great 
Wall  with  a  view  to  attacking  Siberia. 

6.  Make  peace  with  Chiang  Kai-shek. 

c.  Disregard  American  action  and  opinion  and  occupy  Thailand. 

d.  Attack  Burma  and  the  Burma  Road  via  Thailand. 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1351 

e.  Take  or  isolate  the  Philippine  Islands  and  Hongkong  and  attack  Singapore. 

f.  Contain  or  isolate  the  Philippine  Islands  and  Hongkong  and  seize  the 
Netherlands  East  Indies. 

g.  Reorient  their  whole  foreign  policy  by  withdrawing  from  the  Axis. 
h.  Seek  a  general  settlement  through  American  mediation. 

i.  Bide  their  time,  wait  for  a  better  opportunity  for  the  pursuance  of  any  of 
the  above  lines  of  action,  hoping  that  time  will  be  in  their  favor. 

j.  On  the  basis  of  the  neutrality  pact  with  Russia  as  a  "face  saver",  enter  into 
an  understanding  with  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  in  regard  to  terri- 
torial expansion  and  economic  penetration  in  southeast  Asia  and  the  southwestern 
Pacific  area. 

2.  Most  Probable  Action 

Japan,  beset  with  uncertainties,  will  probably  "buy"  time  by  entering  into 
negotiations  with  the  United  States.  A  cabinet  upset  in  Japan,  a  not  unlikely 
event,  will  change  the  whole  picture.  The  present  cabinet,  however,  will  initiate 
no  additional  aggression  on  the  part  of  Japan  until  all  diplomatic  means  of 
relieving  pressure  have  been  explored  and  exhausted.  This  does  not  preclude 
independent  action  on  the  part  of  Japan's  armies  in  the  field, 

3.  Japan — Combat 

Japan  has  an  active  army  of  about  2,000,000  including  an  air  force  of  55,000 
and  a  trained  and  partially  trained  reserve  of  3,500,000  men. 

The  active  forces  are  deployed  over  a  wide  area  fi-om  Karafuto  and  Manchou- 
kuo  in  the  north  to  the  Southern  French  Indo-China — Thailand  border  in  the 
south.  The  estimated  number  of  active  divisions  or  their  equivalent  is  68,  plus 
15  depot  divisions  in  Japan  Proper.  Japan  has  recently  mobilized  approximately 
5C0,000  reserves  which  have  been  utilized  as  replacements  and  in  forming  new 
units  included  in  the  above  estimate. 

Japan  has  been  withdrawing  a  considerable  number  of  her  troops  from  China 
and  despatching  them  to  Indo-China  and  Manchuria.  Some  of  these  have  been 
replaced  by  Manchurian  and  Wang  Ching-wei's  puppet  troops.  Since  the  out- 
break of  the  Russo-German  war,  the  forces  in  Manchoukuo  have  been  increased 
from  8  to  19  divisions  with  auxiliary  troops  including  4  tank  regiments  and  4 
cavalry  brigades,  totalling  about  500,000  officers  and  men.  The  Japanese  army 
is  well  trained  and  an  efficient  fighting  force.  Officers  are  well  qualified  to  per- 
form their  various  duties  in  peace  and  war.  The  staflf  has  functioned  well  during 
difficult  tactical  operations  in  China.  The  enlisted  men,  although  somewhat 
lacking  in  initiative,  are  well  trained,  experienced  in  combat,  well  disciplined, 
courageous  and  aggressive  to  the  point  of  recklessness.  The  Japanese  have  been 
consistently  successful  in  China  from  a  tactical  point  of  view  and  only  combat 
with  a  modern  army  can  determine  Japan's  relative  efficiency  compared  to  mod- 
ern occidental  armies.  Japan's  army  is  physically  hardy  and  psychologically 
inspired  by  loyalty  to  the  Emperor,  devotion  to  duty  and  a  fanatical  patriotism 
which  make  it  a  dangerous  foe  on  the  Asian  continent  or  nearby  islands. 

The  Japanese  Army  and  Navy  air  forces  have  made  rapid  progress  since  1937. 
Personnel  strength  of  Army  and  Navy  air  forces  is  55,000  officers  and  men  and 
the  two  services  have  a  combined  plane  strength  of  approximately  3,743  combat 
planes.  The  Army  squadrons  number  114  and  the  Navy  has  124  squadrons. 
Plane  design  has  lagged,  but  lack  of  formidable  opposition  has  left  them  undis- 
puted air  superiority.  Four  years  of  continuous  air  operations  have  increased 
the  efficiency  of  Japanese  aviation  in  no  small  degree.  Recent  acquisition  of 
German  planes  and  technical  advisors  has  contributed  to  Japanese  air  pro- 
ficiency. 

The  Japanese  Army  is  the  best  equipped  army  in  Asia.  Its  equipment,  how- 
ever, is  inferior  to  that  of  any  of  the  modern  European  armies.  The  shortage 
of  raw  materials  and  production  capacity  will  limit  the  number  of  new  divisions 
which  can  be  organized,  even  though  Japan's  partially  trained  manpower  is  ample 
for  her  anticipated  needs.  Personal  equipment  appears  to  be  sufficient  and  in 
good  condition  but  there  is  a  shortage  of  organizational  equipment  such  as  tanks, 
and  other  mechanized  equipment,  antiaircraft  weapons  and  modern  artillery. 

Japan  has  a  navy  consisting  of  approximately  180,000  men  and  officers  exclusive 
of  about  20,000  in  the  naval  air  corps.  Naval  strength  comprises  over  a  million 
tons  already  built  and  nearly  500,000  tons  building.  The  navy  is  divided  into  two 
main  divisions:  the  Combined  Fleet  and  the  Japanese  Naval  Forces  in  China. 
The  latter  consists  of  the  North  Central  and  South  China  Fleets.  The  Combined 
Fleet  is  based  in  home  waters. 


1352    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

The  Japanese  naval  personnel  is  well  trained — a  training  equal  to  tliat  of  the 
British  and  American  navies.  The  Japanese  navy  is  modern,  well  balanced,  and 
ready  for  prompt  service.  It  is  relatively  strong  in  aircraft  carriers  and  tenders ; 
it  would  be  a  formidable  opponent  to  the  navy  of  any  power  or  those  of  any 
combination  of  powers  attempting  offensive  operations  in  the  western  Pacific  area. 

Japan,  because  of  her  geographic  location  blocks  all  sea  approaches,  north  of 
Haiphong,  to  the  southeastern  coast  of  Asia ;  flanks  all  routes  from  the  east 
to  the  eastern  and  northeastern  coast  of  the  mainland ;  and  is  in  a  remarkably 
strong  strategical  position  for  defense  against  any  distant  naval  power.  Further- 
more her  geographic  position  is  such  that  her  navy,  on  the  strategical  defensive, 
could  from  time  to  time  successfully  assuiue  the  tactical  offensive. 

4.  Japan — Political 

The  political  cauldron  of  Japan  has  been  boiling  furiously  since  Matsuoka  was 
relieved  as  Foreign  Minister.  During  the  time  that  Matsuoka  was  Foreign  Min- 
ister and  under  the  leadership  of  Premier  Prince  Konoye,  Japan  set  up  its  own 
version  of  totalitarianism  last  fall  called  the  "new  national  structure".  Political 
parties  were  disbanded  and  the  Imperial  Rule  Assistance  Association,  designed 
to  unite  all  the  people  in  assistance  to  the  Throne,  was  hastily  whipped  into 
shape.  The  Association  was  not  a  political  organization  like  those  controlling 
Italy,  Germany,  and  Russia  because  of  the  Japanese  theory  of  the  Emperor  as 
the  supreme  head  of  the  state  to  whom  all  Japanese  yield  obedience  and  service. 
The  vaguely  stated  aims  of  the  Association  were  too  diffused  to  meet  with 
general  approval ;  as  conditions  are  at  present,  it  is  clear  that  the  "new  structure", 
movement — so  far  as  its  basic  purpose  was  concerned — has  entirely  miscarried. 
In  its  major  tests,  provided  by  the  efforts  to  regiment  industry  and  "reform"  the 
Diet,  it  merely  stirred  up  severe  controversies.  The  original  hope  that  the 
Imperial  Rule  Assistance  Association  could  "unify  all  phases"  of  Japan's  national 
life  has  long  since  disappeared. 

While  the  outward  totalitarian  structure  has  weakened,  the  domination  exer- 
cised by  the  army  clique  for  nearly  a  decade  continues.  Practically  every  phase 
of  life  in  Japan  has  been  placed  under  governmental  control. 

The  whole  political  machinery  is  geared  to  preparation  for  expansion  into 
the  maritime  provinces  of  Siberia,  for  further  expansion  in  southeast  Asia  and 
the  southwestern  Pacific  and  to  the  solution  of  the  China  "Incident."  Without 
their  previous  enthusiasm  and  behind  uncertain  leadership,  the  Japanese  are 
continuing  in  the  path  to  what  they  believe  is  their  "divinely  appointed  destiny" 
without  being  too  sure  as  to  where  that  "destiny"  will  take  them.  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  there  are  indications  that  the  people  of  Japan  are  becoming  more  and 
more  alarmed  and  apprehensive ;  they  fear  that  the  present  course  will  take 
them  into  a  major  war.  There  is  increasing  dissatisfaction  with  the  secretive 
nature  of  governmental  policy.  If  Japan  goes  to  war  with  a  major  power,  her 
people  will  enter  it  desperately  rather  than  confidently. 

In  September,  1940,  Japan  concluded  a  Tripartite  Pact  of  Co-operation  with 
Germany  and  Italy  which  by  implication  requires  Japan  to  attack  the  United 
States  (or  any  other  power  except  Russia,  not  involved  in  the  European  War  at 
that  time)  should  it  attack  either  of  the  Axis  partners.  Although  Foreign 
Minister  Toyoda.  Matsuoka's  successor,  has  said  that  there  is  no  change  in  the 
foreign  policy  of  Japan,  and  that  Japan  will  adhere  to  the  Axis  Alliance,  there 
are  indications  that  Toyoda's  sincerity  in  making  such  a  statement  is  entirely 
different  from  that  of  Matsuoka.  In  other  words,  the  advantages  and  value  of  the 
Tripartite  Agreement  are  at  present  being  very  seriously  questioned.  But 
Germany,  through  her  representatives  in  Japan,  is  doing  everything  within  her 
power  to  keep  Japan  "in  line."  Thus  Japan  is  most  anxious  to  confer  with  the 
United  States,  "looking  toward  a  peaceful  settlement  of  all  outstanding  issues 
between  the  two  countries,"  which  means  recognizing  Japan's  territorial  and 
economic  gains  in  Eastern  Asia.  The  chief  obstacle  is  that  even  if  a  conference 
were  convened  by  the  two  governments,  there  could  be  no  guarantee  of  the 
results  of  such  a  conference  unless  the  Japanese  Army  and  Navy  were  directly 
represented.  Although  a  request  for  such  representation  would  be  unprecedented, 
G-2  is  of  the  opinion  that  unless  such  representation  is  obtained,  a  conference 
at  this  time  would  be  without  lasting  results. 

Japan  has  boundless  ambition  in  East  Asia,  but  she  finds  herself  in  a  poor 
strategic  position  to  take  advantage  of  the  opportunities  the  present  time  affords. 
Japanese  leaders  are  aware  of  the  perils  of  further  military  commitments  before 
the  stalemate  in  China  is  broken.     One  of  the  factions  in  Japan  fsCvors  making 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1353 

a  final  effort  to  persuade  Chiang  Kai-shek  to  conclude  a  peace  as  soon  as  possible ; 
another  taction  favors  fighting  the  issue  to  a  conclusion.  The  stalemate  is  about 
as  far  from  decision  as  it  has  been. 

In  the  maelstrom  of  Japanese  indecision,  one  thing  stands  out  clearly — that 
is,  that  the  Japanese  do  not  want  the  United  States  to  become  involved  in  the 
war,  but  they  want  the  United  States  to  stay  out  of  the  war  primarily  to  enable 
Japan  to  retain  a  free  hand  in  advancing  the  Co-Prosperity  Sphere  in  Asia. 

Another  fact  which  is  almost  as  clear  is  that  Admiral  Toyoda  is  a  stop-gap 
Foreign  Minister,  appointed  temporarily  with  the  idea  of  making  a  more  perma- 
nent appointment  when  Japanese  policy  could  be  more  coherent  and  concrete. 

5.  Japan — Economic 

Because  of  the  ever-increasing  stringency  of  the  embargo  placed  on  Japan  by 
the  United  States,  Great  Britain  and  the  Netherlands  East  Indies,  the  economic 
situation  in  Japan  is  slowly  but  surely  becoming  worse.  The  Japanese  have 
always  lacked  war  materials,  adequate  foreign  exchange  and  sufficient  foreign 
trade ;  the  embargo  has  served  to  increase  the  deficiencies  in  these  categories. 
These  deficiencies  are  serious  but  are  not  likely  to  become  dangerous  before 
December  1,  1941.  The  fact  that  Japan  is  also  encumbered  with  financial 
problems  connected  with  the  "incident"  in  China  prevents  any  curative  steps 
being  taken. 

The  technical  assistance  which  the  Germans  have  been  giving  to  Japan  over 
a  period  of  six  months  is  no  longer  as  welcome  as  it  was  before  Germany's 
attack  on  Russia.  That  attack  has  precluded  the  possibilties  of  Japan's  re- 
ceiving machinery  and  implements  of  war  from  Germany.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
the  Japanese  are  beginning  to  question  whether  the  Tripartite  Agreement  has 
not  brought  far  greater  economic  disadvantages  than  advantage  to  Japan  in 
carrying  out  her  plans  for  a  "Co-Prosperity  Sphei*e"  in  Asia.  The  Pro-Axis 
leaders  are  finding  great  difficulty  in  justifying  the  alliance  with  Germany. 

The  "Co-Prosperity  Sphere"  is  anything  but  prosperous.  Because  of  the  diffi- 
culties of  labor  shortage,  lack  of  sufficient  transportation  facilities  and  lack  of 
cooperation  among  the  people  who  have  been  brought  into  the  "sphere"  by  force 
or  persuasion,  the  "sphere"  is  about  to  fall  apart. 

The  action  of  the  Netherlands  East  Indies  in  joining  with  the  United  States 
and  Great  Britain  in  embargoing  goods  to  Japan  was  undoubtedly  a  severe  blow, 
both  economically  and  in  prestige.  The  economic  competition  going  on  behind  the 
scenes  in  Thailand,  between  Japan  on  the  one  hand,  and  Great  Britain  and 
China  on  the  other,  will  be  increasingly  significant.  Recent  information,  how- 
ever, indicates  that  Japanese  banking  interests  are  asking  for  a  new  loan  of 
25,000,000  Bahts  from  Thailand  bankers,  (supplementing  a  loan  of  $3,750,000 
actually  made  to  Japan  early  in  August  in  order  to  pay  for  commodities  pur- 
chased by  Japan  in  Thailand).  The  influence  of  the  Chinese,  the  traditional 
financiers  of  Siam,  cannot  be  overlooked  here. 

The  processes  of  economic  warfare  are  so  slow  that,  even  if  the  status  quo  ante 
were  to  be  established  in  China  by  way  of  settlement  of  the  Sino-Japanese  con- 
flict, Japanese  economic  predominance  in  the  East  Asiatic  area  would  still  be 
so  firmly  established  that  several  months  would  have  to  pass  before  the  effects 
of  the  economic  embargo  would  in  itself  infiuence  Japanese  action  in  the  Far 
East. 

The  effects  of  the  embargo  will  compel  Japan  to  strive  to  obtain  more  assist- 
ance in  East  Asia  as  well  as  to  try  to  persuade  Great  Britain,  the  United  States 
and  the  Netherlands  East  Indies  through  threats  and  promises  to  soften  the  im- 
pact their  embargo  has  caused.  Japan  obviously  does  not  want  to  go  to  war 
with  the  United  States  to  achieve  her  economic  ol)jectives,  but  at  the  same  time 
she  feels  that  the  achievement  of  these  objectives  is  an  essential  part  of  her 
foreign  policy. 

The  fact  remains  that  Japan  lacks  essential  raw  materials  to  support  either 
her  manufacturing  industries  or  a  major  war  effort.  To  procure  them  she  must 
have  foreign  exchange ;  in  order  to  obtain  foreign  exchange,  she  must  have 
foreign  trade,  which,  at  present,  is  seriously  curtailed.  The  stoppage  of  trade 
is  reducing  Japan's  raw  materials  drastically — raw  materials  which  are  vital 
to  the  organic  well-being  of  Japan  and  to  her  ability  to  wage  war  successfully. 
No  other  country  even  approaches  the  United  States  in  importance  to  Japan's 
econemic  welfare,  both  as  a  source  of  raw  materials  and  as  a  market  for  the 
exports  of  Japan.  Thus  through  the  advantage  the  United  States  has  gained 
through  the  embargo,  Japan  finds  herself  in  a  very  poor  bargaining  position. 

5.  Tab  E— U.  S.  S.  R.— Omitted. 


1354    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

I.  B.  124 

September  11,  1941. 
Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff : 
Subject :  Political  Developments  in  Japan. 

1.  A  United  Press  dispatch  from  Tokyo  dated  September  11,  1941,  gives  the 
following  information : 

"Emperor  Hirohito  today  took  direct  command  of  Japanese  Army  Head- 
quarters and  moved  to  assure  close  Array  collaboration  with  Premier  Fumi- 
maro  Konoye's  Government,  which  appeared  to  be  trying  to  keep  Japan  out 
of  war  even  if  that  meant  drifting  away  from  her  Axis  ties." 

2.  Major  developments  are  reported  as  follows : 

a.  Establishment  of  a  new  Defense  General  Headquarters  under  General  Otozo 
Yamada.  Yamada  is  personally  responsible  to  the  Emperor  and  becomes  virtual 
Generalissimo  of  the  Army  superseding  previous  emphasis  on  General  Staff 
control. 

b.  Appointment  of  F\imio  Goto,  former  Home  Minister,  as  chairman  of  the 
Central  Cooperative  Council  of  the  Imperial  Rule  Assistance  Association,  replac- 
ing Admiral  Suetsugu. 

c.  Entertainment  of  the  Cabinet  at  luncheon  by  the  Emperor,  "in  appreciation 
of  its  outstanding  services  to  the  State." 

3.  A  proper  evaluation  of  this  news  is  impracticable  at  this  early  date  but  a 
definite  trend  seems  indicated — a  trend  away  from  the  Axis  and  toward  better 
relations  with  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain.  The  new  system  is  inter- 
preted as  an  effort  to  strengthen  the  civilian  government,  check  militaristic 
domination  of  Imperial  Policy,  and  erect  a  barrier  to  possible  dissatisfaction 
among  the  militarists  with  the  future  course  of  events. 

4.  General  Yamada  is  a  conservative,  of  great  energy  and  ability.  It  is 
reported  that  he  stands  high  in  the  Emperor's  favor.  Goto  is  likewise  a  con- 
servative and  replaces  one  of  Japan's  worst  jingoists.  The  action  of  the  Emperor 
in  taking  direct  command  of  the  Army  and  his  giving  prestige  to  the  Cabinet  by 
inviting  it  to  luncheon,  and  publicly  thanking  it  is  unprecedented. 

5.  Barring  a  massacre  of  the  conservatives  by  the  militarists,  an  event  deemed 
unlikely  in  view  of  the  Emperor's  action,  it  is  probable  that  Japan  will  find  a 
peaceful  way  out  of  one  of  the  greatest  crises  in  her  history  and  seek  a  means 
to  realign  her  foreign  policy  in  an  anti-Axis  direction. 

(signed)     Sherman  Miles 

Sherman  Miles, 
Brigadier  General,  U.  8.  Army, 
Acting  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  0-2. 
Distribution : 

The  President  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-2 

Secretary  of  War  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  WPD 

Under  Secretary  of  War  Coordinator  of  Information 

Assistant  Secretary  of  War  "Director  of  Naval  Intelligence 

Secretary  of  State  G.  H.  Q. 

Chief  of  Staff  General  Embick 

[Note  by  General  Miles  :  ]  Original  copy  given  to  Gen.  Watson  for  the  President. 

(signed)     S.  M. 


September  17,  1941 
Memorandum  for  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  W.  P.  D. : 

Subject:  Combat  Estimate,  Japan.  (With  map  showing  disposition  armed 
forces. 
In  compliance  with  verbal  request,  this  date,  from  the  Assistant  Chief  of 
Staff,  W.  P.  D.,  there  is  attached  hereto  (Tab  A)  a  brief  Combat  Estimate 
on  Japan,  with  a  map  showing  the  disposition  of  Japan's  armed  forces  and  the 
Asiatic  area  at  present  occupied  by  the  Japanese. 

Shebman  Miles, 
Brigadier  General,  U.  8.  Army. 
Acting  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  0-2. 
Incls.-2 
Tab  A 
Map' 

'  Omitted. 


EXHIBITS    OF    JOINT    COMMITTEE  1355 

'L^AB  A — Combat  Estimate,  Japan 

Japan  has  an  active  army  of  about  2,000,0()0,  including  an  air  force  of  55,000, 
and  a  trained  and  partly  trained  reserve  of  3,500,000  men. 

The  active  forces  are  deployed  over  a  v^'ide  are0  from  Karafuto  and  Man- 
choukuo  in  the  north  to  the  Southern  French  Indo-China-Thailand  border  in 
the  south.  The  estimated  number  of  active  divisions  or  their  e<iuivalent  is  68, 
plus  15  depot  divisions  in  Japan  Proper.  Japan  has  recently  mobilized  approxi- 
mately 500,000  reserves  which  have  been  utilized  as  replacements  and  in  forming 
new  units  included  in  the  above  estimate. 

Japan  has  been  withdrawing  a  considerable  number  of  her  troops  from  China 
and  despatching  them  to  Indo-China  and  Manchuria.  Some  of  these  have  been 
replaced  by  Manchurian  and  Wang  Ching-wei's  puppet  troops.  Since  the  out- 
break of  the  Rnsso-German  war,  the  forces  in  Manchoukuo  have  been  increased 
from  8  to  21  division.s  with  auxiliary  troops  including  4  tank  regiments  and  4 
cavalry  brigades,  totalling  about  500,000  officers  and  men.  The  Japanese  army 
is  well  trained  and  an  eflScieint  figliting  force.  OflScers  are  well  qualified  to 
perform  their  various  duties  in  peace  and  war.  The  staff  has  functioned  well 
during  difficult  tactical  operations  in  China.  The  enlisted  men,  although  some- 
what lacking  in  initiative,  are  well  trained,  experienced  in  combat,  well  disci- 
plined, courageous  and  aggressive  to  the  point  of  recklessness.  The  Japane^se 
have  been  consistently  successful  in  China  from  a  tactical  point  of  view  and  only 
combat  with  a  modern  army  can  determine  Japan's  relative  efficiency  compared 
to  occidental  modern  armies.  Japan's  army  is  physically  hardy  and  psychologi- 
cally inspired  by  loyalty  to  the  Emperor,  devotion  to  duty  and  a  fanatical  patri- 
otism which  make  it  a  dangerous  foe  on  the  Asian  continent  or  nearby  islands. 

The  Japanese  Army  and  Navy  air  forces  have  made  rapid  progress  since 
1937.  Personnel  strength  of  Army  and  Navy  is  55.000  officers  and  men  and  the 
two  services  have  a  combined  plane  strength  of  approximately  3,743  combat 
planes.  The  Army  squadrons  number  114  and  the  Navy  has  124  squadrons. 
Plane  design  has  lagged,  but  lack  of  formidable  opposition  has  left  them  undis- 
puted air  superiority.  Four  years  of  continuous  air  operations  have  increased 
the  efficiency  of  Japanese  aviation  no  small  degree.  Recent  acquisition  of  Ger- 
man planes  and  technical  advisors  has  contributed  to  Japanese  air  proficiency. 

The  Japanese  Army  is  the  best  equipped  army  in  Asia.  Its  equipment,  how- 
ever, is  inferior  to  that  of  any  of  the  modern  European  armies.  Shortage  of 
raw  materials  and  production  capacity  will  limit  the  number  of  new  divisions 
which  can  be  organized,  even  though  Japan's  partially  trained  manpower  is 
ample  for  her  anticipated  needs.  Personal  equipment  appears  to  be  sufficient 
and  in  good  condition  but  there  is  a  shortage  of  organization  equipment  such 
as  tanks,  and  other  mechanized  equipment,  antiaircraft  weapons  and  modern 
artillery. 

[2]  Japan  has.  a  navy  consisting  of  approximately  180,000  men  and  officers 
exclu.sive  of  about  20.000  in  the  naval  air  corps.  The  naval  vessels  have  over 
a  million  tons  already  built  and  nearly  500,000  tons  in  the  process  of  building. 
The  navy  is  divided  into  two  main  divisions:  The  Combined  Fleet  and  the 
Japanese  Naval  Forces  in  China.  The  latter  consists  of  the  North  Central  and 
South  China  Fleets.     The  Combined  Fleet  is  based  in  home  waters. 

The  Japanese  naval  personnel  is  well  trained — equal  to  that  of  the  British 
and  American  navies.  The  Japanese  navy  is  modern,  well  balanced,  and  ready 
for  prompt  service.  It  is  relatively  strong  in  aircraft  carriers  and  tenders; 
it  would  be  a  formidable  opponent  to  the  navy  of  any  power  or  those  of  any 
combination  of  powers  attempting  offensive  operations  in  the  western  Pacific 
area. 

Japan,  because  of  her  geographic  location  blocks  all  sea  approaches,  north  of 
Saigon,  to  the  southeastern  coast  of  Asia ;  flanks  all  routes  from  the  east  to 
the  eastern  and  northeastern  coast  of  the  mainland ;  andl  is  in  a  remarkably 
strong  strategical  position  for  defense  against  any  distant  naval  power.  Fur- 
thermore her  geographic  position  is  such  that  her  navy,  on  the  strategical  de- 
fensive, could  from  time  to  time  successfully  assume  the  tactical  offensive. 


September  18,  1941. 
Memorandum  for  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  W.  P.  D. 
Subject.  Strategic  Estimate  of  the  Situation. 

1.  The  following  data  are  furnished  in  response  to  your  memorandum,  above 
subject,  WPD  4994,  September  17,  1941.  The  succeeding  paragraphs  are  num- 
bered according  to  the  questions  propounded  therein. 


1356    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

"1.  Do  you  see  any  beneficial  effect  of  America's  war  effort  with  respect  to 
Great  Britain  maintaining  her  control  over  Singapore?" 

America's  defense  effort,  in  terms  of  political,  military,  and  economic  pres- 
sure, has  already  contributed  materially  toward  curbing  Japan's  advance  to 
the  southwest.  This  restraint  on  Japan  tends  to  become  stronger  as  time  passes 
by. 

"2.  If  Great  Britain  were  driven  out  of  the  Mediterranean  and  Middle  East 
Area,  could  she  retain  control  in  a  remunerative  sense  in  India  and  Malaysia? 
What  are  the  capabilities  of  Japan  with  respect  to  this  situation?" 

Yes,  provided  the  Trans-Pacitic  sea  lanes  are  secured.  In  such  an  event  Japan 
would  be  sorely  tempted  to  attack  to  the  southwest.  Such  an  attack  could  be 
blocked  only  by  the  use  of  large  U.  S.  Naval  forces  and  considerable  U.  S. 
ground  and  air  forces. 

"3.  If  the  Russian  military  forces  were  defeated  in  European  Russia,  would 
the  Maritime  and  Siberian  Areas  continue  to  resist?  What  would  their  capabili- 
ties be  in  the  premises?" 

Yes,  but  on  the  basis  of  a  purely  passive  defense.  Resistance  could  be  organ- 
ized more  effectively  in  eastern  than  in  western  Siberia.  The  degree  of  resist- 
ance would  depend  in  large  measure  on  material  assistance  from  the  United 
States  and  Japan's  position  in  the  then  developing  situation.  The  amounts  of 
material  furnished  by  us  would  be  conditioned  by  the  shipping  situation,  the 
means  of  land  transport  available  on  the  Asiatic  mainland  and  by  the  attitude 
of  Japan. 

[2]  "4.  What  would  the  effect  be  of  a  successful  German  drive  to  the  south- 
we.st  including  the  north  and  northwest  African  Areas?" 

Sucii  a  move  would  have  two  major  disadvantages  for  Germany :  military 
overextension  and  an  increased  economic  problem  with  reference  to  Spain  and 
Portugal.  It  would  give  her  tlie  following  major  advantages:  consolidation  of 
western  Europe  and  north  Africa ;  increased  opportunity  for  naval  raiding  by 
.ships  and  aircraft  based  on  northwest  Africa;  opportunity  to  extend  her  in- 
fluence in  Latin  American  and  perliaps  to  infiltrate  there  physically.  Such  action 
by  Germany  would  necessitate  the  promp  occupation  of  the  Natal  area,  Brazil, 
by  the  United  States  and  the  prompt  occupation  of  the  Azores  and  the  Cape  Verde 
Islands  by  the  Democracies. 

"5.  What  would  tlie  effect  be  on  the  situation  if  the  Germans  make  a  success- 
ful drive  southeastward  through  Turkey,  Iran  and  against  the  Suez  Area?" 

Such  an  event  would  entail  disastrous  British  losses  and  a  profound  shock  to 
British  morale.  It  would  throw  the  British  back  against  India  and  Kenya. 
It  would  require  the  reorganization  and  protection  of  sea  communications  be- 
tween India.  Malaysia,  Australasia  and  the  Democracies.     (See  2  above). 

Shekman  Miles, 
Brigadier  Oenerah  U.  8.  Army, 
Acting  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  0—2. 


I.  B.  131 

September  23,  1941. 
Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff  : 
Subject :  Crisis  in  Japan. 

1.  This  Division  has  information  from  a  highly  reliable  source  to  the  effect  that 
the  Japanese  Cabinet  is  confronted  with  a  highly  critical  and  explosive  situation. 
The  Emperor's  recent  gesture  in  support  of  the  Cabinet  notwithstanding,  certain 
pressure  groups  in  Japan  are  making  threatening  gestures  toward  the  Premier. 

2.  The  point  at  issue  is  whethei'  or  not  the  Japanese  Government  is  to  en- 
courage, authorize  or  permit  a  nationwide  celebration  on  the  anniversary  of  the 
signing  of  the  Tripartite  Agreement.  Genuine  Government  anxiety  over  this 
point  is  obviously  being  used  as  a  red  herring  in  the  road  to  national  objectives 
in  the  hope  that  the  United  States  Goverimient  can  be  rushed  into  making  con- 
cessions designed  to  strengthen  the  authority  of  the  present  Japanese  Cabinet. 
This  on  the  theory  that  if  the  current  Japanese  Cabinet  falls  there  will  be  no  one 
left  in  Japan  with  whom  we  can  deal, satisfactorily. 

3.  Attention  is  invited  to  the  fact  that  in  all  of  her  recent  proposals  and 
counter-propo.sals  Japan  has  carefully  avoided  giving  any  definite  assurance  that 
she  will  not  attack  Ru.ssia. 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  ^        1257 

4.  The  present  agitation,  tlierefore,  on  the  part  of  Japan  to  exti'act  an  imme- 
diate agreement  from  the  United  States  to  some  or  all  of  her  proposals  tor  a  'con- 
ference of  leaders"  may  be  motivated  by  a  desire  to  cover  preparations  for  an 
all  out  attack  on  Siberia  timed  with  the  expected  Russian  collapse  in  Europe. 

5.  A  lessening  of  pressure  at  this  time  would  be  considered  as  appeasement 
by  the  Japanese  and  would  be  highly  deterimental  to  the  advantage  that  the 
United  States  has  gained  by  the  policy  initiated  when  Japanese  funds  in  this 
country  were  frozen  and  reaffirmed  when  a  strict  embargo  was  placed  on  oil 
going  to  Japan. 

[2]  (S.  The  celebration  of  the  .signing  of  the  Tripartite  Agreement  by  the 
Japanese  on  September  27,  and  the  extent  of  that  celebration  is  a  matter  entirely 
within  the  control  and  jurisdiction  of  the  present  Jjipanese  Government.  The 
United  States  can  and  should  judge  only  by  the  acts  and  not  by  the  words  of  that 
Government. 

7.  This  Division  still  believes,  as  stated  in  I.  B.  112.  dated  August  16.  1941,  that 
forceful  diplomacy  vis-a-vis  Japan,  including  the  application  of  ever  increasing 
military  and  economic  pressure  on  our  part  offers  the  best  chance  of  gaining 
time,  the  best  possibility  of  preventing  the  spread  of  hostilities  in  the  Paciiic 
Area,  and  also  the  hope  of  the  eventual  disruption  of  the  Tripartite  Pact.  The 
exercise  of  increasingly  strong  "power  diplomacy"  by  the  United  States  is  clearly 
indicated. 

Sherman  Miles, 
Brigadier  General,  U.  8.  Army, 
Acting  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  0-2. 
Distribution : 

THE  PRESIDENT  Chief  of  Staff 

Secretary  of  State  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff.  W.  P.  D. 

Secretary  of  War  Director  of  Naval  Intelligence 

Under  Secretary  of  War  General  Embick 


Assistant  Secretary  of  War 


fb 


I.  B.  13n 


OcTOBEaa  2,  1941 . 


Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff: 
Subject :  Japanese-American  Relaticms. 

1.  The  crisis  in  Tokyo  brought  about  by  the  anniversary  of  the  Tripartite  Agree- 
ment has  been  weathered  by  the  Konoye  ('abinet  through  a  somewhat  perfunctory 
celebration  involving  speeches  by  the  German  and  Italian  Ambassadors,  Prince 
Konoye,  and  others,  at  luncheons  given  in  honor  of  the  Axis  on  September  27, 
1941. 

2.  This  Division  has  information  from  a  highly  reliable  source  to  the  effect 
that  at  4  :  30  p.  m.  on  September  27th  after  completing  the  ceremonies  celebrating 
the  anniversary  of  the  Tripartite  Pact  the  Japanese  Foreign  Minister  asked  the 
American  Ambassador  to  call  on  him,  and  urged  him  to  strongly  recommend  to 
his  home  government  an  immediate  meeting  between  Prince  Konoye  and  President 
Roosevelt. 

3.  The  Japanese  Ambassador  in  Washington  was  advised  as  to  the  gist  of 
Admiral  Toyoda's  conversation  with  Ambassador  Grew.  Admiral  Nomura  also 
was  urged  by  his  Foreign  Minister  to  do  everything  in  his  power  to  prevail  upon 
the  President  to  meet  and  confer  immediately  with  Prince  Konoye. 

4.  The  fervor  with  which  the  Japanese,  over  a  period  of  many  months,  have 
been  agitating  for  this  "meeting  of  leaders"  has  been  matched  only  by  their 
reluctance  to  make  connnitments  <m  two  points,  i.  e.  withdrawal  from  China,  and 
preparation  for  an  attack  on  Siberia. 

5.  This  Division  is  of  the  belief  that  the  present  Cabinet  in  Tokyo  does  not 
yet  feel  strong  enough  to  enforce  any  order  for  withdrawal  of  Japanese  troops 
from  China,  even  though  under  pressure  from  the  United  States,  it  might  be  in- 
clined to  do  so.  And,  as  a  matter  (»f  fact,  at  this  stage  in  the  execution  of  our 
national  strategic  plan,  a  cessation  of  hostilities  in  China  followed  by  the  with- 
drawal of  twenty-one  Japanese  divisions,  20  independent  brigades,  and  1,000  air- 
craft therefrom  would  be  highly  detrimental  to  our  interests.  Such  a  force  if 
returned  to  Japan  would  be  potentially  of  such  an  explosive  nature  that  only  a 
military  oligarchy  could  control  it.  These  militarists  would  submerge  or  destroy 
the  moderate  element  in  Japan  replacing  it  with  a  restless  Chauvinistic  element 
possessing  neither  the  ability  nor  the  inclination  to  continue  diplomatic  relations 
with  anv  of  the  Democratic  Powers. 


1358    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

If  the  Japanese  force  in  China  were  transferred  to  Indo  China  or  Manchoukuo 
it  would  undoubtedly  overflow  into  adjacent  regions  and  our  interests  would  be 
even  further  jeopardized. 

It  seems  evident  that  the  Konoye  Government  lacks  confidence  enough  to  make 
any  promises  in  regard  to  restraining  the  Kwantung  Army,  even  at  its  present 
strength,  from  launching  an  attack  on  Siberia.  With  its  forces  augmented  by 
nil  or  a  part  of  the  troops  now  in  China,  the  home  government  would  be  helpless, 
for  the  Kwantung  Army  since  1932  has  been  completely  independent  of  the 
various  cabinets  appointed  in  Tokyo  and,  reinforced  by  elements  from  China, 
would  undoubtedly  attack  when  it  felt  assured  that  such  action  was  opportune. 
The  opportune  moment  will  be  coincident  with  or  immediately  following  a  Rus- 
sian collapse  in  Europ)e,  or  if  and  when  the  Russian  force  becomes  numerically 
inferior  because  of  withdrawals  from  Siberia  to  reinforce  the  European  Armies. 

6.  From  the  foregoing  it  seems  imperative,  for  the  present  at  least,  to  keep 
as  much  of  the  Japanese  Army  as  possible  pinned  down- in  China.  In  other  words 
we  must  cease  at  once  our  attempts  to  bring  about  the  withdrawal  of  Japanese 
armed  forces  from  China  and  must  give  to  China  whatever  aid  is  possible  on  our 
part  in  sustaining  the  Chinese  power  and  will  to  continue  to  contain  and  occupj 
the  bulk  of  the  J'apanese  Army. 

7.  The  initial  feeling  of  revulsion  over  this  apparent  utilization  of  China  as 
a  cat's  paw  in  our  plan  of  strategy  will  be  alleviated  by  an  examination  of  the 
situation  of  the  anti-Axis  powers  in  the  light  of  cold  reason.  Our  objective  is 
the  destruction  of  Naziism,  and  all  out  aid  to  those  powers  actively  engaged  in 
resisting  its  aggressive  drive  for  world  domination.  Russia  is,  as  a  matter  of 
expedience,  an  ally  in  this  cause.  We  must,  among  other  things,  do  what  we  can 
with  what  we  have  at  our  disposal  to  aid  Russia  in  her  struggle  with  Germany. 
Any  action  on  our  part,  therefore,  which  would  liberate  Japanese  (pro-Axis) 
forces  for  action  against  Russia's  rear  in  Siberia  would  be  foolhardy. 

8.  The  eagerness  on  the  part  of  the  Japanese  Foreign  Minister  for  a  "meeting 
of  leaders"  is  probably  based  on  a  strong  desire  to  strengthen  the  position  of 
the  cabinet  with  respect  to  the  internal  situation  in  Japan.  Such  a  conference 
would:  (1)  Strengthen  Prince  Konoye's  position  with  his  people,  (2)  Extend  the 
tenure  of  the  present  cabinet  at  least  through  the  sessions  of  the  conference. 
(3)  Increase  the  belief  of  all  Japanese  leaders  that  we  would  not  meet  with 
them  unless  willing  to  make  concessions.  In  other  words,  a  conference  to  them 
will  mean  concessions  on  our  part.  If  the  President  of  the  United  States  can 
be  persuaded  to  loosen  the  economic  restrictions  now  in  force  against  Japan, 
Prince  Konoye  can  then  go  before  the  Japanese  people  with  a  fait  accompli  such 
as  no  other  man  has  been  able  to  produce  in  the  last  decade.  Economic  conces- 
sion, it  must  be  observed,  is  the  one  essential  which  the  Japanese  military  leaders 
recognize  as  necessary  to  be  obtained  before  another  major  war  can  be  fought. 
Once  the  conference  is  convened  the  Japanese  will  be  in  a  strong  position  to 
demand  some  economic  concessions,  pleading  the  certainly  of  the  collapse  of 
the  Konoye  government  if  he  goes  home  empty-handed. 

9.  From  the  point  of  view  of  the  United  States,  a  conference  of  leaders  at  this 
time,  might  serve  to  give  this  country  additional  time  in  which  to  prepare  more 
adequately  for  any  eventuality.  Definite  understanding,  however,  should  be 
established,  prior  to  such  a  conference,  with  Great  Britain,  Russia,  China,  Thai- 
land and  the  Netherlands  East  Indies.  Through  cooperative  and  unified  action 
with  the  powers  named,  we  have  obtained  the  economic  advantages  we  now  hold. 
It  is  the  opinion  of  this  Division  that  these  advantages  should,  under  no  circum- 
stances, be  sacrificed  unless  concessions  can  be  gained  from  Japan  which  will 
benefit  all  the  non-Axis  countries  of  the  Pacific  area  ;  otherwise  the  very  objective 
this  country  has  sought  so  long  to  attain,  that  of  unified  anti-Axis  strength  in  the 
Pacific,  will  be  lost  completely. 

10.  This  Division  is  of  the  opinion  that  neither  a  conference  of  leaders  nor 
economic  concessions  at  this  time  would  be  of  any  material  advantage  to  the 
United  States  unless  a  definite  commitment  to  withdraw  from  the  Axis  were 
obtained  from  Japan  prior  to  the  conference.  The  immediate  objective  of  the 
United  States  is  to  weaken  Hitler  in  every  way  possible.  A  Japanese  guarantee 
not  to  attack  Russia  in  Siberia  would  free  Russia,  psychologically  and  militarily, 
for  stronger  opposition  to  Hitler.  With  this  in  mind,  a  definite  condition  prece- 
dent to  such  a  proposed  conference  should  be  a  complete  withdrawal  by  Japan  from 
the  Axis  and  a  guarantee,  backed  by  substantial  evidence  of  sincerity,  not  to 
attack  Russia  in  Siberia. 

11.  Since  it  is  highly  improbable  that  this  condition  can  be  met  by  the  Japanese 
Government  at  the  present  time  our  course  lies  straight  before  us.     This  Division 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1359 

still  believes  that  forceful  diplomacy  vis-a-vis  Japan,  iDcluding  the  application  of 
ever  Increasing  military  and  economic  pressure  on  our  part,  offers  the  best 
chance  of  gaining  time,  the  best  possibility  of  preventing  the  spread  of  hostilities 
in  the  Pacific  Area,  and  the  best  hope  of  the  eventual  disruption  of  the  Tripartite 
Pact.  The  exercise  of  increasingly  strong  "power  diplomacy"  by  the  United  States 
is  still  clearly  indicated. 

Hayes  A.  Kkonee, 
Colonel,  General  Staff, 
Acting  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-2. 
Distribution : 

The  President  Chief  of  Staff 

Secretary  of  State  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  W.  P.  D 

Secretary  of  War  Director  of  Naval  Intellig,ence 

Under  Secretary  of  "War  Major  General  Embick 

Assistant  Secretary  of  War 


October  16,  1^1. 
Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff : 
Subject :  Fall  of  the  Japanese  Cabinet. 

1.  A  United  Press  dispatch  states  that  the  three  months  old  Konoye  Cabinet 
resigned  on  October  16th  under  nationalistic  pressure  for  termination  of  Jap- 
anese-American peace  negotiations. 

2.  This  resignation  was  the  logical  result  of  Foreign  Minister  Toyoda's  failure 
to  secure  a  relaxation  of  the  economic'  pressure  on  Japan  by  the  U.  S.  Government. 

3.  It  is  impossible  to  predict  the  next  move  on  the  part  of  Japan  until  the 
composition  of  the  next  cabinet  is  known.  It  is  highly  probable,  however,  that 
the  trend  will  be  toward  the  Axis,  with  the  Army,  rather  than  the  Navy,  exercis- 
ing the  controlling  influence.  This  Army  element  will  not  be  slow  to  take  ad- 
vantage of  any  weakening  of  the  Siberian  Army  brought  about  by  Russian  reverses 
in  Europe. 

Sherman  Mrr.Es, 
Brigadier  Oenerah  U.  8-  Army, 
Acting  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  0-2. 

Distribution : 

Secretary  of  War  Coordinator  of  Information 

Under  Secretary  of  War  State  Department 

Assi.stant  Secretary  of  War  General  Embick 

Assistant  Chief  of  Staff.  WPD  Director  of  Naval  Intelligence 

GHQ  

Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff : 
Subject :  Japan's  New  Premier. 

1.  The  United  Press  reports  that  Lieutenant  General  Hideki  Tojo,  War  Minister 
in  the  late  Konoye  Cabinet,  has  been  designated  Premier  and  ordered  to  form  a 
new  Cabinet. 

2.  General  Tojo  was  born  in  1884,  the  son  of  a  Samurai.  He  has  held  several 
high  offices  in  the  Army,  notably  that  of  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Kwantung  Army, 
Vice  Minister  of  War  and  In.spector  General  of  Aviation. 

3.  He  has  been  called  the  father  of  modern  Japanese  Army  strategy  and  is 
known  to  be  anti-foreign,  with  a  particular  dislike  for  the  Russians,  and  an  open 
admiration  for  German  methods.  He  created  a  sensation  in  1938  when,  as  Vice 
Minister  of  War,  he  predicted  that  Japan  would  have  to  fight  Russia  as  well 
as  China.  He  also  warned  that  America  would  have  to  be  watched.  When  the 
Axis  Alliance  was  signed  in  September  1940  he  said  that  the  road  Japan  would 
follow  had  been  "definitely  decided"  and  there  was  no  turning  back.     General 


October  17,  1941. 


1360    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Tojo  is  regarded  by  his  associates  as  a  man  of  unshakable  determination.  He 
cites  reverence  and  filial  piety  as  the  two  most  important  attributes  of  a  Jap- 
anese soldier.  He  has  little  patience  for  arguments  or  other  other  people's  views. 
4.  Any  cabinet  selected  by  General  Tojo  may  be  expected  to  have  Axis  leanings, 
but  will  be  otherwise  anti-foreign  and  highly  nationalistic. 

Sherman  Mti.bs, 
Brigadier  General,  U.  8.  Army, 
Acting  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  0~2. 
Distribution : 

Secretary  of  War  G.  H.  Q. 

Under  Secretary  of  War  Coordinator  of  Information 

Assistant  Secretary  of  War  State  Department 

Chief  of  Staff  General  Erabick 

Assistant  Chief  of  Staff.  W.  P.  D.  Director  of  Naval  Intelligence. 

October  21, 1941. 
Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff: 
Subject :  Kwantang  versus  the  Siberian  Army. 

I  have  prepared  this  copy  of  the  above  study  for  submission  to  the  President. 
Inasmuch  as  it  points  out  the  desirability  of  certain  action  by  the  United  States, 
it  is  requested  that  you  decide  whether  or  not  it  should  go  forward. 

Sheeman  Miles, 
Brigadier  Oenei'al.  U.  S.  Army, 
Acting  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-2. 


I.  B.  144 

October  21,  1941. 
Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  StaCf : 

Subject :  The  Kwantung  versus  the  Siberian  Army  (For  Situation  Map  see  Tab  A. ) 
1.  The  best  information  available  to  this  Division  indicates   the  strengths 
of  the  Siberian  forces  east  of  Lake  Baikal  and  the  Japanese  Kwantung  Army  in 
Manchoukuo  to  be  approximately  as  indicated  below : 

Kwantung  Army  Siberian  Army 

Infantry 25  Divs.     (450,000  men) ___ 31  Divs.    (540,000  men). 

Cavalry 4  Brigs.  (  12.000  men) —  10  Divs.   (  75,000  men). 

R.  R.  Guards 36  Bns.      (   72  000  men)_.  _ 

Tanks 7  Regts.  (     1,7W  tanks) ___10  Brigs.  (     1,600  tanks). 

Air  Corps 7  Regts.  (        500 planes)  — 10  Divs.   (     1,677  planes). 

Army  Troops  and  overhead—  150,000  men 25,000  men. 

Total  Man  Power 684,000  men 682,000  men. 

2  It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  Siberian  Army  is  relatively  strong  in  cavalry  and 
in  planes  at  present.  However,  the  Japanese  inferiority  in  the  air  could  be  quickly 
altered  by  shifting  from  China  (where  Japan  is  practically  unopposed  in  the  air) 
the  bulk  of  the  Japanese  air  forces  operating  with  the  ground  forces  in  tUat  area. 

3.  Although  the  quality  of  the  present  leadership  of  the  two  opposing  forces 
has  not  been  tested,  the  consensus  of  opinion  here  is  that  the  leadership  in  the 
Siberian  and  in  the  Japanese  forces  is  the  best  in  their  respective  armies. 

4.  In  general,  the  materiel  and  equipment  in  neither  force  is  comparable  to 
the  latest  types  in  use  by  the  German,  British  and  American  armies.  Russian 
medium  and  heavy  tanks  are  believed  to  be  superior  to  similar  equipment  in 
the  Kwantung  Army. 

5.  Weather  conditions  during  the  fall  and  winter  months  give  a  slight  advantage 
to  the  Siberian  Army,  inasmuch  as  the  Japanese,  as  a  ijeople,  have  not  had  time 
to  be  come  inured  to  the  rigors  of  the  extreme  cold  prevalent  in  Siberia  during 
these  months. 

6.  Neither  the  Siberian  nor  the  Kwantung  Army  lias  a  sufficient  superiority 
over  the  other,  at  present,  to  warrant  an  offensive.  This  situation  may  change, 
however,  in  the  near  future  if  the  Siberian  force  or  any  large  part  thereof  is 
moved  westward  to  strengthen  the  forces  in  European  Russia.  The  Kwantung 
Army,  on  the  other  hand,  has  doubled  in  strength  since  July  1,  1941,  and  it  is 
fairly  certain  that  Japan  will  continue  to  strengthen  this  army  with  whatever 
men  and  equipment  she  can  spare  from  China  and  Japan  Proper. 


EXHIBITS   OF    JOINT    COMMITTEE  1361 

7.  If  and  when  the  Kwantung  Army  feels  that  it  has  a  combat  superiority  over 
the  Siberian  army  of  2  to  1  it  is  highly  probable  that  it  will  take  the  offensive 
regardless  of  the  policy  and  intentions  of  the  Tokyo  Government.  When  this 
ratio  rises  to  3  to  1  or  better  the  probability  will  become  a  certainty. 

8.  This  being  true,  it  is  very  much  to  our  interest,  so  long  as  Russia  continues 
to  offer  active  resistance  to  Germany,  to  take  whatever  steps  may  be  possible  to 
maintain  the  present  Russian  equality  in  combat  strength  vis-a-vis  the  Kwantung 
Army.    Two  such  practicable  steps  immediately  present  themselves : 

a.  Increased  aid  to  China,  to  enable  the  latter  to  continue  to  pin  to  the  ground 
in  North,  Central  and  South  China  the  bulk  of  the  Japanese  Army. 

b.  Increased  aid  to  the  Russian  armies  both  in  Europe  and  Siberia. 

Sherman  Miles, 
Brigadier  General,  U.  S.  Army, 
Acting  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-2. 
Enc. :  Map.^ 

Distribution  : 

The  President 
Secretary  of  State 
Secretary  of  War 
Under  Secretary  of  War 
Assistant  Secretary  of  War 
Assistant  Secretary  of  War  for  Air 
Chief  of  Staff 
Coordinator  of  Information 
Director  of  Naval  Intelligence 
Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  W.  P.  D. 
G.  H.  Q. 
General  Embick. 


I.  B.  148 

NOVEMBEB  1,  1941. 

Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff: 

Subject :  Possible  Japanese  Drive  into  Yunnan.     (For  map  see  Tab  A). 

1.  Recent  developments  in  the  international  situation,  and  particularly  in  the 
Pacific,  indicate  the  possibility  of  a  Japanese  invasion  of  Yunnan  Province  in 
an  attempt  to  cut  China's  life-line,  the  Burma  Road. 

2.  Factors  which  indicate  possibility  of  such  a  line  of  action  by  Japan : 

a.  The  political  and  economic  situation  at  home  and  pressure  from  the  Axis 
demand  action. 

6.  If  she  moved  on  Thailand,  or  elsewhere  to  the  south,  Japan  runs  grave  risk 
of  war  with  the  ABD  countries — an  event  which  she  wishes  to  avoid,  at  least 
for  the  present. 

c.  Japan's  plan  for  conquest  of  Eastern  Siberia  would  obviously  best  be  served 
by  a  policy  of  watchful  waiting  until  Russia  is  much  weakened. 

d.  A  drive  from  Indo-China  into  Yunnan  would  most  probably  not  involve 
Japan  with  any  third  nation. 

e.  An  offensive  elsewhere  in  China  could  have  no  such  decisive  effect  as  the 
stoppage  of  supplies  entering  China  over  the  Burma  Road.  This  operation,  if 
successful,  might  force  capitulation  of  the  Chinese. 

3.  Factors  operating  against  such  an  offensive: 

a.  Japan  is  already  extended  in  China  where  she  has  the  equivalent  of  some 
30  divisions  spread  so  thinly  that  withdrawal  of  any  troops  for  concentration 
elsewhere  would  seriously  endanger  her  present  lines.  This  was  clearly  shown 
in  the  recent  operations  at  Changsha  and  Ichang. 

J).  Japan  has  perhaps  33  divisions  in  Manchuria  and  adjacent  area.s.  To  with- 
draw any  considerable  force  fi-om  this  region  might  cause  her  to  "miss  the  bus" 
when  her  chance  comes  for  invasion  of  Siberia. 

c.  Japan  has  the  equivalent  of  some  3i/j  divisions  in  Indo-China  as  garrison 
troops  and  to  secure  the  Thai  borders.  Continuance  of  the  bulk  of  these  troops 
on  this  duly  is  necessary. 

d.  Similar  considerations  apply  to  the  concentration  of  the  Japanese  air  forces. 

e.  Estimates  of  the  initial  force  required  for  invasion  of  Yunnan,  from  various 
sources,  British,  Chine.se,  Russian  and  American,  vary  from  5  to  10  divisions, 
and  all  agree  on  the  necessity  of  using  strong  air  forces.  Thus,  a  major  effort 
would  be  necessary,  including  the  use  of  many  transports,  supply  ships,  etc. 

1  Omitted. 


1362    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

f.  If  Japan  became  involved  in  a  long  campaign  in  southwest  China,  she  would 
be  seriousiy  nampered  in  opeiations  elsewnere. 

4.  Physical  difficulties  in  tne  way  of  a  Yunnan  invasion  are  considerable,  the 
most  important  being  the  terrain.  The  best  corridor  is  that  followed  by  the 
Yunnan  meter-gauge  railway  from  the  border  at  Laokai  to  Kunming.  This  is  a 
tortuous  route  along  the  sides  of  deep  gorges,  from  an  elevation  of  305  feet  at 
Laokai  to  4,500  at  Mengize  on  the  Uiinan  plateau  in  a  distance  of  110  miles. 
(Airline,  about  75  miles.)  The  dozens  of  bridges  and  tunnels  have  presumably 
been  destroyed ;  the  Chinese  report  that  they  have  completely  demolished  the 
railway  including  the  roadbed  for  a  distance  of  50  miles  north  of  the  border, 
and  partially  for  an  additional  15  miles.  There  is  a  trail  about  30  miles  west  of 
and  roughly  parallel  to  the  railroad,  but  there  is  no  road  south  of  Mengtze.  Only 
two  other  cori'idors  exist,  according  to  the^Chinese  Minister  of  War:  one,  an  old 
road  parallel  to  and  about  30  miles  west'of  the  railway;  the  other  about  125 
miles  east  of  the  railway.  The  same  source  says  that  lateral  travel  between 
these  routes  is  impossible  because  of  the  ruggedness  of  the  terrain,  and  that  the 
Chinese  have  rendered  impassable  all  three  routes  of  approach.  Possible  use  of 
the  valleys  of  the  larger  river  appears  remote. 

The  Red  River  flows  from  the  Tali  Lake,  just  north  of  the  Burma  Road  250 
miles  west  of  Kunming,  southeastward  into  Indo-Lhina  at  Laokai.  It  is  not 
navigable  north  of  Laokai.  There  is  a  trail  running  northward  along  the  river 
to  a  point  60  miles  above  Laokai,  where  it  branches  northeast  to  Mengtze.  A 
footpath  extends  on  up  the  river  all  way  to  Tali.  The  terrain  is  extremely 
rugged.  From  the  scanty  information  available,  the  valleys  of  the  Black  and 
Makong  Rivers  would  be  even  less  accessible. 

5.  Chinese  preparations  against  an  invasion  of  Yunnan  from  Indo-China  include 
the  demolitions  mentioned  above.  For  some  time,  two  group  armies  have  been 
stationed  in  southeastern  Yunnan.     These  are: 

1st  Group  Array :  6th  Army  Corps  of  2  divisions ;  60th  Army  Coi*ps  of  3 
divisions. 

9th  Group  Army:  52d  Army  Corps  of  3  divisions;  54th  Army  Corps  of  2 

divisions. 

Plus  2  independent  divisions.     These  are  regular  troops,  but   the  bulk  are 

Yunnanese,  who  have  not  previously  demonstrated  superior  fighting  qualities. 

The  commander  of  the  troops  in  this  area  is  General  Kuan  Ling-shenk  who  took 

part  in  the  successful  Changsha  defense  of  1939. 

The  Chinese  lack  artillery,  are  very  short  of  ammunition,  both  artillery  and 
small  arms,  and  to  all  practical  purposes  are  devoid  of  an  air  force. 

The  Chinese  have  lightly  organized  a  position  20  to  40  miles  in  depth,  with 
the  main  line  of  resistance  along  a  generally  east-west  line  about  50  miles  north 
of  Laokai.  Their  line  of  observation  is  along  the  border.  Two  other  positions 
south  of  Kunming  are  being  organized.  The  southernmost  is  about  30  miles  south 
of  Kunming. 

6.  It  is  estimated  that  at  the  present  rate  of  Japanese  reinforcement  of  their 
troops  in  Indo-China,  a  period  of  from  one  to  three  months  will  be  required 
before  they  can  have  a  sufficient  concentration  for  an  offensive  against  Yunnan. 

7.  The  rate  of  Japanese  advance  on  Kunming  once  the  border  is  crossed,  will 
depend  on  the  degree  of  Chinese  resistance,  especially  in  their  defense  of  the 
extremely  rugged  terrain  between  the  Indo-China  plain  and  the  Yunnan  plateau. 

8.  A  Japanese  offensive  into  Yunnan  from  Indo-China  would  be  an  extremely 
difficult  operation  but  if  it  were  successful  in  closing  the  supply  route  from 
Burma  it  would  be  a  serious  blow  to  China's  power  and  will  to  resist. 

Shearman  Miles, 
Brigadier  General,  U.  8.  Army, 

Bnc. :  Acting  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G~2. 

Tab  A.' 

Distribution :  Chief  of  the  Army  Air  Forces 

The  President  Mr.  Lauchlin  Currie 

Secretary  of  War  Division  of  Defense  Aid  Reports 

Secretary  of  State  Director  of  Naval  Intelligence 

Under  Secretary  of  War  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  W.  P.  D. 

Assistant  Secretary  of  War  G.  H.  Q. 

Assistant  Secretary  of  War  Chief  of  the  Air  Corps 

for  Air  Air  Corps 

Chief  of  Staff  General  Embick. 
Coordinator  of  Information 

» Omitted. 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1363 

NOVEMBEB  2,  1941. 
Memorandum  for  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  W.  P.  D. : 

Subject:  G-2  Estimate,  Far  Eastern  Situation.     (For  situation  and  communica- 
tions maps  see  Tabs  B,  C,  and  D. )  ^ 

In  compliance  with  verbal  request,  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  W.  P.  D.,  this 
date,  the  following  is  submitted  as  a  Gi-2  Estimate  of  the  Far  Eastern  Situation : 

1.  After  four  years  of  war  in  China,  Japan  is  militarily  over-extended  on  the 
mainland  of  Asia,  economically  weak,  and  psychologically  aware  of  the  fact  that 
her  economic  strrjture  is  crumbling. 

2.  For  obvio'S  reasons  both  Germany  and  China  would  like  to  embroil  the 
United  State  in  a  large  scale  war  with  Jaimn.  While  Japan  is  reluctant  to 
go  to  war  '.nth  us,  her  political  and  economic  situations  demand  action.  She 
has  the  following  alternatives : 

a.  Attack  Siberia  to  neutralize  the  threat  on  her  flank  and  rear. 

b.  Occupy  Thailand  as  a  base  from  which  to  launch  an  offensive  against  Burma 
or  Malaya. 

c.  Contain  or  isolate  the  Philippine  Islands  and  Hongkong  and  seize  the  Nether- 
lands East  Indies. 

d.  Launch  a  direct  attack  on  Singapore. 

e.  Make  a  determined  effort  to  bring  the  war  in  China  to  a  close  by  cutting 
China's  last  supply  route,  the  Burma  Road. 

/.  Bide  her  time  while  disposing  her  forces  from  north  to  such  in  such  a  way 
that  she  will  be  able  to  seize  the  opportunity  for  successful  aggression  in  what- 
ever direction  it  presents  itself. 

3.  A  Japanese  attack  on  Siberia  is  unlikely  as  long  as  Russian  resistance  in 
Europe  continues,  and  as  long  as  the  Siberian  forces  are  not  materially  reduced 
in  strength.  Action  under  5  above  might,  and  under  c  or  d  above  would  cer- 
tainly bring  Japan  into  armed  conflict  with  .ABD  powers — a  situation  which 
Japan,  at  present,  wishes  to  avoid. 

4.  A  drive  from  Indo-China  into  Yunnan  wouM  probably  not  involve  Japan 
with  any  Third  Power.  Although  an  extremely  diflicult  operation  for  the  Japa- 
nese, requiring  elaborate  preparation  on  their  part,  a  successful  drive  into  Yun- 
nan and  across  the  Burma  Road,  even  if  it  did  not  cause  China's  early  capitula- 
tion, would  nevertheless,  be  a  terriflc  blow  at  her  chances  of  holding  out.  It 
would  not  however,  have  the  effect  of  immediately  releasing  any  considerable 
Japanese  force  for  use  elsewhere,  since  long-drawn  out  mopping  up  operations 
would  probab'y  be  necessary. 

5.  Because  of  the  ruggedness  of  the  terrain  in  southern  Yunnan,  and  the 
almost  complete  lack  of  communications,  the  Chinese,  if  determined,  could  put 
up  a  very  strong  resistance  even  with  the  means  now  at  their  disposal.  Such 
a  defense  would  further  deplete  Japan's  meager  resources  and  immobilize  her 
remaining  reserves.     (For  a  description  of  the  terrain  see  Tab  A.) 

6.  Japan's  most  probable  line  of  action,  therefore,  will  be  to  continue  her 
efforts  to  secure  a  relaxation  of  American  economic  pressure  while  completing 
her  plans  and  arranging  her  forces  for  an  advance  in  the  direction  which  will  be 
most  fruitful  of  auick  results. 

SHEaiMAN  Miles, 
Brigadier  General,  U.  S.  Army, 
Acting  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  0-2. 


I.  B.  148-1 

November  13,  1941. 
Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff: 

Subject :  Possible  Japanese  Drive  into  Yunnan. 

1.  Reference  is  made  to  memorandum  of  this  Division  to  the  Chief  of  Staff, 
I.  B.  148,  November  1, 1941,  subject :  Possible  Japanese  Drive  into  Yunnan.  In  this 
memorandum  emphasis  was  placed  on  the  principal  avenue  of  advance,  Laokai- 
Kunming.  Since  its  submission  the  question  has  been  raised  of  the  possibility  of 
a  Japanese  advance  against  Kunming  and  the  Burma  road  through  Kwangsi 
Province,  in  conjunction  with  a  penetration  up  the  normal  avenue  of  the  Yunnan 
railroad,  Laokai-Mengtze-Kunming. 


» Omitted. 
79716  O— 46— pt.  14 30 


1364     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

2.  The  axis  of  the  route  thi-ough  Kwangsi  is  the  course  of  the  Yu  river,  150 
miles  northeast  of  the  Yunnan  railroad  and  roughly  parallel  to  it.  (See  Map, 
Tab  A.)  This  river  rises  in  the  mountains  of  eastern  Yunnan  and  flows  through 
southwest  Kwangsi  Province  to  its  confluence  with  the  West  River  near  Nanning. 
It  is  navigible  for  river  junks  as  far  west  as  Poseh.  To  make  use  of  this  cor- 
ridor the  Japanese  would  have  to  move  north  from  Hanoi  to  Caobang,  thence 
across  the  Chinese  border  to  the  vicinity  of  Poseh,  whence  they  could  launch 
their  attack  up  the  Yunnan  escarpment  toward  Kwangnan  on  the  plateau,  150 
miles  southeast  of  Kunming. 

This  would  be  an  even  more  difficult  operation  than  a  direct  attack  along  the 
Yunnan  railway  line,  since  the  supply  problem  would  be  enormous.  -  Fron? 
Caobang  a  fair  road  for  light  motor  traffic  runs  185  miles  north  to  Poseh.  Most 
bridges  on  this. route  have  a  capacity  of  only  li^  tons.  Also  it  is  probable  that 
since  the  Japanese  occupation  of  Indo-China,  the  Chinese  have  destroyed  the  road 
near  the  border. 

Poseh  can  also  be  reached  by  the  Hanoi-Langson-Nanning  road,  and  thence 
northwest  via  Wuming  and  the  Yu  valley.  Somewhat  better  roads  exist  on  this 
route  but  the  distance  from  Langson  to  Poseh  is  about  260  miles,  as  compared 
with  185  from  Caobang  to  Poseh.  Here  also,  the  Chinese  have  demolished  the 
highways  near  the  border,  and  also  the  railway  line  which  was  under  construc- 
tion before  the  Japanese  occupation  of  Nanning  in  1940. 

Arrived  at  Poseh  tlie  Japanese  would  be  confronted  with  practically  the  same 
difficult  terrain  conditions  as  at  Laokai,  on  the  frontier.  Poseli  has  an  elevation 
of  525  feet ;  Kwangnan,  4.515.  The  air  distance  between  the  two  is  approximately 
100  miles,  and  there  are  no  motor  roads  in  existence.  (The  Chinese  have  been 
surveying  a  highway  from  Kaihua,  east  of  Mengtze  on  the  Yunnan  railway, 
through  Kwangnan  to  Poseh,  but  latest  reports  indicate  no  actual  construction 
on  this  route.)     The  terrain  is  almost  as  rugged  as  that  north  of  Laokai. 

The  only  apparent  reason  for  use  of  this  route  would  be  in  the  event  that 
the  Japanese  plan  of  campaign  called  for  a  "pincers"  movement  on  Kunming. 
However,  it  would  not  be  a  true  envelopment  as  initially  it  would  be  directed 
against  Chinese  forces  not  allotted  to  the  defense  of  Kunming.  Ab.sence  of  lateral 
communication  inside  China  would  be  a  serious  handicap  to  such  an  operation, 
to  say  nothing  of  the  long  line  of  conmiunications  through  a  hostile  territory. 

3.  a.  For  defense  against  a  movement  through  Kwangsi  Province,  there  are 
available  in  the  Fourth  War  Zone  (Kwangsi  and  western  Kwangtung)  the 
following  troop^ 

16th  Group  Army:  31st  Army  Corps  of  2  divisions:  46th  Army  Corps  of  2 
divisions. 
35th  Group  Army :  64th  Army  Corps  of  2  divisions. 

These  are  regular  troops,  largely  veterans  from  Kwangsi  and  adjacent  areas, 
of  excellent  fighting  ability.  The  Zone  Commander  is  Chang  Fa-kuei,  a  very 
capable  oflicer  of  long  experience. 

b.  The  Chinese  lack  artillery,  are  very  short  of  ammunition,  both  artillery 
and  small  arms,  and  to  all  practical  purposes  are  devoid  of  an  air  force. 

4.  An  attack  on  Kunming  through  Kwangsi  Province  is  only  conceivable  in 
conjunction  with  an  advance  up  the  Yunnan  railway.  It  is  estimated  that  this 
would  require  at  least  an  additional  five  Japanese  divisions,  or  a  minimum 
total  task  force  of  10  divisions. 

5.  It  is  estimated  that  there  are  now  available  in  Indo-China  for  an  expedition 
against  Kunming  a  maxinuun  of  40,000  troops,  probably  less.  At  least  160.000 
troops  would  have  to  be  brought  into  Indo-China  through  Haiphong  for  a  double 
envelopment,  and  at  least  60O(X>  for  a  single  direct  attack.  ONI  estimates 
the  capacity  of  this  port  at  2.(X)0  fully  equipped  troops  per  day.  On  this  basis, 
under  the  most  favorable  circumstances,  at  least  one  month  would  be  required  to 
concentrate  a  sufficient  foi'ce  for  the  direct  attack  up  the  Yunnan  railway. 
Between  two  and  three  months  would  be  i-equired  to  make  the  concentration  for 
a  double  attack  up  the  railway  and  up  the  Yu  river  valley. 

6.  The  rate  of  Japanese  advance  on  Kunming  once  the  border  is  crossed,  would 
depend  on  the  degree  of  Chinese  resistance,  especially  in  the  defense  of  the 
extremely  rugged  terrain  between  the  Indo-Chinese  and  Yu  river  plains  and 
the  Yunnan  plateau. 

7.  A  Japanese  offensive  into  Yunnan  from  Indo-China  would  be  an  extremely 
difficult  operation  but  if  it  were  successful  in  closing  the  supply  route  from  Burma 
it  would  be  a  serious  blow  to  China's  power  and  will  to  resist.  In  this  connec- 
tion it  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  British  War  Office  concludes  that  such  an 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1365 

offensive  would  be  rendered  "most  diflBcult"  by  reason  of  the  supply  problem 

alone,  while  the  French  Military  Attache  at  Tokyo  ridicules  any  idea  of  an 

attack  on  Yunnan  from  Indo-China. 

Sherman  Miles, 
Brigadier  Oenera],  U.  S.  Army, 
Acting  Assistant  Chi^f  of  Staff,  0-2. 

Enclosure : 
Tab  A/ 

Distribution : 

THE  PRESIDENT  Mr.  Lauchlin  Currie 

Secretary  of  War  Division  of  Defense  Aid  Reports 

Secretary  of  State  Director  of  Naval  Intelligence 

Under  Secretary  of  War  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  W.  P.  D. 

Assistant  Secretary  of  War  G.  H.  Q. 

Assistant  Secretar-y  of  War  for  Air  Chief  of  the  Air  Corps 

Chief  of  Staff  Air  Corps 

Coordinator  of  Information  General  Embick 

Chief  of  the  Army  Air  Forces 


November  25,  1941. 
Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff :  ^ 

Subject :  Far  Eastern  Situation. 

1.  The  following  are  extracts  from  cables  received  in  the  Offtce  of  Naval 
Intelligence  together  with  G-2  comment  thereon  : 

a.  From  Shanghai  November  21.  Intense  activity  at  Woosung  since  the  15th. 
Unusual  number  of  ships  present  including  former  merchant  craft  10,000  tons 
and  up.  Wednesday  10  transports  sailed,  eight  of  which  carried  troops.  Same 
day  32  additional  ships,  similar  type,  anchored  in  lower  Whangpoo.  Landing 
boats  included  in  outgoing  equipment.  On  decks  of  three  outgoing  ships  was 
observed  a  number  of  creosoted  heavy  timber  trestles  in  sections  each  approxi- 
mately 60  feet  long  and  8  feet  wide.  Several  merchant  vessels  recently  taken 
over  observed  installing  machine  gun  mounts.  One  thousand  troops  departed 
from  Swatow  last  Saturday. 

0-2  Comment:  Movement  of  troops  from  Central  China  believed  directed 
toward  Hainan  and  Indo-China.  No  evidences  of  heavy  concentration  on 
Taiwan  (Formosa). 

ft.  From  Guam  November  23.  Increased  naval  activity  Truk,  Saipan  area. 
Indicated  increases  base  forces  in  Mandates.  Additions  to  fleet; — Palao,  one 
division  Marus ;  Truk,  two  divisions  Marus ;  and  two  seaplane  tenders,  also 
shore  command  (possible  landing  force).  Saipan,  two  divisions  Marus;  Jaluit, 
three  divisions  Marus  and  three  unidentified  shore  commands,  also  two  seaplane 
tenders.  Air  force  activity  increasing.  Eleventh  Air  Group  believed  in  Palao. 
Airon  24  concentrated  in  Marshalls.  Fifth  Fleet  apparently  at  Chichijima, 
portions  possibly  at  Marcus.  It  is  estimated  that  70  itinerant  ships  arrived  or 
departed  from  Mandates  since  November  1  with  emphasis  on  Truk  and  Jaluit 
areas. 

Cf-2  Comment:  Marus  are  small  cargo  or  passenger  vessels  requisitioned 
by  the  Navy  for  use  as  trains,  supply  vessels  and  tenders.  A  Dityision  of 
Marus  consists  of  some  two  to  four  vessels. 

The  Eleventh  Air  Oro-ihp  is  something  a  little  larger  than  an  American 
Squadron.  The  Fifth  Fleet  consists  of  odds  and  ends  of  vessels  not  useable 
by  the  Combined  Fleet.  Airon  24  consists  of  one  old  carrier  (Kamoi)  and 
one  converted  carrier. 

2.  From  information  available  in  the  Division  the  Japanese  strength  in  the 
mandated  islands  is  believed  to  be  as  follows : 

15,000  ground  troops.  8  destroyers. 

100  aircraft  of  all  types.  9  submarines. 

4  light  cruisers. 

3.  The  Navy  Department  have  supplied  the  following  connnent  on  November 
24th  regarding  Japanese  activity  in  the  Western  Pacific  : 

"Apparent  establishment  by  Japan  of  combined  air  and  surface  patrol  over* 
shipping  routes  U.  S.  to  Australia.     Daily  aircraft  patrols  observed  extending 

1  Omitted. 


1366    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

over  Gilbert  Islands  from  Jaluit.  Surface  craft  believed  covering  area  extending 
to  Ellice  Island.  Fishing  fleet  reported  cooperating  with  patrols.  Fishing  fleet 
divided  in  three  sections :  one  in  vicinity  of  Bathhurst  Island,  one  near  Arnham, 
one  near  Thursday  Islands.  Fishing  fleet  expected  to  appear  around  Dutch 
New  Guinea.    These  ships  equipped  with  long  range  radio." 

(signed)     Sherman  Miles 

Sherman  Miles, 
Brigadier  Oeneral,  U.  IS.  Army, 
Acting  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  Ch-2. 
Distribution : 

Secretary  of  War 
War  Plans  Division 
GHQ 


November  26,  1941. 
Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff : 

Subject:  Japanese  Naval  Task  Force. 

The  following  information  was  received  from  the  Commandant  14th  Naval 
District  through  the  OflBce  of  Naval  Intelligence  at  12 :  45  a.  m.,  this  date : 

1.  The  Japanese  have  been  organizing  a  naval  task  force  for  the  past  month 
comprising : 

a.  Second  Fleet:  Under  the  command  of  Commander-in-Chief,  Second  Fleet. 
(The  Second  Fleet  corresponds  roughly  to  our  Scouting  Force,  consisting  mainly 
of  strong  Cruiser  Divisions). 

6.  Third  Fleet  which  formerly  was  the  China  Coast  Command  Force  including 
its  first  and  second  base  forces,  constituted  by  miscellaneous  small  vessels. 

c.  Combined  Air  Force  consisting  of  all  large  carrier  forces. 

d.  Also  destroyer  squadron  3,  air  squadron  7,  submarine  squadron  5,  and 
possibly  1  battleship  division  from  First  Fleet  consisting  of  3  battleships. 

Summary  of  Above :  14  Heavy  Cruisers,  4  Light  Cruisers,  10  Carriers,  3  Light 
Cruisers.  2  Destroyer  Squadrons  (24  destroyers),  2  Submarine  Squadrons  (18 
submarines),  and  possibly  3  battleships. 

2.  The  combined  air  force  has  assembled  in  Takao,  Formosa,  with  some  units 
believed  in  Hainan  Island.  The  Third  Fleet  is  believed  moving  in  direction  of 
Takao  and  Bako,  Pescadores  off  West  Coast  of  Formosa,  from  home  waters  in 
Japan.  Units  from  the  Second  Fleet  are  at  present  possibly  enroute  to  South 
China  as  advance  scouts.  Strong  concentration  of  submarines  and  air  groups 
in  the  Marshalls.    Present  location, other  units  of  this  task  force  are  not  known. 

3.  The  evaluation  put  upon  the  above  information  by  the  Commandant,  14th 
Naval  District  is  that  a  strong  force  may  be  preparing  to  operate  in  Southeastern 
Asia,  while  component  parts  thereof  may  be  expected  to  operate  from  Palao  and 
the  aiarshall  Islands. 

Sherman  Miles, 
Brigadier  General,  U.  8.  Army, 
Acting  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  0-2. 
Distribution : 

Secretary  of  War 

Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  W.  P.  D. 

I.  B.  File 

Far  East  Section 

Record  Section 


November  27, 1941. 
Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff: 
Subject :  Recent  developments  in  the  Far  East. 

1.  It  has  been  reported  on  good  authority,  that  between  18  and  24  Infantry 
Divisions  and  8  Armored  Brigades  from  the  Russian  Far  Eastern  Army  have 
been  identified  on  the  Western  front.  If  this  is  true,  between  24  and  18  Divisions 
and  2  Armored  Brigades  remain  in  Eastern  Siberia.  Thus  the  possibility  of  a 
Kwantung  Army  offensive  thrust  against  Siberia  is  increased,  although  such 
a  move  is  not  believed  imminent  at  present. 

2.  Certain  Japanese  troops  have  been  withdrawn  from  North  and  Central 
China  within  the  last  three  weeks — 24,000  of  them  sailed  from  Woosung  (near 
Shanghai)  between  November  15  and  23.  The  transports  carried  184  landing 
boats.     Several  other  ships  left  during  same  period,  number  of  troops  and  cargoes 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1367 

unchecked.     A  special  landing  craft  carrier  left  Shanghai  the  18th  of  Novem- 
ber and  was  sighted  of  Wenchow  on  the  23th  sailing  southwest. 

3.  A  Naval  Task  Force  which  was  reported  by  the  14th  Naval  District  (Hawaii) 
as  organized  and  concentrated  at  Taiwan  and  Hainan  appears,  according  to 
a  November  27  radio  from  the  16th  Naval  District  (Manila)  to  be  a  loosely 
organized  force  on  its  way  to  an  unknown  concentration  point.  According  to 
the  latter  dispatch  it  consists  of: 

3-4  battleships   (possibly  only)  5  mine  layers 

3  carriers  4  converted  seaplane  carriers 

11  heavy  cruisers  12  mine  sweepers 

5  light  cruisers  12  patrol  motor  boats 

47  destroyers  14  others 

16  submarines 

It  is  apparently  not  yet  ready  for  concerted  action  as  its  Commander  is  still  in 
home  waters  and  the  force  concentration  has  not  yet  taken  place. 

4.  The  Japanese  land  forces  in  the  Mandated  Islands  have  been  gradually 
increased  in  the  last  6  months  from  5,000  to  15,000  men,  and  they  now  have  about 
100  combat  planes  of  all  types,  plus  the  4th  Fleet,  a  mixed  naval  force  of  second 
class  units. 

5.  Reports  from  Bangkok  indicate  that  the  Japanese  Foreign  Office  officials 
there  expect  hostilities  to  break  out  in  that  region  in  the  near  future. 

6.  According  to  British  i-eports,  the  Japanese  have  made  and  will  continue  to 
make  aerial  reconnaissance  over  British  Pacitic  Islands,  especially  the  Gilbert 
Group,  Nauru  and  Ocean  Isands ;  also  over  the  Northern  portion  of  British 
Malaya. 

7.  Reliable  information  has  been  received  that  the  Japanese  Foreign  Office 
officials  in  North  French  Indo-China  expect  military  movements  in  and  through 
that  region  in  the  near  future. 

8.  In  Tongking,  the  total  number  of  Japanese  troops  remains  at  about  25,000 
(ly^  Divisions),  with  about  90  planes.  Since  November  21st,  additional  Japa- 
nese troops  have  been  moving  into  Southern  French  Indo-China :  10,000  from 
Tongking  (which  have  been  replaced  there  by  other  troops),  and  some  20,000  by 
sea.  Conservative  estimate  of  number  of  Japanese  troops  now  in  southern  Indo- 
China  is  at  least  70,000.  This  is  approximately  SVj  Divisions.  The  number  of 
Japanese  planes  has  also  been  increased  by  82  (London,  Military  Attache  report, 
November  25) ,  bringing  the  total  in  the  south  to  not  less  than  157.  There  may  be 
more  than  this  number  since  observation  is  limited.  A  large  quantity  of  equip- 
ment has  been  landed  in  Indo-China  in  the  last  60-70  days  in  amounts  far  in 
excess  of  current  needs  for  the  force  believed  there  at  present.  Totals  (mini- 
mum) : 

At  Saigon  :  300  side  cars 

90   Tanks    (under  5  tons)  (Bren  gun    20  road  rollers 

carriers?)  5,000  collapsible  rubber  boats 

42  Tanks  (7  to  9  tons)  500  horses 
About     30     other     Armored     vehicles    3  locomotives 

(Type  not  specified)  500    light     railway     freight     cars     (4 

60  75-mm.  guns.  wheel) 

230  Guns — various  calibers  1,500  cases  gas  masks 

1.030  trucks  14  ambulances 

200  motorcycles  52  armored  cars 

At  Hanoi: 

900  Trucks. 

Large  quantities  of  railway  material  (type  not  specified)  oil  and  aviation 
gasoline  (quantities  not  mentioned).  Tanks  and  artillery  (quantities,  types, 
calibers,  not  mentioned). 

9.  According  to  a  i-eliable  report  of  November  17,  there  ig  a  concentration  of 
approximately  50,000  troops  on  the  Island  of  Hainan.  The  air  bases  on  the 
southern  part  of  this  island  are  capable  of  holding  several  hundred  planes  which 
can  be  flown  from  there  to  Tourane  in  Indo-China  and  from  that  point  to  Saigon, 
which  is  only  about  400  miles  from  Tourane. 

10.  A  reliable  source  reported  on  November  25  that  an  unconfirmed  report  to 
the  Hanoi  government  indicated  Japanese  plans  for  an  invasion  of  Thailand 


1368    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

about  Decembei-  1,  including  seizure  of  the  Isthmus  of  Kra.  In  connection  with 
this  last  item,  the  Japanese  are  reliably  reported  to  have  been  working  on  a 
naval  and  air  base  at  Kompongson  Bay  on  the  Gulf  of  Siam,  since  September  27, 
1941.  Also  Japanese  reconnaissance  planes  have  recently  been  seen  over  northern 
Malaya. 

11.  Up  to  the  evening  of  November  26th,  the  Japanese  Ambassador  had  been 
unable  to  make  the  Secretary  of  State  yield  to  Japanese  proposals  and  demands, 
and  in  consequence  the  Japanese  hopes  for  an  appeasing  settlement  by  the  United 
States  are  very  slim. 

12.  There  is  good  evidence  that  the  Japanese  are  prepared  to  use  chemical  and 
probably  bacteriological  warfare  whenever  and  wherever  they  deem  it  necessary 
or  profitable  to  do  so. 

13.  A  press  dispatch  of  November  21  quotes  the  Chinese  military  spokesman, 
Chungking,  as  accusing  the  Japanese  of  starting  germ  warfare.  He  said  that  on 
November  4th  Japanese  planes  dropped  food  and  clothing  at  Changteh,  Hunan 
Province  and  that  persons  who  made  use  of  these  were  taken  ill  and  died  with 
symptoms  similar  to  those  of  bubonic  plague.  (The  Military  Attache  Chungking 
is  investigating  this  report). 

14.  From  the  foregoing  it  appears  evident  that  the  Japanese  have  completed 
plans  for  further  aggressive  moves  in  Southeastern  Asia.  These  plans  will  prob- 
ably be  put  into  effect  soon  after  the  armed  services  feel  that  the  Kurusu  mission 
is  a  definite  failure.  A  task  force  of  about  five  divisions,  supported  by  appro- 
priate air  and  naval  units  has  been  assembled  for  the  execution  of  these  plans. 
This  force  is  now  enroute  southward  to  an  as  yet  undetermined  rendezvous. 

15.  This  Division  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  initial  move  will  be  made  against 
Thailand  from  the  sea  and  overland  through  Southern  Indo-China.  It  is  further 
believed  that  the  Japanese  are  uncertain  of  the  reaction  of  the  ABD  powers  to 
this  move  and  therefore  have  organized  in  suffioient  strength  to  cope  with  any 
opposition  they  might  initially  encounter  from  those  powers  in  the  South  China 
Sea. 

Sherman  Miles, 
Brigadier  General,  U.  8.  Army, 
Acting  Assistant  Chief  of  l^taff,  0-2. 
Distribution : 

Secretary  of  War  • 
Assistant  Secretary  of  War 
Assistant  Secretary  of  "War  for  Air 
Chief  of  the  Army  Air  Forces 
Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  W.  P.  D. 
Director  of  Naval  Intelligence 
G.  H.  Q. 


I.  B.  159 

November  29,  1941. 
Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff : 

Subject:  Brief  Periodic  Estimate  of  the  Situation  December  1,  1941-March  31. 
1942. 

I.  Oenernl. 

1.  This  estimate  is  addressed  to  the  objective  of  Nazi  defeat.  Its  purpose  is  to 
examine  the  factors  of  strength  and  weakness  and  of  strategic  positions  of  the 
Nazis  and  of  their  opponents,  in  order  to  present  the  military  possibilities  and 
probabilities  during  the  period  December  1,  1941  to  March  31,  1942. 

2.  a.  During  that  period  Germany,  though  weakened  by  her  losses  in  Russia, 
will  remain  the  only  power  capable  of  launching  large  scale  strategic  offensives. 
Her  success  In  Uussia  and  the  advent  of  winter  make  disposable  a  larger  portion 
of  German  land  and  air  iwwer  than  at  any  time  since  the  beginning  of  the  Russo- 
German  war.  On  the  other  hand,  the  price  she  has  had  to  pay  for  her  Russian 
success  and  the  width  of  the  wasted  zone  behind  her  Eastern  Front  Indicate  that 
a  considei'able  period  of  time  would  be  required  for  the  reorganization  and 
redisposltlon  of  lier  major  forces.  The  German  conduct  of  war,  so  far,  has  been 
characterized  by  a  thoroughness  and  delibei-ation  in  this  regard.  Between  the 
end  of  one  campaign  and  the  launching  of  the  next  there  have  been  considerable 
periods  of  time.     In  the  present  case,   if  Germany  should  decide  to  shift  the 


EXHIBITS    OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  1369 

theater  of  war,  all  indications  point  to  an  even  greater  necessity  for  a  consider- 
able time  lag  than  has  so  far  existed  between  her  successive  campaigns.  Large 
scale  German  strategic  offensives  are  therefore  not  to  be  expected  outside  of  the 
Russian  theater  within  the  period  under  consideration.  It  is  much  more  prob- 
able that  Germany  will  continue  her  attack  on  Russia,  particularly  in  the 
Ukraine  and  the  North  Caucasus  plain  between  the  Azov  and  Caspian  Seas  during 
the  winter  and  early  spring. 

ft.  Japan  also  has  the  strategic  initiative,  but  to  a  much  more  limited  degree 
than  is  the  case  with  Germany.  Japan,  already  extended  militarily,  has  a  multi- 
plicity of  strategic  objectives;  but  for  a  variety  of  reasons,  she  cannot  concen- 
trate the  required  forces  to  attack  any  of  them  on  a  large  scale  and  with  assur- 
ance of  success.  A  possible  exception  to  the  latter  statement  lies  in  the 
contingency  of  a  serious  depletion  of  Russian  forces  in  eastern  Siberia.  But  even 
in  this  case,  a  large  scale  Japanese  strategic  offensive  against  Siberia  during 
the  period  in  question  is  somewhat  doubtful  in  the  light  of  present  politico- 
military  situation  and  of  the  rigorous  winter  climate  in  that  region. 

c.  Great  Britain  is  pressing  a  limited  strategic  offensive  in  Libya  and  has  taken 
the  aerial  offensive  over  Western  Europe.  She,  too,  is  extended  militarily  and 
more  extensive  ground  and  aerial  action  is  beyond  her  means. 

d.  All  other  belligerent  or  potentially  belligerent  powers  must  be  considered 
incapable  of  large  .scale  strategic  offensives  during  the  period  in  question.  The 
United  States,  committed  to  the  defeat  of  Nazi  Germany,  is  an  increasingly  impor- 
tant element  in  the  situation.  Our  influence  is  exerted  in  naval  and  aerial  partic- 
ipation in  the  Battle  of  the  Atlantic,  in  the  supply  of  material  and  technical  assist- 
ance to  the  four  land  theaters  and  in  psychological,  economic  and  political  action 
against  the  Axis  throughout  the  world.  But  all  this  does  not  sum  up  to  a  large 
scale  strategical  offensive.  We  have  only  a  means  of  strategical  maneuver — our 
ability  to  make  available  more  or  less  material  and  technical  facilities  and  in  their 
allocation  to  those  theaters  where  they  will  be  most  advantageously  employed. 

e.  Neither  the  economic  nor  the  psychologic  situation  in  Germany  indicates  any 
possibility  of  weakening  the  Nazi  power  to  a  critical  extent  during  the  period  in 
question. 

/.  From  the  above  it  must  be  concluded  that,  during  the  period  in  question  : 

(1)  Neither  the  anti-Axis  nor  the  Axis  powers  can  force  a  decision. 

(2)  The  anti-Axis  powers  will  have  a  period  of  at  least  four  months  in  which 
they  may  strengthen  their  position  in  one  or  more  of  the  four  important  theaters 
of  war,  and  in  which  they  may  decide  upon  a  regrouping  of  forces,  subject  to 
certain  physical  limitations,  con.sonant  with  their  chosen  long  range  strategy  for 
the  defeat  of  the  Nazis. 

II.  Brief  Estimate  on  the  Theaters  of  War. 

1.  The  British  Isles.  This  theater  is  the  citadel  of  the  Anti-Axis  Powers.  Its 
security  is,  therefore,  so  essential  to  Nazi  defeat  that  it  must  be  held.  The 
groimd,  sea  and  aerial  defenses  of  the  islands  have  been  and  are  being  materially 
strengthened. 

For  reasons  given  previously,  it  is  not  believed  that  Germany  will  be  in  a  posi- 
tion to  attempt  an  invasion  of  the  islands  during  the  period  in  question.  It  is 
probable  that  an  invasion,  if  attempted,  will  be  delayed  until  mid-summer  of 
1942.  An  attempt  made  at  that  time  will  probably  be  unsuccessful.  As  for  the 
present,  after  a  short  delay  for  reoi'^anization  and  transfer,  Germany  can  launch 
large-scale  air  attacks  on  the  United  Kingdom  at  any  time  that  she  is  willing 
to  move  the  necessary  forces  from  the  Russian  front.  In  view  of  the  improved 
Britisb  defenses  and  of  the  weakening  of  the  German  Air  Force,  however,  it  is 
estimated  that  in  the  period  in  question  such  attacks  cannot  reach  the  intensi- 
ties of  those  of  the  winter  of  1940-41. 

From  this  theater  the  only  British  offensive  capability  lies  in  the  air.  It  is 
to  be  expected  that  strategic  bombing  of  Germany  and  the  occupied  territories 
will  continue;  but  that  this  action  will  be  indecisive. 

Material  aid  from  the  United  States  has  been  an  esential  element  in  the  re- 
sistance and  survival  of  the  B''itish  Isles.  Continuance  of  this  aid  is  still  essen- 
tial.    It  is,  fortunately,  the  easiest  of  all  the  land  theaters  for  us  to  aid. 

2.  The  Atlantic.  The  Battle  of  the  Atlantic  is  essentially  a  struggle  for  the  sea 
lanes  radiating  from  the  United  Kingdom,  this  conflict  is  now  trending  against 
Germany.  Sinkings  by  the  Axis  are  decreasing  and  ship  construction  in  Britain 
and  the  United  States  is  increasing.     It  is  now  probable  that  replacements  have 


1370    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

overtaken   losses.     Figures   on    ship   and    tonnage   losses   during   1941   are   as 
follows : — 

Losses  (British,  Allied  and  Neutral) 


: 

Total 

Monthly  average/ 

Ships 

Tonnage 

Ships 

Tonnage 

January  1  to  June  30  (6  months) 

628 
285 

2,  755,  242 
1, 000, 990 

105 
63 

459, 207 

June  30  to  Nov.  15  (4^  months)         -  - 

222,442 

During  October  over  4,200,000  tons  of  goods  were  imiwrted  into  the  United 
Kingdom,  as  compared  with  a  monthly  average  for  the  year  of  approximately 
2,500,000.  The  October  imports  were  received  after  the  United  States  Navy 
began  convoy  duty  in  the  Atlantic.  As  the  weight  of  the  United  States  Navy 
continues  to  increase,  success  in  the  Battle  of  the  Atlantic  should  be  assured. 

Since  Germany's  means  of  attack  (surface  raiders,  long-range  planes  and 
submarines)  are  of  limited  use  in  other  theaters,  it  is  to  be  expected  that  she 
will  continue  the  offensive  in  this  theater,  regardless  of  results  or  of  operations 
elsewhere. 

The  United  States  is  contributing  powerfully  to  the  decision  in  the  Battle 
of  the  Atlantic  by  direct  naval  action  and  by  the  building  of  cargo  vessels.  Con- 
tinuance of  this  action  is  essential  to  the  defeat  of  Germany. 

3.  Eastern  Theater.  By  a  series  of  relentless  offensives  Germany  has  occupiei^ 
vast  stretches  of  terrain,  including  many  of  Russia's  industrial  regions  and  has 
inflicted  grave  casualties  on  the  Red  Army.  But  Germany  has  suffered  great 
losses  in  men  and  material,  and  has  not  yet  attained  her  basic  objectives  of 
destroying  the  Russian  armies  and  the  Stalin  regime.  While  Germany  could 
transfer  her  principal  military  effort  to  other  theaters  this  winter,  it  is  esti- 
mated that  she  will  continue  to  concentrate  on  the  attack  on  Russian.  Specifi- 
cally she  will : 

Seek  to  destroy  the  mass  of  the  Russian  armies. 
Continue  the  seige  of  Leningrad. 

Attempt  to  cut  the  Russian  supply  lines  to  Archangel  and  Murmansk. 
Seek  to  seize  the  general  line  of  the  Volga. 

Attempt  to  overrun  the  Caucasus,  thus  obtaining  oil  and  securing  a  jump- 
off  position  for  an  eventual  advance  into  the  Middle  East. 

The  most  serious  German  threat  is  southeastwards  to  the  Caucasus,  and  her 
goal  is  oil.  Axis  forces  are  extending  eastward  north  of  Rostov  toward  the 
Don.  They  may  capture  Stalingrad  and  gain  control  of  the  Volga  south  to 
its  mouth  at  Astrakhan.  Russian  defense  of  the  North  Caucasus  will  probably 
eventually  fail,  after  substantially  delaying  the  Axis  advance.  With  sufficiently 
determined  and  prompt  allied  aid,  the  Germans  may  be  kept  from  occupation 
of  the  Trans-Caucasus  and  control  of  the  Baku  oil  fields. 

The  U.  S.  S.  R.  is  weaker,  relative  to  Germany,  than  at  the  outset  of  hos- 
tilities. Her  political  structure  has  remained  stable  and  her  armies,  while 
depleted,  have  not  been  irreparably  defeated.  Russia  is  favored  by  the  follow- 
ing :  The  extreme  cold  of  winter  is  a  deterrent  to  operations,  and  Russian 
training  and  technique  in  severe  winter  weather  is  considered  better  than  that 
of  the  invaders.  While  the  Soviet  situation  is  critical,  ready  availability  of 
manpower  resources  is  in  Russian  favor.  Defense  industry  is  in  operation  at 
approximately  60%  of  pre-war  volume.  British  and  American  material  assist- 
ance is  being  received ;  increased  and  continuing  allied  assistance  is  urgently 
required. 

The  following  considerations  are  unfavorable  to  the  U.  S.  S.  R. :  The  uncer- 
tainty of  the  Far  Eastern  situation  causes  concentration  of  efficient  Soviet 
ti^oops  along  the  Manchukuo  frontier,  not  available  for  use  in  the  western  theater. 
The  Soviet  Army  has  shortages  in  tanks,  all  weapons,  probably  in  all  ammuni- 
tion. The  shortage  in  tanks  is  especially  serious ;  that  in  small  arms  and  small 
arms  ammunition  is  less  marked  than  in  other  weapons.  The  means  of  supply 
from  the  outside  world  are  difficult  and  precarious.  To  date  no  British  opera- 
tion elsewhere  has  been  sufficiently  strong  to  cause  any  withdrawal  of  German 
troops  from  Russia. 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  1371 

Aside  from  surrender,  which  seems  unlikely,  Russia's  only  feasible  line  of 
action  is  to  resist  stubbornly  in  the  hope  that  attrition,  climate  and  lengthened 
communications  will  eventually  bring  her  assailants  to  a  standstill.  By  the 
spring  of  1942  it  is  estimated  that  organized  but  depleted  Russian  armies  will 
stand  behind  the  Volga  and  perhaps  even  as  far  west  as  Moscow.  It  is  also 
probable  that  Russian  forces  will  hold  the  Caucasus  mountains  and  Trans- 
Caucasia. 

With  her  industry  dislocated,  Russia  is  in  extreme  need  of  material  assistance 
from  abroad.  She  requires  raw  materials,  machine  tools  and  munitions.  Un- 
fortunately, the  avenues  of  entry  are  vulnerable,  limited  in  capacity  and  very 
awkwardly  located.  Aid  to  Russia  has  been  planned  on  the  basis  of  a  total 
import  capacity  of  500,000  tons  per  month.  It  is  by  no  means  certain  that  this 
figure  will  be  reached.  Russian  requirements  can  only  be  met  by  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain.  This  relatively  small  contribution  at  the  crisis  of 
the  Russo-German  war  appears  to  be  the  total  material  means  available  to  the 
Democracies  to  influence  the  struggle  within  this  theater. 

4.  Middle  Eastern  Theater.  In  this  theater,  extending  from  Libya  to  the 
Caspian,  only  the  western  segment  is  active.  In  Libya  the  British  are  engaged 
in  an  offensive  the  issue  of  which  is  still  in  doubt.  Farther  to  the  east,  Syria, 
Iraq  and  Iran  are  shielded  from  the  war  for  the  time  being  by  neutral  Turkey 
and  by  the  Russian  forces  in  the  Caucasus. 

Because  of  the  Russian  campaign  and  certain  great  logistic  diflBculties,  there 
is  practically  no  danger  of  an  Axis  major  offensive  in  this  theater,  from  the 
north,  before  the  spring  of  1942.  Even  a  British  defeat  in  their  current  Libyan 
operations  would  so  exhaust  the  Axis  forces  in  North  Africa  as  to  free  Alexandria 
and  Suez  from  the  threat  of  a  thrust  from  the  west.  A  British  victory  in  Libya 
would  probably  force  German  entry  into  Tunisia  and  their  occupation  of  Algiers 
and  Morocco.  But  such  an  eventuality  would  be  more  apt  to  delay  than  to  hasten 
an  all-out  German  offensive,  from  the  west  and  the  north,  against  the  Middle 
East  Theater. 

Even  if  successful  in  their  current  Libyan  offensive,  it  is  not  believed  that  the 
British  will  be  able  to  advance  through  Tripolitania  without  a  considerable 
delay  for  reorganization.  It  is  therefore  probable  that  from  the  British  point 
of  view  this  theater  will  shortly  become  a  defensive  one,  with  a  minimum  of 
.several  months  available  for  the  completion  of  its  organization. 

In  the  eastern  sector  of  this  theater  ( the  Levant,  Iraq  and  Iran ) ,  the  British 
are  gradually  building  a  substantial  force  to  meet  any  Axis  threat  to  the  area 
through  Turkey  or  the  Caucasus  Mountains.  In  the  Levant,  there  are  three 
Australian  divisions  with  other  troops,  and  General  Wavell  told  our  Military 
Observer  in  Iran  that  he  expected  to  have  at  least  ten  divisions  in  Northern 
Iraq  by  March  of  1942. 

The  United  States  is  committed  to  providing  great  masses  of  material  to  the 
Middle  East,  and  is  undertaking  vast  construction  projects  to  facilitate  supply. 
Except  the  British  Isles,  the  Middle  East  is  the  most  accessible  of  the  important 
active  theaters  to  us,  and  our  lines  of  supply  to  it,  though  long,  are  the  least 
vulnerable. 

We  are  building  up  an  influence  on  British  military  policy  in  the  Middle  East. 
Further  American  commitments,  including  probably  the  eventual  employment 
of  our  armed  forces,  will  be  necessary  in  this  region. 

5.  The  Far  Eastern  Theater.  Here  the  initiative  rests  with  Japan  in  spite 
of  her  military  overextension.    She  has  the  following  lines  of  action  open  to  her : 

c.  Attack  Siberia. 

h.  Attack  Yunnan  Province  to  cut  the  Burma  Road  with  a  view  to  an  early 
end  to  the  war  with  China. 

c.  Occupy  Thailand. 

d.  Through  Thailand,  attack 

(1)  Burma  and  the  Burma  Road, 

(2)  Malaya. 

e.  Attack  the  Philippines  and  Hong  Kong,  preparatory  to  a  movement  on 
Singapore  or  the  Netherlands  East  Indies. 

f.  Contain  or  isolate  the  Philippines  and  Hong  Kong  and 

(1)  Attack  Singapore 

(a)  directly  by  sea; 

(b)  by  sea  in  conjunction  with  a  land  attack  through  Thailand 
and  Malaya. 

(2)  Attack  the  Netherlands  East  Indies. 


1372    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

g.  Bide  her  time,  wait  for  a  better  opportunity  to  pursue  any  of  the  above 
lines  of  action,  hoping  that  the  course  of  events  will  turn  in  her  favor. 

h.  Seek  a  general  settlement  through  American  mediation,  including  an  under- 
standing with  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  as  to  political  and  economic 
penetration  of  southeast  Asia  and  the  southwestern  Pacific. 

i.  Raorient  her  whole  foreign  policy  by  withdrawing  from  the  Axis. 

(h)  and  (i)  are  impossible,  short  of  a  complete  overthrow  of  her  governing 
forces. 

The  most  probable  line  of  action  for  Japan  is  the  occupation  of  Thailand. 

The  forces  of  all  other  countries  in  the  Far  East  are  on  the  defensive  before 
Japan.  The  British  Commonwealth,  the  Netherlands  East  Indies  and  the  United 
States  are  in  consultative  association  for  the  defense  of  Maylasia.  To  date 
this  association  has  been  effective  in  slowing  down  the  Japanese  penetration  to 
the  southwest.  China  is  containing  the  equivalent  of  30  Japanese  divisions. 
The  U.  S.  S.  R.,  hard  pressed  for  troops  in  European  Russia,  has  reduced  her 
Siberian  garrisons  to  what  she  estimates  to  be  the  minimum  necessary  to  deter 
Japan  from  attacking  to  the  north.     So  far  she  has  been  successful  in  this  effort. 

China,  aided  and  encouraged  by  America,  will  remain  in  the  war  against  Japan 
and  will  continue  to  contain  important  Japanese  forces.  *  The  effective  use  of 
China's  unlimited  manpower,  as  an  anti-Axis  potential,  depends  entirely  on  the 
extent  to  which  she  is  able  tiO  equip  it,  particularly  in  artillery  and  aviation.  For 
this,  she  is  entirely  dependent  upon  the  United  States.  The  stronger  the  Chinese 
become,  the  more  Japanese  troops  will  be  pinned  down  in  China,  thereby  releasing 
further  Russian  strength  for  use  against  Hitler. 

Although  China  is  receiving  an  increasing  amount  of  equipment  from  this 
country,  a  major  offensive  by  the  Chinese  cannot  be  expected  during  the  period 
ending  March  31,  1942. 

The  British  Imperial  forces  in  Malaysia  and  at  Hong  Kong  occupy  a  purely 
defensive  role.  The  forces  in  Malaya  have  recently  been  re-enforced  by  addi- 
tional troops  from  Australia,  New  Zealand  (air),  and  India,  while  those  in 
Hong  Kong  have  been  augmented  by  the  arrival  of  Canadian  levies.  Both  of 
these  localities  present  a  very  strong  defense  against  any  possible  Japanese 
attack. 

The  people  and  government  of  the  Netherlands  East  Indies  have  continued, 
aflBrmatively  and  constructively,  to  function  practically  as  a  sovereign  state,  loyal 
to  the  mother  country.  As  evidence  of  Dutch  spirit,  they  (a)  have  reorganized 
their  army,  (b)  are  actively  at  work  manufacturing  needed  army  equipment,  (c) 
are  actively  training  reserves,  (d)  have  expanded  their  system  of  air  fields 
throughout  the  islands,  (e)  have  cooperated  with  the  British  and  United  States 
governments  in  preparation  of  extensive  plans  for  defense,  (f)  have  refused  to 
renew  their  commercial  treaty  with  Japan,  (g)  have  delivered  to  Japan  only 
10,000  tons  of  oil  since  January  1,  1941 — said  delivery  having  been  on  an  old 
contract  still  in  force. 

In  the  Far  East  the  United  States  is  concerned  as  a  possible  belligerent  and 
also  as  a  prime  source  of  war  materials  for  China,  the  British  Commonwealth 
and  for  the  Netherlands  East  Indies.  We  are  in  process  of  sending  a  few  mili- 
tary airplanes  to  Thailand.  But  this  theater  will  be  a  secondary  one  from  the 
point  of  view  of  supply.  ITnder  all  circumstances  we  will  continue  to  be  able 
to  supply  Australasia,  the  Dutch  East  Indies,  and  probably  also  China,  though 
somewhat  precariously,  through  the  Burma  Road.  Siberia  will  becT>me  completely 
cut  oflf  if  Japan  attacks  Russia. 

Our  influence  in  the  Far  Eastern  Theater  lies  in  the  threat  of  our  Naval  power 
and  the  effort  of  our  economic  blockade.  Both  are  primary  deterrents  against 
Japanese  all-out  entry  in  the  war  as  an  Axis  partner.  If  we  become  involved  in 
war  with  Japan  we  could  launch  a  serious  offensive  against  her  by  Naval  and 
Air  forces.  But  such  an  attack  would  fall  short  of  a  major  strategic  offensive 
because  it  could  not  be  decisive  within  a  reasonable  time,  and  still  more,  because 
it  would  be  a  diversion  of  forces  away  from  rather  than  toward  our  objective, 
the  defeat  of  the  Nazis. 
III.  Morale. 

The  outstanding  feature  of  the  war  in  1941  has  been  the  rise  in  anti-Axis  and 
the  decline  in  Axis  morale. 

The  anti-Axis  powers  have  been  heartened  by  the  failure  of  the  German  air 
attack  on  Britain,  the  decreased  German  success  in  the  Atlantic,  the  continued 
resistance  in  the  Middle  and  Far  Eastern  theaters,  the  drain  on  Germany  of  the 
Russian  Campaign  and  of  her  conquered  territories,  and  probably  most  of  all, 
by  the  continued  progress  of  America  from  neutrality  towards  participation  in 
the  war. 


EXHIBITS    OF    JOINT    COMMITTEE  1373 

Even  more  notable  has  been  the  decline  in  Axis  nioraJe.  In  Italy  and  Japan 
the  reasons  are  obvious.  Both  are  weary  of  unsuccessful  war  and  economically 
distressed.  But  Gerniany  presents  a  true  paradox.  Here  is  a  warrior  nation 
which  has  made  colossal  sacrifices  to  build  war  power  and  has  had  unprece- 
dented success  in  war — and  yet  is  wholly  apathetic.  No  enthusiasm  prevails, 
only  the  desire  to  see  it  all  end. 

In  any  given  period,  a  nation  at  war  generally  finds  itself  in  one  of  three  mili- 
tary situations.  To  each  of  these  situations  there  should  be  a  corresponding 
moral  reaction.    These  situations  and  reactions  are : 

Military  Situation  Moral  Reaction 

1.  Superiority  of  strength.  Pose.ssion  1.  The  elan  of  victory — fighting  with 
of  initiative.    Unbroken  success.  confidence  of  success. 

2.  Approximate  equality  in  strength.  2.  The  grim  struggle — fighting  to  gain 
Initiative   doubtful.     Ultimate   success  .success. 

still  in  balance. 

3.  Inferiority  in  strength.  Strategic  3.  Their  "back  to  the  wall" — fighting 
initiative  lost.    Ultimate  success  doubt-    to  prevent  defeat. 

ful. 

Perhaps  the  most  fundamental  fact  in  the  war  situation  today  is  that  Ger- 
many is,  and  has  continuously  been  in  military  situation  Number  1,  while  the 
moral  reaction  of  her  people  is.  and  has  been  for  some  time  rather  lower  than 
Number  2. 

Tlie  morale  factor  in  the  war  will  be  affected  by  the  outcome,  probably  within 
the  next  month,  of  the  operations  in  Russia  and  in  Libya,  and  by  Japan's  de- 
cision. But  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  the  trend  of  1941  in  German 
morale  will  be  reversed  or  even  materially  reduced  in  the  period  under  dis- 
cussion. 

In  this  factor  lies  the  germ  of  Nazi  defeat. 

Sherman  Miij;s, 
Brigadier  General,  U.  S.  Army, 
Acting  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-2 
Distribution : 

The  President  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-i 

Secretary  of  War  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  W.  P.  D. 

Secretary  of  State  G.  H.  Q. 

Under  Secretary  of  War  Chief  of  the  Air  Corps 

Assistant  Secretary  of  War  Director  of  Naval  Intelligence 

Assistant   Secretary  of  War  for  Coordinator  of  Information 

Air  General  Embick 

The  Chief  of  Staff.  Record  Section 

Chief  of  the  Army  Air  Forces  I.  B.  File 

Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-1 
Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-3 
dya 


I.  B.  159t-A 


December  5,  1941. 


Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff: 

Subject:  Suppleraehtarv  Brief  Periodic  Estimate  of  the  Situation  December  1. 
1941— March  81,  1942. 

I.  Oeneral. 

1.  This  estimate  is  addressed  to  tne  objective  of  Nazi  defeat.  Its  purpose  is  to 
examine  the  factors  of  strength  and  weakness  and  of  .'Strategic  positions  of  the 
Nazis  and  of  their  opponents,  in  order  to  present  the  military  possibilities  and 
probabilities  during  the  period  December  1,  1941  to  March  31,  1942.  It  supple- 
ments and  amplifies  the  Brief  Periodic  Estimate  of  the  Situation  December  1. 
1941-March  31,  1942,  issued  by  this  Division  on  November  29,  1941,  and  is 
believed  to  be  more  suitable  for  planning  purposes  than  the  previous  estimate. 

2.  a.  During  that  period  Germany,  though  weakened  by  her  losses  in  Russia, 
will  remain  the  only  power  capable  of  launching  large  scale  strategic  offensives. 
Her  success  in  Russia  and  the  advent  of  winter  make  disposable  a  larger  porti()n 
of  German  land  and  air  power  than  at  any  time  since  the  beginning  of  the 
Russo-German  war.     On  the  other  hand,  the  price  .she  has  had  to  pay  for  her 


1374    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Russian  success  and  the  width  of  the  wasted  zone  behind  her  Eastern  Front  indi- 
cate that  a  considerable  period  of  time  would  be  required  for  the  reorganization 
and  redisposition  of  her  major  forces.  The  German  conduct  of  war,  so  far,  has 
been  characterized  by  a  thoroughness  and  deliberation  in  this  regard.  Between 
the  end  of  one  campaign  and  the  launching  of  the  next  there  have  been  con- 
siderable periods  of  time.  In  the  present  case,  if  Germany  should  decide  to 
shift  the  theater  of  war,  all  indications  point  to  an  even  greater  necessity  for  a 
considerable  time  lag  than  has  so  far  existed  between  her  successive  campaigns. 
Large  scale  German  strategic  offensives  are  therefore  not  to  be  expected  outside 
of  the  Russian  theater  within  the  period  under  consideration.  It  is  much  more 
probable  that  Germany  will  continue  her  attack  on  Russia,  particularly  in  the 
Ukraine  and  the  North  Caucasus  plain  between  the  Azov  and  Caspian  Seas  during 
the  winter  and  early  spring. 

6.  Japan  also  has  the  strategic  initiative,  but  to  a  much  more  limited  degree 
than  is  the  case  with  Germany.  Japan,  already  extended  militarily,  has  a  mul- 
tiplicity of  strategic  objectives ;  but  for  a  variety  of  reasons,  she  cannot  concen- 
trate the  required  forces  to  attack  any  of  them  on  a  large  scale  and  with  assur- 
ance of  success.  A  possible  exception  to  the  latter  statement  lies  in  the  con- 
tingency of  a  serious  depletion  of  Russian  forces  in  eastern  Siberia.  But  even 
in  this  case,  a  large  scale  Japanese  strategic  offensive  against  Siberia  during 
the  period  in  question  is  somewhat  doubtful  in  the  light  of  present  politico- 
military  situation  and  of  the  rigorous  winter  climate  in  that  region. 

c.  Great  Britain  is  pressing  a  limited  strategic  offensive  in  Libya  and  has 
taken  the  aerial  offensive  over  Western  Europe.  She,  too,  is  extended  mili- 
tarily and  more  extensive  ground  and  aerial  action  is  beyond  her  means. 

d.  All  other  belligerent  or  potentially  belligerent  powers  must  be  considered 
incapable  of  large  scale  strategic  offensives  during  the  period  in  question.  The 
United  States,  committed  to  the  defeat  of  Nazi  Germany,  is  an  increasingly  impor- 
tant element  in  the  situation.  Our  influence  is  exerted  in  naval  and  aerial  par- 
ticipation in  the  Battle  of  the  Atlantic,  in  the  supply  of  material  and  technical 
assistance  to  the  four  land  theaters  and  in  psychological,  economic  and  political 
action  against  the  Axis  throughout  the  world.  But  all  this  does  not  sum  up 
to  a  large  scale  strategical  offensive.  We  have  only  a  means  of  strategical 
maneuver — our  ability  to  make  available  more  or  less  material  and  technical 
facilities  and  in  their  allocation  to  those  theaters  where  they  will  be  most  advan- 
tageously employed. 

e.  Neither  the  economic  nor  the  psychologic  situation  in  Germany  indicates 
any  possibility  of  weakening  the  Nazi  power  to  a  critical  extent  during  the  i)eriod 
in  question. 

/.  From  the  above  it  must  be  concluded  that,  during  the  period  in  question : 

(1)  Neither  the  anti-Axis  nor  the  Axis  powers  can  force  a  decision. 

(2)  The  anti-Axis  powers  will  have  a  period  of  at  least  four  months  in  which 
they  may  strengthen  their  position  in  one  or  more  of  the  four  important  theaters 
of  war,  and  in  which  they  may  decide  upon  a  regrouping  of  forces,  subject  to 
certain  physical  limitations,  consonant  with  their  chosen  long  range  strategy  for 
the  defeat  of  the  Nazis. 

11.  Morale. 

The  outstanding  feature  of  the  war  in  1941  has  been  the  rise  in  anti-Axis  and 
the  decline  in  Axis  morale. 

The  anti-Axis  powers  have  been  heartened  by  the  failure  of  the  German  air 
attack  on  Britain,  the  decreased  German  success  in  the  Atlantic,  the  continued 
resistance  in  the  Middle  and  Far  Eastern  theaters,  the  drain  on  Germany  of  the 
Russian  Campaign  and  of  her  conquered  territories,  and  probably  most  of  all, 
by  the  continued  progress  of  America  from  neutrality  towards  participation  in 
the  war. 

Even  more  notable  has  been  the  decline  in  Axis  morale.  In  Italy  and  Japan 
the  reasons  are  obvious.  Both  are  weary  of  unsuccessful  war  and  economically 
distressed.  But  Germany  presents  a  true  paradox.  Here  is  a  warrior  nation 
which  has  made  colossal  sacrifices  to  build  war  power  and  has  had  unprecedented 
success  in  war — and  yet  is  wholly  apathetic.  No  enthusiasm  prevails,  only  the 
desire  to  see  it  all  end. 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE 


1375 


In  any  given  period,  a  nation  at  war  generally  finds  itself  in  one  of  three  mili- 
tary situations.  To  each  of  these  situations  there  should  be  a  corresponding 
moral  reaction.    These  situations  and  reactions  are: 

Moral  Reaction 


1.  The  elan  of  victory — fighting  with 
confidence  of  success. 

2.  The  grim  struggle — fighting  to  gain 
success. 

3.  Their  "back  to  the  wall" — fighting 
to  prevent  defeat. 


Military  Situation 

1.  Superiority  of  strength.  Posses- 
sion of  initiative.    Unbroken  success. 

2.  Approximate  equality  in  strength. 
Initiative  doubtful.  Ultimate  success 
still  in  balance. 

3.  Inferiority  in  strength.  Strategic 
initiative  lost.  Ultimate  success  doubt- 
ful. 

Perhaps  the  most  fundamental  fact  in  the  war  situation  today  is  that  Germany 
is,  and  has  continuously  been  in  military  situation  Number  1,  while  the  moral 
reaction  of  her  people  is.  and  has  been  for  some  time  rather  lower  than  Number  2. 

The  morale  factor  in  the  war  will  be  affected  by  the  outcome,  probably  within 
the  next  month,  of  the  operations  in  Russia  and  in  Libya,  and  by  Japan's 
decision.  But  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  the  trend  of  1941  in  German 
morale  will  be  reversed  or  even  materially  reduced  in  the  period  under 
discussion. 

In  this  factor  lies  the  germ  of  Nazi  defeat. 

III.  Brief  Estimate  on  the  Actual  and  Potential  Theaters  of  War. 

1.  The  British  Isles.  This  theater  is  the  citadel  of  the  anti-Axis  Powers.  Its 
security  is,  therefore,  so  essential  to  Nazi  defeat  that  it  must  be  held.  The 
ground,  sea  and  aerial  defenses  of  the  islands  have  been  and  are  being  materially 
strengthened. 

For  reasons  given  previously,  it  is  not  believed  that  Germany  will  be  in  a 
position  to  attempt  an  invasion  of  the  islands  during  the  period  in  question.  It 
is  probable  that  an  invasion,  if  attempted,  will  be  delayed  until  mid-summer  of 
1942.  An  attempt  made  at  that  time  will  probably  be  unsuccessful.  As  for  the 
present,  after  a  short  delay  for  reorganization  and  transfer,  Germany  can 
launch  large-scale  air  attacks  on  the  United  Kingdom  at  any  time  that  she  is 
willing  to  move  the  necessary  forces  from  the  Russian  front.  In  view  of 
Improved  British  defenses  and  of  the  weakening  of  the  German  Air  Force, 
however,  it  is  estimated  that  in  the  period  in  question  such  attacks  cannot 
reach  the  intensities  of  those  of  the  winter  of  1940-41. 

From  this  theater  the  only  British  offensive  capability  lies  in  the  air.  It  is 
to  be  expected  that  strategic  bombing  of  Germany  and  the  occupied  territories 
will  continue ;  but  that  this  action  will  be  indecisive. 

Material  aid  from  the  United  States  has  been  an  essential  element  in  the 
resistance  and  survival  of  the  British  Isles.  Continuance  of  this  aid  is  still 
essential.    It  is,  fortunately,  the  easiest  of  all  the  land  theaters  for  us  to  aid. 

2.  The  Atlantic.  The  battle  of  the  Atlantic  is  essentiallv  a  strusgle  for  the 
sea  lanes  radiating  from  the  United  Kingdom,  this  conflict  is  now  trending 
against  Germany.  Sinkings  by  the  Axis  are  decreasing  and  ship  construction 
in  Britain  and  the  United  States  is  increasing.  It  is  now  probable  that  replace- 
ments have  overtaken  losses.  Figures  on  ship  and  tonnage  losses  during  1941 
are  as  follows : 

Losses  (British,  Allied  and  Neutral) 


January  1  to  June  30  (6  Months). 
June  30  to  Nov.  15  (iH  Months). 


Total 


Ships 

628 
285 


Tonnage 

2,  755, 242 
1,000,990 


Monthly  average 


Ships 

105 
63 


Tonnage 


459,  207 
222,442 


During  October  over  4,200,000  tons  of  goods  were  imported  into  the  United 
Kingdom,  as  compared  with  a  monthly  average  for  the  year  of  approximately 
2,500,000.  The  October  imports  were  received  after  the  United  States  Navy  began 
convoy  duty  in  the  Atlantic.  As  the  weight  of  the  United  States  Navy  continues 
to  increase,  success  in  the  Battle  of  the  Atlantic  should  be  assured. 


1376    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Since  Germany's  means  of  attack  (surface  raiders,  long-range  planes  and 
submarines)  are  of  limited  use  in  other  theaters,  it  is  to  be  expected  that  she  will 
continue  the  offensive  in  this  theater,  regardless  of  results  or  of  operations  else- 
where. 

The  United  States  is  contributing  powerfully  to  the  decision  in  the  Battle  of 
the  Atlantic  by  direct  naval  action  and  by  the  building  of  cargo  vessels.  Continu- 
ance of  this  action  is  essential  to  the  defeat  of  Germany. 

3.  Eastern  Theater.  By  a  series  of  relentless  offensives  Germany  has  occupied 
vast  stretches  of  terrain,  including  many  of  Russia's  industrial  regions  and  has 
inflicted  grave  casualties  on  the  Red  Army.  But  Germany  has  suffered  great 
losses  in  men  and  materiel,  and  has  not  yet  attained  her  basic  objectives  of 
destroying  the  Russian  armies  and  the  Stalin  regime.  While  Germany  could 
transfer  her  principal  military  effort  to  other  theaters  this  winter,  it  is  estimated 
that  she  will  continue  to  concentrate  on  the  attack  on  Russia.  Specifically  she 
will: 

Seek  to  destroy  the  mass  of  the  Russian  armies. 

Continue  the  siege  of  Leningrad. 

Attempt  to  cut  the  Russian  supply  lines  to  Archangel  and  Murmansk. 

Seek  to  seize  the  general  line  of  the  Volga. 

Attempt  to  overrun  the  Caucasus,  thus  obtaining  oil  and  securing  a 
jump-off  position  for  an  eventual  advance  into  the  Middle  East. 
The  most  serious  German  threat  is  southeastwards  to  the  Caucasus,  and  her 
goal  is  oil.  Axis  forces  may  capture  Stalingrad  and  gain  control  of  the  Volga 
south  to  its  mouth  at  Astrakhan.  Russian  defense  of  the  North  Caucasus  will 
probably  eventually  fail,  after  substantially  delaying  the  Axis  advance.  VTith 
suflSciently  determined  and  prompt  allied  aid,  the  Germans  may  be  kept  from 
occupation  of  the  Trans  Caucasus  and  control  of  the  Baku  oil  fields. 

The  U.  S.  S.  R.  is  weaker,  relative  to  Germany,  than  at  the  outset  of  hostilities. 
Her  political  structure  has  remained  stable  and  her  armies,  while  depleted,  have 
not  been  irreparably  defeated.  Russia  is  favored  by  the  following :  The  extreme 
cold  of  winter  is  a  deterrent  to  operations,  and  Russian  training  and  technique 
in  severe  weather  is  considered  better  than  that  of  the  invaders.  While  the 
Soviet  situation  is  critical,  ready  availability  of  manpower  i-esoures  is  in  Russian 
favor.  Defense  industry  is  in  operation  at  approximately  60%  of  pre-war 
volume.  British  and  American  material  assistance  is  being  received;  increased 
and  continuing  allied  assistance  is  urgently  required. 

The  following  considerations  are  unfavorable  to  the  U.  S.  S.  R. :  the  uncer- 
tainty of  the  Far  Eiisterh  situation  causes  concentration  of  eflBcient  Soviet  troops 
along  the  Manchukuo  frontier,  not  available  for  use  in  the  western  theater. 
The  Soviet  Army  has  shortages  in  tanks,  all  weapons,  probably  in  all  ammuni- 
tion. The  shortage  in  tanks  is  especially  serious ;  that  in  small  arms  and  small 
arms  ammunition  is  less  marked  than  in  other  weapons.  The  means  of  supply 
from  the  outside  world  are  diflicult  and  precarious.  To  date  no  British  operation 
elsewhere  has  been  suflSciently  strong  to  cause  any  withdrawal  of  German  troops 
from  Russia. 

Aside  from  surrender,  which  seems  unlikely,  Russia's  only  feasible  line  of 
action  is  to  resist  stubbornly  in  the  hoi)e  that  attrition,  climate  and  lengthened 
communications  will  eventually  bring  her  assailants  to  a  standstill.  By  the 
spring  of  1942  it  is  estimated  that  organized  but  depleted  Russian  armies  will 
stand  behind  the  Volga  and  perhaps  even  as  far  west  as  Moscow.  It  is  also  prob- 
able that  Russian  forces  will  hold  the  Caucasus  mountains  and  Trans-Caucasia. 

With  her  industry  dislocated,  Russia  is  in  extreme  need  of  material  assistance 
from  abroad.  She  requires  raw  materials,  machine  tools  and  munitions.  Unfor- 
tunately, the  avenues  of  entry  are  vulnerable,  limited  in  capacity  and  very  awk- 
wardly located.  Aid  to  Russia  has  been  planned  on  the  basis  of  a  total  import 
capacity  of  500,000  tons  per  month.  It  is  by  no  means  certain  that  this  ficrure 
will  be  reached.  Russian  requirements  can  only  be  met  by  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain.  This  relatively  small  contribution  at  the  crisis  of  the  Russo- 
German  war  appears  to  be  the  total  material  means  available  to  the  Democracies 
to  influence  the  struggle  within  this  theater. 

4.  Middle  Eastern  Theater.  In  this  theater,  extending  from  Libya  to  the 
Caspian,  only  the  western  segment  is  active.  In  Libya  the  British  are  engaged 
in  an  offensive  the  issue  of  which  is  still  in  doubt.  Farther  to  the  east,  Syria, 
Iraq  and  Iran  are  shielded  from  the  war  for  the  time  being  by  neutral  Turkey 
and  by  the  Russian  forces  in  the  Caucasus. 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  1377 

Because  of  the  Russian  campaign  and  certain  great  logistic  difficulties,  there 
is  practically  no  danger  of  an  Axis  major  offensive  in  this  theater,  from  the  north, 
before  the  spring  of  1942.  Even  a  British  defeat  in  their  current  Libyan  opera- 
tions would  so  exhaust  the  Axis  forces  in  North  Africa  as  to  free  Alexandria 
and  Suez  from  the  threat  of  a  thrust  from  the  west.  A  British  victory  in  Libya 
would  probably  force  German  entry  into  Tunisia  and  their  occupation  of  Algiers 
and  Morocco.  But  such  an  eventuality  would  be  more  apt  to  delay  than  to 
hasten  an  all-out  German  ofiEensive,  from  the  west  and  the  north,  against  the 
Middle  East  Theater. 

Even  if  successful  in  their  current  Libyan  offensive,  it  is  not  believed  that  the 
British  will  be  able  to  advance  through  Tripolitania  without  a  considerable  delay 
for  reorganization.  It  is  therefore  probable  that  from  the  British  point  of  view 
this  theater  will  shortly  become  a  defensive  one,  with  a  minimum  of  several 
months  available  for  the  completion  of  its  organization. 

In  the  eastern  sector  of  this  theater  (the  Levant,  Iraq  and  Iran),  the  British 
are  gradually  building  a  substantial  force  to  meet  any  Axis  threat  to  the  area 
through  Turkey  or  the  Caucasus  Mountains.  In  the  Levant,  there  are  three 
Australian  divisions  with  other  troops,  and  General  Wavell  told  our  Military 
Observer  in  Iran  that  he  expected  to  have  at  least  ten  divisions  in  Northern  Iraq 
by  March  of  1942. 

The  United  States  is  committed  to  providing  great  masses  of  material  to  the 
M'ddle  East,  and  is  undertaking  vast  con.sti  uction  projects  to  facilitate  supply. 
Except  the  British  Isles,  the  Middle  East  is  the  most  accessible  of  the  important 
active  theaters  to  us,  and  our  lines  of  supply  to  it,  though  long,  are  the  least 
vulnerable. 

We  are  building,  up  an  influence  on  British  military  policy  in  the  Middle  East. 
Further  American  commitments,  including  probably  the  eventual  employment 
of  our  armed  forces,  will  be  necessary  in  this  region. 

o.  The  Conquered  Nations.  The  conquered  countries  will  continue  to  rally 
somewhat  more  strongly  against  their  conqueror.  While  effective  revolts  are  to 
be  discounted,  maintenance  of  order  will  divert  some  40  German  and  some  25 
Italian  divisions.  The  economic  contributions  of  these  countries  to  the  Axis 
war  effort  will  fall  below  German  hopes  and  will  tend  to  decline.  Germany's 
failures  in  administration,  in  organization  of  production  and  above  all  in  recon- 
ciliation to  her  hegemony  of  Europe  will  become  an  increasing  drain  on  her 
strength. 

6.  The  Far  Eastern  Theater.  Here  the  initiative  rests  with  Japan  in  spite  of 
her  military  overextension.     She  has  the  following  lines  of  action  open  to  her : 

a.  Attack  Siberia. 

6.  Attack  Yunnan  Province  to  cut  the  Bunna  Road  with  a  view  to  an  early 
end  to  the  war  with  China. 

c.  Occupy  Thailand. 

d.  Through  Thailand,   attack 

(1)  Burma  and  the  Burma  Road, 

(2)  Malaya. 

e.  Attack  the  Philippines  and  Hong  Kong,  preparatory  to  a  movement  on 
Singapore  or  the  Netherlands  East  Indies. 

f.  Contain  or  isolate  the  Philippines  and  Hong  Kong  and 

(1)  Attack  Singapore 

(a)  directly,  by  sea; 

(b)  by  sea  in  conjunction  with  a  land  attack  through  Thailand  and 
Malaya. 

(2)  Attack  the  Netherlands  East  Indies. 

g.  Bide  her  time,  wait  for  a  better  opportunity  to  pursue  any  of  the  above 
lines  of  action,  hoping  that  the  course  of  events  will  turn  in  her  favor. 

h.  Seek  a  general  settlement  through  American  mediation,  including  an 
understanding  with  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  as  to  political  and 
economic  penetration  of  southeast  Asia  and  the  southwestern  Pacific. 

i.  Reorient  her  whole  foreign  policy  by  withdrawing  from  the  Axis. 

(h)  and  (i)  are  impossible,  short  of  a  complete  overthrow  of  her  governing 
forces. 

The  most  probable  line  of  action  for  Japan  is  the  occupation  of  Thailand. 

The  forces  of  all  other  countries  in  the  Far  East  are  on  the  defensive  before 
Japan.  The  British  Commonwealth,  the  Netherlands  East  Indies  and  the 
Ujiited  States  are  in  consultative  association  for  the  defense  of  Malaysia.  To 
date  this  association  has  been  effective  in  slowing  down  the  Japanese  penetra- 


1378    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

tion  to  the  southwest.  China  is  containing  the  equivalent  of  30  Japanese  divi- 
sions. The  U.  S.  S.  R.,  hard  pressed  for  troops  in  European  Russia,  has  reduced 
her  Siberian  garrisons  to  what  she  estimates  to  be  the  minimum  necessary  to 
deter  Japan  from  attacliing  to  the  north.  So  far  she  has  been  successful  in  this 
effort. 

China,  aided  and  encouraged  by  America,  will  remain  in  the  war  against 
Japan  and  will  continue  to  contain  important  Japanese  forces.  The  effective 
use  of  China's  unlimited  manpower,  as  an  anti-Axis  potential,  depends  entirely 
on  the  extent  to  which  she  is  able  to  equip  it,  particularly  in  artillery  a;id 
aviation.  For  this,  she  is  entirely  dependent  upon  the  United  States.  The 
stronger  the  Chinese  become,  the  more  Japanese  troops  will  be  pinned  down 
in  China,  thereby  releasing  further  Russian  strength  for  use  against  Hitler. 

Although  China  is  receiving  an  increasing  amount  of  equipment  from  this 
country,  a  major  offensive  by  the  Chinese  cannot  be  expected  during  the  period 
ending  March  31,  1942. 

The  British  Imperial  forces  in  Malaysia  and  at  Hong  Kong  occupy  a  purely 
defensive  role.  The  forces  in  Malaya  have  recently  been  re-enforced  by  addi- 
tional troops  from  Australia,  New  Zealand  (air),  and  India,  while  those  in 
Hong  Kong  have  been  augmented  by  the  arrival  of  Canadian  levies.  Both  of 
these  localities  present  a  very  strong  defense  against  any  possible  Japanese 
attack. 

The  people  and  government  of  the  Netherlands  East  Indies  have  continued, 
aflSrmatively  and  constructively,  to  function  practically  as  a  sovereign  state, 
loyal  to  the  mother  country.  As  evidence  of  Dutch  spirit,  they  (a)  have  reor- 
ganized their  army,  (b)  are  actively  at  work  manufacturing  needed  army 
equipment,  (c)  are  actively  training  reserves,  (d)  have  expanded  their  system 
of  air  fields  throughout  the  islands,  (e)  have  cooperated  with  the  British  and 
United  States  governments  in  preparation  of  extensive  plans  for  defense,  (f) 
have  refused  to  renew  their  commercial  treaty  with  Japan,  (g)  have  delivered 
to  Japan  only  10,000  tons  of  oil  since  January  1,  1941 — said  delivery  having  been 
on  an  old  contract  still  in  force. 

In  the  Far  East  the  United  States  is  concerned  as  a  possible  belligerent  and 
also  as  a  prime  source  of  war  materials  for  China,  the  British  Commonwealth 
and  for  the  Netherlands  East  Indies.  We  are  in  process  of  sending  a  few 
military  airplanes  to  Thailand.  But  this  theater  will  be  a  secondary  one  from 
the  point  of  view  of  supply.  Under  all  circumstances  we  will  continue  to  be 
able  to  supply  Australasia,  the  Dutch  East  Indies,  and  probably  also  China, 
though  somewhat  precariously,  through  the  Burma  Road.  Siberia  will  become 
completely  cut  off  if  Japan  attacks  Russia. 

Our  influence  in  the  Far  Eastern  Theater  lies  in  the  threat  of  our  Naval  power 
and  the  effort  of  our  economic  blockade.  Both  are  primary  deterrents  against 
Japanese  all-out  entry  in  the  war  as  an  Axis  partner.  If  we  become  involved 
in  war  with  Japan  we  could  launch  a  serious  offensive  against  her  by  Naval 
and  Air  Forces  based  on  the  Philippines  and  elsewhere  in  Malaysia.  But  such 
an  attack  would  fall  short  of  a  major  strategic  offensive  because  it  could  not 
be  decisive  within  a  reasonable  time,  and  still  more,  because  it  would  be  a 
diversion  of  forces  away  from  rather  than  toward  our  objective,  the  defeat  of 
the  Nazis. 

7.  Northwest  and  West  Africa,  a.  Northwest  Africa.  Although  valuable  as 
a  base  for  aerial  operations,  northwest  Africa  cannot  provide  an  anti-Axis 
offensive  theater  of  operations.  Any  anti-Axis  ground  force  that  had  occupied 
this  area  would  be  face<l  with  the  crossing  of  the  Mediterranean,  if  it  should 
decide  to  conduct  operations  on  the  European  mainland.  Its  prime  value, 
therefore,  to  anti-Axis  forces  lies  primarily  in  denying  its  occupation  to  Axis 
forces.  Paragraph  9,  Tab  A,  outlines  the  potential  opposition  to  Axis  occupation 
and  shows  clearly  that  German  forces  would  meet  with  little  resistance.  Time 
and  space  factors,  as  well  as  potential  enemy  resistance,  clearly  indicate  that 
Germany  can  occupy  this  area  ahead  of  an  anti-Axis  force. 

On  the  other  hand,  enemy  potentialities  are  not  as  favorable  with  regard  to 
the  occupation  of  the  Azores.  With  control  of  the  Atlantic  still  in  the  hands 
of  anti-Axis  forces,  the  Axis  could  hardly  be  exi^ected  to  span  one  thousand 
miles  of  ocean  to  reach  the  Azores.  Should  the  Azores  be  prevented  from 
falling  into  the  hands  of  Axis  forces,  the  advantages  gained  by  the  Axis  occupa- 
tion of  Northwest  Africa  would  be  partially  nullified. 

6.  West  Africa.  West  Africa  is  of  value  to  the  Axis  in  providing  submarine 
and  airplane  bases  from  which  to  operate  against  Allied  shipping  and  influence 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  1379 

Latin  America.  Axis  occupation  would  also  deny  the  direct  bomber  ferry  service 
from  the  United  States  to  the  Middle  East  Theater.  The  theater  is  one  which 
would  be  extremely  severe,  due  to  climatic  and  disease  factors,  to  all  but  native 
troops.  With  France  committed  to  collaboration  with  Germany,  time  and  space 
factors  and  potential  resistance  would  make  undisputed  occupation  by  the  Axis 
difficult  but  p<issible.  Cape  Verde,  on  the  other  hand,  could  be  occupied  by 
anti-Axis  forces  and  the  occupation  would  limit  the  encroachment  of  Axis 
forces  towards  South  America  and  reduce  the  scope  of  operation  of  Axis  sub- 
marines and  planes. 

c.  The  probability  of  German  occupation  of  Northwest  and  West  Africa  during 
the  period  December  1,  1941-March  31,  1942.  is  contingent  on  the  possible  outcome 
of  the  present  campaign  in  Libya  as  well  as  on  the  plans  of  the  German  General 
Staff.  The  preceding  sub-paragraphs  show  that  Germany  can  occupy  Northwest 
Africa  at  will  and  West  Africa  with  some  delay.  On  the  other  hand,  success 
by  the  Axis  in  those  areas,  would  probably  invite  anti-Axis  occupation  of  the 
Azores  and  Cai^e  Verde.  It  .seems  more  likely  that  this  German  action  in  Africa 
will  be  postponed,  but  if  it  is  launched  it  should  surprise  no  one. 

8.  M'esteni  HcDiixphcrc.  During  the  period  December  1,  1941  to  March  31, 
1942,  it  is  not  expected  there  will  be  any  significant  change  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere  theater. 

The  twenty  Latin  American  republics  all  have  individual  problems.  Most 
of  their  political  difficulties  are  due  to  economic  strain  and  jockeying  for  power 
between  the  "ins"  and  the  "outs",  the  "outs"  always  being  supported  by  the  anti- 
American  forces.  They  are  all  extremely  conscious  of  the  world  situation  and 
the  two  powerful  antagonists,  and  are  not  anxious  to  make  any  enmities  with 
the  potential  winner.  Military  power  impresses  them  mightily,  as  few  other 
matters  do. 

In  this  area,  no  direct  war  effort  can  be  seen  during  this  period,  and  Germany's 
line  of  action  and  organization  will  be  to  perfect  and  extend  her  present  influence 
in  each  of  the  countries  by  propaganda,  bribery  and  coercion.  Subversive  activi- 
ties will  be  kept  under  c<»ver  and  the  Axis  influence  will  not  emerge  in  any  large- 
scale  version  in  this  area  until  a  more  propitious  circumstance  arises  which 
will  be  determined  by  the  progress  of  events  in  Europe  and  Asia. 

In  other  words,  the  Axis  threat  in  the  WVstern  Hemisphere  theater  is  potential 
during  this  period,  with  possibilities  of  political  upheavals,  sabotage  and  sub- 
versive actions  only  if  it  is  to  cause  a  diversi(m  of  American  forces  and  attention. 

SHERMAN  Miles, 
Brigadirr  General,  U.  8.  Army, 
Acting  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-2. 

Enclosure: 
Tab  A 

Distribution : 

Chief  of  StMff  Eastern  European  Section 

Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  W.  P.  D.  Far  Eastern  Section 

G.  H.  Q.  Latin  American  Section 

Air  Corps  Southei-n  European  Secticm 

Dire<-tor  of  Naval  Intelligence  Western  European  Section 

Air  Section  Record  Section 

British  Empire  Section  I.  B.  File 
Central  European  Section 

Tab  a — S.i:pportinc;  Estimates 

1.  The  British  Empire — Omitted. 

2.  U.  S.  S.  R.— Omitted. 

."?.  The  Philippines — Omitted. 

4.  German^- — Omitted. 

5.  Italy — Omitted. 
(5.  Japan 

7.  Thailand 

8.  Turkey— Omitted. 

9.  Iberian  Peninsula.  N«»rthwest  Africa — Omitted. 


70716  O— 46— pt.  14 Z\ 


1380    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  I  EARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


(j.  Japan. 

a.  Comhat.  Japan  has  an  active  army  of  about  2,000,000  including  an  air  force 
of  about  65,000.  She  now  has  increased  her  trained  and  partially  trained  reserve 
to  approximately  4,750,000.  The  estimated  number  of  active  divisions  is  62 ; 
of  independent  brigades,  22 ;  of  cavalry  brigades,  5 ;  and  of  tank  regiments,  13 : 
plus  15  depot  divisions  in  Japan  proper  and  Korea,  and  garrison  troops  and  rail- 
way guard  units  in  Manchuria. 

The  active  forces  are  deployed  over  a  wide  area  from  Karafuto  (Sakhalin) 
and  Manchuria  in  the  north  to  the  French  Indo-China-Thailand  border  in  the 
south.  According  to  the  latest  reports  available,  the  distribution  outside  Japan 
proper  is  approximately  as  follows  : 


Divs. 

Ind. 
Brigs. 

Cav. 
Brigs. 

Tank 
Regts. 

Manchuria  and  Adjacent  regions. 

North  China                                              

30 
8 

10 
2 
2 
1 
3 

6 
6 
6 

1 

4 
1 

7 
1 

1 

Canton  and  South  China  Coast 

1 

1 

1 

1 

This  wide  deployment  creates  immense  problems  of  supply  and  communications, 
and  requires  the  use  of  a  large  number  of  transports  and  supply  ships.  Reliable 
information  indicates  that  as  of  October  1,  the  .iapanese  forces  on  the  continent 
south  of  the  great  wall  had  reserve  supplies  and  nuinitions  for  not  more  than  six 
weeks,  this  in  spite  of  extensive  use  of  vessels  of  the  Japanese  merchant  fl^et 
withdrawn  from  the  Pacific  trade.  Since  October  1,  of  course,  this  situation  has 
probably  been  alleviated,  but  the  problem  of  supply  still  exists.  Any  hostile  naval 
or  air  action  against  the  lines  of  communication  to  the  continent  would  put  the 
Japanese  forces  in  Central  China  and  all  areas  to  the  south  in  a  very  critical 
position. 

The  Japanese  army  is  well  trained  and  has  proved  an  efficient  fighting  force 
against  the  Chinese.  The  staff  has  functioned  well  during  diflScult  tactical  opera- 
tions in  China.  The  enlisted  men,  although  somewhat  lacking  in  initiative,  arc 
well  trained,  the  bulk  experienced  in  combat,  courageous  and  aggressive  to  the 
point  of  recklessness.  The  Japanese  have  been  consistently  successful  in  China 
from  a  tactical  point  of  view ;  only  combat  with  a  modern  army  can  determine 
Japan's  relative  efl[iciency  compared  to  modern  occidental  armies.  Japan's  army 
is  ph.vsically  hardy,  and  psychologically  inspired  by  loyalty  to  the  Emperor, 
devotion  to  duty,  and  a  fanatical  patriotism  which  makes  it  a  formidable  foe  on 
the  Asian  continent  or  nearby  islands. 

Except  for  the  Russian  forces  in  Siberia,  the  Japanese  army  is  the  best  equipped 
aimy  in  Asia.  Its  equipment,  however,  is  inferior  to  that  of  any  of  the  powerful 
European  armies.  The  shortage  of  raw  materials  and  production  capacity  will 
limit  the  number  of  new  divisions  which  can  be  equipped,  even  though  Japan's 
partially  trained  man  power  is  ample  for  her  anticipated  needs.  Individual 
equipment  appears  to  be  sufficient  and  in  good  condition,  but  there  is  a  shortage  of 
organizational  and  other  equipment,  such  as  tanks,  antiaircraft  weapons,  and 
modern  artillery. 

The  Japanese  Army  and  Navy  air  forces  have  made  rapid  progress  since  1937. 
Personnel  strength  of  both  is  about  100,000  oflBcers  and  men,  and  the  two  services 
have  a  combined  plane  strength  of  approximately  5353  combat  planes.  The  Army 
has  136  squadrons  and  2362  planes;  the  Navy  159  squadrons  and  2991  planes. 
Plane  design  has  lagged,  and  many  old  type  planes  are  included  in  the  totals, 
above,  but  lack  of  formidable  opposition  has  allowed  the  Japanese  to  maintain 
undisputed  air  superiority.  Four  years  of  continuous  air  operations  have  in- 
creased the  efl5'jiency  of  Japanese  aviation  in  no  small  degree.  Acquisition  of 
German  planes  and  more  extensive  employment  of  German  technical  advisers  has 
probably  contributed  to  a  further  increase  in  efficiency  Present  plane  production 
is  currently  estimated  at  200  per  month,  for  all  combat  t.vpes,  both  army  and  navy. 

Japan  has  a  navy  consisting  of  appoiximately  180,000  men  and  officers,  exclu- 
sive of  about  35,000  in  the  naval  air  corps.  Naval  strength  comprises  over  a 
million  tons  already  built  and  nearly  oOO.OOO  tons  building.  The  navy  is  divided 
into  two  main  divisions:  the  Combined  Fleet,  and  the  Japanese  Naval  Forces  in 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1381 

China.     The  latter  consists  of  the  North  Central  and  South  China  Fleets.     The 
Combined  Fleet  is  based  in  home  waters. 

The  Japanese  navy  is  modern,  well  balanced,  and  ready  for  prompt  service. 
It  is  relatively  strong  in  aircraft  carriers  and  tenders;  it  would  be  a  formidable 
opponent  to  the  navy  of  any  power,  or  to  those  of  any  combination  of  powers, 
attempting  offensive  operations  in  the  western  Pacific. 

Japan,  because  of  her  geographic  location  including  her  bases  on  Formosa  and 
Hainan,  tianks  all  sea  approaches  to  the  southeastern  coast  of  Asia  north  of 
Saigon ;  lies  athwart  all  routes  from  the  east  to  the  eastern  and  northeastern 
coast  of  the  mainland  ;  and  is  in  a  remarkably  strong  strategical  jwsition  for 
defense  against  any  distant  naval  power.  The  Formosa  base  is  the  key  to  this 
position;  neutralization  of  Formosa  would  imperil  all  her  troops  and  installa- 
tions south  of  Japan  proper.  However,  Japan's  geographic  position  is  such  that 
her  navy  on  the  strategical  defensive  could  from  time  to  time  assume  the  tactical 
offensive.  Japan's  greatest  weakness  lies  in  the  vital  necessity  of  keeping  open 
the  water  lines  of  communication  to  her  forces  in  central  and  south  China  and 
Indo-China  over  routes  that  are  vulnerable  to  underwater  and  air  attack  from 
hostile  bases  in  the  Philippines,  Malaya,  Burma,  and  China. 

b.  Political.  A  year  ago,  under  the  premiership  of  Prince  Konoye,  Japan  set  up 
its  own  version  of  totalitarianism,  called  the  "new  national  structure."  Political 
parties  were  disbanded,  and  the  Imperial  Rule  Assistance  A.ssociation,  designed 
to  unite  all  the  people  in  a.ssistance  to  the  Throne,  was  hastily  whipped  into 
shape.  As  a  political  organization,  however,  the  Association  does  not  control  the 
country  as  do  the  Nazis  in  Germany  or  the  Fascists  in  Italy,  since  such  control 
would  be  conti-ary  to  the  Japanese  theory  of  the  Emperor  as  the  supreme  head 
of  the  State,  to  whom  all  Japanese  yield  obedience  and  service.  The  stated  aims 
of  the  Association  were  too  vague  to  meet  with  general  approval,  and  it  is  clear 
that  the  "new  structure"  movement  has  not  been  a  success  since  it  has  not  been 
able  to  "unify  all  phases  of  Japanese  life." 

While  this  attempt  to  create  a  totalitarian  structure  has  been  going  on,  the 
domination  exercised  by  the  army  clique  for  nearly  a  decade  has  continued.  The 
whole  political  machinery  is  geared  to  preparation  for  expansion  into  the  mari- 
time provinces  of  Siberia,  for  further  expansion  in  southeast  Asia,  and  the  south- 
we.stern  Pacific,  and  to  the  solution  of  the  China  "Incident". 

The  Tripartite  Pact  which  Japan  signed  with  Germany  and  Italy  in  Septem- 
ber, 1940,  by  implication  requires  Japan  to  attack  the  United  States,  or  any  other 
power,  except  Russia,  not  involved  in  the  European  war  at  that  time,  should 
it  attack  either  of  the  Axis  partners.  The  strong  Russian  resistance  to  Nazi 
attack  has,  however,  been  a  damper  to  Japanese  enthusiasm  for  her  Axis  obli- 
gations. Although  Foreign  Minister  Togo,  who  succeeded  Toyoda,  has  announced 
that  there  is  no  change  in  the  foreign  policy  of  Japan,  and  that  Japan  will  adhere 
to  the  Axis  alliance,  there  is  evidence  that  in  order  to  secure  a  better  position 
for  herself,  she  might  disregard  her  obligations,  and  even  withdraw  from  the 
Ax:is.  Japan  has  boundless  ambitions  in  East  Asia,  but  in  view  of  the  increas- 
ing American  and  British  strength  in  the  Far  East,  and  the  continued  stalemate 
in  China,  she  finds  herself  in  a  more  and  more  unfavorable  strategic  position 
to  realize  these  ambitions.  Japanese  government  leaders  are  aware  of  the 
perils  of  further  military  adventures ;  they  want  to  avoid  a  general  war  in 
the  Pacific.  They  wish  by  every  means  possible  to  inveigle  the  United  States 
into  an  agreement  "looking  toward  a  peaceful  settlement  of  all  outstanding 
issues  between  the  two  countries."  This  simply  means  recognition  of  Japan's 
territorial  and  economic  gains  in  Eastern  Asia.  The  result  of  these  conflicting 
desires  is  a  state  of  almost  desperate  indecision.  The  fact  that  Japanese 
newspapers  have  come  out  with  their  most  bombastic  bluster  during  the  begin- 
ning of  Mr.  Kurusu's  conference  seeking  a  peaceful  settlement  with  this  country 
is  the  best  indication  of  the  lack  of  coordination,  the  indecision,  and  the  confused 
general  political  situation  in  Japan.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  army  hot- 
heads, the  Black  Dragon  Society,  and  other  intransigents  will  oppose  most  stren- 
uously any  major  concessions  by  their  present  government  leaders.  Thus  the 
chief  obstacle  to  successful  negotiations  by  Mr.  Kurusu  or  any  other  envoy,  has 
been  the  fact  that  although  Premier  Togo  is  an  army  man,  he  cannot  be  said 
to  control  the  army,  the  navy,  or  the  ultra-nationali.'Jtic  secret  societies.  Until 
such  control  is  assured,  no  agreements  through  negotiations  can  be  successfully 
carried  out.  The  Kurusu  conference  can  now  be  said  definitely  to  have  ended  in 
failure  because  of  the  extreme  position  taken  by  the  Japanese  Government  in 
regard  to  concessions  which  they  felt  could  be  made  in  the  Far  Eastern  Area. 


1382    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Without  their  previous  enthusiasm  and  behind  uncertain  leadership,  the  Jap- 
anese are  continuing  in  the  path  to  what  tliey  believe  is  their  "divinely  appointed 
destiny"  without  being  too  sure  as  to  where  that  destiny  will  take  them.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  there  is  evidence  that  the  people  of  Japan  are  becoming  more 
and  more  alarmed  and  apprehensive;  they  fear  that  the  present  course  is  taking 
them  into  a  major  war  with  not  just  one  power,  but  with  a  combination  of 
powers.  In  her  present  situation,  if  Japan  goes  to  war.  her  people  will  enter  it 
desperately  rather  than  confidently. 

c.  Economic.  Because  oi  the  ever  increasing  stringency  of  the  embargo  placed 
on  Japan  by  the  Unittd  States,  Great  Britain,  and  the  Netherlands  East  Indies, 
the  economic  situation  in  Japan  is  slowly  but  surely  becoming  woi-se.  The 
Japanese  have  always  lacked  war  materials,  adequate  foreign  exchange,  and 
suflBcient  foreign  trade ;  the  embargo  has  served  to  increase  sharply  the  de- 
ficiencies in  these  categories. 

Germany's  attack  on  Russia  has  cut  off  the  supply  of  military  and  industrial 
equipment  and  machinery  from  Germany  to  Japan.  The  Japanese  are  finding 
that  economically,  as  well  as  politically,  the  Tripartite  Pact  has  serious  dis- 
advantages to  them.  The  pro-Axis  leaders  are  having  more  and  more  difficulty 
in  justifying  the  alliance  with  Germany. 

Japan's  Greater  East  Asia  Co-Prosperity  Sphere  is  anything  but  prosperous. 
Labor  shortages,  lack  of  adequate  and  sufficient  transportation  facilities,  guer- 
rilla warfare  and,  most  of  all.  lack  of  cooperation  on  the  part  of  the  people  who 
have  been  brought  into  the  "sphere"  by  force  or  the  threat  of  force,  have  pre- 
vented Japan  from  realizing  the  economic  benefits  which  she  has  so  often  and 
so  loudly  proclaimed  would  result  from  her  scheme. 

The  firm  united  front  of  the  United  States,  Great  Britain,  and  the  Netherlands 
East  Indies  in  enforcing  the  embai'go  has  put  Japan  "on  the  spot"  economically. 
Even  little  Thailand  has  been  encouraged  to  resist  .Japanese  pressure  for  economic, 
as  well  as  political,  concessions.  The  effects  of  the  embargo  will  compel  Japan 
to  strive  to  obtain  more  assistance  from  the  regions  under  her  control  in  East 
Asia,  and  to  continue  her  efforts  to  persuade  the  ABD  powers  through  threats 
and  promises  to  relax  the  embargo.  If  she  goes  to  war  to  achieve  her  economic 
objectives,  Japan  faces  ruin;  but  at  the  same  time  she  feels  that  achievement 
of  these  objectives  are  vital  to  her  existence. 

Japan  lacks  essential  raw  materials  to  support  either  her  manufacturing  in- 
dustries or  a  major  war  effort,  even  continued  effort  against  China.  The  stop- 
page of  trade  and  freezing  of  credits  has  drastically  reduced  Japan's  supply  of 
raw  materials,  and  has  caused  her  to  begin  using  her  reserves.  Many  of  her 
industries  are  suffering  from  .shortages,  rationing  has  been  extended  and  intensi- 
fied ;  in  short,  economically  Japan  is  in  perilous  plight.  The  situation  calls  for 
strenuous  measures ;  yet,  if  she  goes  to  war,  she  may  use  up  her  i-esen-es, 
especially  of  oil  and  steel,  before  she  can  force  a  decision  favorable  to  herself. 
Thus  her  economic  situation  contributes  largely  to  the  indecision  of  her  leaders. 
This  is  a  problem  which  she  must  solve  within  the  next  few  months. 

7.  Thailand. 

a.  The  contributions  of  Thailand  toward  the  defeat  of  the  Nazi  or  Axis  forces 
has  been  for  the  most  part  negligible.  H")wever,  beginning  in  the  late  summer 
of  1941  there  have  been  evidences  of  her  growing  will  to  resist  any  encroach- 
ments on  her  sovereignty.  This  is  supported  by  the  facts  that  Thailand  has 
been  strengthened  both  in  military  force  and  diplomacy  to  a  position  where 
the  Thais  could  make  a  very  real  contribution  to  the  common  cause. 

6.  Thailand,  or  Siam,  a  weak  buffer  state  between  colonies  of  Great  Powers, 
has  traditionally  played  one  off  against  the  other  while  leaning  toward  the 
dominant  one  of  the  moment.  The  fall  of  France,  accomranied  with  her  replace- 
ment in  Indo-China  by  aggressive  Japanese  troops  on  Thai  borders,  compelled 
the  Thai  government  to  reorient  her  policies.  The  obvious  weakness  of  the 
Democracies  throughout  19^9.  1940  and  the  first  half  of  1941  made  Thailand's 
foreign  relations  appear  pro-Japanese.  And  thei*e  is  no  doubt  that  several 
Thai  Cabinet  Ministers  and  other  influential  leaders  including  P»'inces  of  Royal 
blood  are  pro-Japanese.  However,  the  Prime  Minister  and  Field  Marshal,  Luang 
Pibul  Songgram,  for  all  practical  purpo.ses  the  supreme  ruler  of  Thailand,  is 
positively  pro-Thai  to  the  exclusion  of  all  foreign  ties  or  bias.  The  key  to  the 
situation  may  be  that  since  August  1941  Songgram  has  devoted  almost  all  his 
efforts  and  his  considerable  abilities  to  the  reorganization  and  strengthening  of 
Thai  armed  forces.       The  Thai  army   is  unquestionably  loyal,  and  with  their 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1383 

morale  high  from  recent  victories  over  the  French  forces,  they  can  be  counted 
on  to  follow  the  person  and  leadership  of  their  Commander-in-Chief. 

c.  The  formation  of  the  ABCD  coalition  and  the  strong  position  recently  taken 
by  the  United  States  have  effectively  altered  the  political  and  diplomatic  out- 
look. Thailand  is  now  distrustful  of  Japanese  designs  and  fearful  of  invasion. 
A  guarantee  of  Thailand's  territory  and  independence  after  the  war,  and  imme- 
diate, substantial,  material  aid  and  supplies,  would  greatly  sti-engthen  Thailand's 
will  and  power  to  resist  the  Japanese. 

d.  With  reference  to  Thailand,  a  great  contribution  that  could  be  made  to 
the  defeat  of  Nazi  foi-ces  would  be  to  prevent  this  country  and  natural  base  of 
operations  against  the  Burma  Road,  Malaya,  and  the  East  Indies  from  falling 
into  Axis  hands.  The  Thai  army  and  people  will  fi.?ht  bravely  to  defend  their 
independence,  but  with  little  or  no  outside  aid,  probably  could  not  withstand  a 
determined  attack  in  force  more  than  two  weeks.  Thai  forces  are  deployed  along 
the  long  Mekong  River  frontier,  but  first  line  defense  units  of  less  than  40,000 
reliable  combat  troops — especially  with  insignificant  mechanized  units  and  woeful 
weakne.ss  in  antitank  and  antiair  forces — could  not  block  for  long  the  logical  push 
from  northwest  Cambodia  west  along  the  railroad  to  Bangkok  and  the  heart 
of  Tliailand. 

c.  Thailand's  resistance  may  be  disastrously  affected  under  heavy  enemy 
bombing,  unless  fighting  planes  and  antiaircraft  units  are  made  available  to 
Bangkok  in  time.  If  supporting  outside  forces  could  assume  the  protection  of 
the  entire  Malay  Peninsula,  up  to  and  in  contact  with  Bangkok,  and  give  some 
naval  aid  in  the  (iulf  of  Siam,  Thailand  could  concentrate  her  entire  force 
against  the  major  threat  from  the  southeast  to  her  distinct  advantage.  With 
relatively  small  quantities  of  military  supplies  and  equipment,  but  particularly 
air  force,  antiair,  and  antimechanized  elements,  medium  artillery  ammunition, 
and  technical  or  military  advisers  arriving  in  time,  Thailand  might  hold  out 
indefinitely. 

THAILAND'S    ARMED    FORCKS 

40,000  Regular  Army — well  trainetl  and  equipped,  organized  into  5  Corps  (8.000 

each)  of  15  Inf.  Divisions  (2,500  each). 
8,000  men  mobilized  in  newly  organized  6th  Corps. 
2,500  in  Marine  Division. 

20,000  police  force  and  border  guards  under  military  organization. 
20<),000  partially  trained  reserves  not  mobilized  and  lacking  in  equipment.     Only 
2,000  trained  reserve  rfflcers. 

Mechanized  force  of  95  tanks  and  150  motorcycle  trooi)s. 

Anti  Air  defense — about  12  light  guns,  8  75-A.A.  and  8  searchlights. 

Country  wide  air  defen.se  warning  system. 

Air  Force 

200  airplanes  of  all  types  organized  into  5  Army  wings  and  1  Naval  wing. 
600  trained  pilots  but  no  reserve  planes. 

Thai  Naval  Force  consists  of  4  heavy  gunboats,  16  medium  and  small  torpedo 
boats,  12  motorboats  and  5  small  submarines.    Sufficient  trained  personnel. 
There  is  an  arsenal  in  Bangkok  with  means  for  pro<lucing  considerable  small 
arms  and  light  artillery  ammunition. 


Decembee  6,  1941. 
Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff : 
Subject :  Estimate  of  Japanese  Strength  in  Indo-China. 

1.  It  is  estimated  that  there  are  107,000-115,000  Japanese  troops  ashore  in  Indo- 
China,  25,000  in  the  north  and  82,000-90,000  in  the  south. 

2.  Analysis  of  the  foregoing: 
a.  Tong  King: 

Initial  garrison 6,  000 

Landed  prior  to  Oct.  18 5,000 

Landad  since  Oct.  18 14,000 


Present  Total ♦25, 000 

•Exclusive  of  about  13,000  troops  landed  at  Haiphong  and  moved  south  by  rail. 


1384    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

ft.  South  Indo-China: 

(1)  Known  to  have  landed. 

Garrison  Nov.  1 32,000 

Nov.  3-18 

By  sea 2,  000 

By  rail 3,  000 

Nov.  18-29 

By  sea 30,  COO 

By  rail - 10,  000 

77,000 
Since  Nov.  29  (est.) 5,000 

82,000 

(2)  Reported  by  Manila,  December  21 — 21  transports  in  Camrah  Bay — esti- 
mated 18,000. 

(3)  According  to  various  reports,  there  is  an  undetermined  number  of  trans- 
ports enroute  to  Indo-China. 

Shfeman  Miles, 
Brigadier  Genera],  U.  S.  Aruiif, 
Acting  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-2. 
liistribution : 

Secretary  of  War. 
Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  WPD. 
mid 

Dex:ember  6,  1941. 

Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff: 

Subject:  Estimate  of  Japanese  Air  and  Gro\ind  Forces  in  Indo-China,  Hainan 
and  Formosa. 

1.  Indo-China. 

Japanese  troops  in  the  theater 125,000 

In  the  North 25,000 

In  the  S:)utb 82,000   . 

On  ships  in  harbors ^-_  18,000 

Total 125,000 

(Other  troops,  number  unknown,  are  in  transit  tow.^rd  Indo-China. 

south  of  Shanghai) 
Planes  (bulk  in  the  south) 450 

2.  Hainan. 

Japanese  troops 50,  000 

Planes  (approx. ) 200 

3.  Taiiran    {Formosa) . 

Japane.se  troops 40,  000 

Planes  (approx.) i 400 

4.  B'lsis  of  the  foregoing:  Reports  by  M.  T.  D.,  O.  N.  I.,  State  Department 
nnd  British  Intelligence. 

Shermais?  Miles, 
Brigadier  General,  U.  8.  Arnii/, 
Acting  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-2. 
Distribution  : 

Secretary  of  War. 

A.ssistant  Chief  of  Staff,  WPD. 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1385 

EXHIBIT  NO.  33A 


WAR  DEPARTMEKT 

WASMtlMTON 


I.  B*  13S  Octoljei?  2,  1941 « 


MiMOBAHDOll  KSi  SHB  OSUEf  OS*  SCtfTt 


X«       3?h«  crisis  in  SJokyo  brottght  atK>ut  Ijy  tb«  aJ»>lT«r«ar;f  of  • 
the  Tripartite  Afir^eoeat  hoa  beea  veathsred  V  ib«  Eoao^re  C«his«t 
tkr9u^  a  weamvhAt  x'srfanstQX?  ceLe'bratJLon  Involvlas  ig;»«eoh««  1>jr 
the  (renaaa  «ad  Itsli&n  iabft«sadU>r««  Prin«e  Xocc^e*  and  ot&rrti,, 
at  luncbeoas  giren  la  hooor  of  the  Axis  oe  Septeastser  2'?»  16' 

2«       Shis  Sivleion  has  Ixiforitation  frca  &  big^jr  r«Xia'oii? 
aQUcrco  to  the  •ffeet  that  at  4t?K}  p»a«  on  Septcsiher  STtli  «ft«£- 
ecapl«tiB£  tha  fteramoal«e  e«l«hratiag  th»  iuailr«emtery  of  the 
Srlpartite  Faet  the  Js^aaase  i^oraign  ^lidetar  ss^id.  th»  4a«»ri&aa 
AalDaasador  to  call  on  hi»»  aad  \ir£«d  hiss  to  wtt^sgiy  roc^^vam&.  tc 
hie  hoaa  gorernne&t  an  iaaedlste  a4«tlxi^  h«tv«8&i  I'rlr;.Ct»  3«n03^  ^tnd 
Presidast  Soo«eT<at. 

3*       The  Japanasa  Aai>ttn9sA.<sT  in  Ifad&iis^toa  was  adrioed  a«  to 
gist  of  Adsirel  ^;^da'«  cosnrersation  vith  iahastbsidor  0r«ir« 
Adalral  Sbanra  aXsc  was  urg»d  bjr  hla  Toraigo  ^ul«tay  to  do  inrtXTf 
thins  ia  hi»  powar  to  prevail  upoa  tb«  Pretildant  to  «*«t  juid  ar.af«r 
Ittaedi&taly  with  Prlnco  Eoaoje* 

4,       The  farror  with  which  tha  J^aaesa,  avar  a.  period  of 
oaasy  moatha,  hava  heen  agitatlag  for  thia  "uaatiag  of  lattdare"  haa 
hcaa  aatehed  oaljr  'by  their  relu^aaoa  to  aake  eottdtacsta  oa  two 
poiats,  i.e.  nfithdraafal  froia  Chiaa,  aftd  pr«ipar»tioa  for  aa  attaafc 

s^iheria.  '         ^  '     """*"•  ■     ^~" 

5«       This  DiTisioa  i»  of  the  halief  that  the  preeaat  Oahiaet 
Ih  Teltyo  doaa  not  yat  feel  strong  eaou^  to  eaforaa  any  ^rd«iir  f»r 
vithdraval  of  JaptuMse  troops  from  Chiaa,  area  Ibhoa^  xa&me  ^rasaure 
froa  the  Unitad  States,   it  aight  he  iacaiaad  to  (to  eo»    Aad,  as  a  | 
mattar  of  fact,  at  this  sta«e  ia  the  eacaoutioa  of  our  aaticasl         I 
strategic  piaa,  a  oessatioa  of  hostilities  la  ChinA  fcliov*«!'.  >~ 


1386    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


: 


EXHIBITS    OF    JOINT    COMMITTEE 


1387 


vxtkf  siraBS*  'itoddf-^ 


t»  ,%i»  tat 


Lass  «r!>UlB^-  ^'9 


«>i»<w«*i«x»»    Itts[%h«r  w>i 


1  seta  eswi»«<Aa»»  o^  "S«3LJa^»     I^^Rm* 


u<}ir'la4§S9«4r  «9idsat 


Srtn9«  XoQsjv  e«ft 


HSR?  ftiilti 


vill  1>«  la  «  slMToa^  po«ttlo«  to 


«fiOjec«lc  ^i«ae««sSj»ait,  pl»»5ia«  ««i  e«r*«la%3r  ef  tb«  <w3.1ap««  of  t 


JCes^^r^ 


It   If   h*  S&4S 


«Rpt?^h«ad»d. 


eoafarexuMr 


^«      fr«B  tb*  poitrt  of  •»!•»  of  tfa»  t&»it«a,  8*»t«B,  a 
.»j|«r#  ftC  tM»  tt»»»  iiii«h*  *«CTB  *o  glT*  this  «^Ty  additioael  1: 
%X3a  ia  «§iiefi  t&  psM^fiW*  «xr*  «&»9MJMa.7  for  aasy  •TBotaality. 

«B<&  fii  o©ai'«r«3W*^»  «3-«ii  te»«t  Br4ti«A»»  aa»«ta,  <M3»,  fhallauA  and 
tb«  »»th«irl»»a«  aawt  XnAl*tR«     rasea^  ooep*ff»ti're  and  lailfled  action 
vitfe  til©  jKWWrs  swawA*  *•  Siaw  oMwdatd  the  eeooowle  adTsntc^cc  i« 
aov  iJoXU*     Xt  i»  tb«  epiaioa  9f  tM»  Sirisloii  that  t}>««e  adiraatagaa 
riwoid.  usaAB-  SIS  circsBMtaBe**,  *«  «a»ifl«a4  xaa««»  ewae4fi»9ion» 
eec  "be  gaiasd  froa  Jsosa  wiJi<S»  *111  Iwasifit  ail  tls«  aoa-^AxiB  iJao»trl«a, 
■  »f  th«  B*ssiflc  ar«a;  oti»rvl«8  the  i^tarf  eb;J««ti¥»  thie  coanwy  haa 
fltM^t  w  i«a«  »«  attain,  th&*  ef  -fflalflwt  wlfci-Axla  atrangth  in  «» 
3PB$4fi«s,  «in  b«  l»ai  ooapletely. 

10,      'Sika  Blvifiioa  i«  of  the  orpialoa  that  xtalthMT  a  ceafareace 
©f  laedssrs  aor  acosiomic  ooiice0aiotte  at  tWla  *la«  wrold  *•  of  ajy 
aafiarlal  »*«racKtaeB  to  tSa  TJjalt«d  Stataa  tadac s  a  dafiaita  coasait- 
aaist  to  withOrav  fr«a  tha  Jad*  lemr*  oMaiaad  fr<a  Je^aa  prior  to 
tba  caaf««BOa*    »»  i«a»diat»  oT>^etiT«  of  tba  Uoitad  Statas  Is  to 
Maac«si  Hitlar  la  wrary  way  xwaBlbla.    A  Jgptjat»9  gviaraatae  not  tc 
attaek  &w«ia  in  St1>«ria  wnld  fr»«  Suasla,  pv^^iologioaHy  end 
ailitarliy.  *«*  «tron«er  oppoaitlon  to  EltXar*    With  thl«  in  alad, 
a  a«tfi»it«  oofiditica,  pr«c#dBnt  to  wich  a  proj^oead  coaf«r«ne«  should 
ba  a  eesplate  wi.trljara»fal  hy  J'a^aa  froa  tlia  Axis  and  a  e«i»rant«&, 
baaiBad  "by  «o3>«tantlal  arideace  of  siBoarlty,  not  to  attack  HuaelB 
itt  Slheria. 

11»       Sine*  It  is  hlfl^y  iflgflrobabla  that  this  condition  oaa  he 
sset  hy  tha  Japanesa  OoTarBaHsot  at  the  presaat  tlae  ot»  ceuraa  lias 


-^ 


■■I 


1388    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS    OF    JOINT    COMMITTEE  1389 

EXHIBIT  NO.  34 

[Copy] 

October  18,  1941. 
Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff: 
Subject:  Resignation  of  Japanese  Cabinet. 

1.  The  Navy  dispatched  the  attached  message  on  October  10.  Our  G-2  does 
not  concur  in  the  situation  pictured  by  the  Navy.  War  Plans  Division  agrees 
vvitli  G-2. 

2.  Navy  dispositions  may  require  adjustment  and  a  special  alert.  This  is  not 
true  for  the  Army. 

3.  Rcco}ntuendotion. 

That  the  Secretary  of  War  direct  that  secret  radiograms,  as  follows,  be  sent 
to  the  Command  General,  United  States  Army  Forces  in  the  Far  East  and  the 
Commanding  General,  Hawaiian  Department ;  C.  G.  Western  Defense  Command. 

Following  War  Department  estimate  of  Japanese  situation  for  your  in- 
formation. Tension  between  United  States  and  Japan  remains  strained  but 
no  repeat  no  abrupt  change  in  Japanese  foreign  policy  appears  imminent     end 

/s/  L.  T.  Gerow 
L.  T.  Gerow, 
Brigadier  General, 
Acting  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff. 
Concurrence. 

A.  C.  of  S.,  G-2  (Bratton)  concurs. 
Incl. 
Naval  message,  10-16-41. 


1390    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

EXHIBIT  NO.  35 

January  31.  1942. 
[i]         Meruorandum  for  the  Record: 
Subject :  Warnings  sent  to  Hawaii  prior  to  Dec.  7.  1941. 

Before  leaving  the  Military  Intelligence  Division  I  am  preparing  this  memo- 
randum for  record  should  it  ever  be  needed.  It  covers  the  information  now  on 
hand  concerning  M.  I.  D.'s  part  in  the  warnings  sent  to  Hawaii  before  December  7. 

1.  Noi-.  27,  1941.  Secret  telegram  from  W.  P.  D.  to  the  Commanding  Generals 
of  the  Hawaiian  Department  and  the  Caribbean  Defense  Command.  This  tele- 
gram was  numbered  472  and  was  sent  out  at  6:11  p.  m.  on  the  27th.  It  stated 
that  Japanese  future  action  was  unpredictable  and  that  hostile  action  was  pos- 
sible at  any  moment.  It  directed  the  Commanding  Generals  to  undertake,  prior 
to  hostile  Japanese  action,  such  reccmnaissance  and  other  measures  as  they 
deemed  necessary,  and  to  report  measures  taken.  The  contents  of  this  dispatch 
was  known  to  me  at  the  time,  though  J  do  not  remember  to  have  seen  an  exact 
copy. 

2.  Nor.  21,  1941.  I  sent  a  short  telegram  to  the  G-2"s  Hawaii  and  Panama  and 
to  all  the  Corps  Areas.  The  telegram  to  Hawaii  was  numbered  473  and  sent  at 
6:59  p.  ni.  This  message  stated  that  hostilities  may  ensue  as  a  result  of  a 
practical  stalemate  in  Japanese  negotiations  and  that  subversive  activities  may 
be  expected.  It  was  sent  because  of  the  obvious  seriousness  of  the  situation 
and  the  great  danger  of  sabotage  everywhere,  a  point  which  was  not  specifically 
covered  in  W.  P.  D.'s  telegram  referred  to  in  the  paragraph  above,  and  with 
which  this  Division  is  specifically  charged  under  the  President's  directive  of 
June  1939.  This  telegram  was  sent  after  consultation  with  W.  P.  D.,  and  my 
recollection  is  that  they  recommended  the  inclusion  of  the  direction  that  the 
G-2's  would  inform  the  Commanding  Generals  and  Chiefs  of  Staffs  only. 

3.  Nov.  27,  19.1(1.  The  Commanding  General,  Hawaii,  replied  in  a  short  tele- 
gram to  the  W.  P.  D.  telegram  referred  to  in  Par.  1  above.  This  telegram  was 
numbered  9r)9  and  recieved  in  Washington  at  5 :  r>7  a.  m.,  Nov.  28.  It  specifically 
refers  to  the  number  of  the  W.  P.  D.  telegram  of  November  27,  and  therefore  is 
an  answer  [2]  to  that  telegram.  It  states,  however,  that  his  Department 
was  alerted  "to  prevent  sabotage."  It  further  stated  that  he  had  liaison  with 
Navy.  Being  an  answer  to  the  W.  P.  D.  telegram  of  November  27,  this  reply  from 
General  Short  was  sent  to  and  seen  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  the  Chief  of  Staff 
and  W.  P.  D.  It  was  not  sent  to  or  seen  by  this  Division.  I  do  not  remember 
to  have  been  informed  of  this  message  in  any  way. 

4.  Nov.  28,  19^1.  At  some  time  during  this  day,  I  think  in  the  morning.  General 
Arnold  told  me  that  he  was  extremely  worried  about  sabotage  of  planes.  He 
stated  that  a  number  of  bombers  had  been  received  from  different  points  in  one 
of  the  western  depots,  all  having  a  certain  defect  which  indicated  sabotage. 
He  told  me  that  he  proposed  to  .send  out  drastic  orders  to  all  air  forces  at  home 
and  abroad  to  take  all  precautions  against  sabotage.  I  told  him  that  a  general 
warning  on  sabotage  had  been  sent  the  previous  day  to  the  Gr-2's.  He  was  not 
satisfied  with  this,  and  insisted  that  specific  directions  be  sent  by  his  staff  to 
all  Air  Corps  commands.  This  directive  was  written  by  Major  C.  R.  Blake,  chief 
of  the  Counter  Intelligence  Branch,  OflSce  of  Chief  of  Air  Corps  at  the  direction 
of  Greneral  Martin  Scanlon,  A-2.  It  directed  inter  alia  the  air  commands  to 
"initiate  forthwith  all  additional  measures  necessary  to  provide  for  the  pro- 
tection of  your  establishments  and  equipment  against  sabotage,  protection  of 
your  personnel  against  subversive  propaganda,  and  protection  of  all  activities 
again.st  espionage."  I  strongly  objected  to  this  message  going  out  to  air  forces 
only.  I  was  in  complete  accord  with  the  Air  Corps  in  believing  that  sabotage 
was  a  real  danger  and  that  the  necessary  precautions  should  be  taken,  but  I  did 
not  believe  that  the  Air  Forces  alone  should  be  given  additional  warnings,  or  that 
so  broad  and  general  a  directive  should  be  given  to  so  many  different  commands. 
1  feared  all  kinds  of  drastic  measures  against  civilians  which  would  have  dis- 
astrous repercussions.  I  knew  that  the  policy  of  the  Chief  of  Staff  was  not  to 
alarm  the  civilian  population,  as  indicated  in  the  W.  P.  D.  warning  message  of 
November  27.  My  objection  to  the  proposed  Air  Corps  directive  finally  resulted, 
late  in  the  afternoon  on  the  28th,  in  a  staff  conference  in  General  Bryden's  office 
attended  by  General  Gerow,  General  Scanlon  and,  I  believe.  General  GuUion. 
The  result  of  this  conference  was  the  approval  of  a  message  drafted  by  me  but 
containing  also  the  sentence  quoted  above  from  the  Air  Corps  draft,  modified, 


EXHIBITS    OF    JOINT    COMMITTEE  1391 

however,  by  a  prohibition  against  illegal  measures  and  a  reference  to  the  delimi- 
tation of  responsibility  in  subversive  activities  as  between  the  Army,  Navy  and 
the  F.  B.  I.  This  message  as  approved  in  the  staff  conference  was  sent  by  The 
Adjutant  General  to  the  Commanding  Generals  of  all  Corps  Areas  and  overseas 
departments.  The  message  to  Hawaii  was  numbered  482  and  sent  at  8:  37  p.  m. 
It  was  also  agreed  at  the  above  mentioned  staff  conference,  at  the  insistence  of 
the  Air  Corps,  that  identical  messages  would  be  sent  by  the  Air  Staff  to  all  air 
commands,  and  this  was  done.  The  message  that  went  to  Hawaii  was  numbered 
484  and  sent  at  9 :  23  p.  m. 

[3]  5.  November  29,  19^1.  The  Commanding  General,  Hawaiian  De- 
partment, replied  by  reference  to  the  Adjutant  General's  cable  #482  of  November 
28  (the  message  referred  to  in  the  paragraph  immediately  above  as  having  been 
sent  by  The  Adjutant  General  as  a  result  of  the  stall"  conference  in  General 
Bryden's  oflSce).  This  message  stated  in  detail  the  precautions  which  General 
Short  had  put  into  effect  in  Hawaii  against  subversive  activity.  It  was  sent  by 
The  Adjutant  General  on  December  1.  1941  to  the  Secretary  of  the  General 
Staff,  and  bv  the  latter  disseminated  to  the  Staff,  including  of  course  M.  I.  D. 
It  was  considered  by  this  Division  as  a  satisfactory  answer  to  the  message  which 
it  purported  to  answer,  i.  e.  the  message  of  November  28  which  resulted  from 
the  Bryden  staff  conference  on  subversive  activity. 

6.  On  the  morning  of  December  7,  19Jit,  having  received  certain  information 
that  morning  that  the  Japanese  negotiations  would  d(  finitely  be  broken  off  at 
2  p.  m.  that  afternoon,  and  being  convinced  that  this  might  well  be  timed  with 
a  planned  Japanese  attack  somewhere,  I  went  to  the  Chief  of  Staff's  cflB  -e  and 
urged  him  to  send  a  warning  message  to  the  overseas  departments.  While  I 
was  there  General  Gerow,  Col.  Eratton  of  this  Division,  and  Col.  Bundy  of 
W.  P.  D.,  came  in.  They  fully  concurred  in  the  necessity  for  such  a  message. 
It  was  written  by  the  Chief  of  Staff,  sent  by  the  hand  of  Col.  Brctton  to  the 
Message  Center,  and  the  Message  Center  stated  it  would  be  in  the  hands  of  the 
recipients  within  another  half  hour.  Col.  Bratton  so  reported  to  the  Chief  of 
Staff.     It  was  not  delivered  in  Hawaii  until  after  the  attack  began. 

7.  Summary.  There  are  obviously  three  points  of  outstanding  interest  in 
regard  to  these  messages : 

a.  Greneral  Short's  message,  number  959,  of  November  27,  specfl  ally  stated 
that  it  was  an  answer  to  the  W.  P.  D.  message  number  472  of  the  same  date. 
It  was  a  wholly  inadequate  answer  to  that  message.  It  was  not,  however, 
referred  in  any  way  to  this  Division,  nor  was  its  contents  made  known  to  this 
Division.  Even  had  it  been  made  known  to  this  Division,  the  responsibility  of 
determining  whether  or  not  it  was  an  adequate  answer  to  the  W.  P.  D.  message 
number  472  clearly  lay  with  the  latter  Division. 

b.  The  repetition  of  sabotage  warnings  contained  in  the  M.  I.  D.  message  num- 
ber 473  of  November  27  and  in  T.  A.  G.  message  number  482  of  November  28. 
The  latter  message  resulted  in  the  insistence  of  the  Air  Corps  that  further 
sabotage  warning  be  sent,  and  I  fully  concurred  in  the  sending  of  such  warning 
provided  they  were  sent  to  the  responsible  Commanding  Generals  as  well  as  to 
the  air  commands,  and  that  they  contiued  precautions  against  unlimited  action 
on  the  part  of  many  relatively  junior  air  commanders. 

[4]  c.  The  failure  of  the  Signal  Corps  to  get  the  message  of  December 
7  through  promptly  or  to  notify  the  Chief  of  Staff  or  any  Division  of  the  Staff 
that  it  would  not  go  through  promptly. 

[s]     Sherman  Miles, 
Sherm\n  Mit.es, 
Brigadier  General,  U.  8.  Arm^y 

Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  0~2. 
Enclosure : 

Memo  from  Lt.  Col.  C.  J.  Barrett,  January  29,  1942  on  the  background  on 
the  Air  Corps  message  of  Nov.  28,  1941. 


J.\NtTART  29,  1942. 
Memorandum  for  General  Miles : 
Subject :  Interview  with  Major  Blake. 

The  following  information  was  obtained  from  Major  Charles  R.  Blake,  Chief, 
of  the  Counter  Intelligence  Branch.  Office  of  the  Chief  of  the  Air  Corps: 

On  the  morning  of  November  28,  Major  Blake  was  called  to  General  Scanlon's 
office  and  directed  to  prepare  a  message  addressed  to  the  commanders  of  all  Air 


1392    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Force  activities,  both  in  the  United  States  and  foreign  possessions,  directing  them 
to  take  the  necessary  steps  to  prevent  sabotage,  espionage  and  the  execution 
of  any  other  threat  to  internal  security.  Major  Blake  wrote  in  longhand  in  that 
oflSce  a  draft  copy  of  which  is  attached,  marked  "Enclosure  1".  Later  he  wrote 
a  Clearer  copy  of  the  same  draft,  still  in  longhand,  copy  of  which  is  attached 
marked  "Enclosure  2".  The  message  was  then  typed  with  several  carbon 
copies  and  delivered  by  Major  Blake  to  General  Scanlon,  standing  in  the  door 
to  General  Arnold's  oflBce.  Another  oflBcer,  believed  to  be  Colonel  Vanaman, 
was  present,  but  since  Major  Blake  does  not  know  Colonel  Vanaman,  identity  is 
not  certain.  General  Scanlon  took  the  message  to  General  Arnold's  office*  and 
left  a  short  time  later  with  the  statement  that  the  message  was  to  be  coordinated 
with  G-2. 

No  reason  for  the  preparation  of  this  message  was  given  to  M">jor  B'ake  at 
the  time.  He  states,  however,  that  he  was  later  informed  unofficially  that  it 
resulted  from  a  conference  attended  by  the  Chief  of  Staff,  the  Chief  of  the  Army 
Air  Forces  and  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations. 

/S/    C.  J.  Barrett 

C.    J.    B.VRKETT, 

TA-eut.  Colonel,  Oeiieral  Staff. 
Enclosures : 

Cpy.  radio  11-28-41    ' 
Cpy.  radio  11-28-41 

End  #1 

11/28/41        12 :  02  P.  M.  Secret 

^^^  A.  C.  of  AS-A2 

Auth:  €fe  ef  At  €t 
Date:  11-28-^1 
Initials:  CRB 
Copy  No.  2  of  6 

The  world  situation  requires  immediate  atten.  to  the  problem  of  sabotage, 
subversion  and  espionage  prevention  in  all  echelons  of  the  AAF. 

You  are  directetl  to  initiate  forthwith  all  addit.  measures  nee  to  provide  for 
the  comple  prot  of  your  establish  and  equip  against  sab,  prot  of  your  pers  against 
subv  prop  and  prot  of  all  activities  against  esp. 

It  is  further  directed  that  reports  of  all  steps  init  by  you  to  comply  with  these 
instr  be  sub  to  CAAF  on  or  before  12/2/41. 

End.  #2 
Secret 

Auth  :  €«T  el  At  €t 

AC  of  AS-A-2 
Date:  11-28-41 
Initals:  /S/    CRB 
Copy  No.  2  of  6 

To :  Commanding  General,  Air  Force  Combat  Command. 
Chief  of  the  Air  Corps. 
Commanding  Generals  of  all  Foreign  Air  Force  Activities. 

1.  The  world  situation  requires  immediate  attention  to  the  problem  of  sabotage, 
subversion,  and  espionage  prevention  in  all  echelons  of  the  Army  Air  Forces. 

2.  You  are  directed  to  initiate  forthwith  all  additional  measures  necessary  to 
provide  for  the  complete  protection  of  your  establishments  and  equipment  against 
sabotage,  protection  of  your  i)ersonnel  against  subversive  propaganda,  and  protec- 
tion of  all  activities  against  espionage. 

3.  It  is  further  directed  that  reports  of  all  steps  initiated  by  you  to  comply 
with  these  instructions  be  submitte<l  to  the  CAAF  on  or  before  Dec.  2,  1941. 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE 

EXHIBIT  NO.  36 


1393 


1394    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXJIIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE 

EXHIBIT  NO.  37 

Basic  Exhibit 

OP 

Despatches 
Basic  exhibits  of  despatches  (19^1) 


1395 


Date 

To 

Action 

Page 

1  Apr - 

OPNAV 

COM  ALLNAV  DIST 

1 

4  Apr 

18  Apr 

3Jul 

OPNAV 

OPNAV 

CNO.    

CINCPAC,  CINCAF,  COM  1-16 

ALUSNA,        PEIPING,        ASTALUSNA 

CHUNGKING  &  SHANGHAI. 
CINCAF.  CINCPAC.  CINCLANT  C0M15 

(AIRMAIL)  SPENAVO  LONDON. 

CINCAF,  CINCPAC  

CINCAF _ 

CINCAF 

2 
3 

4 

3  Jul    -. 

OPNAV 

OPNAV __ 

OPNAV 

OPNAV 

OPNAV.... 

OPNAV-. 

COM  16 - 

COM  16 

5 

7ju1 

7Jul 

6 

7 

ItJul- 

17  Jul 

19JU1 

CINCAF.. 

CINCAF 

CINCAF 

OPNAV. 

OPNAV   PRIORITY   ROUTINE— CINC- 
PAC, CINCAF,  COM  14. 

LIST  OF  ADDRESSESE  CINCPAC,  CIN- 
CAF, CINCLANT,  COM  15  SPENAVO 

LIST  OF  ADDRESSEES 

8 
9 
10 

19Jul 

11 

20  Jul 

12 

25JuL.-. _ 

CNO     

13 

25Jul 

CNO          

13 

25Jul 

CNO       

CINCPAC,  CINCAF,  CINCLANT,  COM 

15  SPENAVO  LONDON. 
CINCAF,  CINPAC,  CINCLANT 

14 

14  Aug 

OPNAV 

CNO 

CNO          

15 

28  Aug  .              .  - 

CINCPAC,      COMPAN     NAVCOAST 

FRONTIER. 
U.  S.  HOLDERS  WPL52 

16 

90ct 

17 

16  Oct                 -  - 

CNO 

OPNAV               .   .     ..     . 

CINCLANT,  CINCPAC,  CINCAF 

ALL  MERCHANT  SHIPS     --.. 

18 

16  Oct       

19 

17  Oct -.- 

OPNAV. 

OPNAV      .       

NAVSTA  TUTULA  SAMOA  CINCPAC, 

CINCAF,  COM  11-16. 
CINCAF,  C0M12 

20 

17  Oct     

21 

17  Oct       

CNO         

CINCPAC     

22 

23  Oct 

OPNAV 

C0M12,  14,  16  CINCPAC,  CINCAF 

CINCPAC,  CINCAF,  COM  11-16 

CINCPAC,  CINCAF,  COM  12,  14 

23 

4  Nov              .      .  . 

OPNAV                     

24 

18  Nov... 

OPNAV      

25 

20  Nov 

OPNAV - 

CINCAF,  COMPACSO  NAV  COASTAL- 

FRON. 
CINCPAC,  CINCAF 

26 

21  Nov          

OPNAV      .- 

27 

22  Nov 

CINCPAC 

OPNAV 

28 

22  Nov 

OPNAV 

CINCPAC 

29 

OPNAV                

CINCPAC       

30 

23  Nov    

COM  12                

OPNAV 

31 

24  Nov 

CNO - 

CINCAF,  CINCPAC,  COM  11.  12.  13,  15... 
CINCAF                      

32 

24  Nov 

OPNAV                          .  . 

33 

25  Nov                   .  . 

OPNAV..... 

OPNAV38S                 

COM  12 

34 

27  Nov      

COM  ALNAL  COAST  FRON  COM  14,  16, 

CINPAC.  CINCAF 
CINCAF.  CINCPAC  

35 

27  Nov 

CNO 

36 

27  Nov         

OPNA.V                

COM  1-13,  15,  NAVY  Y\RD  WASHING- 
TON, GOV  GUAM  &  SOMOA. 
COM  PNNCP,  COM  PSNCF. 

37 

28  Nov 

CNO 

38 

^Dec    ... 

OPNAV                       

CINCAF ...-. 

39 

^  Dec 

OPNAV 

CINCAF,  CINCPAC,  COM  14,  16 

40 

3  Dec 

OPNAV 

CINCAF,  COM16  .. 

41 

4  Dec 

OPNAV                        .       . 

ALUSNA     TOKYO,     BANKOK     ASTA- 
LUSNA PEIPING,  SHaNGHAL 

CO  MARDET  PEIPING  CO  MARDET 
TIENTSIN. 

NAVST.\.  GUAM                    

42 

4  Dec 

OPNAV. 

43 

4  Dec 

OPNAV 

44 

6  Dec 

OPNAV 

CINCPAC 

45 

6  Dee 

COM  14  .          .. 

OPNAV 

46 

[1]        Top  Secret 

1  April  1941 

From:  OPNAV 

Action :  Com  all  Nav  Districts  NY  Wash  Governors  of  Guam  and  Samoa 

Info: 

012358 

Personnel  of  your  Naval  Intelligence  Service  should  be  advised  that  because 
of  the  fact  that  from  past  experience  shows  the  Axis  powers  often  begin  activities 


79716  O — 46 — pt.  14- 


-32 


1396    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

in  a  particular  field  on  Saturdays  and  Sundays  or  on  national  holidays  of  the 
country  concerned,  they  should  take  steps  on  such  days  to  see  that  proper  watches 
and  precautions  are  in  effect. 


[2]        Top  Secret 

4  April  1941 

From:  OPNAV 

Action :  CINCPAC  CINCAF  Com  1  3  4  5  6  7  8  10  11  12  13  14  15  16 

Info:  CINCLANT  COMBATFOR  COMSCOFOR  COMBASEFOR  COMDTS  Navy 

Yards  Boston,  Poi-tsmouth,  New  York,  Philadelphia,  Norfolk,  Charleston,  Mare 

Island,  Pearl  Harbor,  Puget  Sound,  NAD  Puget  Sound,  Mare  Island,  Oahu  & 

Cavite. 
041700 

Except  DESDIV  50  (S-27,  S-28  and  NTS)  vessels  on  routine  supply  trips  fill 
allowances  and  obtain  supplies  required  for  mobilization. 

At  discretion  fleet  commanders  will   accept   final   increment   of  mobilization 
supply  ammunition. 

Strip  ship  in  accordance  with  orders  action  ADDEES. 

Ships  assigned  availability  for  drydocking  at  ADDEES  discretion. 

For  this  purpose  ships  of  the  Pacific  Fleet  are  not  to  return  to  mobilization 
ports  on  the  continent. 


\3]         Confidential 

18  April  1941 

From:  OPNAV 

Action  :  ALUSNA  Peiping ;  Astalusna  Chungking ;  Astalusna  Shanghai. 

Info  :  CINCPAC ;  CINCAF ;  COMSIXTEEN. 

1815X1 

Include  CINCPAC  as  information  addressee  in  all  despatch  reports  also  fur- 
nish one  copy  of  all  intelligence  reports  plus  present  distribution  dirert  to 
CINCPAC.  Send  them  by  way  of  issuing  ( fl3cer  Comsixteen  for  secret  and 
confidential  and  through  Fleet  Postoff  Pearl  for  other. 


[-}!         Top  Secret 

3  July  1941 

From :     Chief  of  Naval  Operations 

Action:  CIXCAF-CI\CPAC-ClNCLANT-COM  15    (Airmail)    SPENAVD   London 

Info: 

031939 

[Paraphrase] 

The  unmistakable  deduction  fi'oni  information  from  numerous  sources  is  that 
the  Japanese  Govt  has  determined  upf)n  its  future  policy  which  is  supported  by 
all  principal  Japanese  political  and  military  groui)S.  This  jwlicy  probably 
involves  war  in  the  near  future.  An  advance  against  the  British  and  Dutcli 
cannot  be  entirely  ruled  out.  however  the  CNO  holds  the  opinion  that  Jap  activity 
in  the  South  will  be  for  the  present  confined  to  seizure  and  development  of  naval, 
army  and  air  bases  in  Indo  China.  The  neutrality  pact  with  Ru.ssia  will  be 
abrogated  and  major  military  effort  will  be  against  their  maritime  provinces 
which  will  probably  be  toward  the  end  of  July  though  attack  may  be  deferred 
until  after  collapse  of  Eui'opean  Russia.  They  have  ordered  all  Jap  vessels  in 
US  Atlantic  p<irts  to  be  \^est  of  Panama  Canal  by  1  Aug.  Movement  of  Jap  flag 
shipping  from  Japan  has  been  suspended  and  additional  merchant  vessels  are 
being  requisiti<med.  Using  utmost  secrecy,  inform  principal  Army  commanders 
and  your  own  innnediate  subordinates  except  Ghormley.  Also  British  Chiefs  of 
Staff  and  Ambassador. 

Copy  to 

COS,  US  Army 
OP-12 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1397 

[5]         Top  Secret  , 

3  July  1941 

From :     OPNAV 

Action :  CINCAF  CINCPAC 

Info:       CINCLANT    COM    11-12-13^14-15-16;    ALUSNA    London:     ALUSNA 

Tokyo;  ASTALUSNA  Shanghai 
032130 

[Paraphrase] 

Definite  information  has  been  received  that  between  July  16  and  22  the  Japa- 
nese Gov't  has  issued  orders  for  7  of  the  11  Nip  vessels  now  in  tlie  North  Atlantic 
and  Caribbean  area  to  pass  through  the  Panama  Canal  to  the  Pacific.  Under 
routine  schedules  three  of  the  remaining  ships  will  move  to  the  Pacific  during 
this  same  period.  The  one  remaining  ship,  under  routine  movement,  can  be  clear 
by  July  22nd.  Briefly,  all  Nipponese  merchant  vessels  will  be  clear  of  the  Carib- 
bean and  North  Atlantic  areas  by  July  22nd.  In  Jap  business  communities  strong 
rumors  are  curreivt  that  Russia  will  be  attacked  by  Japan  on  July  20th.  From 
unusually  reliable  Chinese  sources  it  is  stated  that,  within  2  weeks  Japan  will 
abrogate  neutrality  treaty  with  Russia  and  attack.  The  present  strength  and 
deployment  of  Nip  Army  in  Manchuria  is  defensive  and  the  present  distribution 
of  Jap  Fleet  appears  normal  and  that  it  is  capable  of  movement  either  north  or 
south.  That  a  definite  move  by  the  Japanese  may  be  expected  during  the  period 
July  20th  dash  August  first,  is  indicated  by  the  foregoing. 


[6]        Top  secret 
7  July  1941 
From :     Opnav 
Action :    Cincaf 
Info :       Cincpac 
070224 

Tokyo  to  Washington  1  July  329: 

Japan  directs  eight  Marus  on  East  Coast  United  States  rush  cargo  handling 
and  proceed  Colon  Pass  through  Canal  to  Pacific  between  16  and  22  July  on 
following  schedule:  16th,  Tokai ;  17th,  Amagisan;  18th,  Awajisan;  19th,  Tosan; 
20th,  Kiyosumi ;  21st,  Kirishima  ;  22nd,  Norfolk  and  Asuka  X. 

Tokyo  to  Berlin  2  July  585:    (English  text  note  to  Ribbentrop  in  part) 

"Japan  is  preparing  for  all  possible  eventualities  regarding  Soviet  in  order 
join  forces  with  Germany  in  actively  combatting  Communist  and  destroying 
Communist  system  in  eastern  Siberia  X  at  same  time  Japan  cannot  and  will 
not  relax  efforts  in  the  south  to  restrain  Britain  and  United  States  X  new 
Indo-China  bases  will  intensify  restraint  and  be  vital  contribution  to  Axis 
victory." 

Berlin  to  Tokyo  2  July  825: 

Oshima  delivers  above  note  and  tells  Ribbentrop  in  part,  "Matsuoka  will  soon 
submit  a  decision  X  if  you  Germans  had  only  let  us  know  you  were  going  to 
fight  Russia  .so  soon  we  might  have  been  ready  X  We  were  planning  to  settle 
South  Seas  questions  and  China  incident  hence  decision  cannot  be  reached 
immediately,  but  Japan  will  not  sit  on  fence  while  Germany  fights  Russia." 


[71         Top  secret 
7  July  1941 
From :     Opnav 
Action :   Cincaf 
Info :       Cincpac 
070243 

Tokyo  to  Berlin  and  Vichy  16  June  519: 

Matsuoka  requests  Ribbentrop's  aid  in  demand  on  French  for  following  naval 
bases:  "Saigon  and  Camranh";  and  following  air  bases  in  southern  French 
Indo-China:  'Saigon,  Bienhoa,  Piinompenh,  Kompontrach,  Nhatrang,  Soctrang, 
Touraine,  Simreap"  X    Japan  determined  acquire  above  quickly,  diplomatically 


1398    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

if  possible  or  by  force  if  necessary  in  order  expand  and  strengthen  them  X 
Chief  reason  given  is  to  prevent  British  moving  in. 

Berlin  to  Tokyo  21  June  739: 

Ribbentrop  reluctant  to  force  issue  now. 

Tokyo  to  Berlin  and  Vichy  22  June  549  and  2^6  respectively : 

Matsuoka  will  negotiate  directly  with  French  X     Repeats  determination  get 
bases  soon. 

Tokyto  to  Vichy  28  June  258: 

French  Indo-China  base  question  this  date  receives  Imperial  sanction. 

30  June  252: 

Japan  now  considers  it  absolutely  essential  to  force  France  accede  to  demands 
for  above  bases. 


[8]         Top  secret 
15  July  1941 
From :      Opnav 
Action :    Cincaf 
Info:       Cincpac 
151924 

Summary  of  Tokyo  to  Washington  fifteen  July  three  six  eight  X  Relayed  to 
London  X  Quote  within  next  day  or  two  Japan  Vichy  commercial  negotiations 
begin  X  Japan  will  propose  in  name  of  mutual  defense  taking  over  southern 
French  Indo  China  naval  and  air  bases  outlined  in  Jonab  dated  seven  July  X 
At  same  time  Japan  will  attempt  to  station  necessary  army  navy  air  forces  in 
that  area  peacefully  with  French  agreement  if  possible  X  If  French  object 
Japan  has  decided  to  use  force  X  Japan  does  not  intend  move  further  south 
or  interfere  with  colonial  government  X  Move  necessary  to  guarantee  supplies 
from  colony  and  Thailand  and  prevent  Syrian  type  British  action  X  Tokyo 
wishes  avoid  friction  with  Britain  and  particularly  the  United  States  if  possible 
but  risk  is  necessary  unquote. 


[9]        Top  secret 
17  July  1941 
From :     OPNAV 
Action:  CINCAF 
Info:       CINCPAC 
180300 

Tokj'o  to  Vichy  twelve  July  two  seven  four  and  two  seven  Ave  list  six  terms  of 
ultimatum  to  be  an.swered  by  twenty  July  x  Japan  will  send  necessary  army  navy 
air  forces  to  southern  French  Indo  China  x  French  turn  over  naval  and  air  bases 
listed  in  Jonab  of  seven  July  x  expeditionary  force  to  have  right  to  maneuver  and 
move  about  freely  x  French  withdraw  forces  at  landing  points  to  avoid  possible 
clashes  x  Vichy  authorize  French  Indo  China  military  to  arrange  details  with 
Japanese  either  before  or  after  landing  x  colony  to  pay  Japan  twenty  three  rail- 
lion  piastres  annually  to  meet  cost  of  occupation  xx  Tokyo  to  Vichy  fourteen 
July  two  eight  one  army  now  planning  advance  on  or  about  twenty  July  xx 
Tokyo  to  Saigon  and  Hanoi  sixteen  July  circular  one  five  one  eight  formal 
demands  presented  to  Vichy  on  fourteenth  x  reply  asked  by  twentieth  x  Japan 
intends  carry  out  p'ans  by  force  if  opposed  or  if  British  or  United  States  inter- 
feres X  Kanju  Maru  being  held  at  Saigon  to  evacuate  all  Japanese  there  sailing 
early  dawn  twenty  four  July  x  burn  codes  x  Japanese  in  northern  area  evacuate 
or  move  into  Hanoi. 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1399 

[10]        Top  secret 
19  July  1941 
From :      OPNAV 
Action:  CINCAF 
Info :       CINCPAC 
193230 

Purple  fourteen  July  Canton  to  Tokyo  two  five  five  quote  information  from 
military  oflBcials  to  attaches  in  Canton  follows  x  one  x  the  recent  general  mobiliza- 
tion order  expresses  Japans  irrevocable  resolution  to  end  Anglo  American  as- 
sistance in  thwarting  Japans  natural  expansion  and  her  indomitable  intention 
to  carry  this  out  with  the  backing  of  the  Axis  if  possible  but  alone  if  necessary  x 
formalities  such  as  dining  the  expeditionary  forces  and  saying  farewell  to  them 
were  dispensed  with  to  avoid  alarm  and  because  we  wished  to  face  this  new  war 
with  a  calm  and  cool  attitude  x  two  x  immediate  object  will  be  to  attempt  peaceful 
French  Indo  China  occupation  but  will  crush  resistance  if  offered  and  set  up 
martial  law  x  secondly  our  purpose  is  to  launch  therefrom  a  rapid  attack  when 
the  international  situation  is  suitable  x  after  occupation  next  on  our  schedule 
is  sending  ultimatum  to  Netherlands  Indies  x  in  the  seizing  of  Singapore  the 
Navy  will  play  the  principal  part  x  Army  will  need  only  one  division  to  seize 
Singapore  and  two  divisions  to  seize  Netherlands  Indies  x  with  air  forces  based 
on  Canton  comma  Spratley  comma  Palau  comma  Singora  in  Thailand  comma 
Portuguese  Timor  and  Indo  China  and  with  submarine  fleet  in  Mandates  comma 
Hainan  comma  and  Indo  China  we  will  crush  British  American  military  power 
and  ability  to  assist  in  schemes  against  us  x  three  x  occupying  force  will  be  reor- 
ganized as  twenty  fifth  Army  corps  of  four  divisions  and  also  thirtieth  Army  corps 
consisting  of  South  China  forces  to  be  assigned  special  duty  with  airplanes 
tanks  and  howitzers  x  General  lida  in  command  will  set  up  headquarters  in 
Saigon  x  preparation  complete  x  expedition  will  soon  proceed  from  here  unquote 
parenthesis  note  by  Opnav  it  should  be  noted  that  above  is  not  a  directive  but 
appears  to  express  thinking  and  opinions  of  Canton  orange  military  parenthesis. 


[11]        Top  secret 

19  July  1941 

From:  COM  SIXTEEN 

Action:  OPNAV 

Info:  CINCPAC  CINCAF 

191514 

Tokyo  to  met  number  fifteen  sixty  of  nineteenth  in  prep  affirm  code  states  that 
although  cabinet  has  changed  there  will  of  course  be  no  departure  from  the 
principle  that  tripartite  pact  forms  keystone  of  Japans  national  policy  and  new 
cabinet  will  also  pursue  policy  of  former  cabinet  in  all  other  matters. 


[12]        Top  secret 

20  July  1941 

From:  COM  16 

Action :  CINCPAC  ROUTINE,  CINCAF  ROUTINE,  COM  14  ROUTINE,  OPNAV 

PRIORITY 
Info: 
2013356 

Tokyo  to  Vichy  number  two  nine  five  purple  of  nineteenth  XX  army  has  all 
preparations  made  XX  have  decided  to  advance  on  twenty  fourth  regardless  of 
whether  demands  accepted  or  not  X  orders  for  advance  will  be  issued  on  July 
twenty  third  Japanese  time  X  remainder  of  message  contains  instructions  to 
ambassador  regarding  exchange  of  official  documents  in  case  of  accentance  X 
Instructions  regarding  notifying  Tokyo  of  Frances  reply  etcetera. 


1400    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

[13]        Top  secret 

25  July  1941 

From :  Chief  of  naval  operations. 

Action  :  Addressees  as  per  attached  list. 

Info : 

251600 

At  twelve  hundred  get  July  twenty  sixth  1941  execute  wplol  except  the  ninth  to 
eighteenth  words  inclusive  of  task  baker  of  paragraph  seven  the  word  United 
States  being  considered  as  one  word  X  The  excepted  words  will  be  executed  at  a 
later  date  after  necessary  arrangements  have  been  made 

Addressees  for  despatch  concerning  execution  of  wpl-51 

By  rapid  communication  means  to : 

Commander  in  Chief,  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet. 

Commander  in  Chief,  U.  S.  Atlantic  Fleet  (require  acknowledgement  from 
this  addressee). 

Commander,  Battleships,  Atlantic  Fleet. 

Commander,  Battleship  Division  Three,  Atlantic  Fleet. 

Commander,  Cruisers,  Atlantic  Fleet. 

Commander,  Cruiser  Division  Two,  Atlantic  Fleet. 

Commander,  Destroyers,  Atlantic  Fleet. 

Commander,  Aircraft,  Atlantic  Fleet. 

Commander,  Patrol  Wings,  Atlantic  Fleet. 

Commander,  Submarines,  Atlantic  Fleet. 

Commander,  Support  Force,  Atlantic  Fleet. 

Commander,  Train,  Atlantic  Fleet. 

Commander,  Transports,  Atlantic  Fleet. 

Commandant,  Naval  Operating  Base,  Newfoundland. 

Commandant,  Naval  Operating  Base,  Bermuda. 

Commandant,  Tenth  Naval  District. 

Commandant,  Naval  Operating  Base,  Guantanamo,  Cuba. 

Special  Naval  Observer,  London. 

U.  S.  Naval  Attache,  Ottawa,  Canada. 
By  registered  air  mail  to : 

President,  Naval  War  College;  Commandant,  First  Naval  District;  Comman- 
dant, Third  Naval  District ;  Commandant,  Fourth  Naval  District ;  Com- 
mandant, Fifth  Naval  District;  Commandant,  Sixth  Naval  Di.strict;  Com- 
mandant, Seventh  Naval  District;  Commandant,  Eighth  Naval  District; 
Commandant,  Fifteenth  Naval  District. 
By  registered  ordinary  mail  to : 

Commandant,  Eleventh  Naval  District ;  Commandant,  Twelfth  Naval  Dis- 
trict;  Commandant,  Thirteenth  Naval  District;  Commandant,  Fourteenth 
Naval  District. 


1 14]         Top  secret 

25  JXJLT  1941. 
From  :  Chief  of  Naval  Operations. 

Action  :  CINCPAC  OINCAF  CINCLANT  COM  15  SPENAVO  London 
Info: 
252023 

This  is  a  joint  despatch  from  the  CNO  and  the  Chief  of  Staff  US  Army  X 
Appropriate  Adees  deliver  copies  to  commanding  generals  Hawaii  Philippines 
and  Caribbean  Defense  Command  and  to  General  Chaney  in  London  XX  You 
are  advised  that  at  1400  GCT  July  twenty  sixth  United  States  will  impose  eco- 
nomic sanctions  against  Japan  X  It  is  expected  these  sanctions  will  embargo 
all  trade  between  Japan  and  the  United  States  subject  to  modification  through 
a  licensing  system  for  certain  material  X  It  is  anticipated  that  export  licenses 
will  be  granted  for  certain  grades  of  petroleum  products  cotton  and  possibly 
some  other  materials  and  that  import  licenses  may  be  granted  for  raw  silk  X 
Japanese  assets  and  funds  in  the  United  States  will  be  frozen  except  that  they 
may  be  moved  if  licenses  are  granted  for  such  movement  X  It  is  not  repeat 
not  expected  that  Japanese  merchant  vessels  in  United  States  ports  will  be 
seized  at  this  time  X     ITnited  States  flag  merchant  vessels  will  not  at  present 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  1401 

be  ordered  to  depart  from  or  not  to  enter  ports  controlled  by  Japan  X  CNO 
and  COS  do  not  anticipate  inunediate  hostile  reaction  by  Japan  throngh  the 
use  of  military  means  bnt  you  are  furnished  this  information  in  order  that  you 
may  take  appropriate  precautionary  measures  against  possible  eventualities  X 
Action  being  initiated  by  the  United  States  army  to  call  the  Philippine  army 
into  active  service  at  an  early  date  XX  This  despatch  is  to  be  Itept  secret 
except  from  immediate  navy  and  array  subordinates  X  SPENAVO  inform  CNS 
but  warn  him  against  disclosure  X  Action  addees  this  dis  are  cincpac  cinclant 
cincaf  com  fi  teen  spenavo  London 

(Deliver  one  copy  to  War  Plans  Division  U.  S.  Army) 


I  ri  I         Top  secret 

14  August  1941. 
From :  OPNAV 

Action  :  CINCAF,  CINCPAC,  CINCLANT 
Info  :  COM  11-12-13— COM  14-15-16. 
142155 

Indications  that  orange  ships  formerly  in  N<n-th  Atlantic  and  those  on  South 
Atlantic  routes  returning  Japan  via  Magellan  comma  4  tankers  only  A-essels  on 
Pacitie  coast,  none  enroute  to  USA,  none  North  Atlantic,  estimated  17  w^est  coast 
of  South  America,  none  Los  Angeles  to  Panama.  Japanese  rapidly  completing 
writhdrawal  from  world  shipping  routes.  Scheduled  sailings  cancelled  and  ma- 
jority .ships  in  other  than  China  and  Japan  seas  areas  home-ward  bound.  Re- 
sumption of  shipping  services  indefinite  result  of  USA,  British  and  Dutch  pres- 
sure through  refusal  of  transit  of  Panama  Canal,  export  control  restrictions,  re- 
fusal of  bunkering  and  port  facilities  and  fund  freezing. 


\16]         Top  Secret. 

28  August  1941. 
From:  CNO. 

Action :  CINCPAC  Connnander  Panama  Naval  Coastal  Frontier. 
Info:       CINCLANT;   SPENAVO.  LON :    Commander  Pacific  Southern  Coastal 

Frontier  ;  Commander  Caribbean  Naval  Coastal  Frontier  &  COM  11. 
282121 

(Paraphrase) 

Certain  operations  prescribed  for  the  Atlantic  by  WPL  .51  are  hereby  extended 
to  areas  of  the  Pacific  Ocean  as  described  herein  in  view  of  the  destruction  by 
raiders  of  merchant  vessels  in  the  Pacific  Ocean  within  the  Western  Hemi.«phere 
neutrality  zone  as  defined  in  the  declaration  of  Panama  of  Oct.  3,  1939.  Formal 
changes  in  WPL  51  will  be  issued  but  meanwhile  action  addressees  will  execute 
injmediately  the  following  instructions.  CINCPAC  constitute  the  Southeast 
I'acific  Force  consisting  of  two  7500  ton  light  cruisers  and  dispatch  it  to  Balboa. 
For  task  purposes  this  force  will  operate  directly  under  CNO  after  entering  the 
Southeast  Pacific  sub  area  as  defined  in  WPL  40  para  .3222  except  western  limit 
is  longitude  100  degrees  west.  Witliin  the  Pacific  sector  of  the  Panama  naval 
coastal  frontier  and  within  the  Southeast  Pacific  sub  area  the  connnander  Panama 
naval  coastal  frontier  and  connnander  Southeast  Pacific  Force  will  in  cooperation 
and  acting  under  the  strategic  direction  of  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  execute 
the  following  task  colon  Destroy  surface  raiders  which  attack  or  threaten  United 
States  flag  shipping.  Interpret  an  approach  of  surface  raiders  within  the  Pacific 
sector  of  the  Panama  naval  coastal  frontier  or  the  I'acifiL-  Southeast  sub  area  as 
a  threat  to  United  States  flag  shipping.  XX  For  the  present  the  forces  con- 
cerned will  base  Balboa  but  CNO  will  endeavor  to  make  arrangements  for  basing 
on  South  American  ports  as  may  be  required  XX  Action  Adees  and  commander 
Southeast  Pacific  Force  infonn  CNO  when  these  instructions  have  been  placed 
in  effect.     XX 

Distribution  : 

Copies  to  12,  16,  20,  30,  38,  38W ;  WPD,  U.  S.  Army;  Brit.  Nav.  Staff  in 
Washington. 


1402    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

[17]        Top  Secret. 

'      9  Ocax)BEB  1941. 
From :     CNO. 

Action  :  All  U.  S.  holders  of  WPL  fifty-two  outside  of  Navy  Department 
Info: 
082335 

(Paraphrase) 

On  October  11th  at  0200  GCT  cancel  WPL  51  and  place  WPL  52  in  eftect. 
[18]         Top  Secret. 

16  OCTTOBER  19«. 

From :     CNO. 

Action:  CINCLANT  CINCPAC  CINCAF  (Acknowledge). 

Info: 

162203 

The  resignation  of  the  Japanese  Cabinet  has  created  a  grave  situation  X  If  a 
new  Cabinet  is  formed  it  will  probably  be  strongly  nationalistic  and  anti  Ameri- 
can X  If  the  Konoye  Cabinet  remains  the  effect  will  be  that  it  will  operate  under 
a  new  mandate  which  will  not  include  rapprocliement  with  the  US  X  In  either 
ca.se  hostilities  between  Japan  and  Russia  are  a  strong  possibility  X  Since  the 
US  and  Britain  are  held  re.sponsible  by  Japan  for  her  present  desperate  situation 
there  is  also  a  posibility  that  Japan  may  attack  these  two  powers  X  In  view  of 
these  possibilities  you  will  take  due  precautions  including  such  preparatory 
deployments  as  will  not  disclose  strategic  intention  nor  constitute  provocative 
actions  against  Japan  X  Sec<md  and  third  Adees  inform  appropriate  Army  and 
Naval  District  authorities  X    Acknowledge  XX 


[19]        Top  Secret. 

16  October  1941. 
From:  OPNAV. 
Action  :  All  merchant  ships. 
Info: 
162300 

(Paraphrase) 

The  following  despatch  is  for  all  United  States  merchant  ships  in  the  Pacific : 
There  is  a  possibility  of  hostile  action  by  Japan  again.st  U.  S.  shipping.  United 
States  merchant  ships  at  sea  in  the  Pacific  proceed  now  as  follows:  In  Chinese 
waters.  China  Sea  or  Dutch  Indies  waters,  proceed  immediately  to  Manila,  Singa- 
pore, or  a  North  Australian  Port.  In  North  Pacific  westbound,  except  those 
bound  to  Vladivostok,  proceed  to  Honolulu  unless  close  to  the  Philippines,  in  the 
latter  case  proceed  there.  Ships  bound  for  Vladivostok,  proceed  on  voyage.  If 
Honolulu  bound  continue  voyage.  If  in  North  Pacific  eastbound,  continue  voyage. 
If  in  South  Pacific,  continue  voyage.  Vessels  operating  coastwise  off  of  South 
America  or  be